Transforming urban neighbourhoods: limits of developer-led partnership and benefit-sharing in residential redevelopment, with reference to Seoul and Beijing by Shin, Hyun Bang
 Transforming Urban Neighbourhoods: 
Limits of Developer-led Partnership and Benefit-sharing in 
Residential Redevelopment, 
with reference to Seoul and Beijing 
 
 
 
 
Hyun Bang Shin 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of London 
2006 
 2
Abstract 
 
The thesis studies the dynamics of  urban residential redevelopment programmes in Seoul 
and Beijing that have been effectively transforming dilapidated neighbourhoods in recent 
decades. 
The policy review shows that neighbourhood renewal programmes saw difficulties in 
ensuring cost-recovery and replicability in both cities, and that this has led to the 
formation of  residential redevelopment programmes that depend heavily on the 
participation of  real estate developers in spite of  social, economic and political differences 
between the cities of  Seoul and Beijing. Based on research data collected from a series of  
area-based field research visits in Seoul and Beijing between 2002 and 2003, the thesis 
examines how developer-led partnerships in urban redevelopment take place in different 
urban settings, what contributions are made by participating actors and how 
redevelopment benefits are shared among the existing and potential residents in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods. 
The main arguments in this thesis are as follows. Firstly, the emergence of  profit-making 
opportunities in dilapidated neighbourhoods forms the basis of  developer-led partnership 
among property-related interests that include the local government, professional 
developers and property owners. Poor owner-occupiers and tenants in both Seoul and 
Beijing assume a more passive role. Secondly, local authorities intervene to ensure that the 
partnership framework works, but this is carried out largely in favour of  professional 
developers and absentee landlords whose material contributions are significant. Thirdly, 
redevelopment benefits are shared among existing residents in differentiated ways. The 
most affected in negative ways are the marginalised population whose social and 
economic status is increasingly threatened by the market risks in times of  globalisation, 
urban growth and redevelopment in the 1990s. 
This thesis concludes that partnerships in neighbourhood redevelopment do not have 
benign outcomes for all. Stronger government intervention is necessary in order to safe-
guard the interests of  existing residents in dilapidated neighbourhoods, ensure their 
participation, and in particular, increase the protection of  those increasingly marginalised 
by the process of  redevelopment. 
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1.1 Urban regeneration in Seoul and Beijing: 
the need for empirical research 
The Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, setting out the official position of  the 
United Nations originally endorsed in December 1988, called for international efforts to 
“facilitate adequate shelter for all by the year 2000” by adopting “enabling policies, 
whereby the full potential and resources of  all governmental and non-governmental 
actors in the field of  human settlements are utilised” (United Nations 1988). Such efforts, 
however, seem to have been far from adequate, as a recent UN report suggested that one 
third of  the world’s urban population is still living with inadequate access to housing, safe 
water or sanitation (UN-Habitat 2003a: 13-14). In developing regions, such residents 
accounted for 43% of  total urban population. 
The history of  tackling shelter problems in developing countries since the 1950s revealed 
two contrasting approaches: slum improvement and upgrading versus clearance and 
redevelopment. The former strategy was largely popular among academics and 
practitioners, who were in favour of  housing improvement set in local contexts, 
emphasising residents’ own initiatives for the mobilisation of  their own skills, knowledge 
and resources (Aldrich and Sandhu 1995; Choguill 1999; Werlin 1999). Mass clearance and 
wholesale redevelopment were often denounced due to their destructive nature that 
caused irreversible damages to the delicate fabric of  social networks within subjected 
neighbourhoods (Mukhija 2003). 
The national and local governments in the Republic of  Korea (hereafter South Korea) and 
the People’s Republic of  China (hereafter mainland China) thought otherwise. In these 
countries, slum upgrading only occupied a marginal position, and wholesale 
redevelopment has been a dominant urban renewal strategy. In the case of  Seoul, an 
official survey conducted in 1979 indicated that nearly 17% of  its housing stock turned 
out to be substandard and dilapidated. Most dwellings were informal and illegal as they 
were built on public lands without formal land tenure (EPBK 1982; KRIHS 1981: 961). 
From 1984, the majority of  these dilapidated dwellings became subject to a revised urban 
renewal approach that was titled the Joint Redevelopment Programme (hereafter JRP). It 
aimed at wholesale redevelopment of  dilapidated neighbourhoods, transforming them 
into high-rise estates. By 1995, dwellings provided through redevelopment accounted for 
17% of  all the dwelling stock (or 25% of  all the apartment units) in Seoul (Seoul 
Development Institute 1996: 188). The core feature that differentiated it from preceding 
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urban renewal approaches was the JRP’s project financing and management structure, 
which largely depended on real estate developers’ participation in partnership with 
property owners. In the course of  its application, the JRP, however, faced resistance from 
local residents, especially tenants, who were forcefully evicted without compensation. This 
was particularly true of  the 1980s and early 1990s when tenants’ protests, violence, 
eviction and arrests were part of daily life, something that urbanites lived with and to 
some extent, ignored if not directly affected. 
In the case of  Beijing, a municipal survey of  housing conditions conducted in 1990 
revealed that more than one quarter of  inner city dwellings required urgent attention due 
to their structural instability and severe deterioration (Liu 1991a: 16). The mayor of  
Beijing gave a speech at the end of  April 1990, which signalled a shift in the direction of  
Beijing’s urban renewal strategy towards enforced adoption of  market principles (BMG 
1990). The particular programme devised thereafter was known as the Old and 
Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme (hereafter ODHRP). As in Seoul, 
Beijing’s ODHRP also aimed at wholesale redevelopment that mostly resulted in high-rise 
commercial flats, which could be sold at market prices in the city’s expanding new housing 
market. This was to guarantee participating developers’ recovery of  project costs and 
acquisition of  development profits. 
Since their inception, JRP and ODHRP have become the dominant urban policy for the 
renewal of  dilapidated neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing, and transformed urban 
landscapes. While these programmes helped local authorities tackle housing problems in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods by resorting to the private sector’s financial resources and 
expertise, the end products (that is, new dwellings) of  JRP and ODHRP projects appear 
to remain beyond the reach of  most low-income residents. To the extent that poor 
residents in dilapidated neighbourhoods are excluded from entering their neighbourhoods 
transformed to accommodate more affluent groups of  municipal population (Smith and 
Williams 1986b), JRP and ODHRP depict a process of  gentrification as “the new urban 
colonialism” (Atkinson and Bridge 2004), having extended its reach to these East Asian 
cities. 
Despite these programmes’ relatively long-standing history of  implementation, their 
assessment is far from adequate. With regard to the JRP, academics and pundits began to 
interpret such renewal activities from a critical political economic perspective (Jang 1998a, 
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1998b) or social justice and human rights perspective (ACHR 1989b; CIIR 1988; Ha 
2001b; Kim 1998; Seo 1999). Most critiques focused on assessing urban renewal from a 
welfare perspective, criticising the lack of  government attention to the provision of  
affordable housing for poor residents (e.g. Ahn 2002; Cho and Park 1995; Choi 1991; Ha 
1994, 1999, 2002; Kim et al. 1996; J.Y. Lee 2000; Sohn 1995; Yoon 1997). Such literatures, 
however, were mostly macro-level without providing an insight into the nature of  
redevelopment and its post-redevelopment impacts on residents in local contexts. 
With regard to Beijing’s ODHRP, in spite of  the programme’s decade-long application, 
few international debates have taken place, which critically examine the programme. The 
news of  intensifying urban renewal activities began to appear sporadically in international 
media only recently. The media attention, however, was mostly on evolving housing 
markets and the soaring prices of  commercial flats in cities like Beijing and Shanghai 
which raised concern over increasing affordability gaps (e.g. The Economist 14 July 2001; 
The Economist 16 April 1998). At the outset of  this research, only a handful of  academic 
literature was available. This alerted us to the increasing influence of  the real estate 
industry in urban renewal projects (Leaf  1995; Lu 1997), the issue of  redevelopment 
compensation as a source of  residents’ discontent (Abramson 1997; Zhang 1997), inner 
city residents’ relocation to suburban estates and development of  informal housing 
consumption on urban peripheries (Leaf  1995), and urban renewal as part of  the broader 
process of  urban restructuring (Gaubatz 1999; Wu 1997). These thought-provoking 
writings, however, presented limited views on what was going on in Chinese cities at 
neighbourhood level, and how residents were affected and reacted in the process. 
There is a lot more to learn regarding the renewal processes in Seoul and Beijing. 
Informed views on how different sectors (that is, the public sector, the private sector and 
local communities) partake in redevelopment neighbourhoods are limited. We are yet to 
understand why the JRP and ODHRP have become predominant renewal strategies in 
Seoul and Beijing, what contributions are made by participating developers, local 
authorities and residents, and what benefits are shared (or not shared) by partaking entities. 
In this respect, this thesis aims to present detailed empirical analyses of  how the JRP and 
ODHRP operate at neighbourhood levels. The thesis aims to provide opportunities to 
gain insights into urban processes that strongly influence many families at low levels of  
income who find it increasingly difficult to settle due to the demolition and displacement 
which are part of  neighbourhood transformation. The findings apply far more widely 
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than the two countries studied. 
 
1.2 Key hypothesis and research questions 
The overarching objective of  this research is to examine how developer-led partnerships 
in urban redevelopment came to operate in different urban settings, what roles were 
undertaken by participating actors and how redevelopment benefits are shared among the 
existing and potential residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods. Given the negative 
experiences in western cities and in other developing countries of having private sector 
participation in low-income neighbourhoods (UN-Habitat 1993), the key hypothesis that I 
propose at the outset of this research is: 
‘Developer-led redevelopment does not benefit local residents.’ 
This key hypothesis is to be addressed in the light of the following questions that are 
considered throughout this study: 
What were the living conditions in dilapidated neighbourhoods before 
redevelopment? 
What opportunities were there in dilapidated neighbourhoods that enabled the 
establishment of  developer-led redevelopment strategy? How were developers able 
to exploit these opportunities? 
What roles were played by the private and public sectors in sustaining residential 
redevelopment? 
What were the patterns of  displacement and relocation of  local residents upon 
redevelopment? What difficulties did local residents face upon displacement? 
What were the impacts of  redevelopment on local residents’ housing conditions? 
Did all the residents share redevelopment benefits? 
Were local residents able to contribute and participate as equal partners in 
neighbourhood transformation? 
Who really benefited and lost? 
 
1.3 Research framework and theoretical foundation 
This section lays the theoretical foundation for the design of  the research framework. 
Two main theoretical underpinnings are discussed: (1) the rent gap theory on urban 
renewal and gentrification and (2) the constraints perspective on residential mobility. 
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Rent gap theory: a critical perspective on urban renewal and gentrification 
This research uses the theory of  ‘rent gap’ as the main tool for the critical understanding 
of  Seoul and Beijing’s urban renewal processes. The rent gap refers to the situation in 
which the actual rents derived from current conditions are far below the potential rents of  
newer development displacing the old. The rent gap theory allows us to understand and 
explain the main impetus behind the real estate investment in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
and developers’ participation. The theory focuses on the political economic conditions 
that lead to the production of  gentrifiable properties in urban neighbourhoods, and how 
the human intervention is necessary to realise the development opportunities. 
Rent gap theory, urban renewal and gentrification 
Urban renewal with increased private sector participation is closely associated with the 
displacement of  local residents who are too poor to afford upgraded or redeveloped 
dwellings. The phenomenon of  local residents’ displacement due to housing rehabilitation 
or redevelopment at neighbourhood scale is often referred to as gentrification (Smith and 
LeFaivre 1984: 50-51). Here, gentrification is defined as a process that accompanies capital 
re-investment in dilapidated neighbourhoods and subsequent replacement of  poor 
households with more affluent groups that largely include growing number of  
professional/managerial class in post-industrial cities. Smith and Williams define 
gentrification as “the rehabilitation of  working-class and derelict housing and the 
consequent transformation of  an area into a middle-class neighbourhood” (Smith and 
Williams 1986a: 1). 
The rent gap theory was first introduced by Neil Smith to emphasise the structural 
changes that drove gentrification (Smith 1979). Since its introduction, the theory has 
become a powerful analytical framework for the understanding of  inner city decline, its 
renewal and residents’ displacement and gentrification (Clark 1988, 1992, 1995; Smith 
1987, 1992, 1996, 2002; Smith and LeFaivre 1984; Smith and Williams 1986b). 
The rent gap theory explains that neighbourhoods go through a devalorisation cycle 
before experiencing capital reinvestment and gentrification (Smith 1996; Smith and 
LeFaivre 1984). The devalorisation cycle includes new construction of  structures and their 
first use, disinvestment and abandonment. According to Neil Smith, there are three main 
sources that contribute to the devalorisation of  properties: (1) improved labour 
productivity that makes it possible to build a similar structure at lower costs; (2) physical 
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wear and tear; and (3) obsolescence of  building style (Smith 1996: 63-64). The 
devalorisation cycle eventually leads to the “systematic decrease in the capitalised ground 
rent, reflected in lower house rents in an area and a relatively lower selling price for 
structures” (Smith and LeFaivre 1984: 50). Here, ground rent refers to the “claim made by 
landowners on users of  their land,” and capitalised ground rent is defined as “the quantity 
of  ground rent that is appropriated by the landowner, given the present land use” (Smith 
1996: 62). 
As a neighbourhood goes through the devalorisation cycle, house values fall and so do the 
levels of  capitalised ground rent (Smith 1996: 62-67). As the devalorisation cycle 
continues, it leads to the growth of  a rent gap, which refers to the disparity “between the 
ground rent actually capitalised with a given land use at a specific location and the ground 
rent that could potentially be appropriated under a higher and better land use at that 
location [that is, potential ground rent]” (Smith and LeFaivre 1984: 50). Figure 1-1 shows 
this process of  devalorisation and rent gap expansion. The rent gap expansion is further 
aided “by continued urban development and expansion…that has historically raised the 
potential ground rent level in the inner city” (Smith 1996: 67-68). For professional 
developers, owner occupiers and absentee landlords, the rent gap represents development 
opportunities. 
Figure 1-1: The devalorisation cycle and the expansion of the rent gap 
(Adapted from Smith 1996: 65) 
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Arguing against the consumption-side critics who focus on the production of  gentrifiers 
(that is, new urban elites comprised of  professional, technical and administrative workers) 
and their consumption preference (Beauregard 1986; Hamnett 1991, 1992; Ley 1980; 
Munt 1987), the proponents of  the rent gap theory argue that it is not the existence of  
gentrifiers but the presence of  rent gap which provides a fundamentally necessary 
material condition for urban renewal and gentrification processes. Consumer choice is still 
seen as important, but it is regarded as being ‘boostered’ by producers to create effective 
demand. For the proponents of  the rent gap theory, gentrification is more influenced and 
in fact produced by “builders, developers, landlords, mortgage lenders, government 
agencies and real estate agents involved on the production and supply side, and their 
actions and profit motives are essential to the process of  rent gap expansion and closure” 
(Clark 1992: 359). 
Although the rent gap thesis was initially proposed to explain the causes of  inner city 
gentrification in post-industrial cities, the rent gap expansion could also be “essential to 
the redevelopment process” (Clark 1992: 359). It is understood that gentrification 
encompasses rehabilitation and redevelopment. Gentrification through redevelopment 
occurs when demolition becomes the main method of  closing the rent gap (Williams 
1984). 
Presence of  capital for the closure of  the rent gap 
As Clark noted, “Rent gap closure hinges on the active expression of  demand for ‘higher 
and better uses’ of  a site” (Clark 1992: 360), and the rent gap itself  does not determine 
the type of  end products a gentrifying area would come to possess. The closure of  the 
rent gap requires a substantial presence of  capital to be invested in built environment for 
higher profits (Smith and LeFaivre 1984: 53). It is argued that the capital to complete the 
closure of  rent gap comes into existence through ‘capital switch,’ which refers to the 
process of  capital flow redirection from the primary, production circuit to the secondary 
circuit of  fixed assets and built environment (Smith 1986: 29-30; Wu 1997: 643). 
According to the interpretation of  David Harvey, capital switch takes place as a solution 
to the problem of  capital over-accumulation, which is an inherent tendency in the primary 
(production) circuit of  capital (Harvey 1981: 93-97). The capital flow into built 
environment presupposes two conditions: (1) the production of  surplus capital and labour, 
which fosters long-term asset formation; and (2) the existence of  a functioning capital 
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market to enable the creation of  ‘fictional capital’ (Harvey 1981: 96-97). The second 
condition is deemed necessary as the investment in built environment (or capital flow into 
built environment) is often difficult for individual capitalists. In this respect, the presence 
of  “a State willing to finance and guarantee long-term, large-scale projects with respect to 
the creation of  the built environment” (Harvey 1981: 97) would facilitate the capital 
switching process. 
The switch of  capital into the real estate sector has its own advantage and disadvantage. 
The investment in built environment in the form of  infrastructure and land development 
for further expansion of  production capacity is an advantage for the facilitation of  the 
primary circuit of  capital flow as it provides an opportunity for further accumulation and 
profit retaining. On the other hand, the investment in built environment requires a long-
term commitment, and spatially fixes capital in a locality. As the new opportunities are 
found for additional investment, the tendency of  over-accumulation prevails in the 
secondary circuit of  capital in the form of  over-investment in built environment, leading 
to potential crises of  devaluation (Harvey 1981: 101). 
Human intervention in closing the rent gap 
In gentrification literature, the proponents of  consumption-side explanations commonly 
acknowledge that “neighbourhood decline is necessary but is not sufficient for 
gentrification to occur” (Beauregard 1986: 47). They argue that it is important to look at 
the emergence of  gentrifiers as a social group and their role as agents and consumers that 
enables and completes the process of  gentrification (Beauregard 1986; Hamnett 1991; 
Munt 1987). This perspective, however, limits our understanding within the domain of  
individual consumerism and consumer behaviour with less attention paid to the socio-
economic and political contexts within which gentrifiable properties are produced. 
The proponents of  the rent gap theory argue that gentrification is not realised by the 
gentrifiers who merely close the circuit of  production-consumption by consuming 
rehabilitated housing stock, and that the rent gap is not to be treated as a mechanistic 
determinant. Production-side critics focus on social relations and power struggles in a 
given locality that lead to human interventions. 
“…the rent gap does not determine property development. Property development 
and rent gaps are determined by social relations and power struggles centring on the 
making and taking of  values in the built environment”  (Clark 1995: 1490-1491) 
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Contrary to consumption-side critics who treat state policies as “of  secondary 
importance” (Bailey and Robertson 1997: 563), production-side critics argue that it is the 
political intervention that completes the transformation of  ‘rent gap’ into actual 
development gains and, together with the conditions in a given locality, determines the 
end products of  neighbourhood transformation. To the extent that the rent gap condition 
only provides material conditions for capital reinvestment, and that the profit realisation is 
achieved only by active political intervention, the public sector assumes a catalytic or an 
enabling role (Smith 1996). 
The growth in the rent gap could also be influenced by “blighting effect of  state and local 
government policy” (Badcock 1989: 142). For instance, school development, building 
height restrictions or land use zoning to restrict commercial development may discourage 
the full closure of  the rent gap. As Smith (1987) noted, it is possible that “Not all 
neighbourhoods experiencing the rent gap may experience gentrification or 
redevelopment; some economic opportunities remain unexploited and specific local 
conditions may discourage the process” (ibid, p.464). 
Constraints perspective on residents’ displacement and relocation 
Part of  the objectives of  this research is to find out the impacts of  neighbourhood 
redevelopment on local residents by closely examining the changes in their housing 
experiences upon displacement. In redevelopment projects, most local residents are 
displaced involuntarily from their homes, forced to make decisions to move while facing 
various constraints that are beyond their control. In this regard, this research adopts a 
constraints perspective on residential mobility. This perspective views that institutional 
and structural constraints are more determinant for residential relocation than individual 
housing demands or preferences. 
Since the seminal work on residential mobility by Peter Rossi in 1955, the existing 
literatures on residential relocation could be divided broadly into two main strands: the 
demand-oriented perspective and the constraints perspective. The demand-oriented 
perspective identifies residential mobility or relocation as a spatial adjustment process 
initiated by individual households to meet their needs arising from family life cycle, job 
relocation or personal life style preferences. This perspective focuses on the behavioural 
aspects of  housing choice, placing households’ “life cycle changes at the top of  the list of  
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sources of  residential moves” (Rossi 1980: 37). The desire of  households for a larger 
space, tenure change and more affordable accommodation significantly explains relocation 
behaviour (Clark and Onaka 1983). The homeownership of  a high-quality, single-family 
home in a suburban setting is regarded as the stable state, suitable for child-bearing, and 
became a norm for middle-class families (Kingsley and Turner 1993: 2; Michelson 1977). 
In contrast to the demand-oriented perspective, the constraints perspective emphasises 
the supply-side constraints within which choices are made (see for example, Flowerdew 
1982; Moore and Rosenberg 1993; Murie 1974; Rex and Moore 1967). In this perspective, 
instead of  focusing primarily on individual choices as in the behavioural approach, 
residential mobility was viewed as influenced by household expenses on the one hand, and 
the presence of  institutional constraints such as households’ access to existing financial 
provisions and public housing on the other (Flowerdew and Manion 1982: 10-12). 
These constraints might also be generated by the urban managers and ‘gatekeepers’ who 
controlled and distributed scarce urban resources and facilities (Pahl 1970). Rather than 
adopting a narrow focus on local urban managers, it is important to set constraints within 
wider socio-economic processes (Cadwallader 1992: 18; Flowerdew and Manion 1982: 13-
20). For example, in the United States, the exodus of  middle-income families in the 1960s 
and 1970s from the inner city neighbourhoods to outer suburban areas once played as 
impetus for residential relocation, leading to the sharp increase in suburban population 
from 24% of  national population in 1950 up to 70% in 1980 (Kingsley and Turner 1993: 
2). For urban poor families, however, the affordability crisis due to increasing income 
inequalities and limited availability of  affordable rental units outside the central city led 
them to be trapped within inner city areas despite the situation that most new low-wage 
jobs were created in suburban cities (Apgar 1993; Kingsley and Turner 1993). 
The supply-side constraints perspective acknowledges that residents also face 
information-constraints when making decisions to move. For instance, the study of  
Turner and Wienk (1993) on the residential segregation in Canadian cities reveals that 
fewer houses in minority areas or integrated neighbourhoods had been advertised in 
newspapers than those in ‘white areas.’ The study also showed that real estate agents 
practiced discriminatory treatment against minority home-seekers, and steered them away 
toward minority areas, hence acting as barriers to the housing choice by minority 
households (Turner and Wienk 1993). 
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From a structural viewpoint, such constraints would be shaped by the structure of  
housing provision that influenced the patterns of  housing consumption and production 
through the dynamics of  relationships among social agents involved (Ball 1986a, 1986b). 
The development of  ‘rent gaps’ (the difference between the ground rent appropriated by 
landlords under current land use and the anticipated ground rent under a different land 
use) in inner city areas would drive gentrification, hence displacing or forcefully relocating 
low-income families (Smith 1996). Such processes could not readily be captured by the 
housing choice and demand-oriented perspective. Those supply-side constraints upon the 
decisions to move “tend to be much more place-specific” and “reflect the historical 
character of  the stock …as well as specific mixes of  local regulation and development 
controls which interact with more general economic and programmatic trends” (Moore 
and Rosenberg 1993: 125). 
All the literatures above suggest that the decision to move by residents is not simply a 
function of  housing adjustment to fulfil individual household’s housing preferences and 
needs, but is conditioned by institutional and structural constraints. The supply-side 
constraints perspective is particularly persuasive in this research that examines the 
experiences of  residents subject to involuntary relocation and displacement within the 
context of  neighbourhood restructuring through residential rehabilitation or 
redevelopment programmes. Such experiences are often beyond the control of  residents, 
and are involuntary to the extent that their relocation is induced by external forces that 
change the existing neighbourhood structure. 
 
1.4 Urban regeneration and partnership: evidence from the West 
The research on which this thesis is based was first conceived by the realisation that the 
two cities, having experienced different urban development trajectories and distinct socio-
economic and political backgrounds, came to share a similar urban renewal strategy that 
relied heavily on developers. 
Since the 1980s, urban renewal strategies in many European and North American cities 
have increasingly been shaped by partnership with the private sector (UN-Habitat 1993). 
Existing literatures on private-led development in western cities are mostly focused on the 
experiences of  the UK and the US. The rise of  New York, London and other of  their 
post-industrial cities in the global competition for investment capital also seems to have 
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made private-led, place-oriented regeneration more attractive in these cities. For these 
reasons, the background to how private sector participation in urban regeneration has 
been analysed and assessed largely draws on the experiences of  the UK and the US. 
Existing literatures on East Asian experiences including South Korea and mainland China 
will be referred to throughout this thesis when necessary. 
Private sector participation in urban regeneration 
In the UK, with the development of  the welfare state during the post-war years, local 
authorities carried out public service delivery, and when short of  resources to meet 
service demands, received central government grants (Fainstein 2001: 6). In a similar vein, 
urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s was mostly implemented by local authorities, 
focusing on the provision of  social housing, but it was the private sector that undertook 
the actual construction. In this respect, as Healey et al (1992) noted, public and private 
interests were in “a synergetic relationship” (Healey et al. 1992: 216). 
The UK experience differed from that of  the US where the private sector actively 
participated in urban renewal during the post-war years. Scholars such as Squires (1996) 
point out that in the US, “the private partner dominated as the public sector’s role 
consisted principally of  ‘preparing the ground for capital’” (Squires 1996: 275). Public-
private partnership in the 1950s and 1960s largely focused on sub-urban expansion and 
slum clearance in urban ghettos near business centres and more affluent neighbourhoods 
(Fainstein 2001: 6). Public subsidies were provided to facilitate commercial development 
in downtown areas, to promote homeownership and sub-urbanisation through highway 
construction (Squires 1996: 273-276). Gregory Squires (1996) refers to the long-standing 
ideology of  privatism in the USA for explaining the nation’s increasing reliance on public-
private partnership for economic restructuring and urban redevelopment: 
“The central tenet of  privatism is the belief  in the supremacy of  the private sector 
and market forces in nurturing development, with the public sector as a junior 
partner whose principal obligation is to facilitate private capital accumulation”  
(Squires 1996: 267) 
 
Since the 1980s, there has been a lot of  policy interest in establishing partnerships with 
the private sector for carrying out urban regeneration. In the US, diminishing federal 
reserves for social services and urban renewal programmes led to re-visiting the concept 
of  partnership, which is “widely perceived to be an innovative approach that is timely in 
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an age of  austerity” (Squires 1996: 267). In Britain, public-private partnership received 
renewed attention, this time the private sector assuming a leading role for rebuilding inner 
city areas where problems of  declining industry, decaying infrastructure, poverty 
concentration and social polarisation were prevalent (Edwards 1984; Gore 1991; Healey et 
al. 1992; UN-Habitat 1993). In the changing environment, the private sector became “a 
legitimate provider of  public policy initiatives,” providing finance that used to be largely in 
the domain of  local authorities (Healey et al. 1992: 217). 
As the public sector’s direct intervention in urban renewal and housing development was 
substantially curtailed, public-private partnership was seen as a way of  tapping the private 
sector’s financial resources and managerial skills (Cameron 1992). The Conservative 
government in this period considered partnership “as a means of  transferring 
responsibility for urban regeneration to the private sector” (Bailey et al. 1995: 1). In his 
study on partnership agencies in Britain, Bailey et al (1995) identifies several factors that 
set the background for the rise of  partnership in Britain. Firstly, economic recession in the 
1990s coupled with loss of  jobs and declining manufacturing industry led to local 
authorities to seek for alternative strategies including “closer links with the private sector” 
(Bailey et al. 1995: 7). Secondly, local government control of  major services was 
substantially transferred to the central government. For instance, local authorities were 
excluded from allocating development funds such as the City Grant that replaced Urban 
Development Grant in 1988. For local authorities, partnership was regarded as one of  
“new institutional arrangements at the local level in order to maximise both their 
influence and the leverage by which limited funds, or resources such as land, could be 
used to maximum advantage” (ibid, p.8). Thirdly, departmental competitions in central 
government to implement inner city initiatives led to the fragmented programme 
implementation, which called for “new alliances between local government, local 
businesses and the voluntary sector at the local level…as a partial response to the array of  
ill co-ordinated government initiatives” (ibid, p.9). Fourthly, there had been attempts by 
the central government “to give the private sector greater ownership of  urban policy” 
(ibid, p.11), also supported by business organisations such as the Confederation of  British 
Industry. 
Prevalence of property-based regeneration 
Property-based regeneration has prevailed while pursuing public-private partnership 
approaches, and has become a governing strategy of  urban regeneration in post-industrial 
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cities (Cameron 1992; Healey et al. 1992; Quilley 1999). Property-based redevelopment is 
also being preached in cities of  developing countries that try hard to compete in 
globalising world, and a recent evidence of  this process is witnessed in Shanghai (Wu 2000, 
2003). Place promotion and urban re-imaging through ‘flagship’ projects have become 
dominant themes of  urban regeneration (Bianchini et al. 1992), along with revitalisation 
of  dilapidated or derelict urban lands in inner city areas which economic activities and 
affluent population once fled from. As Quilley (1999) noted: 
There has been a pervasive homogeneity in the models of  urban regeneration 
pursued by western cities since the 1980s. Common strands include flagship 
property developments and an emphasis on physical regeneration; environmental, 
and infrastructural developments aimed at increasing the quality of  life (“liveability”) 
and attracting the expanding service class; waterfront and harbour developments 
typically featuring the development of  marinas and the recycling of  nineteenth-
century warehouses for residential and office developments and as “heritage”; the 
expansion of  the central business district; and a commitment to the twenty-four-
hour city and café society” 
  (Quilley 1999: 189) 
 
Proponents of  property-based regeneration argue that place-oriented inner city renewal is 
expected to generate further investment by enhancing commercial development 
opportunities (e.g. improved general appearances and increased funding possibilities) and 
reap economic benefits (e.g. job creation and new demand for service industry) that would 
eventually trickle down to poor neighbourhoods (Cameron 1992). Turok, for example, 
argue that property-based regeneration creates construction-related jobs, contributes to 
the expansion of  indigenous companies, acts as a catalyst to attract further investment, 
revitalises run-down neighbourhoods, and initiates area-wide economic restructuring 
(Turok 1992). 
Although inner city areas were experiencing multi-faceted problems including job losses, 
crime, poverty, poorly managed infrastructure and dilapidated housing, social problems in 
the worst neighbourhoods were of  secondary importance, as governmental responses had 
largely taken a physical approach. In the UK, various subsidies such as the City Grants 
and Urban Development Grants were provided to support property-led regeneration and 
local economic growth. According to Jones (1996b), the UK government in the 1980s 
“sought to withdraw from the direct provision and subsidization of  industrial property” 
(Jones 1996b: 801), and remove supply-side constraints to attract and win the confidence 
of  private capital (Jones and Watkins 1996: 1129). The establishment of  the Urban 
Development Corporations (hereafter UDCs) in the UK in the 1980s is often cited as 
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representing the Conservative government’s property-led regeneration strategy. The 
UDCs were “non-elected agencies…set up with sole powers to execute policies leading to 
market-led, property-based regeneration” (Bailey et al. 1995: 15). As Parkinson (1988) 
noted, the UDCs were based on the assumption that “regeneration should be physically 
led by a single-purpose agency, free from the constraints of  local democracy, which 
should establish at minimal public cost the conditions for private investment, which will 
generate wealth that will eventually flow back into the community” (Parkinson 1988 cited 
in Bailey et al. 1995: 15). 
In the UK, the New Labour government since the late 1990s has focused on 
implementing area-based regeneration and tackling social exclusion. In addition, 
improving urban environmental quality such as the physical and visual appearances of  
buildings and public space has been prevalent (Urban Task Force 1999). To this extent, it 
could be said that place-oriented property-led regeneration has survived under the Blair 
administration. Whereas such promotion of  physical appearances was left to the private 
sector under the Conservative government, it was actively sought by the Blair 
administration (Booth 2005). 
Role of the public sector in regeneration partnerships 
The emphasis on private sector led to the modification of  the role of  the public sector, 
which increasingly became an enabler or facilitator, focusing on removing supply-side 
constraints and providing incentives and financial subsidies to attract private capital. Bailey 
et al. (1995) state that the centralisation of  control in Britain in the 1980s weakened the 
autonomy of  local authorities, which used to be strong and interventionist in the 
preceding decades. The central government in this process “engineered the transition of  
local government from being the primary agency to tackle inner city area problems to 
being one of  many players” (Bailey et al. 1995: 18). This in turn laid the foundations for 
the formation of  local growth coalition in order for local authorities to salvage what was 
left of  its autonomy. Local authority initiatives that required allocation of  central grants, 
however, had to be justified by involving support or participation of  the private sector 
(Bailey et al. 1995: 18-19). 
Critical literature links the changes in urban renewal strategy closely with the change in 
urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Griffiths 1998; Harvey 
1989; Quilley 1999). The managerial form of  governance, according to Griffiths (1998: 
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42), is characterised by state resource allocation and bureaucratic organisation of  social 
services delivery on the basis of  social welfarism. Structural changes (such as the 
economic recession, declining basis of  manufacturing industry in traditional metropolitan 
areas, and changes in employment structure and relations) have led to the erosion of  the 
basis of  managerialism. A new form of  class alliance has replaced managerialism in order 
for cities to survive and succeed in the new environment of  diminishing territorial barriers 
for global capital movement and of  intense inter-urban competition for jobs, resources 
and private capital investment (Harvey 1989). Local authorities have become more 
desperate “to pin down increasingly fleet-footed capital” (Weber 2002: 531). David 
Harvey (1989) notes: 
“The new urban entrepreneurialism typically rests, then, on a public-private 
partnership focusing on investment and economic development with the speculative 
construction of  place rather than amelioration of  conditions within a particular 
territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic 
goal”  (Harvey 1989: 8) 
 
The ‘speculative construction of  place’ under entrepreneurialism entails risks, which are 
absorbed by the local public sector (Harvey 1989: 7). In other words, public sector 
subsidies ensure “private sector manoeuvrability…especially in areas of  high risk” (Healey 
et al. 1992: 218). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, both local and central 
government initiatives to enhance private sector participation had “a remarkably 
consistent approach with the promotion of  private investment and confidence by both 
financial pump priming and the removal of  constraints” (Jones 1996a: 205). The 
transformation from managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism in the UK is thus 
government-led, fuelled by local authorities that strive to maintain its limited autonomy in 
times of  centralisation of  control by the central government. As Healey et al. (1992) 
argues: 
“Not only has central government remained highly active in promoting and 
sustaining partnership, but local government, the original object of  exclusion, has 
become increasingly entrepreneurial as it has fought to maintain its position in the 
public policy arena of  economic development”  (Healey et al. 1992: 219) 
 
In the US, the local authorities are known to be more business-oriented, seeking economic 
growth in coalition with other private interests. This is interpreted as a growth machine, 
which is manoeuvred by a local growth coalition that combines land-based interests 
including local officials, their counter parts in the federal government, developers, real 
estate agents, mortgage lenders and so on (Logan and Molotch 1987; Molotch 1976). 
 35
Social consequences of urban renewal 
Urban renewal during the last several decades has made profound changes to the 
landscape of  major cities in the UK and the US. Policy makers and proponents of  place-
focused, private-led renewal processes seem to assume that urban renewal not only brings 
benefits for local economy and raise fiscal revenues for local government but also affects 
local neighbourhood positively by bringing in more affluent groups of  population (Bailey 
and Robertson 1997: 564-566). 
On the other hand, a large number of  researchers focus on analysing urban renewal and 
resulting gentrification as a negative outcome (Allen 2000; Atkinson 2000a, 2002; Goetz 
2002; LeGates and Hartman 1986; Marcuse 1986; Smith and Williams 1986b). They tend 
to focus on the scale of  displacement, loss of  affordable housing and to a lesser extent, 
social implications of  gentrification (Atkinson 2002). In the United States, studies 
(LeGates and Hartman 1986; Marcuse 1986; Sumka 1979) showed that a substantial 
number of  residents were found to be displaced due to gentrification. Marcuse (1986), for 
instance, showed that up to 60,000 households were displaced from abandonment, and 
between 10,000 and 40,000 households from displacement annually in New York. 
LeGates and Hartman (1981) also found that 2.5 million persons were displaced annually 
in the United States (LeGates and Hartman 1981 cited in LeGates and Hartman 1986: 
197). In Britain, few studies attempted to measure the scale of  gentrification-induced 
displacement, but a recent longitudinal study based on 1981 – 1991 census data found that 
losses of  working class, inactive and elderly groups of  population from gentrified areas of  
Greater London turned out to be profound (Atkinson 2000b). The presence of  social 
housing in gentrifying city centres in UK cities, however, seemed to have lessened the risk 
of  displacement, though the economic opportunities resulting from urban regeneration 
were not shared by residents in deprived neighbourhoods due to labour market 
segmentation (Cameron and Doling 1994). Bianchini et al. (1992) are also sceptical of  the 
redistributive effect of  flagship projects in urban regeneration, arguing that they 
contribute little to local communities (in terms of  the number of  new jobs allocated) and 
small local business. It was also suggested that residents in deprived neighbourhoods 
would find it difficult to access new attractions often located in city centres (Bianchini et 
al. 1992: 252-253). 
Loss of  affordable housing is also pointed out as a negative outcome of  urban renewal 
and gentrification. In the United States, urban renewal in the 1960s led to the demolition 
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of  404,000 dwellings by 1967, while only 41,580 replacement units were built to 
accommodate low- and middle-income families (Friedland 1983: 85 cited in Squires 1996: 
275). Redeveloped or gentrified dwellings are often beyond the financial reach of  original 
poor residents. Gentrification occurs at a neighbourhood level (Smith and LeFaivre 1984), 
and this leads to the reduction of  affordable housing available to original residents, 
resulting in what Marcuse (1986) termed as ‘exclusionary displacement’ (ibid, p.156). 
LeGates and Hartman (1986: 190-194) found in the review of  existing studies that 
displacees tended to resettle within or close to their original neighbourhoods, and certainly 
within the same city. This came however at the expense of  spending more on housing. 
Other research examined the consequences of  gentrification upon displacees placed in 
wider social contexts. Displacement of  disadvantaged residents through gentrification in 
the United States is reported to have resulted in increased racial and class conflicts 
(LeGates and Hartman 1986: 194-196) and aggravated “residential polarisation of  the city 
by income, by education, by household composition, and by race” (Marcuse 1986: 169). 
At the individual level, displacement also affected the well-being and health of  the 
displacees especially when they were rid of  “the opportunities to exercise an appropriate 
level of  control” (Allen 2000: 459). Moreover, housing renewal and forced relocation had 
a significant impact upon people’s psychological well-being by disrupting the residents’ 
continuity in life through the demolition of  one’s home that once helped construct 
his/her identity (Ekström 1994). 
Inclusion of local communities in partnership 
The focus on property-based redevelopment or physical approaches throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s overshadowed social approaches. In the UK, the evaluation of  the 
operation of  the UDCs conducted by the House of  Commons Employment Committee 
called for the inclusion of  local communities in sharing regeneration benefits (in this case, 
increased employment opportunities). The Committee argued that “UDCs cannot be 
regarded as a success if  buildings and land are regenerated but the local community are 
bypassed and do not benefit from the regeneration” (House of  Commons Employment 
Committee 1988: xxv para 89 cited in Jones and Watkins 1996: 1130). The stronger 
emphasis on communities and social needs was eventually reflected in the Conservative 
government’s design of  a series of  Challenge Funds including the City Challenge (initiated 
in 1991) and the Single Regeneration Budget (hereafter SRB; initiated in 1994), which at 
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the outset “sought to achieve a balance between investing in people and places” (Oatley 
1998b: 14). These programmes aimed at allocating funds on the basis of  opportunities 
rather than level of  needs through competitive bidding processes. Each bidder was to 
form a non-hierarchical multi-sectoral partnership among various stakeholders including 
local business interests and local communities in affected areas, moderated by the local 
authority (Oatley 1998a: 148-149). 
The orientation toward place-based policies for urban regeneration paid less attention to 
the betterment of  local residents, as it was often believed that the development gains 
accrued would eventually trickle down to local residents by means of  creating demands 
for new jobs and service industries. Findings in the late 1990s in Britain, however, 
suggested that there was no concrete evidence of  redistributive effect of  property-based 
urban regeneration. In fact, it was noted that income inequality was exacerbated and social 
polarisation increased with some of  the worst neighbourhoods becoming more isolated 
(Glennerster et al. 1999; Power 1996; Power and Mumford 1999; Smith 1999; Social 
Exclusion Unit 1998). 
The attempts by the UK Conservative government as previously reviewed were also 
criticised as having lacked consultation with and representation of  local communities in 
decision-making and evaluation processes. For instance, Baeten (2000) examines the 
regeneration process of  the South Bank, London, and concludes that regeneration 
partnership and competitive bidding for funding failed to contribute to the empowerment 
of  the disadvantaged population in these neighbourhoods despite the claimed objective of  
meeting social needs (Baeten 2000). Hart el al. (1996) also criticises the inclusion of  
business elites and the lack of  representation of  local community interests in non-elected 
agencies (in this case, the Training and Enterprise Councils or TEC) for doing little to 
prevent “the purposeful skewing of  TEC boards in favour of  business interests” (Hart et 
al. 1996: 440) and made it difficult to reflect the needs of  local communities. 
Attempts to reflect community interests moved to the centre of  urban policies in the late 
1990s. The impetus came from the New Labour government’s emphasis on tackling social 
exclusion and the concentration of  multi-faceted problems in the worst-performing 
neighbourhoods (Glennerster et al. 1999; Wallace 2001). To some extent, New Labour’s 
area-based policies were the extension of  place-oriented urban regeneration under the 
Conservative government in the 1980s and 1990s, but the main difference lay in New 
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Labour’s emphasis on encouraging local communities to spearhead changes to come 
(Imrie and Raco 2003). Involving communities in planning and consultation and 
encouraging residents’ active participation in neighbourhood rebuilding were also 
regarded as a means to increase social capital (Social Exclusion Unit 1998). One of  the 
latest policy interventions in area-based initiatives includes the promotion of  a social mix 
through Low Demand Pathfinders programme (Cameron 2003). Stuart Cameron (2003) 
comments that this programme “reflects an explicit concern to ‘rebalance’ the population 
of  disadvantaged and stigmatised neighbourhoods through ‘positive gentrification’” 
(p.2367). 
Though it may be too early to evaluate New Labour’s attempts to foster community 
participation in urban regeneration, some literature provides a critical understanding of  
these. Community participation, tackling social exclusion and improving the 
environmental quality of  urban space have been chosen as three main areas of  action 
(Booth 2005: 262-263). The strategy to improve environmental quality leads to the 
process of  gentrification disguised by the use of  terms such as ‘urban renaissance’ and 
‘diversity’ without effectively addressing its potential negative consequences upon 
disadvantaged population (Lees 2003). Rob Atkinson (2003) argues that the participatory 
system of  governance has provided communities with opportunities to exercise greater 
control over their lives, but failed to realise its full potential as communities lacked the 
right power, capacity and access to resources. He further speculates that a successful 
implementation of  neighbourhood initiatives to transform a neighbourhood might lead to 
the displacement of  many socially excluded individuals elsewhere (Atkinson 2003). 
Difficulties in accessing ‘insider’ knowledge and information along with cultural injustice 
(that is, negative portrayal of  local neighbourhoods) also make it difficult to realise full 
participation of  local communities (Morrison 2003). New Labour’s initiative to involve 
communities in project evaluation also seems to have failed to include local knowledge 
that could have contributed more telling stories of  area improvement (Wilks-Heeg 2003). 
The importance of  valuing local knowledge and listening to residents for regeneration 
policy evaluation has been also put forward by Mumford and Power (2003) in their work 
on family and community in East London. 
Summary 
This section has reviewed the evidence from the West regarding the increasing 
participation of  the private sector in urban regeneration and its assessment. Drawing on 
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existing literatures largely on UK and the USA experiences, we learnt that private sector 
participation in urban regeneration has been in place for many decades. From the 1980s, it 
received renewed attention in order to supplement the public sector’s withdrawal from 
direct intervention and also to rebuild decaying inner city areas. The private sector was 
given a more leading role in pursuing property-based regeneration, which aimed at 
exploiting commercial development opportunities and economic growth. The public 
sector still played an important role and led the changes in regeneration strategies by 
removing supply-side constraints and providing incentives and financial subsidies to 
attract mobile capital. This role was that of  an enabler or facilitator, interpreted in the 
context of  urban entrepreneurialism. In social terms, urban regeneration led to the 
gentrification of  regeneration areas, which was viewed as a negative outcome as it 
involved local residents’ displacement and loss of  affordable dwellings. Although urban 
partnership promoted participation of  all sectors concerned, it was far from achieving 
local residents’ empowerment, and failed to engage them in policy design, implementation 
and evaluation processes. 
The review in this section has shown us that the increasing participation of  developers in 
Seoul and Beijing’s urban regeneration has been a shared experience with the cities of  the 
developed world, and that the study of  Seoul and Beijing’s experiences would present an 
exciting opportunity to provide a platform to bridge conversations across borders. This 
review has also allowed this research to adopt a more critical approach for assessing 
developer-led partnerships with regard to the role of  participating actors and impact on 
residents. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The remaining part of  this thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter Two reviews 
urban demographic and housing contexts to understand the production of  dilapidated 
neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing. It also reviews the historic development of  urban 
renewal policies in these cities, and outlines the implementation process of  Seoul’s JRP 
and Beijing’s ODHRP. 
Chapter Three explains the research methodology adopted in this research. It explains the 
use of  a multiple case study approach applied at neighbourhood levels, the selection of  
field research neighbourhoods and interviewees, methods of  data collection and analysis 
and research constraints encountered during field research visits. 
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Chapters Four to Nine include research findings and discussions. Chapter Four examines 
the physical and social conditions that residents were exposed to before redevelopment. 
The findings help us set the local contexts within which public and private participation 
took place. The findings also provide us with information on local residents that could be 
used to discuss residents’ redevelopment benefits at later chapters. 
Chapter Five addresses the issue of  developers’ participation. It is argued in this chapter 
that the flow of  capital into real estate sector and the expansion of  rent gap in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods provided the economic rationale for their participation in neighbourhood 
redevelopment. This chapter also uses case studies of  redevelopment projects based on 
my field research visits to understand the process of  real estate capital participation at the 
neighbourhood level. 
Chapter Six addresses the issue of  government intervention. This chapter explains that 
the growth of  both JRP and ODHRP projects has been supported by the government 
intervention that provided policy incentives for participating professional developers and 
property owners. The chapter also examines the emergence of  revised JRP and ODHRP 
approaches and their strengths and shortcomings by looking at case studies from my field 
research. The chapter also examines the degree of  local residents’ displacement as a result 
of  each redevelopment approach. 
Chapters Seven to Nine document research findings about local residents’ experiences in 
redevelopment processes. Chapter Seven identifies constraints on residents’ decision to 
move upon displacement. Chapter Eight then examines residents’ post-displacement 
housing experiences by looking at dwelling space, physical conditions, tenure, housing 
costs and means of  financing post-displacement housing. Chapter Eight discusses the 
limits of  existing redevelopment framework regarding local residents’ participation in 
redevelopment processes, and examines their individual and collective responses to their 
neighbourhood transformation. 
Chapter Ten concludes this thesis on the nature of  developer-led partnerships and 
residents’ access to redevelopment benefits. It also provides a summary of  beneficiaries 
and losers in Seoul and Beijing’s neighbourhood redevelopment. A reflection on the 
findings of  this thesis draws lessons from this research. The chapter then outlines this 
study’s contributions to the existing body of  knowledge, and identifies further research 
agenda. 
 41
 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the foundation for this research by emphasising the need for 
empirical research to study developer-led partnership in Seoul and Beijing’s urban 
redevelopment and by outlining the key hypothesis and main research questions for the 
enquiries to follow. Two main theoretical foundations were introduced to construct the 
framework of  this study’s analysis and discussion: rent gap theory to understand 
neighbourhood gentrification and urban renewal in dilapidated neighbourhoods; and the 
constraints perspective to explain residents’ moves and changes in housing experiences 
upon displacement. Evidence from the west where urban regeneration partnership has 
long been implemented was reviewed in order to gain insights into how partnership and 
property-based redevelopment have developed and what impacts they have made on local 
residents. Existing relevant literature on urban growth and renewal in South Korea or 
mainland China will be used throughout this thesis. It is hoped that the comparative 
analysis of  Seoul and Beijing’s redevelopment experiences will provide opportunities to 
gain greater insights into the understanding of  the urban development in these East Asian 
countries. 
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Chapter 2 
Urbanisation, urban housing and the evolution of 
renewal policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Urbanisation and demographic changes 
South Korea: from rapid population growth to stabilisation 
Mainland China: growth, stagnation, then expansion 
2.2 Urban housing conditions 
The case of  South Korea and Seoul 
The case of  mainland China and Beijing 
2.3 Evolution of  urban renewal approaches 
Seoul: slum clearance, ad hoc settlements and renewal experiments 
Beijing: traditional settlements, over-crowding and renewal experiments 
2.4 Implementation of  partnership-based redevelopment 
Joint redevelopment programme in Seoul 
Old and dilapidated housing redevelopment programme in Beijing 
2.5 Conclusion 
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Urban conditions in Seoul and Beijing differed from each other, and also differed from 
those of  developed countries where, as Anne Power noted, inner city problems in post-
industrial societies originated from prolonged decay and abandonment (Power 1993; 
Power and Mumford 1999). Dilapidated neighbourhoods subject to redevelopment in 
Seoul and Beijing were exposed to lack of  maintenance and originated under differing 
circumstances, but they were far from being abandoned. This chapter reviews urban 
demographic and housing contexts to understand the production of  dilapidated 
neighbourhoods within each municipal context. It also reviews how Seoul and Beijing 
came to face the same problems of  ensuring cost-recovery and replicability of  urban 
renewal programmes before implementing the Joint Redevelopment Programme 
(hereafter JRP) and the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme 
(hereafter ODHRP). 
This chapter consists of  five main sections. The first section reviews urbanisation and 
demographic changes in Seoul and Beijing. The second section reviews urban housing 
conditions and identifies the extent of  housing problems by the time these municipalities 
were to introduce the JRP and the ODHRP. The third section introduces the historical 
development of  urban renewal policies to tackle dilapidated neighbourhoods. The fourth 
section outlines the structure of  Seoul’s JRP and Beijing’s ODHRP, and the final section 
sums up this chapter with brief  discussions. 
 
2.1 Urbanisation and demographic changes 
South Korea: from rapid population growth to stabilisation 
Over the last five decades, South Korea has witnessed rapid urbanisation, converting itself  
from a war-torn nation into a highly urbanised, industrial society. This process was 
facilitated by the government’s industrialisation drive, supported through the 
implementation of  a series of  5-year economic development programmes that started in 
1962. These programmes were aimed at creating and enhancing manufacturing and heavy 
industries in major cities around the country. The resulting employment and earning 
opportunities became major pull factors for urban in-migration. For instance, in 1966, the 
natural population growth in Seoul was estimated to be 1.92%, whereas the growth of  
municipal population due to in-migration was 7.4% (SMG 1975: 253). 
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The pace of  urban population growth was outstanding. Whereas only about one-quarter 
of  the national population resided in urban areas in 1960, the urban share of  national 
population was 74.4% in 1990 (NSO Korea 2001a: 22-23). As of  1990, the level of  
urbanisation achieved between 1950 and 1990 was the second greatest increase of  all 
Asian countries with 10 million or more inhabitants (UN-Habitat 1996: 75-77). The urban 
share of  national population has been stable at around 80% since the mid-1990s (NSO 
Korea 2001a: 22-23). 
Table 2-1 below clearly shows that until the 1990s, the growth rates of  urban population 
and households were much higher than the national rates. The household size also 
decreased considerably during the urbanisation period, increasing the share of  nuclear 
families (Yoon 1994: 23-25). The average size of  urban households decreased from 5.12 
persons per household in 1970 to 3.76 in 1990, and then 3.18 in 2000 (EPBK 1973; NSO 
Korea 1992, 2001a). 
Table 2-1: Annual growth rates of population and households in South Korea 
(EPBK 1973, 1977, 1982, 1987; NSO Korea 1992, 1997a, 2001a; Yoon 1994: 24) 
 
National 1960 - 1970 1970 - 1975 1975 - 1980 1980 - 1985 1985 - 1990 1990 - 1995 1995 - 2000
Population 2.3% 2.0% 1.5% 1.6% 1.4% 0.5% 0.7%
Households 3.0% 2.9% 3.4% 3.7% 3.5% 2.7% 2.0%
Urban 1960 - 1970 1970 - 1975 1975 - 1980 1980 - 1985 1985 - 1990 1990 - 1995 1995 - 2000
Population 6.4% 5.3% 5.0% 4.3% 4.1% 1.6% 1.0%
Households 7.3% 6.2% 6.5% 6.3% 6.0% 3.5% 2.3%  
One of  the major characteristics of  the urbanisation process in Korea is the expansion of  
Seoul to urban primacy. Seoul occupies only 0.6% of  Korea’s total land area, but the share 
of  municipal population in the national population grew from 13% in 1966 to 24.4% by 
1990 (EPBK 1968: 93; NSO Korea 2001a: 22-23). With one quarter of  the national 
population living in Seoul, the city was positioned as the 11th largest urban agglomeration 
in 1990 next to Calcutta and Buenos Aires (UN-Habitat 1996: 16-17). 
Mainland China: growth, stagnation, then expansion 
Soon after its establishment in 1949, the People’s Republic of  China was noted for its 
rapid expansion of  urban population. This 1950s’ growth was propelled by the 
industrialisation drive, set out by the new Communist government as an attempt to catch 
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up with developed countries. There was a net urban inflow, supported by an increasing 
number of  new recruits into expanding state enterprises, voluntary migrants in search for 
urban jobs, and involuntary migrants who were driven out in the process of  rural 
collectivisation (Chan 1994: 33-48). Urban natural growth was also at high rates as a result 
of  a post-war baby boom and reduced mortality rates. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the urban share of  national population remained 
stagnant, a phenomenon often referred to as ‘zero urban growth’ (Szelenyi 1981: 1-14). 
Those migrating into cities during the period of  Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) were 
sent back to their places of  origin. The decade-long Cultural Revolution from the mid-
1960s also led to the massive rustication of  urbanites (Chan 1994: 33-48). Extreme 
control was imposed on regional migration with the implementation of  household 
registration system (commonly known as hukou in Chinese). Formally implemented in 
1958, the hukou system has been 
functioning since then as a 
means to prohibit urban 
migration by associating people’s 
registration status with their 
access to social benefits and 
urban services. Since its 
implementation, only those non-
agricultural segments of  urban 
residents have been eligible for 
such benefits and services 
(Solinger 1999). 
From the early 1980s, urbanisation took off  again with the introduction of  open-door 
reform policies. The share of  urban population came to be more than 21% of  national 
population in 1982, and since then increased rapidly to reach 40.5% by 2003 (see Figure 
2-1). It was recently forecast by the National Bureau of  Statistics to rise at a faster rate in 
the coming years (NBS China 2004: 95). 
Migrants in Beijing 
Official statistics in mainland China make a distinction between permanent population 
(changzhu renkou in Chinese) and temporary population (liudong renkou). According to the 
Figure 2-1: Increasing urban share of national population in 
China (% of national total) 
(Chan 1994: 24-25; NBS China 2000, 2001a) 
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
19
49
19
55
19
61
19
67
19
73
19
79
19
85
19
91
19
97
20
03
 46
hukou system, taking the example of  Beijing, permanent population refers to those who 
hold permanently registered residence status within Beijing’s municipal jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, temporary population refers to those who have migrated from other 
provinces into Beijing for a limited period. In this case, their original hukou does not 
change and is kept in their place of  origin. By regulation, migrants in mainland China are 
required to register for a temporary hukou if  they are to stay more than three months 
away from their place of  original residence (B. Li 2004). By 2002, the total number of  
Beijing population reached 15 million, and one quarter were registered temporary 
migrants (BMBS 2003a; NBS China 2004). 
In official statistics, only ‘registered’ migrants have been reported, neglecting a large 
number of  ‘unregistered’ temporary migrants. For instance, according to the result of  a 
municipal survey in 1994, the total number of  registered and unregistered temporary 
migrants in Beijing reached 3.3 million. Only one third of  them turned out to be officially 
registered (BMG 1995; Zhang 1997: 91). The migrants’ average stay reached 19.5 months, 
and 63.1% of  them had been residing in Beijing for six months or longer (AGRI 2002). 
Due to complexities and burdens of  acquiring official residence and employment permits, 
a large number of  temporary migrants remained unregistered, facing limited accesses to 
fair employment conditions and social benefits including public housing (B. Li 2004: 21-
24). Most migrants were of  rural origin, and the majority of  them were engaged in low-
paid labour-intensive secondary or tertiary industries or in insecure temporary jobs (Gu 
and Liu 2002: 201-202). Accommodation was provided by their employers. If  not, 
migrants relied heavily on private renting in the urban fringe where they could rent private 
housing from villagers, or joined existing migrant enclaves established in the suburbs (Gu 
and Shen 2003: 117-118; Jie and Taubmann 2002: 187-194). Therefore, temporary 
migrants were effectively excluded from sharing the benefits of  rapidly expanding 
commercial housing market. Only a small portion of  migrants who were highly skilled 
and educated enough to find well-paid jobs would have access to the private rental sector 
in inner city districts. 
2.2 Urban housing conditions 
This section discusses the urban housing contexts in Seoul and Beijing, and the degree of  
urban housing deterioration at the time of  devising developer-led redevelopment 
programmes (JRP and ODHRP) in these municipalities. This section shows that the way 
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in which housing was produced and consumed went through different trajectories since 
the 1950s, but both municipalities had a large number of  dilapidated dwellings which 
posed problems to budget-constrained municipal governments. 
The case of South Korea and Seoul 
Post-war ‘housing shortage’ and production bias 
The three-year-long Korean War (1950 – 1953) had deleterious influence upon urban 
infrastructure and housing provision. Sources suggested that during the war, up to 18% 
of  the national housing stock was destroyed or made uninhabitable, and this rate reached 
50% in Seoul (W.-J. Kim 1996: 106; Steinberg 1989: 52). Makeshift shelters and refugee 
camps were hastily erected with the help of  foreign aid agencies (W.-J. Kim 1996: 107). 
Illegal dwellings were built in any open space available. Such dwellings were often known 
as ‘panjajib,’ which would be literally translated as a ‘wooden-board framed house.’ 
Facing such a situation, housing debates in South Korea were dominated by a quantitative 
bias. This was strengthened by the government attitude that advocated the approach of  
‘one house per family.’ This became a government catch-phrase as early as 1971: 
“Under the present condition of  having 54.4% of  housing supply ratio, the first 
priority is to overcome quantitative aspects of  housing difficulties [shortage of  
dwellings], and hence, the first direction of  municipal policies should be the 
‘orientation towards one house per family’ so as to endeavour at resolving the 
housing shortage phenomenon”  (SMG 1971a: 117) 
 
The outspoken concern was constantly about the rapid growth of  urban population and 
small households, which were thought to have undermined the current growth of  housing 
production capacity. Such a mismatch between housing supply and demand was coined as 
‘housing shortage.’ The degree of  housing shortage was quantified in terms of  the 
proportion of  the total number of  dwellings to the total number of  households, and this 
ratio was known as ‘housing supply ratio.’ Increasing the housing supply ratio has been a 
major government agenda to this date, and has been a barometer to judge governments’ 
competence to achieve housing welfare for the general population. In urban areas, such 
housing supply ratio was estimated to be 55% in 1970, implying that nearly one in every 
two households had to share a dwelling unit on average (EPBK 1973: 43-49). 
In Seoul, the municipal administrative outline stated that the housing supply ratio for the 
municipality was worse than the national average, having decreased from 50.1% in 1966 to 
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45.7% in 1972 (SMG 1973: 185). An annual housing construction plan included target 
ratios to be achieved, which were often too idealistic. The Seoul municipal government set 
out an ambitious aim to achieve the housing supply ratio of  80% by 1981 (SMG 1973: 
186). However, the reality was that even a conservative measurement would yield a 
housing supply ratio of  less than 60% by 1985 (Yoon 2002: 82). 
Weak private sector and low investment in housing 
In the 1960s, the housing supply in Korea was dominated by small-scale private builders 
who produced nearly 90% of  new housing (see Table 2-2). Between 1962 and 1971, only 
12.6% were constructed by the public sector (KNHC 2001b: 232). A public housing 
agency called the Korea National Housing Corporation (hereafter KNHC) was established 
in 1962 to build homes for low-income households nation-wide, but its contribution 
remained minimal (1.4% of  total housing production) (KNHC 2001b: 232). 
Table 2-2: National housing production in South Korea 
(KNHC 2004; MoCT Korea 2002c) 
Unit: dwellings
Period
Public % of 
planned 
total output
Private % of 
planned 
total output
Public % of 
planned 
total output
Private % of 
planned 
total output
1962 - 1966 475,340 40,266 8.5% 435,074 91.5% 325,935 39,915 12.2% 286,020 87.8%
1967 - 1971 500,000 30,000 6.0% 470,000 94.0% 540,338 69,613 12.9% 470,725 87.1%
1972 - 1976 833,000 250,400 30.1% 582,600 69.9% 760,591 228,766 30.1% 531,825 69.9%
1977 - 1981 1,260,000 477,000 37.9% 783,000 62.1% 1,116,074 495,378 44.4% 620,696 55.6%
1982 - 1987 1,731,000 798,000 46.1% 933,000 53.9% 1,399,372 716,098 51.2% 683,274 48.8%
1988 - 19921) 2,000,000 900,000 45.0% 1,100,000 55.0% 2,717,682 905,294 33.3% 1,812,388 66.7%
1993 - 19971) 2,850,000 1,350,000 47.4% 1,500,000 52.6% 3,125,797 1,173,018 37.5% 1,952,779 62.5%
Note: 1) The planned output figures for these years are taken from the Ministry of Construction and Transportation's Housing White Paper  (2002: 61, 95).
    Housing Construction: Planned Output     Housing Construction: Actual Output
 
The central government’s attempt to increase housing production was often overly 
ambitious, and its projection under-achieved. For instance, the second five-year economic 
development programme (1967 – 1971) aimed at the construction of  800,000 dwelling 
units, which was roughly equal to one-fifth of  the total number of  existing dwellings in 
1965 (MoCT Korea 2002c: 27; Planning and Coordination for the Cabinet Office 1967: 
397). Once put into the implementation stage, the plan was substantially scaled down to 
aim for 500,000 units in order to save the government from humiliation (MoCT Korea 
2002c: 27). 
The reality of  the housing sector until the mid-1980s was that the private sector was weak, 
and the level of  housing investment stayed relatively low despite policy emphasis on 
increased production. According to a report from the Korea Research Institute for 
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Human Settlements, the share of  housing investment in GNP (gross national product) 
averaged 1.6% between 1962 and 1966, and below 3% between 1967 and 1971 (KRIHS 
1981: 13-14). 
When the Korean economy took off  in the 1970s, the gross investment in fixed capital 
formation expanded sharply to support the nation’s industrialisation. The value of  gross 
fixed capital formation (hereafter GFCF) as a share of  gross domestic product (hereafter 
GDP) at 2000 constant prices increased from 14.9% in 1970 to 26.1% in 1985, and hit the 
ceiling of  39.3% in 1996 (The Bank of  Korea 2004). The absolute amount of  housing 
investment increased substantially in line with the expansion of  investment in fixed capital, 
but the share of  housing investment in real GDP hardly exceeded the 5% threshold level 
between 1970 and 1985 (see Table 2-3). In other words, the housing investment received 
less emphasis in comparison with other investments in facilities and non-residential 
construction in times of  rapid economic development. Only from the late 1980s did the 
housing sector experience a substantial increase in investment when the newly elected 
government in 1987 announced a massive housing scheme to supply two million flats 
between 1988 and 1992. This period also coincided with the introduction and 
proliferation of  developer-led urban redevelopment, indicating a renewed emphasis on 
strengthening the private sector. 
Table 2-3: Annual rate of national housing investment in South Korea 
(The Bank of Korea 2004) 
1970 1971 - 1975 1976 - 1980 1981 - 1985 1986 - 1990 1991 - 1995 1996 - 2000
3.7% 3.9% 5.2% 4.5% 5.7% 7.7% 5.8%
24.9% 24.5% 20.9% 17.8% 18.8% 20.8% 17.3%
14.9% 15.9% 24.9% 25.4% 30.4% 37.2% 33.4%
Note: 1) GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation
% of GDP at 2000 constant prices
Housing investment as…
% of GFCF1) at 2000 constant prices
GFCF as % of GDP
 
High-rise orientation 
One interesting feature of  the Korean housing market is the construction bias towards 
high-rise flats. As far back as 1969, the central government stressed apartment 
construction as one of  its three main policy directions, stating that “in large cities, it is no 
longer encouraged to build individual houses, and the construction of  apartment flats is 
to be facilitated” (Planning and Coordination for the Cabinet Office 1969: 366). The 
municipal administrative document also confirmed this policy shift: 
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“The housing construction by the municipality has been transformed as of  1969 to 
accord with the urban structure and to strengthen the degree of  land utilisation by 
building high-rise apartments as per the [central] government policy” 
  (SMG 1971a: 253) 
 
For instance, when the government made an announcement of  its ten-year urban housing 
programme (1972 – 1981), the programme gave emphasis to the development of  large-
scale medium- to high-rise estates (called danji in Korean) (Planning and Coordination for 
the Cabinet Office 1972: 253-254). It was understood that such building practices would 
maximise the economy of  scale and land utilisation. These estates were largely found in 
Seoul in its urban fringe where land mobilisation was relatively easier and cheaper. Each 
estate was huge in scale: for example, Mokdong danji in southwest Seoul accommodated 
26,629 apartment flats (Yoon 1994: 86). 
The increasing orientation towards flat construction can also be seen in other evidence. 
Firstly, an increasingly large share of  planning permits issued for new housing 
construction was for high-rise flats. In 1975, among the 131,850 units that received 
construction permits from the central government, high-rise flats (that is, above 5 storeys) 
constituted 21.0% (W.-J. Kim 1996: 145). The share rose further to 66.8% by 1990 (W.-J. 
Kim 1996: 145; KNHC 2001b: 232-233). Secondly, the public housing agency, KNHC, 
also focused mostly on medium- and high-rise flat construction. The share of  apartment 
flats in the company’s annual housing production was on average 34.8% between 1962 
and 1966, but increased to 97.8% for the period between 1972 and 1981. Since 1987, the 
company has been producing apartment flats only (KNHC 2001b: 530). 
Homeownership orientation 
It is still the case that more than half  of  urban households are in the rental sector, and it is 
common for Korean families to share a sub-divided dwelling among multiple households. 
With the rapid growth of  urban population and small households, accompanied by weak 
housing production capacity, the share of  owner occupying households in urban areas 
decreased from 62.0% in 1960 to 41.3% in 1985 (EPBK 1987; Yoon 1994: 27). The urban 
home-ownership rate has gradually increased since then, but it remained at around 40% in 
Seoul during the last two decades (see Table 2-4 below). 
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Table 2-4: Changing trends of tenure structure in South Korea, 1980 – 2000 
(EPBK 1982, 1987; NSO Korea 1992, 1997a, 1997b, 2001a) 
  Region Tenure 1980 1985 1995 2000
  Urban areas Owner occupation 43.0% 41.3% 46.3% 49.0%
Tenancy 55.4% 55.7% 51.9% 48.8%
Others (e.g. rent free) 1.6% 3.0% 1.9% 2.1%
   Seoul Owner occupation 44.5% 40.8% 39.7% 40.9%
Tenancy 54.2% 56.5% 58.8% 57.5%
Others (e.g. rent free) 1.3% 2.7% 1.4% 1.6%  
In contrast with the tenure distribution, new housing production was targeting 
prospective homebuyers, and long-term public rental housing was scarce. A vivid example 
would be the share of  housing produced by the KNHC for rental and sale (see Table 2-5 
below). The KNHC produced 682,988 units in total between 1962 and 1991, and about 
one third were for sales on the market. From this, one would mistakenly conclude that the 
public agency focused on producing rental units to supplement the homeownership-
oriented private market. However, the reality was that the majority of  these rental units 
supplied were for less than 5 years’ rental period, after which they became subject to sales. 
Rental units for a longer lease period appeared only in the late 1980s. 
Table 2-5: Total output of KNHC housing in South Korea, 1962 – 1991 
(KNHC 1993: 258-259; 2004: 486-487) 
Period   Total Output
① + ② ① ②
% of total 
output
% of total 
output
1 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years
1962 - 1966 5,159 5,097 98.8% 62 1.2% 0 0 0 0 0 62
1967 - 1971 7,739 6,731 87.0% 1,008 13.0% 300 0 0 0 0 708
1972 - 1976 54,420 35,770 65.7% 18,650 34.3% 18,015 0 0 0 0 635
1977 - 1981 154,031 106,314 69.0% 47,717 31.0% 46,632 0 0 0 0 1,085
1982 - 1986 186,678 151,384 81.1% 35,294 18.9% 0 29,994 5,000 0 0 300
1987 - 1991 274,961 86,185 31.3% 188,776 68.7% 0 76,015 0 104,955 7,806 0
Total 682,988 391,481 31.3% 291,507 68.7% 64,947 106,009 5,000 104,955 7,806 0
Note: 1) These are built by the KNHC, and sold to other companies to be rented out to their employees. The rental period was set to be 50 
years intially, but in 1994, it was reduced to 10 years, and again in 1998, to 5 years; 2) These dwellings are provided for those foreigners 
stationed in Korea.
Employer-
provided 
rental flats1)
Rental 
dwellings for 
foreigners2)
Renting Period
For rentalFor sales
 
Housing poverty and sub-standard dwellings in Seoul 
By the early 1980s, housing poverty still prevailed in cities despite the government’s 
emphasis on new housing construction, providing justification for intense renewal 
activities in the years to come. Table 2-6 below presents a summary of  housing conditions 
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since 1980. 1  By 1980, just before the introduction of  the Joint Redevelopment 
Programme (JRP), nearly two thirds of  existing urban dwellings turned out to have no 
access to modern kitchens and flush toilets. Close to half  of  all dwellings in Seoul were in 
similar conditions. The per capita floor space for urban households was estimated to be 
9.3 m2. 
From 1990, the census started to take the number of  households as the basis for the 
estimation of  housing conditions. The result of  the 1990 census revealed that, although 
the per capita floor space increased to 13.0 m2, a little more than one third of  all urban 
households still had no access to modern kitchen and flush toilet. 
Table 2-6: Housing conditions in South Korea: Urban areas and Seoul 
(EPBK 1982, 1987; KNHC 2001b; KRIHS 1981; MoC Korea 1992; NSO Korea 1992, 1994b, 1997a, 1997b) 
Urban areas 1980 1985 1990 1995
Number of ordinary households 
as reported in the census
(households) 4,669,976 6,330,798 8,462,417 10,031,978
Housing stock (units) 2,468,209 3,349,327 4,646,241 6,562,695
Average household size (persons) 4.49 4.10 3.76 3.45
Per capita use floor space (square metre) 9.3 11.0 13.0 16.3
No access to modern kitchen1) 65.2% 45.0% 39.3% 12.9%
No acess to modern flush toilet1) 63.0% 45.6% 36.0% 15.8%
Seoul 1980 1985 1990 1995
Number of ordinary households 
as reported in the census
(households) 1,836,903 2,324,219 2,814,845 2,965,794
Housing stock (units) 968,133 1,176,162 1,430,981 1,688,111
Average household size (persons) 4.47 4.08 3.74 3.42
No access to modern kitchen1) 50.8% 32.5% 31.3% 10.5%
No acess to modern flush toilet1) 44.9% 29.7% 22.2% 9.0%
(1980 - 1985: % of dwellings;
1990 - 2000: % of households)
(1980 - 1985: % of dwellings;
1990 - 2000: % of households)
Note: 1) From 1990, the census started to report the proportion of those households with no access to such facilities, while the previous 
census only reported such conditions based on the number of dwellings.  
The prevalence of  dilapidated substandard dwellings exacerbated the housing conditions. 
Such dwellings were formed through illegal erection on unoccupied lands or through sub-
division without legal permits in times of  rapid urbanisation. The problem was 
particularly acute in Seoul. According to an official announcement, one in every three 
units in Seoul (37.8% of  total municipal housing stock) was estimated to be illegal and/or 
substandard in 1966 (amounting to 136,650 illegal units). By 1972, the share of  such 
                                                 
1 There are no comparable data for the 1960s and 1970s as the census results from these years did not 
report categories such as households’ access to various housing facilities. 
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dwellings still reached 25.5% (163,543 units) (SMG 1973: 185). 
Since 1972, the Seoul municipal government took a decisive step, which somewhat 
resembled a military action, in order to prevent any further construction of  illegal 
dwellings. Throughout the whole municipality, aerial photographs were taken four times a 
year while 159 ground surveillance posts were set up in informal settlements to prevent 
any new construction of  illegal dwellings. Existing residents were encouraged to report 
any new illegal dwellings, and officials deployed routine patrols (ibid, 192). Such 
comprehensive measures to identify and eradicate new illegal dwellings did provoke a 
widespread feeling that illegal dwellings, if  ever built, would soon be found and 
demolished by the government. The annual number of  new illegal dwellings noted by the 
municipal government decreased considerably from 21,589 units in 1970 to 1,160 units in 
1973, and then to 783 units in 1976 (SMG 1977: 175) 
Such draconian measures were, however, far from eliminating existing informal 
settlements in Seoul. Municipal statistics still showed that the share of  illegal and 
substandard dwellings in the total municipal housing stock remained as high as 15.5% in 
1980 (Ha 2001b: 387-388). Only with the implementation of  large-scale residential 
redevelopment from the mid-1980s did illegal, substandard dwellings start to be 
extensively removed. 
The case of mainland China and Beijing 
Public housing provision during the pre-reform period, 1949 – 1978 
In mainland China, the rapid urbanisation in the 1950s increased urban housing demand. 
Moreover, the new government initiation of  large-scale capital projects in cities led to the 
demolition of  many existing dwellings, offsetting any growth in the overall urban housing 
stock. The ruling of  the Communist Party and the political instability discouraged housing 
production in the private sector. Urban authorities also lacked resources either to provide 
new dwellings within their jurisdiction or to carry out maintenance of  rental dwellings 
under their control. Instead, major investment in housing came from the central 
government via state enterprises and institutions which were striving to provide 
accommodation for their expanding work force, as they rapidly increased their share in the 
total industrial output (Wang and Murie 1999b: 63-67). 
During the pre-reform period, the state sector came to account for more than 80% of  
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total national industrial output (NBS China 1999: 423). Under the planned economy, state 
enterprises had to turn over most of  their profits to their supervisory government 
agencies, and in return, received central construction funds that could be invested in their 
operations. Part of  these central construction funds were retained so as to provide their 
employees with welfare benefits. While the staff  and workers in work units generally 
received a low salary, the consumer price was heavily subsidised, and it was the 
distribution of  in-kind benefits including housing, which largely compensated the nominal 
wage. As the state sector expanded its share of  industrial output, so did the public 
housing sector. According to the first national survey on housing stock in 1985, almost 
75% of  total urban housing stock was provided by employers (Wu 1996: 1603). 
Lack of investment in housing 
During the pre-reform period, housing investment largely depended on the capital 
construction investment funds allocated by the state to local governments and enterprises. 
The capital construction investment funds included “the productive investment for the 
main part of  a project and the non-productive investment for facilities and services 
attached to it” (Wu 1997: 649). The investment in housing fell in the non-productive 
investment category under the planned economy, receiving low priority. With the 
structural tendency for underinvestment in non-productive areas, the investment in 
housing was even suppressed in times of  economic boom (Wu 1997: 649-651). 
Figure 2-2: National housing investment in mainland China, 1955 – 1989 
(Compiled from Tables 2-1 and 2-2 in Hong 1999: 104-105, 110) 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
19
55
19
57
19
59
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
Housing Inv estment in million y uan
% of Housing Inv estment in C apital C onstruction
Inv estment
 
Reform period 
 55
According to the World Bank, housing investment as a proportion of  GNP averaged only 
1.5% during the pre-reform period of  1949 to 1978 (World Bank 1992: 2). In the case of  
the share of  housing investment within capital construction investment, it stayed at only 
around 5% during the same period. This, in fact, contrasted sharply with the estimates 
since the reform began (see Figure 2-2). Such lack of  investment in housing during the 
pre-reform period not only discouraged new housing construction but also led to the 
poor maintenance of  existing stock. It was reported in a national housing conference in 
1977 that “in all the then 187 designated municipalities (she shi) as a whole, the average 
annual repair bill (let alone management, maintenance and additions to the housing stock) 
per square metres of  public housing stood at 2.1 yuan, whereas the rental income was a 
mere 1.09” (Kirkby 1990: 297). 
Allocation of public rental housing 
Before the reform, the capacity of  employers to provide housing for their employees 
largely depended on the allocation criteria of  central construction investment funds. The 
allocation of  such resources was carried out “through negotiations between the central 
and local governments, and between the government department and subordinated 
enterprises” (de Rosario 1988 cited in Wu, 1996: 1607). The rank of  state enterprises and 
institutions in the administrative hierarchy was, therefore, significant. Enterprises directly 
under a ministry of  the central government were in a more favourable position than small 
municipal enterprises. As Bian et al. found, the housing system before the reform 
favoured enterprises and institutions “that were (1) in the state sector, (2) managed by 
central ministries, and (3) local, with a higher bureaucratic rank” (Bian et al. 1997: 234). 
Within state enterprises, larger enterprises or those engaged in large capital projects were 
more likely to receive larger shares of  the capital construction funds from the central 
government. Informal contacts with the gatekeepers, known as guanxi in Chinese, were 
also deterministic, distorting state policies in many cases (Wu 1996: 1607-1608). 
On the other hand, small/street-level enterprises were short of  funds to provide welfare 
housing for their employees. They had to rely on public rental dwellings managed by the 
municipal housing bureau, which itself  was under budget constraints (Wu 1996: 1606). 
Major state enterprises in cities were under the direct control of  their supervisory central 
government organs, which meant that revenues generated by such enterprises were 
directly transferred to their supervisory government agencies, bypassing municipal 
governments. In such circumstances, urban authorities could only rely on the revenue 
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transfer from those enterprises under their direct control. Such municipal-level enterprises 
were mostly smaller in size and weaker in terms of  financial capacity than state enterprises. 
Urban housing reform and increased investment 
Since the 1980s, urban housing has been central to urban reform policies in order to 
improve the performance of  state enterprises and the living conditions of  urban residents. 
Housing reform was first introduced with an emphasis on sharing responsibilities by 
adopting a so-called ‘three-pillar system.’ This called for diversified sources of investment 
from the local government, enterprises and employees (Hou 1999; Li 2005). A strong 
emphasis was placed on promoting homeownership and introducing market components 
in the housing sector so that housing was no longer treated as welfare goods but as a 
commodity in a market (Duda et al. 2005; Wang and Murie 1996, 1999b; Zhou and Logan 
2002). Monthly rents in the public rental sector were to be substantially increased from 
1~3% of household income to 15% to cover basic maintenance and management costs 
(World Bank 1992: 28). Public rental dwellings in good conditions became open to sales to 
sitting tenants, and potential buyers were drawn towards the expanding commercial 
housing sector to become owner occupiers. To assist homeownership, the Housing 
Provident Fund was established as the backbone of  China’s new housing finance system. 
It was fundamentally an employment-based system, first introduced in Shanghai in 1991, 
and received monetary contributions from both employers and employees (World Bank 
1992: 30-32). 
The urban housing stock experienced a dramatic increase during the reform period. There 
was a massive boom in housing construction as well as a surge in housing investment 
throughout the whole nation. The housing investment as a proportion of  GNP jumped to 
7.6% by 1988 from an average of  1.5% during the pre-reform period. The housing 
investment as a share of  national gross fixed asset formation also dramatically increased 
from 7.4% in 1978 to 25.8% in 1989 (World Bank 1992: 2-5). Unlike the pre-reform 
conditions under which the major source of  housing investment came from the central 
government’s capital construction investment funds, a large share of  the increased 
investment in housing in the 1980s came directly from the state and collective enterprises. 
This was made possible by the financial reform in the 1980s, which included the 
introduction of  a ‘contract responsibility system.’ This system enabled enterprises to gain 
some degree of  operational autonomy and retain self-raised funds that could be used to 
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improve their performance and invest in projects outside their state budgetary constraints 
(Morris et al. 2002: 363). The growth of  self-raised funds fuelled the increase in housing-
related investment especially between mid-1980s and mid-1990s when the state enterprises 
emerged as the main buyer and financier of  new commodity housing (Wang and Murie 
1996, 1999a; World Bank 1992; Wu 1996, 1997). 
However, the poor performance of  state enterprises in recent years has also created 
difficulties for the state sector to provide welfare housing as before. The World Bank 
(1996: 1-6) reports that since the end of  the 1980s, the state enterprises experienced a 
radical decline of  their profitability, measured as per cent of  their fixed assets, from about 
15% in 1987 down to below 6% in 1994 (World Bank 1996: 1-6). Consequently, the role 
of  state sector as the main financier would be subject to a serious question. 
Deteriorating urban housing conditions 
By 1978, the housing conditions in cities were in need of  urgent attention. Per capita 
living space in cities declined from 4.5 m2 in 1952 to 3.6 m2 in 1978 (Kirkby 1990: 295). 
Due to the under-investment in the housing sector and the lack of  construction of  new 
dwellings for many decades until the end of  the Cultural Revolution, “densification and 
subdivision of  the existing housing stock” had been the main means of  accommodating 
urban growth (Wu 2004: 456). Despite the increased housing investment during the early 
years of  reform implementation, the conditions of  older dwellings in cities worsened. 
One of  the major problems was the lack of  maintenance and management funds. For 
instance, in Beijing, the maintenance and management fees in 1987 were, on average, 0.46 
and 0.10 yuan/m2 respectively. The average rent of  dwellings, however, was 0.11 yuan/m2 
in 1987, and the rent for one storey dwellings (known as pingfang in Chinese) was even 
lower, causing further deterioration due to near negligence (Sun and Zhang 1989: 7). 
According to a nation-wide survey of  urban housing conditions in 1985, more than half  
of  the residents in Beijing (52.7%) did not have a private kitchen (Fan 1989). Nearly two 
thirds (62.7%) had no access to private toilets, and only half  (49%) had in-house tap water 
connection. Beijing’s per capita use space turned out to be 8.77 m2, placing the capital city 
as one of  the regions with the worst conditions (see Figure 2-3 below). 
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Figure 2-3: Per capita use space across provinces in mainland China (for urban housing only) 
(Compiled from Table 1 in Fan 1989: 30) 
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Close to one quarter of  Beijing residents (24.39%) were classified as the housing poor.2 
The incidence of  ‘housing poverty’ was much more severe in inner city districts (25.58% 
of  those surveyed) than in suburban districts (9.91%) (Fan 1989: 32-33). Only 43.9% of  
Beijing residents lived in self-contained dwellings (cheng-tao in Chinese). The results of  a 
housing survey carried out by the Beijing Municipal Property Management Bureau in 1990 
revealed a wide scale of  run-down pingfang dwellings, most of  which were concentrated 
in inner city districts (see Table 2-7). Of  all the pingfang dwellings in the municipality, 
more than one quarter (13.62 million m2) were classified as Grade 3, 4 or 5 dwellings3 that 
were eventually subject to urban renewal (Liu 1991b: 16). 
                                                 
2 ‘Housing poor’ was defined as follows: (1) those families residing in uncomfortable conditions (e.g. three 
generations living together in one room; parents and a child of  12 years old or older living together in one 
room; two or more children of  different gender, aged 12 years or older, living together in one room; two 
couples living together in one room); (2) those families living in over-crowded conditions (i.e. households 
whose per capita living space is less than 2 square metres); and (3) homeless families (e.g. couples without 
their own dwelling after marriage; households residing in non-residential units; households living in make-
shift shelters or in relatives’ or friends’ dwellings) (Hong 1993). 
3 The grading system refers to the classification by the Beijing Municipal Property Management Bureau, 
which is applied to each dwelling: “Grade 1 is new and in good condition; Grade 2 is structurally sound and 
weatherproof  but in need of  repair; Grade 3 is structurally sound (i.e., columns, beams, and bearing walls 
are intact) but suffers from leaking roof, crumbling masonry, and/or broken windows or doors; Grade 4 is 
structurally unsound but not in imminent danger of  collapse; Grade 5 is hazardously dilapidated” (Wu 1999: 
225). 
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Table 2-7: Old and dilapidated housing distribution in Beijing 
(Compiled from Table 1 in Liu 1991b: 16) 
District
Grade 3 Grade 4 and 5
(million m2) (million m2) (million m2)
  Total 48.60 7.52 6.10
15.5% 12.6%
Inner city districts 21.92 5.60 4.59
25.5% 20.9%
Near suburban districts 26.68 1.92 1.51
7.2% 5.7%
Total pingfang dwellings Old and dilapidated pingfang dwellings
 
 
2.3 Evolution of urban renewal approaches 
In spite of  the differences in the development of  housing systems in Seoul and Beijing, 
both cities came to have a large number of  dilapidated dwellings in the 1980s. Policies 
proposed to tackle this problem were experimented with and revised to produce what 
have come to be known as the Joint Redevelopment Programme (JRP) in Seoul since 1984, 
and the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme (ODHRP) in Beijing 
since 1990. This section examines these renewal experiments and their shortcomings. 
Seoul: slum clearance, ad hoc settlements and renewal experiments 
Slum clearance, eviction and relocation in the 1960s and 1970s 
After the Korean War, Seoul was overwhelmed by the prevalence of  illegal and 
substandard dwellings and informal settlements that occupied any available lands in and 
around its inner city districts. Public authorities largely regarded them as ‘cancerous 
elements’ that deterred ‘continuous implementation of  capital building’ (SMG 1970: 263), 
or undesirable components that ‘damaged urban landscape’ (SMG 1973: 4). The quality of  
such illegal/informal dwellings was conceived to be substandard in nature, and formal 
upgrading or land tenure formalisation was marginal. 
Policy responses in the 1950s and 1960s were mostly focused on containing further 
growth of  such settlements and demolishing identified illegal dwellings. Annual plans 
were drawn to monitor the progress. A report stated that between 1958 and 1972, the 
Seoul municipal government managed to relocate approximately 0.3 million residents 
from 48,718 dwellings to city outskirts (Jeong 1984 cited in Jang 1998: 27). Disciplinary 
measures were announced occasionally to discourage additional construction of  such 
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dwellings. For instance, right after the military coup in 1961, the owners of  illegal 
dwellings subject to demolition were to be put on trial in a military court (Chosun Ilbo 
news report on 20 May 1961 cited in Kim et al. 1996: 74). 
The slum clearance and relocation of  residents, however, faced certain limitations that 
made it difficult for the municipal government to carry it out for long. First of  all, there 
was lack of  public land for existing residents’ relocation (Kim et al. 1996: 79). In the 1960s, 
the number of  illegal and substandard dwellings was increasing rapidly despite the 
municipal efforts to contain them. The provision of  public lands for residents’ relocation 
was not a sustainable option in the long term. Secondly, relocation sites were located on 
urban outskirts, and were not adequately serviced for living. Moreover, only about 20% of  
these sites were found to be fit for residential use, and displacees often had to bear land 
preparation and development costs themselves (Jang 1998a: 27-28). Thirdly, many 
displacees faced the loss of  employment opportunities as jobs were scarce around 
relocation sites. They had to pay for the increased transportation costs to commute back 
to the city centre. Eventually, they re-sold the de facto use rights of  their allocated public 
lands, and returned to the city centre (Jang 1998a: 27-29). 
An exemplary case was a site-and-services programme on a large site called Gwangju danji, 
which was located south of  Seoul, 20 km away from the city centre. Started in 1966, it was 
proposed as a relocation site of  displacees from illegal settlements in city centre (Ha 1994: 
109; S.-H. Kim 1996: 91-92). It was planned that 550,000 residents in total were to be 
relocated, accounting for 14.5% of  the municipal population in 1966 (S.-H. Kim 1996: 91-
92; SMG 1999: 82). Despite its ambitious layout, however, the scheme came to an abrupt 
halt in 1971 when large-scale protests by the relocated residents broke out. The scheme 
was doomed to failure, given that the provision of  infrastructure and services was poor, 
that there was no alternative employment in the area, and that residents’ original places of  
work were beyond the reach of  many households due to high transportation costs. Only 
about 20% of  the original target population were relocated in the end (S.-H. Kim 1996: 
92). 
Experiments in the 1960s: formalisation and self-help programme 
While the Seoul municipal government carried out the demolition of  illegal dwellings and 
residents’ relocation to city outskirts, it did not completely rule out more benign 
approaches. One such measure was to formalise some designated illegal settlements on 
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the condition that they be upgraded to conform to urban planning regulations. This 
measure was put into practice in 1967. In total, 10,161 illegal dwellings were subject to this 
measure, about 7.4% of  all illegal dwellings identified at the end of  1966 (Kim et al. 1996: 
75, 81). Designated settlements were to rid themselves of  any illegal and substandard 
characteristics. All the expenses incurred, however, were to be borne by the owners of  
such dwellings. There was no other support from the government apart from its 
supervisory administration (Kim et al. 1996: 81-82). The financial pressure imposed upon 
dwelling owners made it difficult to sustain this programme in the long run. 
Another programme conceived by the municipal government was a self-help programme, 
named the ‘Citizen’s Apartment Programme.’ This programme aimed at replacing illegal 
dwellings with modern walk-up blocks. It first appeared in 1968, and lasted only about 3 
years. In this programme, the municipal government was to provide services for the land 
preparation and the construction of  the basic building framework. Dwelling owners were 
to complete any remaining building works at their own expenses (Kim et al. 1996: 81). It 
initially aimed at constructing 2,000 blocks (90,000 flats), but only achieved to build 406 
blocks as the programme came under serious criticisms when one of  the completed 
blocks collapsed in 1970 due to poor structural conditions. Criticisms included that there 
was a large-scale corruption in awarding building contracts and that the owners of  illegal 
dwellings could not afford the financial burdens and sold their stake to off-site higher 
income residents (Ha 1999: 277). 
Experiments in the 1970s: ‘Temporary Act on the Promotion of  Housing 
Improvement 
In light of  the difficulties in dealing with mushrooming illegal dwellings in Seoul, the 
municipal government made a proposal to the central government for the enactment of  a 
special law so as to enable the municipal government to apply more systematic efforts to 
eradicate illegal dwellings and settlements. Temporary Act on the Promotion of  Housing 
Improvement (hereafter Temporary Act) was thus enacted in 1973. It aimed at completing 
the ‘improvement’ of  all illegal and substandard dwellings by 1981, which was the year the 
Act expired. The key to this Act was to allow the free transfer of  ownership of  those 
public lands occupied by squatter dwellers from the state to the municipal government. In 
this way, when an illegal settlement on such public land becomes subject to renewal, land 
sales revenues could be retained by the municipality, providing it with financial resources 
to proceed with subsequent renewal of  other settlements (Kim et al. 1996: 85). The ideas 
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behind the enactment of  this Temporary Act could be seen in the administrative 
statement by the Seoul municipal government below: 
“What is urgent in reality is to tackle the illegal, substandard dwellings that exist in 
disorder in great numbers all around the city…these dwellings impoverish 
mountains and fields; cause inundation of  rivers and flooding of  urban districts; 
make citizens sick due to the pollution from contamination; cause low self-esteem 
that produce social problems as there are no benefits of  having cultural facilities; 
and degrade the façade of  Seoul. [Therefore] it is inevitable to improve these illegal 
dwellings and put them in order” (SMG 1974: 331) 
 
The Temporary Act was the first attempt by the government to legislate the renewal 
process of  illegal/informal settlements in South Korea. It ultimately targeted 
approximately 121,000 dwellings in 230 project areas in Seoul, which accounted for about 
three quarters of  155,467 illegal dwellings identified in December 1973 (SMG 1974: 345-
346). Any units excluded from this programme were subject to demolition (Kim et al. 
1996: 86). The main urban renewal method adopted under the 1973 Temporary Act was 
the self-help renewal by means of  either ‘in situ upgrading’ or ‘clearance and 
redevelopment’ depending on site conditions. 
In situ upgrading under the 1973 Temporary Act 
In the case of  in situ upgrading, owner occupiers were to take the initiative, pay for the 
expenses of  upgrading their dwellings to the standard prescribed by the Building Act. Any 
conflicts among residents were to be resolved by negotiation (Kim et al. 1996: 83; J.Y. Lee 
2000: 11). The municipal government was responsible for carrying out public works 
including the installation of  tap water connections and the construction of  at least 4 
metre wide thoroughfare (Kim et al. 1996: 83). The in situ upgrading programme was 
initially introduced in 1971, targeting 47,887 illegal dwellings in 220 project areas, and was 
later incorporated into urban renewal programmes under the 1973 Temporary Act. 
The programme, however, only managed to achieve the upgrading of  9,976 units by 1973, 
and 1,203 units between 1974 and 1983 (J.Y. Lee 2000: 11). The major reason for such 
hindrance was, again, too much financial burden upon dwelling owners. They bore as 
much as 54% of  all the costs incurred (J.Y. Lee 2000: 10). There were also difficulties in 
coming to a compromise among the residents for the installation of  basic infrastructure 
and services, as such works involved selective demolition of  dwellings in the path (Kim et 
al. 1996: 84). 
 63
Clearance and redevelopment under the 1973 Temporary Act 
The focus of  the 1973 Temporary Act was on implementing ‘clearance and 
redevelopment’ programmes, which consisted of  two different approaches. The first 
approach was often referred to as the ‘self-help clearance and redevelopment,’ applied 
between 1973 and 1975 (Kim et al. 1996: 87). Lands were to be re-defined into larger 
housing lots (usually at least 165 m2) so that shared ownership among several households 
could make it easier to build ‘corporative housing’ of  higher density. The dwelling owners 
were required to finance all the costs incurred for the purchase of  public lands they 
illegally occupied; for temporary accommodation until re-housing; and for the 
reconstruction of  houses after clearance. 
The second approach that presented important implications for the practices in the 1980s 
was the ‘consigned redevelopment.’ It called for the organisation of  a steering committee 
among owner occupiers, and consigned the clearance of  dwellings as well as the 
construction of  apartment flats or multi-dwelling houses to a private builder. The 
municipal government was to recommend private builders of  good reputation, and 
assumed a supervisory role during the project period. Twenty to thirty households were to 
come together so as to define approximately 1,000 m2 of  housing lot, and construct 
dwellings with higher density (Kim et al. 1996: 96). 
These two approaches were very limited in scale. The ‘self-help clearance and 
redevelopment’ programme was only applied to 1,418 illegal dwellings, far from reaching 
the municipal government’s initial target of  6,731 dwellings (Kim et al. 1996: 92). The 
total number of  dwellings that were redeveloped by the ‘consigned redevelopment’ 
programme only reached 2,253 dwellings in 12 project areas (Kim et al. 1996: 96). 
Limits of  renewal programmes in the 1970s 
The renewal programmes trialled in the 1970s faced many problems. Firstly, for most 
owners who were under considerable financial constraints, it was too costly to meet all the 
building requirements imposed upon them, leading to a very low participation rate (Jang 
1998a: 45). These trial programmes all incurred large costs on the residents’ side in order 
to finance the construction of  dwellings and temporary accommodation during a project. 
Secondly, many dwelling owners opted for in situ upgrading that required less financial 
input compared to clearance and wholesale redevelopment. Such request was, however, 
often against the municipal preference that hoped to transform the façade of  the 
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municipality to establish a ‘modern’ look before the expiration of  the Temporary Act in 
1981 (Kim et al. 1996: 95-101; SMG 1983: 335-336). Thirdly, conflicts among residents 
also deterred the smooth operation of  redevelopment projects. When in situ upgrading 
was applied, it was difficult for them to come to an agreement regarding which dwellings 
were to be demolished in order to give way for infrastructure installation and road 
construction. Furthermore, the promotion of  shared ownership to define larger housing 
lots in order to build apartment flats or multi-dwelling houses was also subject to disputes, 
as some dwelling owners considered it as a restriction upon their exercise of  property 
rights (Kim et al. 1996: 95-101; SMG 1983: 335-336). 
Despite all these problems associated with the trial measures in the 1970s, they still 
presented a set of  useful experiences that fed into the establishment of  the Joint 
Redevelopment Programme in mid-1980s. 
Beijing: traditional settlements, over-crowding and renewal experiments 
The tendency for under-investment in ‘non-productive’ sectors such as urban housing and 
services led to near negligence of  existing dwellings’ maintenance. When opportunities of  
increased investment rose, state enterprises focused on new housing construction. In 
Beijing, the redevelopment of  substandard dwellings only began to take a meaningful 
shape after the implementation of  housing reform measures from the 1980s. During the 
early period of  reform era in the 1980s, the focus was still on the construction of  new 
dwellings by utilising unleashed investment in ‘non-productive’ sector. Facing the 
mounting problems of  deterioration in inner city districts in particular, the Beijing 
municipal government began to seriously take the issue of  urban renewal, acknowledging 
the absence, and hence the needs, of  uniform policies for the redevelopment of  
dilapidated dwellings and neighbourhoods. In this regard, this section summarises the 
evolution of  redevelopment approaches in Beijing from the planned economy period, and 
outlines the shaping of  the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme 
(ODHRP) that began to appear from 1990. 
Capital building, 1949 – 1966 
The period from the Liberation in 1949 until the commencement of  nation-wide fever of  
the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s could be characterised as the period of  capital 
building that involved major building and infrastructure projects (e.g. administrative 
buildings around the Tiananmen Square and the Beijing railway station). Dwellings that 
 65
stood in the way were demolished, and residents were displaced to relocation dwellings 
provided by the municipality. 
In the Old City area (defined as the area within the second ring road), there was 
approximately 17 million m2 of  building space at the time of  the Liberation, 65% of  
which was of  residential use. Most dwellings were pingfang units.4 Only about 5~6% of  
such pingfang units could be identified as old and dilapidated, posing no immediate threat 
to the overall quality of  urban housing stock at that time (Dong 1989: 11; Wu 1999: 49). 
The approaches taken towards the Old City area in general by the municipality could be 
identified as follows: (1) use of  the Old City area as the centre of  the national capital city 
in order to save the costs of  building a new centre elsewhere; (2) redevelopment of  the 
Old City area as soon as possible, demolishing outdated and dilapidated pingfang units; 
and finally, (3) more emphasis on redevelopment than preservation (Dong 1989: 11). In 
this regard, there was lack of  attention given to such pingfang dwellings for their 
management and timely maintenance. 
Replacement of  pingfang dwellings with higher density flats, 1966 – 1974 
This period was under the influence of  the Cultural Revolution, which advocated minimal 
destruction of  workers’ dwellings. If  any dilapidated pingfang dwellings were to be 
demolished, they were replaced with two- or three-storey jianyi zhufang, literally translated 
as simply constructed housing (Dong 1989: 12). These were of  low standard, built with 
thin brick walls to accommodate one bedroom in general with residents to share kitchen 
and toilet. 
In the 1970s, a more systematic approach, known as ‘rolling snowball (in Chinese, gun 
xueqiu)’ approach, appeared for housing reconstruction (ibid, 12). This was in principle to 
provide three times as many dwellings as before demolition by means of  building five- or 
six-storey walk-up blocks. Original residents would be re-housed upon project completion. 
Remaining vacant units were to be reserved as relocation dwellings for other residents 
subject to similar projects. In this way, it was envisaged that the overall number of  new 
dwellings would expand rapidly as such renewal projects took place. In reality, this 
                                                 
4 According to the 1985 Housing Survey, these one-storey pingfang was found to be the major housing 
form, accommodating 45% of  the surveyed urban residents in Beijing. The next most common built form 
was medium-rise residential blocks, home to about one third of  the residents surveyed (Hong 1993). 
 66
ambition was never fully realised. Although this approach survived until the late 1980s, 
each project took a long time to complete, and such long project cycles made the 
approach unpopular (Dong 1989: 12). Furthermore, the densification of  residential space 
placed more constraints upon under-invested infrastructure and utility services within the 
municipality (Wu 1999: 50). 
Infilling instead of  renewal, 1974 – mid-1980s 
From 1974, employers were given the right to develop housing units for their employees 
on their own premises. This led to a phenomenon of  ‘jianfeng chalou,’ meaning that any 
available spaces were filled in with buildings. At the same time, existing pingfang dwellings 
(traditional courtyard houses in particular) underwent a massive infilling process to 
provide temporary shelters to accommodate refugees from the Tangshan earthquake in 
1976 (Dong 1989: 12; Wu 1999: 51). About 2 million m2 of  such temporary shelters were 
built. A documentation of  an infilling process in a courtyard house showed that a typical 
courtyard house experienced “55 per cent increase in built area within the confines of  the 
lot and a loss of  …about 75 per cent of  the 1950s courtyard area” between 1950s and late 
1980s (Gaubatz 1999: 1516). These measures led to a dramatic increase in the total 
amount of  housing construction. During the period from 1974 to 1986, the total amount 
of  new housing construction recorded about 7 million m2, which represented 70% of  
total housing construction since the Liberation. 
Renewal experiments in the late 1980s 
Prior to the ODHRP announcement, the Beijing municipal government implemented a 
few pilot projects in 1987 to test the feasibility of  different approaches towards urban 
renewal. These included projects in Ju’er Hutong, Xiaohoucang, Dongnanyuan and Debao. 
Based on the outline by Liangyong Wu who took the lead for Ju’er Hutong project (Wu 
1999: 52-54), these approaches are summarised below. 
The first approach was concerning the ownership. The original residents residing as public 
rental tenants in pilot project areas were presented with an opportunity to buy 
redeveloped dwellings at a preferential price that only covered basic costs, and become 
homeowners. If  they were to pay in one lump sum, they were given 20% discount. They 
could also pay in instalment over the period of  10 years or less. Loans were provided by 
approved banks at low rates, and some were able to get financial support from their 
employers. If  households were too poor to buy a completed dwelling, they could rent a 
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redeveloped unit on site at low rents with a deposit of  50 ~ 80 yuan per m2. The low rents, 
however, re-created the municipal-wide problems of  poor maintenance and management, 
as the rents could not cover necessary costs. 
The second approach was to propose residents’ relocation to suburban districts by 
offering favourable terms. “Because of  the rent differential in the city core and the 
suburbs” (ibid, 53), the residents who could not afford to pay for a redeveloped unit were 
presented with an option to be re-housed in the suburbs. Such dwellings were usually 
provided by the developer in charge of  the redevelopment project. If  a family did not 
prefer any of  these options, they could also “exchange their right to a unit in the 
redeveloped neighbourhood directly with another household in the Old City” (ibid, 53). 
The third approach was regarding the recovery of  the costs by developers. Commercial 
spaces or any units which were not taken up by original residents could be sold or leased 
by developers on the commercial housing market. In Xiaohoucang project, the revenues 
generated in this way could finance 63% of  the total investment. In Debao project, it was 
85%. “There is an incentive, therefore, from both the developer’s and the government’s 
point of  view, to limit the number of  original residents who may return: the more units 
sold as commodity housing, the more funds can be raised for profit and further 
redevelopment” (ibid, 54). 
Finally, the fourth approach was regarding the regulatory support framework by the 
government to provide incentives for developers. These included interest-free loans to 
developers, tax incentives and reduced charges to developers for the provision of  
infrastructure services in redevelopment neighbourhoods. 
2.4 Implementation of partnership-based redevelopment 
Having experimented with various renewal approaches, the municipal governments of  
Seoul and Beijing came up with partnership-based wholesale redevelopment programmes 
that relied heavily on professional developers to solve the problems of  cost recovery and 
replicability and ensure financial feasibility of  redevelopment projects. This section 
examines the establishment of  the JRP and ODHRP, their progress since inception and 
the outline of  their key principles and implementation processes. 
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Joint redevelopment programme in Seoul 
Establishment of  the JRP: key principles and its progress 
The emergence of  the Joint Redevelopment Programme (sometimes known as 
‘cooperative’ or ‘partnership’ redevelopment programme) was based on the reflection of  
the municipality’s trial programmes up until the early 1980s. Redevelopment financing was 
defined as the most important pre-requisite for the successful transformation of  
dilapidated neighbourhoods which experienced heavy concentrations of  substandard 
dwellings and low-income households. 
The key to the JRP approach was to build high-rise flats to the maximum density 
permitted by the planning regulation so that any remaining units after allocation to 
participating property owners could be sold on the market to recover development costs. 
In this way, it was expected that financial contributions from property owners could be 
reduced as much as possible, hence encouraging greater participation. The Seoul 
municipal government announced a detailed guideline on 24 January 1984, titled ‘Detailed 
Implementation Guideline for the Joint Redevelopment Programme.’ Its main contents 
were as follows (Jang 1998a: 57; 1998b: 270; Kim et al. 1996: 106): (1) property owners 
(owner occupiers and absentee landlords) would form a redevelopment association, which 
becomes the main organisational body for redevelopment implementation; (2) the 
redevelopment association would select a professional developer (or a consortium of  
developers) as its partner to carry out the redevelopment; (3) professional developers 
would pay for up-front costs and provide subsidies to assist residents’ temporary 
relocation; (4) upon completion of  relocation, illegal dwellings would be demolished 
without compensation whereas legal dwellings would be entitled to a certain amount of  
compensation subject to an independent appraisal; and finally, (5) the developer would 
construct up to twice as many dwellings as the demolished units so that remaining units 
after allocation to the property owners could be sold on the open market to recover their 
investment and retain profits. Although there have been changes to the guideline over the 
years, the principle of  establishing partnership between property owners and developers, 
and of  participating developers as the main financier remains unchanged to this date. 
Table 2-8 below shows the summary of  redevelopment projects that received ‘project 
implementation permission’ (Stage 2 in Figure 2-4 on p.71) between 1972 and 2004. ‘Self-
help upgrading’ in the table refers to all those programmes that tried to mobilise the 
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dwelling owners as the main financier of  upgrading programmes. As shown in the table, 
the JRP has been the dominant renewal strategy since the mid-1980s, and continued to 
flourish throughout the 1990s. Of  129,867 dwelling units subject to redevelopment since 
the early 1970s, 80% became subject to the JRP. Since there were in total 160,686 
dilapidated dwellings in Seoul (about 17% of  total municipal housing stock) identified by 
an official survey conducted between March and April 1979 (EPBK 1982; KRIHS 1981: 
961), the majority of  these dilapidated dwellings could be said to have been subject to the 
JRP. 
Table 2-8: The status of neighbourhood redevelopment implementation in Seoul 
(Housing Bureau of SMG 2005) 
(As of 31 December 2004)
1972 - 1976 1977 - 1981 1982 - 1986 1987 - 1991 1992 - 1996 1997 - 2001 2002 - Present
Sub-total Project areas 17 44 48 47 79 55 32 347
Land area (m2) 815,647 2,420,507 1,504,232 1,858,238 5,022,021 2,036,825 800,273 15,143,655
5.4% 16.0% 9.9% 12.3% 33.2% 13.5% 5.3% 100.0%
Dwelling demolished 6,821 16,713 13,425 15,557 45,289 19,608 7,760 129,867
5.3% 12.9% 10.3% 12.0% 34.9% 15.1% 6.0% 100.0%
JRP Project areas 0 0 38 47 79 55 32 276
Land area (m2) 0 0 1,317,495 1,858,238 5,022,021 2,036,825 800,273 11,720,764
Dwellings demolished 0 0 11,769 15,557 45,289 19,608 7,760 104,677
Self-help Project areas 17 44 10 0 0 0 0 71
upgrading Land area (m2) 815,647 2,420,507 186,737 0 0 0 0 3,422,891
Dwellings demolished 6,821 16,713 1,656 0 0 0 0 25,190
Note: The summary is based on the approval year of the project implementation plan by the government.
Period
Sub-total
Classification
 
Outline of  the JRP implementation process 
The JRP was designed to redevelop old and dilapidated urban neighbourhoods by 
implementing projects on a partnership basis (Choi 2002). Local authorities, developers 
and property owners assume a different role and contribute their financial and/or 
organisational resources to transform such neighbourhoods into modern high-rise estates. 
At the core of  this approach lies the partnership agreement between the redevelopment 
association of  property owners (who own land and/or dwellings) and a professional 
developer (or a consortium of  developers). The latter is selected by the association 
through an open bidding process. The association of  property owners is a legal entity, 
representing property owners in a redevelopment project. Once the agreement between 
an association and a developer is made, the developer also becomes part of  the 
association, completing the partnership structure. 
From the viewpoint of  professional developers, the JRP is an attractive option, because 
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property owners transfer all the rights to the developers to clear occupied land and 
dwellings. Such an arrangement effectively reduces the large amount of  initial investment 
in land acquisition (Yoon 1997: 108). The sales of  redeveloped flats enable cost recovery 
and profit maximisation. In return, a portion of  redeveloped flats is set aside for sales to 
property owners (that is, redevelopment association members) at discounted price. 
As for the property owners, their partnership with professional developers provides, in 
principle, an opportunity to trade their existing dilapidated dwellings with new units at 
discounted price. They are given an opportunity to redevelop their dwellings and 
neighbourhood by relying on the financial and technical contribution from developers of  
their choice (Ha 2001b). They are released from the burden of  financing, and managing to 
some extent, the whole project as this is taken care of  by participating developers. If  their 
dwellings stand on public lands, they are entitled to purchase the land to formalise their 
land tenure. 
Because JRP’s financing is achieved by the involvement of  developers, the obvious 
advantage for the municipal government is the transformation of  dilapidated 
neighbourhoods with low budget contribution. The JRP has also become a good source 
of  revenue for the central and local governments through the sales of  public lands in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods (Bae 1997: 197). On the average, nearly half  of  the lands 
in JRP project areas turned out to be owned by either the central or municipal 
governments (Ha 2001a). Furthermore, the construction of  public facilities such as 
administrative office buildings and road networks within a redevelopment neighbourhood 
are built at the expense of  project finance (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2000). The 
municipal government also makes financial contributions in the form of  paying for the 
public rental flats provided for re-housing tenants who are eligible for redevelopment 
compensation (Ministry of  Construction and Transportation. 2000). 
Figure 2-4 below shows the implementation process of  a JRP project, and the responsible 
parties at each stage. The process can be broadly divided into five stages: (1) project 
preparation that includes the designation of  a neighbourhood as a redevelopment district; 
(2) acquisition of  project implementation permission, which is the process of  obtaining a 
formal approval of  the project implementation plan prepared by a redevelopment 
association; (3) finalisation of  management disposal plan to determine the sales price of  
redevelopment flats; (4) project implementation that involves residents’ displacement, 
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relocation and actual construction works; and (5) project liquidation to settle the bills 
among participating property owners and developers. 
Figure 2-4: Redevelopment process of a JRP project 
(MoCT Korea 2000) 
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As shown in the figure, each stage of  a JRP project is mostly initiated by a redevelopment 
association. Property owners and professional developers who constitute a redevelopment 
association are in principle to consult each other and work together in partnership to 
produce plans such as the project implementation plan and management disposal plan. 
Since the expertise and financial contributions from participating developers are crucial 
for the successful implementation of  a JRP project, it can be assumed that professional 
developers take the lead. 
Old and dilapidated housing redevelopment programme in Beijing 
Establishment of  the ODHRP: key principles and progress 
Having experimented with various renewal approaches, the Beijing municipal government 
launched the ODHRP in 1991 to demolish and redevelop 2.5 million m2 of  old and 
dilapidated dwellings by 1995 (BMG 1991). The core idea behind the ODHRP was to 
bring in real estate developers as the main financier and project implementer, while local 
authorities provided administrative support. This was seen as an inevitable solution to the 
severity of  dilapidated housing problems and the limits of  public finance. According to 
Sun and Zhang (1989: 7), the total investment necessary to redevelop old and dilapidated 
dwellings in the Old City of  Beijing (that is, areas within the second ring road) in 1989 
would be “more than 200% of  total urban housing investment in the Old City since the 
Liberation.” 
The turning point was the speech by the mayor of  Beijing on 30 April 1990, which 
emphasised the ripening opportunity for the redevelopment of  inner city districts (BMG 
1990). It was stressed that a series of  new estate developments in suburban districts 
provided new dwellings that could be used for the relocation of  inner city residents. To 
facilitate the implementation of  ODHRP projects, an ODHRP office was opened at the 
municipal government to supervise and support the overall process. Furthermore, the 
municipal government set aside 200 million yuan to lend to those four inner city districts 
(namely Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chongwen and Xuanwu), which received particular 
attention due to the severity of  their housing problems (BMG 1990). Figure 2-5 below 
shows the locations of  dilapidated housing areas as of  1990. 
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Figure 2-5: Location of dilapidated residential areas in and around the Old City of Beijing 
 
 
Upon promulgation of  the ODHRP in April 1990, 37 areas were initially assigned as 
redevelopment project areas. 22 of  them were located in inner city districts, 11 in near 
suburban districts and 4 in outer suburban districts of  Beijing (Lu 1991). The number of  
households affected by this initial assignment reached approximately 50,000, housed in 1.6 
million m2 of  dilapidated dwellings (Wu 1999: 52). By the end of  1994, the total number 
of  ODHR project areas increased up to 221, targeting about one million residents. 
According to Zongyong Wen at the Planning and Management Office in the Dongcheng 
district government, the ODHRP in the 1990s could be divided into two different phases 
(Wen 1998: 39). The first phase applies to the period from April 1990 until May 1992. In 
this period, the municipal government carried out the first stage of  redevelopment in 22 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, demolishing 824,100 m2 of  old and dilapidated housing 
and relocating 29,385 households. This period could be characterised by the following 
features. Firstly, the dwellings subjected to redevelopment were the most dilapidated 
dwellings such as jianyi zhufang (that is, simply constructed dwellings). Secondly, project 
areas were mostly located just outside the second ring road. Thirdly, original residents’ re-
housing ratio was relatively high, most projects having achieved more than 60%. 
The second phase was carried out from May 1992 until 1997 in 114 redevelopment 
project areas (Wen 1998: 39). This phase showed contrasting features. Traditional 
courtyard houses in the Old City of  Beijing also became subject to redevelopment. This 
indicated that redevelopment advanced into the Old City. The main strategy was to 
demolish and redevelop the project area, and there was hardly any other consideration. 
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High-rise flats and commercial buildings were favoured as the end products, and very few 
original residents were able to be re-housed (Lee 1999: 23; Wen 1998: 39). To carry out 
the redevelopment in a financially feasible way, it was thought inevitable to sell as many 
redeveloped flats as possible (UCMCBMPPCC and JSSBC 1992: 21): 
“At present, apart from the limited funding sources such as 200 million yuan of  
state funding and little resources from those homebuyers, the main method is to rely 
on housing management, that is, selling many housing units so as to acquire 
funding”  (UCMCBMPPCC and JSSBC 1992: 21) 
 
The characteristics of  the second phase basically continued to dominate throughout the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. A major change took place in 1998 regarding the way residents 
were to be compensated. Through this change, a stronger emphasis has been placed upon 
monetarised (cash-based) compensation, and this was expected to strengthen the market-
oriented characteristics of  redevelopment. 
By 1999, the number of  ODHRP projects reached 279 (Fang and Zhang 2003). Between 
2001 and 2005, it was reported that Beijing anticipated another 340,000 households to be 
displaced as part of  urban redevelopment projects (People's Daily 1 April 2002). The 
preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing would facilitate the progress. 
Considering the number of  inner city residents, the scale of  displacement indicated that 
approximately 14% of  inner city residents would be subject to the redevelopment (BMBS 
2003a). 
Outline of  the ODHRP implementation process 
Unlike Seoul’s JRP project in which local residents and developers team up together, 
residents in Beijing do not enjoy the same status when ODHRP projects are implemented. 
It is the partnership with local authorities and developers that plays a crucial role in 
completing the transformation of  dilapidated neighbourhoods. This is shown in Figure 
2-6 that summarises the process of  an ODHRP project. This is based on the government 
notice in June 1994, which gave greater power and autonomy to inner city district 
governments for authorising ODHRP projects within their jurisdiction (BMG 1994a; 
Fang and Zhang 2003: 155). 
Local authorities hold the right to designate a project area, but it’s common for developers 
to choose an area and make an application to initiate redevelopment. Once the local 
district government receives an application, it reviews and approves the application based 
 75
on its planning criteria. One important criterion is the proportion of  dilapidated dwellings 
within a proposed neighbourhood. In order to be designated, more than 70% of  the 
dwellings in a neighbourhood must be Grade 3, 4 or 5 dwellings (see footnote 3 on page 
58 for the explanation on the grading classification). Furthermore, at least 30% of  the 
neighbourhood dwellings should be either Grade 4 or Grade 5 dwellings (Fang 1999: 61). 
Figure 2-6: Redevelopment process of an ODHRP project 
(BMG 1994a; Fang 1999: 69-70) 
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The process of  authorising and implementing an ODHRP project as shown above 
indicates that there is little room for residents’ participation until a project reaches the 
stage of  their displacement and relocation. In this regard, Beijing’s ODHRP could be said 
to have a typical top-down character in the sense that ODHRP projects are imposed upon 
residents as part of  a lawful government action – a government programme realised by 
the developers for the betterment of  urban residents. 
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Nevertheless, local residents are still considered to be important contributors since their 
cooperation is one of  the key factors in the success of  ODHRP projects. The land use 
rights, enjoyed by the local residents, are taken away in exchange for redevelopment 
compensation (Fang and Zhang 2003: 157). If  residents are offered re-housing, they are 
required to purchase redeveloped flats, and this is the moment they make financial 
contributions. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed urban demographic and housing conditions embedded within the 
national contexts, and examined the development of  urban renewal policies for the 
transformation of  dilapidated dwellings and neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing. 
The review showed that the origins of  dilapidated neighbourhoods in these cities differed 
considerably. In Seoul, dilapidated dwellings which became subject to the JRP were largely 
an outcome of  informal and illegal building practices, carried out by urban residents 
including in-migrants who had to find a foothold in cities when there were simply not 
enough dwellings during the post-war period of  rapid urbanisation. Forced eviction and 
clearance actions were taken by the municipal government especially in inner city districts, 
but a large number of  such settlements managed to survive through the 1970s. 
In Beijing, the origin of  old and dilapidated dwellings that were subject to the ODHRP 
was not illegal in character. Their eventual deterioration was the result of  long-time under-
investment in housing by the state sector that considered such input as ‘unproductive’ 
during the pre-reform period of  the planned economy. A large proportion of  dilapidated 
dwellings were traditional one-storey courtyard houses called pingfang, which lost their 
character over the years due to inadequate management and maintenance. Major infill 
processes in the 1970s also exacerbated the problem of  over-crowdedness. 
The review of  urban housing conditions showed that Seoul and Beijing were both facing 
severe housing problems by the time they were to introduce the JRP and ODHRP. In 
Seoul, the policy orientation towards new housing construction and homeownership did 
not succeed in eradicating housing poverty. By the early 1980s, about a half  of  urban 
residents still had no access to modern in-house facilities. About 16% of  existing 
dwellings in Seoul were illegal and informal in character. In Beijing, by the mid-1980s, the 
majority of  dwellings lacked in-house facilities, and close to one quarter of  Beijing 
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residents were housing poor. The problem was more acute in inner city districts. 
In the case of  renewal experiences, both cities experimented with several approaches 
before implementing the JRP and ODHRP. In Seoul, the experiences in the 1960s and 
1970s suggested that neither the government nor the residents could finance 
redevelopment on its own. With no heavy financial input coming from the government to 
subsidise the lack of  funding on the residents’ side, the prospect of  redeveloping a 
dilapidated neighbourhood seemed near impossible. In Beijing, the Communist 
government’s supposedly egalitarian nature did little to avoid decades-long neglect of  old 
dwellings. State enterprises and institutions began to make use of  their newly-found 
capacity to make additional investment in employees’ housing provision in the 1980s, but 
the Beijing municipal government found it near impossible to implement urban renewal 
due to its constrained budget and weak tax base. It was the housing market, and hence the 
real estate capital and potential homebuyers’ savings, which were considered to be the 
solution. 
Seoul’s JRP and Beijing’s ODHRP were, in this regard, a means to resolve persisting 
problems of  project financing by attracting professional developers to urban renewal 
projects. These programmes signified responsibility sharing among the state, the market 
and local communities. The structure of  the programmes, however, differed. In both cities, 
professional developers took the leading role in that they were to provide project 
management skills and financial resources. Local authorities provided regulatory support 
and took planning control. As for the residents, the JRP in Seoul was based on a formal 
contractual relationship between property owners (that is, dwelling owners and absentee 
landlords in a redevelopment neighbourhood) and participating developers. In Beijing’s 
ODHRP, professional developers had no formal contract with residents for project 
initiation. Instead, it was the agreement between developers and local authority that 
started the project implementation process. More details of  how the interaction among 
developers, local authorities and residents unfolded will be discussed in subsequent 
analysis in this thesis. 
Having reviewed urban housing contexts and the development of  renewal policies, the 
next chapter explains the research methodology of  this thesis. 
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3.1 Case study approach 
This thesis set out to understand how Seoul and Beijing came to implement a common 
strategy of  developer-led redevelopment programmes despite their different urban 
contexts, what contributions were made by various sectors and what impacts these 
programmes had on local residents. It aimed to gain a contextual understanding of  how 
developer-led partnerships unfold within local contexts in order to find out how the 
public sector, the private sector and local residents interact with each other, and how local 
residents cope with the transformation of  their neighbourhoods. In this way, it is hoped 
that this research provides an insight into the process of  neighbourhood transformation 
at a local level, which has been understudied despite these programmes’ relatively long-
term operation. 
To examine the impacts of  redevelopment on local residents, I aimed to find out the 
degree of  displacement due to redevelopment, to identify constraints that would have 
influenced residents’ decision to move, and to examine the changes in housing conditions 
upon their displacement. As Bailey and Robertson (1997) noted, studies of  urban 
regeneration and residents’ displacement have been largely concerned with the scale of  
displacement. This focus was strengthened by the trend for existing studies to infer the 
scale of  displacement by using census data rather than taking a direct measurement due to 
difficulties in tracking displacees (Atkinson 2002: 9). This research hoped to overcome the 
narrow focus, expand the scope of  study to include post-displacement experiences of  
local residents and hence deliver the views and voices of  local residents. 
To accomplish these objectives, this research adopts a case study approach, which allows 
social science researchers to focus on the contextual effects upon social phenomena (Yin 
1993). The approach has the advantage of  examining “the specific institutional, historical 
and political features of  each country covered, instead of  imposing a standardising 
framework whereby only pre-selected items of  data are accepted for incorporation into 
the analysis” (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999). A case study approach employed in a 
international comparative study also enables researchers to obtain findings that can “shed 
light on shared processes at work in disparate circumstances” (Cheek and Lindau 1998: 5). 
In this study, the benefits of  comparing Seoul and Beijing’s redevelopment experiences 
include the shedding light on the shared processes of  developer-led partnership 
approaches, local authorities’ mounting task of  tackling urban dilapidation in fast growing 
societies, lack of  public resources to enable direct government intervention, strong 
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government leadership and emphasis on economic growth which absorbs available 
resources. By employing a case study approach and detailed preparation as outlined in this 
chapter, this research overcomes the difficulties of  international comparative research, and 
provides a rich understanding of  the shared experiences through comparable findings. 
The case studies in this research were conducted at neighbourhood level, and took a 
multiple case study approach within each municipality, which entailed the selection of  a 
case within a wider case (Stake 2000: 446-447; Weitzman 2000: 812). In other words, if  the 
primary case was a residential neighbourhood, the neighbourhood was nested within a local 
administrative district, which was subsequently nested in a municipality, which in turn was 
identified as to be nested in a city and country. Figure 3-1 below demonstrates such a 
nested approach. 
Figure 3-1: Selection of a case within a wider case: a nested approach 
Neighbourhood
Local District
City
Country
Various actors 
within a 
neighbourhood
 
This approach made it possible to understand the local contexts of  a case study 
neighbourhood in relation to wider geographic and socio-economic contexts at a larger 
scale. Furthermore, by identifying major actors and gatekeepers at different scales, the 
nested approach provided this researcher with an opportunity to look at the interaction 
between actors, gatekeepers and institutions, and how central government policies were 
transmitted down to neighbourhood level, constrained by the local environment. 
 
3.2 Field research visits 
A series of  field research visits were carried out between December 2001 and September 
2003. The field research took the form of  area-based studies. In order to understand 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, I attempted to identify a physical pattern (that is, what 
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the physical condition of  the area was like, and how they were internally organised and 
externally related to the rest of  the city) as well as institutional (that is, what institutions 
were involved in transforming the area, and how they were related to each other) and 
social portrait (that is, what the life conditions were like in subjected neighbourhoods, and 
how the residents therein adjusted to the changes and attempted to overcome any 
difficulties that were confronted). 
This section explains how field research neighbourhoods were selected, what data 
collection methods were used and how residents were recruited for interviews. It also 
discusses the barriers that I encountered and overcame during my field research. Unlike in 
Seoul where I, as a South Korean, possessed natural advantages (e.g. no barriers with 
language, understanding social and cultural contexts, social network), Beijing presented 
institutional and cultural obstacles that required more detailed preparation and adaptation 
to local circumstances to conduct field research. 
Field research neighbourhood selection 
The selection of  neighbourhoods for this research was conditioned by several factors. 
Firstly, there was the policy factor. My baseline research on municipal renewal policies in 
Seoul and Beijing showed that both municipal governments revised their existing 
redevelopment programmes (Joint Redevelopment Programme or JRP in Seoul and Old 
and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme or ODHRP in Beijing). In Seoul, 
the revision was enacted at the end of  1995, and was known as the ‘rolling 
redevelopment.’ Its details are discussed in Chapter 6, and it would suffice here to 
mention that this rolling redevelopment was aimed at enhancing the range of  work of  the 
public housing agency in order to promote the housing security of  tenants eligible for 
redevelopment compensation. In Beijing, the revision was made in March 2000, and its 
main feature was to increase the re-housing rate of  existing residents by providing 
subsidised redevelopment flats. Therefore, at the time of  selecting field research 
neighbourhoods, I hoped to include those neighbourhoods where these revised 
approaches were applied in order to see their nature and impact upon residents. 
The second factor was the time factor. As a redevelopment project usually takes several 
years from the planning stage to the final delivery of  end products, the resource 
constraints of  PhD research mean that it is near-impossible for a PhD researcher to carry 
out longitudinal research to cover the whole progress of  neighbourhood redevelopment. 
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It was, therefore, necessary to conduct field research visits by taking a cross-section of  
redevelopment projects. In this respect, I tried to look for a neighbourhood where its 
redevelopment or residents’ displacement and relocation were phased so that residents’ 
pre- and post-displacement conditions could be examined. 
Bearing these two factors in mind, I established neighbourhood typologies to help me 
search for field research neighbourhoods. This is shown below in Figure 3-2. 
Figure 3-2: Selection typologies of field research neighbourhoods 
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Finally, the third factor to consider was the issue of  access. Redevelopment often gives rise 
to tensions between residents and developers, between residents and local authorities, and 
among residents themselves. A researcher who is alien to the neighbourhoods would find 
it difficult and time-consuming to penetrate existing social networks and win the trust of  
local residents. My access to the field research neighbourhood in Seoul was helped by a 
local NGO leader who was highly respected in the neighbourhood. In Beijing, because 
independent access to neighbourhoods as an individual researcher was impossible, I 
received administrative support from a local research centre that I was attached to during 
my stay in Beijing (see later in this chapter for fuller explanation). 
Neighbourhood selection in Seoul 
The field research in Seoul was carried out in one neighbourhood called Nangok. It is 
located about 15 kilometres away from the city centre and on the south-western edge of  
Gwanak district (see Figure 3-3). Gwanak district is one of  the twenty five administrative 
districts that make up Seoul. 
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Figure 3-3: Location of Gwanak district and Nangok in Seoul 
 
 
The selection of  Nangok neighbourhood was on the basis of  a number of  careful 
considerations. Firstly, it was one of  the only two neighbourhoods in Seoul where 
aforementioned ‘rolling redevelopment’ was implemented. Therefore, it belonged to 
Neighbourhood Type C in Figure 3-2. The other neighbourhood, known as Sillim 2-1 
redevelopment district, was also in Gwanak district, and its redevelopment was completed 
in May 1999. The selection of  Nangok neighbourhood over Sillim 2-1 redevelopment 
district was due to the difficulty in tracking the relocation of  Sillim 2-1 redevelopment 
district’s original residents. Nangok neighbourhood, at the time of  commencing my field 
research, was still in its final stage of  residents’ displacement and relocation, thus having 
the characteristic of  Neighbourhood Type A in Figure 3-2. To some extent, Nangok 
neighbourhood could also be classified as to having the characteristics of  Neighbourhood 
Type B as the residents’ displacement and relocation took two and a half  years to be 
completed. As such, it provided greater opportunities to get in touch with two distinct 
groups of  residents: those who moved out, and those who were awaiting displacement. 
Sillim 2-1 redevelopment district, however, was not completely disregarded. Its 
redevelopment accompanied the construction of  818 public rental flats, which were used 
for the relocation of  residents from Nangok neighbourhood. In this regard, Sillim 2-1 
redevelopment district was also included in this research in that it constituted part of  
Nangok neighbourhood redevelopment project as a relocation site. 
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Secondly, Nangok neighbourhood was selected as it was subject to the JRP in the mid-
1990s before its renewal was switched into the rolling redevelopment programme in 2000. 
My baseline research indicated that in the mid-1990s, property owners signed an 
agreement with a private developer for the neighbourhood redevelopment. The Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997, however, endangered the financial liability of  the participating 
developer, which had to subsequently withdraw from the project. Such events provided a 
unique opportunity to examine both advantages and disadvantages of  the JRP and of  the 
‘rolling redevelopment.’ 
Neighbourhood selection in Beijing 
The field research in Beijing was carried out in 2002 and 2003 in two different phases. 
Most interviews with local residents and key actors took place in the summer of  2003. 
The researcher spent half  a year in 2002 in Beijing to review the national and municipal 
urban policies, and be immersed within the local environment as part of  the 
familiarisation process. 
The selection of  field research neighbourhoods was carried out by this researcher 
presenting the selection criteria to the local authority (via a local research institution), who 
subsequently pinpointed several neighbourhoods that met such criteria. The reasons for 
such an arrangement are explained later in this section when the access problems are 
discussed. The main reason was the practical difficulty in conducting independent field 
research as a foreign researcher in mainland China. This was especially so when the 
research topic was as sensitive as the neighbourhood redevelopment and its compensation. 
The neighbourhoods selected were Xinzhongjie (marked ‘A’ in Figure 3-4 below) and 
Haiyuncang (marked ‘B’). They were all located within one of  the four inner city districts 
called Dongcheng district. Xinzhongjie neighbourhoods belonged to Dongzhimen Street 
Office,5 while Haiyuncang neighbourhood was part of  Beixinqiao Street Office. Their 
neighbourhood contexts are further explained in the following chapter. 
These neighbourhoods turned out to fit my research design. Haiyuncang neighbourhood 
was one of  the four pilot project areas in Beijing for the implementation of  the revised 
                                                 
5 In Beijing, the administrative hierarchy is as follows: Municipal (shi) Government – Local District (qu) or 
County (xian) Government – Street (jiedao) Office. Each jiedao consists of  neighbourhood committees 
(juweihui), and neighbourhood committee leaders (zhuren), appointed by the district government, undertake 
daily administrative tasks. 
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ODHRP approach (therefore, Neighbourhood Type C in Figure 3-2). Its redevelopment 
was completed at the end of  2002, and the re-housing took place throughout the first half  
of  2003. 
Figure 3-4: Location of field research neighbourhoods in Dongcheng district, Beijing 
(Original administrative map from DDG 1998) 
 
 
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood was an area where the neighbourhood redevelopment was 
implemented by a private developer, and its redevelopment was phased in (therefore, 
Neighbourhood Type B in Figure 3-2). At the time of  my field research, its Phase I 
redevelopment was already completed, converting one quarter of  its neighbourhood into 
a modern estate of  high-rise commercial flats. The Phase II redevelopment was yet to 
start, and residents in Phase II area were not informed of  their displacement timing. The 
majority of  my interviews with residents in Beijing were with former or present 
Xinzhongjie residents. 
Figure 3-5 below shows the summary of  selected neighbourhoods in both Seoul and 
Beijing, showing the progress of  redevelopment in relation to the corresponding 
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redevelopment policies. 
Figure 3-5: Selected field research neighbourhoods and their redevelopment progress in relation to 
renewal policies and field interview timing 
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Data collection methods 
Focusing on the neighbourhood contexts and redevelopment processes meant that the 
research required multiple data collection methods (Yin 1993). Three main data collection 
methods were used, which were: (1) collection of  local documents and archival records 
related to the fields study areas; (2) on-site observation; and (3) semi-structured interviews 
with residents and key actors. The research was also supplemented by the acquisition of  a 
survey data set on former Nangok residents, provided by a local welfare centre in Seoul. 
Collection of  local documents and archival records 
The first methodological step was to carry out a literature search through local policy 
documents and archival records to supplement my understanding of  the national and 
municipal housing policies, specifically of  the local housing contexts within which 
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redevelopment policies were implemented. The range of  documents and archival records 
included: (a) policy announcements and amendments to existing housing and urban 
renewal laws and regulations; (b) minutes and proceedings from South Korea’s National 
Assembly or local district assembly, and their equivalents in mainland China if  available; 
(c) performance reports from public agencies if  accessible; (c) local media coverage; (d) 
official statistics and yearbooks from local district governments. Once the field research 
neighbourhoods were selected, efforts were also made to gather materials related to these 
neighbourhoods. These included local authorities’ reports and statistics on these 
neighbourhoods; media coverage on the housing redevelopment in the field study sites; 
and reports, if  any, from non-governmental or not-for-profit organisations on the field 
research neighbourhoods. 
On-site observation 
The second methodological step was on-site observation. On-site observation was used 
for the researcher to become familiarised with the field research neighbourhoods, and to 
provide the researcher with a clear picture of  the physical and social conditions in the 
residential areas. The information gathered from my observation formed the background 
for conducting interviews with local residents and officials, and was “used to validate or 
corroborate the messages obtained in the interview” (Robson 1993: 192). The details of  
information collected through on-site observation were as shown below in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Details of information and their mode of recording during on-site observation 
 
Information Type Details Mode of Recording 
Typical examples of dwelling types Photographs; note-taking Dwelling Conditions: 
Degrees of visual deterioration and in-house facilities Photographs 
Infrastructure and 
Utilities Services 
Public transportation connection and the frequency of its 
operation; 
Street lighting; 
Public toilets; 
Methods of excrement collection, and its frequency; 
Sewage system and the degree of its development 
Ordinance survey or 
cadastral map, if available, 
with different colour codes; 
note-taking; photographs 
Services and activities Existence of local amenities and their location 
Existence of any public gathering places or community centres
Adjacency of markets and employment places 
Ordinance Survey Map, if 
available with different 
colour codes; note-taking; 
photographs 
 
Semi-structured interviews with key actors and residents 
The third methodological step for data collection was semi-structured interviews with key 
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actors and local residents. Interviews with local residents, in particular, were carried out in 
order to collect individual case histories. Collection of  individual case histories is one of  
the data collection methods that “provide an enormously detailed and substantiated 
account of  one person’s ‘history’ with reference to some specific personal characteristic or 
series of  events they have experienced” (Hakim 2000: 63). The collection of  individual 
case histories focuses on particular aspects of  a person’s life. In this research, this 
particular aspect was individual household’s housing and redevelopment experiences, 
narrated through a member (usually household head) or members (household head and 
spouse) of  each family. 
I devised an interview schedule to conduct semi-structured interviews in Seoul (see 
Appendix A1). This was also used in Beijing, but the interviews in Beijing were further 
assisted with a questionnaire that I produced on the basis of  the interview schedule (see 
Appendix A2 for the questionnaire sample in Chinese). This was to make sure the basic 
household details and housing conditions were recorded correctly at the beginning of  an 
interview in order to minimise the possibility of  misinterpretation due to language barriers. 
In total, 40 residents were interviewed: 20 in Seoul and 20 in Beijing (see Appendix B1 for 
the list of  residents interviewed). The selection of  residents for interviewing is explained 
later in this chapter. 
Semi-structured interviews with key actors included local officials, neighbourhood 
committee leaders and managers working for developers engaged in neighbourhood 
redevelopment. These interviews were to collect their comments and views in relation to 
the contemporary urban housing and renewal policies in each municipality as well as their 
views on residential redevelopment projects taking place in field research neighbourhoods. 
In Seoul, 18 interviews were conducted with key actors. In Beijing, 15 interviews were 
carried out, and a formal meeting with six officials from Dongzhimen Street Office and 
Dongcheng district government was held to listen to their views on neighbourhood 
redevelopment (see Appendix B2 for the list of  interviewees). 
Raw survey data from a local welfare centre in Seoul 
In addition to my field research data, the research was further aided by the acquisition of  a 
set of  raw survey data from a local welfare centre (that is, Sillim Welfare Centre). The 
survey was conducted in Seoul in June 2002 to gather information on former Nangok 
residents who were displaced as part of  its neighbourhood redevelopment. Thanks to a 
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senior research fellow at the Korea Centre for City and Environment Research, I was 
introduced to the local welfare centre and had a chance to take part in the survey activity, 
collecting responses from 11% of  total sample population (156 households). When the 
survey was taking place, I was nearing the completion of  semi-structured interviews with 
local residents. There was little chance, therefore, that my research design was influenced 
by the welfare centre’s survey. Nevertheless, the survey data turned out to be very 
beneficial for this research, as it supplemented quantitative interpretation of  the changes 
in Nangok residents’ housing conditions due to redevelopment. The survey responses 
were coded by the welfare centre, and the data set was available in SPSS for Windows 
format. 
Selection of residents for interviews 
Interviewees in Seoul 
Selecting residents in Seoul to interview for this research was done using a snowball 
sampling technique, which is a non-probability sampling method often employed when 
the acquisition of  sampling characteristics is difficult. 
“[Snowball sampling] involves contacting a member of  the population to be studied 
and asking him or her whether they know anyone else with the required 
characteristics… The nominated individuals are interviewed in turn and asked to 
identify further sample members. This continues until no further sample members 
are obtained. Then another member of  the population of  interest is identified, 
preferably from a different area or social class, and the process of  asking for 
contacts with the required characteristics begins again”  (Arber 2001: 63). 
 
In this respect, the most important criteria for selecting interviewees were their diversity 
and range of  experiences (Stroh 2000: 203). For this research, four main categories were 
considered when selecting residents: (1) income status; (2) employment status; (3) 
displacement and relocation status; and (4) eligibility for redevelopment compensation. 
The use of  this technique was deemed appropriate in this research for three main reasons. 
The first was the fact that it was difficult for an individual researcher to obtain a set of  
household registration records that would assist probability sampling. This problem was 
even more acute in Beijing where the degree of  social control was tighter. An uninformed 
random door-to-door visit by a foreign researcher would have provoked suspicion in 
Beijing’s social and political environment. 
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The second reason was the resource constraints in individual research. Conducting a 
survey of  a meaningful sample population required a lot of  financial resources and a 
considerable amount of  time when implemented on one’s own. The fact that this research 
was to be conducted in two municipalities in different countries exacerbated such 
constraints. 
The third reason was the potential hostility among local residents towards visitors 
including researchers. This is particularly problematic in redevelopment neighbourhoods 
where tensions build up as work progresses. Residents might feel offended by the way 
‘outsiders’ were treating them. They would also feel reluctant to meet outsiders due to 
their residence in dilapidated neighbourhoods that might have led to the sense of  being 
disadvantaged or excluded. Such feeling was confirmed in Seoul while having a discussion 
with a local NGO leader in Nangok neighbourhood (interviewee KSS7-INW-01). He said 
that some of  the local residents actively working for tenants’ housing rights were hostile 
towards the so-called ‘intellectuals’ who used to come to the neighbourhood for the sake 
of  their own research projects without adequate consultation. In addition, many people 
including some journalists were visiting the neighbourhood to take photographs for 
various reasons before the commencement of  its demolition. For these reasons, it was 
more sensible to conduct interviews through a snowballing (that is, referral) method so 
that I could win the trust of  local residents and overcome the obstacle of  being treated as 
one of  such ‘outsiders.’ 
Interviewees in Beijing 
In Beijing, I initially tried to apply the same snowball sampling strategy. Initially, this 
seemed even more appropriate as I feared it was near impossible to obtain the 
cooperation of  Beijing’s local authorities if  any survey was proposed. The snowball 
sampling, however, turned out to be problematic in Beijing, as it faced additional 
constraints originating from access problems. Arranging interviews with local residents 
was only possible through the coordination of  neighbourhood committee leaders, who 
could have acted as ‘gatekeepers.’ Neighbourhood committee leaders were themselves 
residents, but they also served the government as the lowest branch of  local 
administrative organs. Being aware of  this potential problem, I proposed four main 
categories as above (that is, income status; employment status; relocation status; and 
eligibility for redevelopment compensation) to the local street office and neighbourhood 
committee leaders in order to avoid the situation in which only those relatively better off  
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were recruited. 
In the end, the number of  interviews conducted with residents in coordination with 
neighbourhood committee leaders was somewhat fewer than I had originally envisaged. 
The number of  recruited households decreased on two occasions. First, the local 
authority (that is, Dongzhimen Street Office) scaled down the number of  interviewees at 
the time of  initial negotiation. Second, in the course of  conducting interviews, the 
neighbourhood committee leaders grew weary of  accompanying researchers while 
carrying on with their daily administrative tasks. I eventually agreed to stop recruiting 
more households when I felt I had learnt as much as practical under the constrained 
research circumstances in Beijing. 
Summary of  residents interviewed in Seoul and Beijing 
Table 3-2 shows the distribution of  resident interviewees according to their former 
residence and their household move status at the time of  interviewing. Appendix B1 
shows all the residents interviewed in Seoul and Beijing (Box 3-1 on p.98 explains how the 
coding for interviewees’ identification was constructed by this researcher). In Seoul, 20 
residents were interviewed in total. Eleven of  them were already displaced and relocated 
at the time of  interviewing, and nine were yet to be displaced. In Beijing, 20 residents 
were interviewed in total. Three of  them were displaced from Xiangheyuan 
neighbourhood (also under the administrative control of  Dongzhimen Street Office), 
located adjacent to Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. Because Xinzhongjie and Haiyuncang 
neighbourhood committee leaders found it difficult to contact those displaced to outer 
suburban districts, these former Xiangheyuan residents were recruited in order to 
guarantee the diversity of  interviewees. These three households were displaced from their 
former residence in Xiangheyuan neighbourhood as part of  its redevelopment6 in April 
and May 2001 (Haiyuncang residents were also displaced in this period). One of  the 
twenty households was recruited through my personal acquaintance as neighbourhood 
committee leaders were not able to come up with any households who were temporarily 
re-housed upon displacement. 
                                                 
6 According to a Xiangheyuan neighbourhood committee leader, part of  Xiangheyuan neighbourhood went 
through redevelopment in the summer of  2001, displacing 866 households (44% of  its registered 
households). She stated that re-housing was considered unnecessary as the redevelopment was to construct 
high-rise modern flats called Wanguocheng, which were beyond the reach of  displaced residents. Three 
households interviewed were all displaced from Xiangheyuan neighbourhood in 2001 and moved to an 
outer suburban estate called Yinghuayuan in Shunyi district. 
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Table 3-2: Distribution of resident interviewees as per their former and current place of residence 
 
In Seoul
Status of household move
Moved to relocation rental flats
(in Sillim 2-1 District)
Moved to other neighbourhoods
adjacent to Nangok
Subject to displacement
94 7  
In Beijing
Redevelopment
approach
Subject to
displacement
Re-housed
Moved to near
suburban district
Moved to outer
suburban district
Temporarily
housed
Phase I
area
2 3
ODHRP
(completed)
Phase II
area
9
ODHRP
(yet to start)
2
Revised ODHRP
(completed)
3
ODHRP
(completed)
1
ODHRP
(completed)
Former
residence
(before
displacement/
relocation)
   Xinzhongjie
Current residence (after redevelopment)
   Haiyuncang
   Xiangheyuan
  (adjacent to Xinzhongjie)
   Dongsi
  (adjacent to Haiyuncang)  
Field encounters 
Gaining access 
In this research, gaining access to field research neighbourhoods and recruiting 
interviewees required particular attention. Researchers working in a foreign country often 
become subject to suspicion. As Razavi (1992) noted retrospectively about her research in 
Iran where she came from, she struggled to win the trust of  local people in part because 
she was attached to a Western academic institution as a female researcher. 
“Relationships are not created in a vacuum. Upon entering any community as an 
outsider, various suspicions have to be dispelled, depending on the particular 
circumstances of  the community and the individual researcher”  (Razavi 1992: 154) 
 
In her case, the suspicion ranged from the fear of  espionage to the possibility of  future 
taxation based on the information interviewees were requested to provide (Razavi 1992). 
Razavi’s recommendation was to choose a safe channel to conduct field research, and this 
principle also applied to the field research in Seoul and Beijing. 
In the case of  field research in Nangok neighbourhood in Seoul, the access to the 
neighbourhood was made through a church minister who was well-connected with and 
trusted by Nangok residents. He understood the purpose of  the research, and was eager 
to share the residents’ experiences with regard to the neighbourhood redevelopment with 
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anyone who was sympathetic with the residents’ fate. I was introduced by him to the initial 
batch of  local residents to conduct interviews, and this allowed me to win their trust at 
the early stage of  field research. For instance, an interviewee who was blacklisted by 
financial institutions due to her husband’s credit delinquency record agreed to do an 
interview only because the minister introduced me to her: 
“When the redevelopment of  this neighbourhood began, there were a few 
journalists who came here to do interviews, and I never accepted any request. I 
didn’t want to risk revealing my identity as my family was kind of  hiding away from 
the creditors…I am only doing this interviewee as a favour because the minister 
asked me personally.”   (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01) 
 
The field research in Beijing was more problematic than what was encountered in Seoul. 
The access problems experienced in Beijing were two fold. On the one hand, there was 
the usual issue of  winning the trust of  local residents. On the other hand, there was a 
serious administrative issue, which could have jeopardised the whole research. As a 
foreign researcher, it turned out that it was near impossible to conduct an independent, 
individual research in Beijing, since this required a legal approval from the government 
statistical bureau. The Interim Measures for Administration of  Foreign-related Social 
Survey Activities, which became effective as of  15 August 1999, stated that: 
Article 3 Organisations and individuals from outside the territory, subsidiaries of  
foreign enterprises and resident representative offices of  foreign enterprises within 
the territory and resident institutions in China of  other foreign organisations shall 
not, by their own, conduct such survey activities within the territory of  China. 
Where there is a need to conduct such surveys, they shall be conducted by domestic 
institutions with the qualification of  conducting foreign-related social survey. 
Institutions without such qualification shall not be commissioned for any survey. 
Article 12 The conduct of  foreign-related social survey activities must be submitted 
to the statistical institution’s of  the people’s governments at or above the provincial 
level for review and approval.  (NBS China 2001b) 
 
In order to get around this obstacle, this researcher was based at a government-run 
research institution called the Chinese Academy of  Social Sciences (hereinafter CASS) 
during the field research period. The CASS worked as an umbrella institution for this 
researcher’s field research, and coordinated meetings with local officials and interviews 
with local residents. For the selection of  neighbourhoods and interviewees, the researcher 
made it clear to ensure that all the researcher’s criteria were met while negotiating with the 
local officials. This researcher prepared a guideline for neighbourhood selection, which 
was shared with the CASS before presenting it to the local officials. 
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Influence of  public authority on the research 
In Seoul, there was hardly any influence of  public authority upon this research as there 
was no restriction on carrying out individual research. In Beijing, however, this was not 
the case. As explained above, due to the administrative constraints, the local officials at the 
Dongzhimen Street Office had to be informed, and the interviews with local officials and 
residents were coordinated by the CASS. The arrangement of  actual interviews with local 
residents was further assisted by neighbourhood committee leaders. This process raised 
some concern on two accounts. 
Firstly, the recruitment of  residents through neighbourhood committee leaders left room 
for potential screening. As mentioned earlier, the snowball sampling for recruiting 
interviewees was not feasible in Beijing. Although I made every attempt to make it clear to 
the neighbourhood committee leaders in order to identify and recruit those displacees 
who remained as tenants either in private or public sector after displacement, those 
interviewees who moved to suburban districts turned out to be all owner occupiers. The 
committee leaders said that they could not track back those who remained as tenants in 
private rental sector after displacement. While the difficulty of  tracing all the displaced 
households should be fully acknowledged, their responses were not fully convincing since 
those committee leaders also admitted that most households kept their household 
registration in their former place of  residence. This remained as the limitation of  this 
study, and should be noted when interpreting the interview results. 
In order to supplement this shortfall, I managed to recruit, with difficulties, a couple 
through a personal acquaintance. The couple was displaced from a dilapidated 
neighbourhood close to Haiyuncang neighbourhood in Dongcheng district, and the 
couple was residing temporarily in their father’s residence while searching for the right 
opportunity to buy a house within the district. 
Secondly, there was the possibility that Beijing interviewees were concealing their true 
feelings towards the redevelopment processes and their relationship with the local 
authority. Nine out of  twenty interviews with local residents were conducted in the 
presence of  a neighbourhood committee leader. In this circumstance, there was the 
possibility that the presence of  a neighbourhood committee leader would have ‘toned 
down’ their negative voices towards local officials or government policies. Furthermore, at 
each time of  interviewing, a researcher from the CASS was also present to accompany 
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this researcher. It was possible therefore that the status of  the CASS as the government-
run research institution could have influenced the responsiveness of  interviewees. All in 
all, those interviewees who completed their relocation to suburban districts were less 
enthusiastic to express their views towards the redevelopment. In the case of  those 
interviewees who were subject to imminent redevelopment, they were more ready to voice 
their frustration regardless of  the presence of  neighbourhood committee leaders. When 
the neighbourhood committee leader was present, however, interviewees were tactful 
enough to make comments to ‘save the face’ of  the committee leader as shown below: 
“If  this neighbourhood is to be demolished, I don’t know which compensation 
policy is going to be applied….I ask the committee leader about how much 
[compensation] is to be given out, and she says she doesn't know… She also lives in 
this area, and she must be worried as well... Premier Zhu also explained that the 
redevelopment was to improve residents' living condition. Has it been improved in 
Beijing? According to our current policies, it’s impossible to improve, isn’t it? This 
demolition and displacement method is problematic”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-03) 
 
Coping with unexpected interruption of  research schedule 
In Beijing, the actual interviews with local residents and government officials in field 
research neighbourhoods were originally planned to take place between April and June 
2003. This plan, however, had to be postponed by several months due to the SARS 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic that swept the whole country in the first 
half  of  2003. When the outbreak in Beijing was dramatically disclosed in early April, the 
local authority (Dongzhimen Street Office) was reluctant to invite any outsiders to enter 
their neighbourhoods while they were coping with the epidemic. It was only in late July of  
the same year that the epidemic came under control, and the local authority agreed to 
resume the research work. 
Research ethics and raised expectations 
As Elizabeth Francis noted, “(L)ocal-level research…places the researcher and the 
researched in a social relationship” which raise difficulties in carrying out research since 
the researcher and the researched “bring expectations that are unlikely to coincide” 
(Francis 1992: 86-87). This is particularly the case when carrying out field research and 
interviews in redevelopment neighbourhoods. When the researcher was introduced to the 
local community in Beijing by the local government as mentioned above, it was possible 
that the researcher could be regarded as a government representative, and treated as such 
to express the residents’ on-going concern in relation to the redevelopment. 
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In fact, instead of  under-reporting their concern towards the neighbourhood 
redevelopment, some interviewees were expressive of  their needs and expectations in a 
hope that their voices could be delivered to the local authority via the researcher. Two of  
the interviewees in Beijing were very eager to do the interview as they thought we were 
government representatives. They became much less enthusiastic when it became clear 
that we were not related to the local authority. These interviewees initially thought that 
they could take the opportunity to explain their frustration towards the developer and the 
estate management company. Another interviewee initially refused to do the interview as 
she mistook us for having come from the developer. All these suggested that the research 
visits to a redevelopment neighbourhood could have influenced residents’ views. 
In Seoul, it was also evident that residents in the field research neighbourhood hoped to 
use the interview as a chance to express concern regarding their neighbourhood 
redevelopment. The tone, however, was different from Beijing. Most interviewees were 
aware that the researcher’s field research would not make any difference to their situation. 
Instead, they were making suggestions and recommendations from their own perspectives 
so that these could be summarised by someone like the researcher to be written and 
publicised for future reference. 
At the beginning of  every interview, the researcher made it clear that we were not from 
the government, that the interview was only part of  research activities, and that their 
views and identity would remain anonymous and confidential. A form was prepared for 
each interviewee to sign in order to gain their consent for the use of  interview material 
for this research. These processes helped them understand the purpose of  the research 
and interviews. 
Overcoming language barriers in Beijing 
Another problem of  conducting field research in a foreign environment was the linguistic 
barrier. By the time of  conducting interviews with local residents and officials, the 
researcher was well aware of  local customs and code of  conducts by being exposed to the 
culture for a number of  months prior to these interviews. The researcher was also 
relatively fluent in standard Mandarin Chinese. Nevertheless, the use of  strong local 
dialectics by the local residents raised concern for potential misunderstanding. In order to 
minimise this, two provisions were made. Firstly, a questionnaire was prepared to collect 
the basic information regarding the interviewees’ household details and housing 
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conditions. The questionnaire was based on the interview schedule employed in Seoul. 
Secondly, all the interviews were tape-recorded for future retrieval. The recording was all 
performed with each interviewee’s consent. 
 
3.3 Data analysis 
This research is based on the data collected from local documents and archival records, 
on-site observation and semi-structured interviews with local residents and key actors. 
Due to the nature of  comparative case study approach that this research adopted, such 
data were diverse and rich in quality. From the early stage of  research design, data 
collected and compiled were cross-checked against each other by means of  triangulation 
to ensure the rigour of  this research. “Triangulation means gathering and analysing data 
from more than one source to gain a fuller perspective on the situation you are 
investigating” (Lacey and Luff 2001: 23). This method proved to be particularly useful and 
effective in this research as one type of data was far from adequate to establish a full 
picture of redevelopment projects. The analysis of field data involved transcribing the 
interviews, classifying the collected data, preliminary coding and developing a framework 
for further comparison and thematic classification. 
Transcription 
As Pfaffenberger notes, the act of writing up is “an important form of  data analysis and 
theoretical discovery” since researchers reconstruct the snapshots from the field 
encounter to establish internal coherence (Pfaffenberger 1988: 26). The interviews with 
local residents and key actors constituted an important part of the data collection in this 
research. Most interviews were tape-recorded with the consent from interviewees, and 
were transcribed verbatim. When interviews were not tape-recorded, the researcher made 
hand-written notes in as much detail as possible, and these notes were written up right 
after each interview not to lose any details while still vivid in the memory. When the 
researcher encountered casual contacts or engaged in casual conversation with local 
residents, the researcher tried to produce verbatim transcriptions of such activities. For 
these activities, the researcher kept field research journals and took photographs to ensure 
the loss of detail was minimised. 
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Classifying the data 
The field data collected were organised by assigning document identification numbers. 
One example would be the classification of interview transcripts according to each 
resident interviewee’s identification number coded by the system explained in Box 3-1 
below. The coding was devised to identify a resident interviewee according to his/her 
place of residence (area), method of recording (date type) and sequence of interviewing 
(sequence). This method was used to ensure easy retrieval when analysing as well as to 
protect interviewees’ anonymity. 
Box 3-1: Identification of residents interviewed 
 
The researcher created the following assignment system to identify each interviewee.
The identification is composed of three parts: Area – Data type – Sequence
Area: Country - City – Administrative District
Country C for mainland China K for South Korea
City B for Beijing S for Seoul
Admin. district where interviewees were living at the time of interviewing
S7 for Sillim 7-dong in Seoul, where Nangok neighbourhood is located
S6 for Sillim 6-dong and S10 for Sillim 10-dong in Seoul, where Nangok residents
moved to upon displacement
X for Xinzhongjie neighbourhood in Beijing
K for Kangjiagou neighbourhood in near suburban Beijing, where some of 
Xinzhongjie residents moved to upon displacement
H for Haiyuncang neighbourhood in Beijing
Y for Yingheyuan neighbourhood in outer suburban Beijing, where some of
Xiangheyuan residents moved to upon displacement
H for Haiyuncang neighbourhood in Beijing
D6 for Dongsi 6-tiao in Beijing
Data type: INT for tape recording
INW for note-taking without tape recording
Sequence: 01, 02, 03…
An example of interviewee identification:
Interviewee CBX-INT-01 would refer to an interviewee living in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood in Beijing. The interview was tape-recorded.  
Following a similar approach, all electronic and non-electronic field research data 
including photographs were also organised thematically for ease of retrieval at the stage of 
analysis and writing-up (see Appendix C for the details). 
Coding and developing a framework for interview analysis 
The transcripts of interviews with local residents were analysed by means of the 
framework analysis, which is increasingly used in the analysis of qualitative research (Lacey 
and Luff 2001: 9-13; Spencer et al. 2003). According to Lacey and Luff (2001: 9-10), there 
are five main stages to develop to conduct a framework analysis: (1) familiarisation; (2) 
identification of a thematic framework; (3) indexing; (4) charting; and (5) mapping and 
interpretation. 
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For this research, themes were produced on the basis of the interview schedule, and then 
were arranged in a case chart produced in a spreadsheet format. That is, themes are 
arranged in columns, and cases in rows. In this research, each case would refer to each 
interviewee. Once this chart was established, this researcher went through each interview 
transcript carefully to index those verbatim accounts by the interviewees and chart them 
in the corresponding cell. Once these were completed, the contents under each theme 
were compared across cases to identify “patterns, associations, concepts, and 
explanations” (Lacey and Luff 2001: 11). Figure 3-6 below shows the themes used for the 
indexing and charting. 
Figure 3-6: Themes for indexing and charting residents' interviews 
 
A. Household circumstances and conditions
A-1 Household circumstances
A-2 Household constraints
B. Housing experience and history
C. (In Beijing) Housing reform measures and their influences upon interviewing households
D. Description of current residence and the method of its acquisition
D-1 Housing conditions of current residence (inc. in-house utilities and services)
D-2 Method of acquisition of current residence
E. Views on living in current house
F. Views on life in the neighbourhood
G. Reasons for choosing current place of residence
H. Attempts to solve housing problems
I. Commuting method to work or school
J. Social Network and participation
J-1 Local environment / Amenities
J-2 Participation in neighbourhood activities
J-3 Support Network
K. Description of previous residence and the method of its acquisition
K-1 Housing conditions of previous residence
K-2 Method of acquisition of previous residence
L. Finding an alternative house to live after displacement
L-1 Expectation level for relocation dwellings
L-2 Opportunities for housing mortgage (or bank loan)
L-3 Concerns for living in new flats after relocation
L-4 Difficulties in finding an alternative residence to live
M. Displacement and relocation
M-1 Negative experiences regarding displacement and relocation
M-2 Access to information on redevelopment schedule (including displacement)
M-3 Attitudes toward neighbourhood redevelopment
N. Views on urban renewal policies
O. Views on local authorities
P. Expectation of re-housing after redevelopment
Q. Redevelopment compensation
Q-1 Expectation for the type of compensation
Q-2 Alternative way of using cash compensation  
Analysis and tabulation 
Wherever possible, residents’ responses were quantified or precisely coded. Such 
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responses included their household characteristics (e.g. number of  co-habiting households, 
gender, age, education attainment), employment status (e.g. regular, temporary, 
unemployed), and housing conditions (e.g. tenure status, dwelling size). These were coded 
into the SPSS for Windows software for the ease of  producing descriptive statistics if  
necessary. 
Access to other raw data 
As mentioned earlier, the field research data from Seoul was further aided by a set of  raw 
survey data from a local welfare centre whose service area covered Nangok 
neighbourhood. The data were supplied with a code book produced by the Centre. They 
were used to support part of  the arguments in Chapter 8 of  this thesis which discuss the 
changes in housing experiences of  Nangok residents after their displacement. In most 
cases, the researcher carried out descriptive statistical analysis, but in some cases such as 
the comparison of  rent levels before and after house-moving, a paired-samples T-test was 
performed. These were all conducted using the SPSS for Windows software. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Emphases on redevelopment processes and local contexts led this research to adopt a 
multiple case study approach that involved nesting a neighbourhood within a wider 
context. Such an approach enabled me to examine how a developer-led partnership in a 
neighbourhood redevelopment unfolded within local contexts against the backdrop of  
wider socio-economic processes. International comparative research on cities which 
developed in different urban contexts is a challenge, which requires strenuous efforts but 
provides a rich understanding of  their shared experiences. In conducting research in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, I came up against numerous constraints including access 
problems, data collection, and research ethics and raised expectations. The research 
methodology covering neighbourhood selection, data collection and analysis was carefully 
chosen and designed to overcome such constraints while ensuring consistency and rigour. 
The research methodology itself  adds competency and strength to this research in 
comparison with other previous research on urban redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing, as 
this research established a direct dialogue with key actors and, most of  all, residents in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods. The following chapters present findings of  this research, 
and begin with the examination of  residents’ living conditions before redevelopment. 
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This chapter addresses my first research question: to find out what kind of  physical and 
social conditions residents were exposed to before redevelopment. These findings were 
expected to serve two purposes. Firstly, to help us better understand the operation of  
developers and local authority intervention in neighbourhood redevelopment, which is 
embedded within local contexts. Secondly, to provide information on local residents that 
could be used to determine the benefits of  neighbourhood redevelopment from residents’ 
perspective. 
The data for this chapter largely come from my own observations during the field 
research visits to redevelopment neighbourhoods in 2002 and 2003, and also from my 
interviews with local residents. In the case of  Seoul, this research also benefited from the 
raw survey data provided by a local welfare centre (that is, Sillim Welfare Centre), which 
carried out a questionnaire survey of  156 households displaced from the neighbourhood 
where I also conducted my field research. Physical and social conditions discussed herein 
are largely taken from Nangok neighbourhood in Seoul, and Xinzhongjie neighbourhood 
(second phase redevelopment area) in Beijing, which were yet to face demolition at the 
time of  my field research. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first two sections are devoted to 
Seoul and Beijing respectively. For each city, four main topics are discussed: (1) 
demographic and geographic conditions of  field research neighbourhoods placed in wider 
urban contexts; (2) formation and growth of  field research neighbourhoods; (3) 
neighbourhoods’ physical conditions with emphasis on housing form and in-house 
facilities; and (4) residents’ social conditions, covering their occupational structure, poverty 
and housing tenure. The last section sums up the findings of  this chapter. 
 
4.1 Living conditions in Seoul 
Seoul, Gwanak district and Urban Redevelopment 
Gwanak district in Seoul, where Nangok neighbourhood was located, first became part of  
Seoul in 1961 when the municipality was pursuing a rapid expansion of  its administrative 
jurisdiction. At the time of  incorporation, the district was largely rural. It had just over ten 
thousand residents in 1965, but grew very rapidly to become a densely populated district. 
By 1975, the total population reached 326,393 with a population density of  12,612 people 
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per km2 (SMG 1976: 30). By 1980, the population density reached 18,227 people per km2 
and since then, it has been stable (GDG 1986: 28-29). 
According to the district government’s own account, such demographic expansion in the 
1970s was largely due to the mass relocation of  evictees from more centrally located 
districts in Seoul. This was said to be experienced similarly by other newly incorporated 
municipal districts in the periphery (GDG 1997: 280-281). Indeed, the provision of  
relocation sites to accommodate those evictees was extensively practiced in Gwanak 
district until the early 1970s. For instance, during the five year period between 1964 and 
1968, 11,660 households in total were relocated in Gwanak district after their eviction 
from central Seoul (GDG 1997: 283). Considering that the average number of  household 
members in Seoul in 1970 was five persons (SMG 1971b), this would equate to about 
60,000 people, which meant that half  of  the district population increase between 1965 
and 1970 came from the resettlement of  these evictees. 
Figure 4-1: Population density of districts in Seoul (as of the end of 1997) 
(SMG 1998b: 70, 82-83) 
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Figure 4-1 above shows the population density of  each district in Seoul by the end of  
1997. Gwanak district turned out to be the 14th most densely populated district. Gwanak 
district was, however, one of  the few districts in Seoul with a heavy concentration of  
forestry within its jurisdiction. If  the forestry area was not included, the population 
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density of  Gwanak district surged from 18,087 to 44,102 people/km2, becoming the most 
densely populated in Seoul.7 
The progress of  urban redevelopment in Gwanak district was slow in the 1970s. In 
December 1973, when the municipal government announced the designation of  196 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, 12 were from Gwanak district (GDG 1997: 291). 
However, for the next ten years, as was the case for the whole municipality, redevelopment 
was hardly initiated in these designated neighbourhoods due to the problems with project 
financing. It was only with the commencement of  the Joint Redevelopment Programme 
(hereafter JRP) in Seoul that the neighbourhood redevelopment was actively promoted. 
Table 4-1 below shows the details of  JRP projects completed in Gwanak district by 
December 2004. In total, 13 projects were completed, subjecting 94.6 hectare of  surface 
area and demolishing 10,605 units of  dilapidated dwellings. This accounted for about 17% 
of  total dwelling stock available in the district by 1985 (GDG 2000: 86). Upon project 
completion, 23,008 flats were provided, a 117% increase in terms of  the number of  
dwellings. 
Table 4-1: Details of JRP project completion in Gwanak district (as of December 2004) 
(Housing Bureau of GDG 2005: 198-199; Housing Bureau of SMG 2005) 
Year Number of projects
completed
Surface
area
(m2)
Number of dwellings
demolished
(units)
Number of
new flats supplied
(units)
1988 1 15,391 215 251
… … … … …
1992 2 108,381 596 2,266
1993 3 112,292 1,520 2,856
… … … … …
2000 4 325,789 4,281 9,265
… … … … …
2003 1 264,225 1,954 5,387
2004 2 119,521 2,039 2,983
Total 13 945,599 10,605 23,008  
Formation and growth of Nangok neighbourhood 
In terms of  administration, Nangok neighbourhood belonged to Sillim 7-dong, which was 
                                                 
7 By the end of  1997, about 59% of  the district’s administrative land was designated as forestry area (SMG 
1998b: 70). In Seoul, a substantial share (26%) of  municipal land was taken up by forestry areas, which were 
largely consisted of  mountains and hills along the periphery (SMG 2001b: 72). As of  the end of  December 
2000, 70% of  these forestry areas were protected from development in accordance with the Urban Planning 
Act (SMG 2002c). 
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one of  the sub-districts of  Gwanak district. Sillim 7-dong consisted of  three main 
neighbourhoods as shown in Figure 4-2 below. 
Figure 4-2: Sillim 7-dong in Gwanak district and Nangok 
(Original map from Lee 1989) 
 
 
 
Nangok was formed along a hillside whose slope could be as steep as 45 degrees. Nangok 
redevelopment neighbourhood adjoined Sillim Redevelopment District 7. The latter 
redevelopment district had about 200 dwelling units, and obtained government 
authorisation in September 2002 to implement its redevelopment. Whereas 92.6% of  
Nangok redevelopment neighbourhood was public land with the majority of  dwelling 
owners having no formal land tenure, the land within Sillim Redevelopment District 7 was 
largely privately owned. This explains why Nangok redevelopment area in the cadastral 
map above largely remained empty with no signs of  dwellings. The remaining area of  
Sillim 7-dong included formal dwellings built in the 1980s, and was not subject to 
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redevelopment. Figure 4-3 in the next page shows some of  the views of  Sillim 7-dong. 
In the 1960s, when evictees from central Seoul were relocated to Gwanak district, 
dwellings prepared by the municipal government were hastily done. Their standard was far 
from adequate. For instance, in 1963, 45 one-storey buildings were prepared to 
accommodate 450 displaced households. Each household was allocated to a floor space 
of  13 m2, having only one bedroom and a kitchen (GDG 1997: 281). Not all the displaced 
households were given a completed dwelling. Many were only allocated to a barren site 
where land preparation was performed to the minimum. Evictees were left to build their 
own dwellings at their own expense. 
Nangok was designated in 1968 as a relocation site for about 2,700 households, evicted 
from various inner city districts of  Seoul (GDG 1997: 649). When the evicted families 
arrived at Nangok, each family was allocated to a piece of  land along the hillside. Each lot 
measured about 25 m2. The intention was that evicted families could start building a 
dwelling at their own expense. Interviewees who had been living in Nangok since its first 
establishment reported similar experiences of  eviction and relocation. For instance: 
“I was in my second year of  primary school when we were evicted and built a new 
house here. It’s been more than 30 years since then, since 1968…I came home after 
school, and my house was gone. I looked for my mom, and on a main road, there 
were my mom and dad, on a vehicle that resembled one of  those garbage trucks. 
That night, we came here, and the life in Nangok began.” 
  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-02) 
 
“I first came to Nangok in 1968 with my wife and children. At that time, it was all 
mountainous…We evictees were allocated to a parcel of  land that was roughly a 5-
metre square. The boundary was marked by lime powder and each parcel was 
numbered so that it was allocated to a family by drawing a number. There was no 
other thing apart from the barren land, so we had to erect a tent as a makeshift.” 
  (Interviewee KSS10-INT-03) 
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Figure 4-3: Various views of Sillim 7-dong including Nangok 
(Photos taken by the author in 2002) 
 
 
 
 
Point D.
View to the north showing a steep 
thoroughfare
Point C.
A few more steps further up from Point B, and 
the street becomes much narrower, and turns 
into an alley just enough for a car to drive 
through
Point B.   Uphill view to the south. Nangok 
redevelopment neighbourhood is effectively hidden 
behind the low-rise commercial buildings along the 
street
Point A.
Formal housing outside Nangok neighbourhood
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 Figure 4-3: Various views of Sillim 7-dong including Nangok (continued)
Point E.  View to the north. The area below white line is Nangok redevelopment 
neighbourhood
Point F.  View to the east
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Nangok neighbourhood expanded in the 1970s and 1980s, absorbing many poor families 
and new migrants from rural areas. According to a municipal report in 1991 on Nangok, 
there were in total 4,416 households in the neighbourhood, accommodated in 2,732 illegal 
dwellings (SMG 1991: 186). The total resident population reached 16,734 people, which 
was about two thirds of  the total population of  Sillim 7-dong (GDG 1996: 28). Nangok 
itself  occupied less than 20% of  Sillim 7-dong area, which indicated that the resulting 
population density of  Nangok could have been as high as 107,753 people per km2 (SMG 
1991: 186). This suggested excessively crowded conditions, and was far higher than 
Gwanak district’s average of  19,381 people per km2 (GDG 1996: 28). 
Nangok was originally designated as a redevelopment neighbourhood in 1973, but the 
designation was lifted in 1982 as no further government action was carried out to initiate 
renewal work in the neighbourhood. With the commencement of  the JRP in the mid-
1980s, rumours were spread around the neighbourhood that a JRP project would take 
place soon in the neighbourhood. It was only in 1995, however, that Nangok was 
designated as a JRP district, and that a redevelopment steering committee was approved 
by the district government as the first step of  project implementation. The lack of  formal 
land tenure for most dwellings in the neighbourhood and rumours about potential 
redevelopment in the 1980s and early 1990s created unfavourable conditions for 
neighbourhood expansion, limiting any further growth or physical improvement. 
Nevertheless, Nangok remained a large community. By 1996, a year before the formal 
approval of  redevelopment comprehensive plan, the total number of  residents in the 
neighbourhood still reached 14,640, with a population density of  85,364 people per km2 
(GDA 1996). The number of  dwelling turned out to be 2,609 units. All but nine units 
were without formal land tenure (GDA 1996). 
Physical conditions 
Dwelling form and housing space 
As was mentioned earlier, the evictees who settled down in Nangok in 1968 were first 
allocated to a piece of  land whose size was only about 8 pyeong (an indigenous term often 
quoted by local residents; 1 pyeong is 3.3058 m2 in metric terms). Families mobilised their 
own resources to self-build homes. As the neighbourhood population increased, 
transactions also took place among the residents, which sometimes led to the merging of  
two dwellings into one to allow more residential space (SMG 1991: 188). The original 
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dwelling space of  8 pyeong (26 m2), however, came to be the dominant feature of  physical 
housing standard. Close to two thirds of  all dwellings in Nangok turned out to have a 
dwelling space of  8 pyeong or less. Sharing a dwelling with a multiple number of  
households was common due to frequent sub-letting. A dwelling was occupied on the 
average by 1.6 households, thus each household enjoyed 17 m2 of  floor space on average 
(SMG 1991: 181). Another study found that there were 1.8 households per dwelling, each 
household occupying about 22 m2 of  floor space (Lee 1989: 13). Both findings suggested 
that the dwelling space enjoyed by Nangok residents was far from reaching the urban 
average of  48.3 m2 per household in 1990 (NSO Korea 2001d: 333). Figure 4-4 shows 
some examples of  existing dwelling layout. 
Figure 4-4: Some examples of existing dwelling layout in Nangok 
(Lee 1989: 29) 
 
A former owner occupier, whose dwelling space used to be less than 8 pyeong during their 
residence in Nangok neighbourhood, recollected that she used to sub-let one of  her two 
bedrooms to receive rent income. With four sons and her husband, they were cramped 
into one bedroom: 
“I wish we were to use two bedrooms [at that time]. One [of  the two bedrooms] 
was sub-let, and we lived in one bedroom. So, what can I say, we were extremely 
poor… My husband, he couldn’t make any money, didn’t have any capacity for living. 
But, he didn’t let me find a job. Not even once. He was saying women should stay at 
home…So, there was no room for children to study. In that small room, with one 
bedroom sub-let, it was difficult even to sleep…Then, after my husband passed 
away [16 years ago], I started to work, saved some money, and turned the tenants 
out of  the house. Afterwards, it was so comfortable. Children slept together in the 
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other bedroom, and I slept alone, or sometimes with one or two children…” 
 (Interviewee KSS10-INT-01) 
 
The analysis of  Sillim Welfare Centre’s survey data indicates that the average housing 
space of  113 respondents before their displacement from Nangok neighbourhood turned 
out to be 37.8 m2 (see Table 4-2 below). This was still lower than the urban average of  
61.3 m2 in 2000, but much higher than the 1991 estimate. This could be explained by the 
decrease in the total number of  on-site residents throughout the 1990s. Households came 
to occupy a whole dwelling on their own rather than co-habiting with another household. 
“I started my family in 1986. I have two children, a 15-year-old son and a 13-year-
old daughter. Both are in junior high school in the vicinity…When we were living in 
Nangok before relocation, the house [with a construction space of  less than 26m2] 
originally had one bedroom, and we subdivided it into two. We used one room as a 
storage space, and four of  us all lived in one bedroom…The condition of  the 
previous house was so appalling, and it was very small. It didn’t even have a toilet, so 
we had to use our neighbour’s…”   (Interviewee KSS7-INT-18) 
 
“The house [rented by the interviewee in Nangok at the time of  interviewing] has 
two bedrooms…The rent was cheaper here in this upper hill-side than down there. 
Also, the landlord didn’t want to leave the house empty, as the house might collapse 
if  the house had no warmth…”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-03) 
 
 
Table 4-2: Dwelling floor space in Nangok neighbourhood before redevelopment 
Unit: m2
Valid responses 
(households)
Mean
Standard 
deviation
Valid responses 
(households)
Mean
Standard 
deviation
Valid responses 
(households)
Mean
Standard 
deviation
113 37.8 15.20 26 42.3 16.83 87 36.5 14.57
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey in Summer 2002
Owner occupiers TenantsTotal
 
Dwelling conditions and facilities 
Nangok neighbourhood was connected by a web of  narrow alleys, which were often not 
more than two or three metres wide at the most (see previous Figure 4-4). For residents, 
getting from one place to another within the neighbourhood was not a problem if  they 
were able to navigate through the web, but the steep slope made uphill journeys on foot 
difficult, especially for the elderly. Few roads were capable of  allowing through traffic, 
which therefore hampered the approach of  vehicle in times of  fire or medical emergency. 
Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 in the following pages provide some visual examples of  physical 
conditions of  Nangok neighbourhood and its dwellings. 
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Figure 4-5: Various views of Nangok’s physical conditions before demolition 
(Photos taken by the author in 2002) 
 
  
(a) View of an alley. The letters on the 
wall say “do not dump rubbish here”
(b) View of an alley. LPG cylinders are 
stacked against the wall, and electric and 
telephone cables are hanging above roof
(c) Exterior wall of a house covered with slate 
sheets. Elevated foundation due to the slope
(c) View of a slope way (d) Temporary toilets
(e) Rear wall of the house on the right lower than 
road surface. No sun light through rear window
(f) View of public toilets provided and 
managed by the local authority.
(g) Roof-top extension along the main thoroughfare (h) Another example of a roof-top extension
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Figure 4-6: An example of a dwelling's physical conditions in Nangok 
(Photos taken by the author in 2002) 
 
  
A
B
C D
E
Point A.  Exterior view. Exhausted briquettes are 
stacked against the wall. The number ‘2419’ is a 
dwelling identification number attributed by the 
developer.
Point C.  Bedroom #1, used by the interviewee’s daughter Point D.  View of kitchen
Point B.  Entry area, also used for washing-up, 
with a kitchen sink in the middle. The vertical 
pipe in the foreground is from a briquette stove
Point E.  View of bedroom #2, 
used by the interviewee
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Within the neighbourhood, the most frequently found dwelling type was a one-storey 
dwelling whose floor space was not more than what was originally assigned at the time of  
initial settlement in the late 1960s. Each dwelling consisted of  one or two bedrooms and a 
kitchen area. Indoor flush toilets were rarely found. The pictures and floor plan in Figure 
4-6 above show a typical example of  what such a dwelling would look like. Wherever 
possible, residents built a backhouse to have a private access to toilet, but the odour was 
hard to endure. Over the years, the local authority provided public toilets, and where 
permanent structure was hard to be built, installed temporary ones. An interviewee made 
a comment seasoned with humour that “public toilets are the finest” in Nangok 
(Interviewee KSS7-INT-05). These public toilets were more commonly found as one 
walked further uphill: 
“People living further up there used public toilets. There, 1 out of  4 houses had a 
toilet of  its own...We are located in the middle, and usually toilets are outside the 
main entrance [of  each house]. In our case, our toilet seemed to have been originally 
outside the house, next to the gate, but the previous occupants must have pushed 
the front door further outward so that the toilet came inside the walls 
”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01) 
 
At an individual household level, dwelling upgrading was carried out over the years in 
various ways. Coal-fired heating and cooking system was replaced with oil-fired heating 
system and/or LPG-connected (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) cooking facility. When LPG 
was used, gas cylinders were placed against the wall outside each house. This was a 
dangerous, but inevitable, setting, because electric cookers were hardly used in South 
Korea. It was difficult to carry out underground piping work to install feed pipes for 
conventional LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) supply system around the neighbourhood due 
to the steep slope and high building density. 
When a dwelling was wholly rented out, tenants had to carry out maintenance and 
adjustment works in order to fix equipment and facilities that were abandoned or out of  
order. Especially in the 1990s, landlords were anticipating a redevelopment project to take 
place in Nangok in the immediate future. Housing maintenance was carried out just 
enough to prevent a dwelling from collapsing, in which case the concerned landlord 
would not be able to fully claim his/her rights in a redevelopment project. This was 
because, as mentioned earlier, the dwellings in the neighbourhood were largely absent of  
formal land tenure. Under such circumstances, maintenance and repair works had become 
largely a burden for tenants to bear. A typical situation for tenants who signed a new 
tenancy contract was described by interviewees as follows: 
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“This house [in Nangok] was vacant at the time of  our moving-in [in October 1997], 
and was like in ruins. We had to fix the house and repair the boiler 
ourselves…There was nothing in this house. The boiler was out of  order, and the 
roof  was near collapsing...”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01) 
 
“Our house has two rooms and about 33 m2 of  floor space. It has a small yard in 
front. The landlord said it used to be an empty plot, and he built a wall around it for 
his own use…There was no toilet at the time of  our house moving-in [in 1995]. My 
husband was in construction business, so he built one himself. Of  course it was just 
like a backhouse, a simple brick structure with a roof, and no tiling…Kitchen was 
like a semi-basement due to the slope. It’s awfully small and very inconvenient…We 
installed the boiler ourselves. Originally the heating was by coal, but it smelled a lot. 
Because we were raising children, we spent a lot of  money as there was no other 
choice. The landlords in this neighbourhood [Nangok] don’t do such things even if  
you ask them. So, we squeezed our money, and it was worthwhile as we have lived 
here for several years…Any repair work for the piping or electricity all had to be 
taken care of  by us. The landlords never show up. They simply trade the property 
between themselves, and you never know who the landlord is…” 
  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-02) 
 
Social conditions 
Residents in urban renewal areas and also in Nangok neighbourhood showed a high 
incidence of  non-regular jobs and unemployment. This is well demonstrated in Table 4-3 
below, which summarised three studies.8 Between 40% and 55% of  residents were either 
unemployed or engaged in jobs that could be regarded as precarious and unstable in terms 
of  job security (see the shaded rows in the table). The proportion of  office or factory 
workers (top three job categories in the table) reached 23% in the 1991 study, and much 
lower in the case of  Nangok residents. 
To some extent, this reflected the characteristics of  South Korea’s labour market, which 
was noted for its low share of  employees in regular/permanent jobs (OECD 2000: 33-39). 
Even then, the rate of  unemployment as shown in Table 4-3 turned out to be far higher 
than the national average. The national unemployment rate was effectively kept under 3% 
since 1988 until the national economy was hit by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 (NSO 
Korea 2001d: 196). The unemployment rate of  6.8% in 1998, which was the highest 
                                                 
8 In Table 4-3, three studies are introduced: the 1991 study published by the Seoul Municipal Government 
was to examine the housing situation of  low-income residents residing in low-income neighbourhoods 
including urban renewal districts through the selection of  several case study sites (SMG 1991). The other 
two studies were conducted by Sillim Welfare Centre, once in April 2000 and again in June 2002. The study 
in April 2000 was to look at the living conditions and find out the needs of  the residents in Nangok 
neighbourhood (Sillim Welfare Centre 2000). Because the study was conducted before the large-scale 
displacement took place, it provided a latest insight into the profile of  the residents before displacement. 
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during the last three decades, was still much lower than what was experienced in urban 
renewal neighbourhoods including Nangok. 
Table 4-3: Occupational structure of residents in urban renewal areas including Nangok 
 
Job category
 Administrative work 190 12.7% 12 4.5% 22 5.5%
 Factory work 95 6.4% 23 8.7% 10 2.5%
 Managerial/supervisory 57 3.8% 9 3.4% 4 1.0%
 Service and sales 109 7.3% 50 18.9% 34 8.5%
 Self-employed 67 4.5% n.a. n.a. 10 2.5%
 Peddlers/handicraftsmen 21 1.4% n.a. n.a. 2 0.5%
 Manual labour (casual/construction) 154 10.3% 68 25.8% 54 13.5%
 Unemployed4) 420 28.1% 54 20.5% 78 19.5%
 Unpaid family work n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 70 17.5%
 Public work (NBLS-based) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16 4.0%
 Students 320 21.4% n.a. n.a. 72 18.0%
 Others 62 4.1% 48 18.2% 29 7.2%
 Total 1495 100.0% 264 100.0% 401 100.0%
April 20002) June 20023)19911)
(Household head only)(All household members) (All household members)
Note: 1) SMG (1991); 2) Sillim Welfare Centre (2000); 3) Sillim Welfare Centre (2002); 4) The number of unemployed workers may
also include unpaid family workers in the case of the studies by Sillim Welfare Centre in 2000, and by Seoul Metropolitan
Government in 1991, as unpaid family workers do not appear as an independent category.
Displacees from Nangok
neighbourhood
Residents in Nangok
neigbhourhood
before displacement
Residents in urban
renewal areas
 
The 2002 survey on displaced households by the Sillim Welfare Centre provided another 
interesting piece of  information on the job status of  Nangok residents. It was found that 
only 39.2% of  all the employed household members had full-time permanent positions, 
and 19.0% were working full-time but temporarily employed. The proportion of  those 
working on hourly or daily basis among all those household members employed was 
estimated to be 39.2% (Sillim Welfare Centre 2002). 
In South Korea, the major means-tested social assistance programme is called the 
National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) system. It was put into operation in October 
2000, replacing the Livelihood Protection Programme that was in practice since 1961. The 
NBLS system was an attempt by the central government to re-align its existing social 
assistance programmes in line with the principle of  ‘productive welfare’ (for more 
information, see Lee et al. 2001: 59-81; OECD 2000: 127-143). By the end of  2000, the 
total number of  NBLS beneficiaries in Gwanak district reached 4,570 households, or 
2.4% of  all the households in the district. The proportion of  NBLS beneficiaries was 
much higher in Sillim 7-dong, where Nangok was located, having reached 14.1% (GDG 
2001a: 38-39, 138). The second highest figure, experienced in Bongcheon 5-dong, reached 
only 6.7% (ibid). This suggests that poverty was more likely to be prevalent among the 
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residents in Sillim 7-dong than in any other sub-district within Gwanak district. The high 
proportion of  NBLS beneficiaries was also witnessed among the displacees from Nangok. 
Among 2,067 households displaced from the neighbourhood between September 2000 
and March 2002, 12% were NBLS beneficiaries (Sillim Welfare Centre 2002: 10-11). 
Housing tenure 
According to the data provided by the Housing Bureau of  the Gwanak district 
government, there were in total 2,450 households in Nangok neighbourhood by the end 
of  2000. Of  these, 421 households were owner-occupiers, suggesting a very high 
proportion of  absentee landlords (83.1%) (GDG 2001b). Such low proportion of  owner 
occupation was in contrast with the general tenure distribution in Seoul where about 40% 
of  all the municipal households were owner-occupiers (NSO Korea 2001a). The dominant 
form of  rental tenure in Seoul was called Chonsei in Korean which I explain below, 
accounting for two thirds of  tenant households in the city (41% of  total municipal 
households). The remaining tenants were mostly in deposit-based monthly rental tenure. 
The popularity of  Chonsei tenure in Seoul is also witnessed in Nangok neighbourhood, as 
Table 4-4 below indicated. 
Table 4-4: Nangok residents’ pre-displacement tenure status 
 
Owner occupation Chonsei Deposit-based monthly rent
22.4% 69.4% 8.2%(Valid responses N = 134)
Source: Data from Sillim Welfare Centre study in summer 2002
Pre-relocation tenure status
 
Chonsei in Korea requires a substantial amount of  up-front costs as key money or deposit 
upon signing a contract, and does not require monthly rent payment. This key money is 
returned to tenants in full at the end of  their contract, and could be used in part or in full 
as key money for the tenants’ subsequent Chonsei contract or housing contract (Renaud 
1989: 12).9 As for the deposit-based monthly rental tenure, it occurs usually when tenants 
                                                 
9 This key money is usually invested by landlords in formal and informal financial market, and their 
“interest earning represents an imputed rent” (Ha 2002: 197). The real value of  the key money may be 
depreciated in line with price inflation, and the tenants are to give up the opportunity to gain interest 
income. For the landlords, Chonsei tenure works as “a source of  funds,” and “exemplifies the inherent 
qualities of  residential real estate as collateral. Instead of  borrowing from a bank against this collateral, the 
owner of  the dwelling is receiving a loan from his tenant (or tenants)” (Renaud 1989: 13). Landlords often 
use “the deposit to pay for real estate or business activities” and if  not, deposit the money “with an informal 
dealer on the curb market” that may yield high interests (Renaud 1989: 13). 
 118
are in shortage of  imposed Chonsei key money. If  agreed with their landlords, some of  
the key money is turned into monthly rents. Because there is no regular monthly rent 
payment involved with Chonsei, it provides relatively stable tenure security during the 
contract period even if  they do not have regular income. The amount of  Chonsei deposit 
is often increased upon renewal of  its contract. If  tenants are able to meet this renewed 
demand from their landlords, the increased Chonsei deposit would be equated to an 
increase in the tenants’ accumulated savings. In this way, it works as “a contractual savings 
scheme” by functioning as “a vehicle for self-imposed savings and asset accumulation” 
(Renaud 1989: 12). 
When residents were residing in Nangok neighbourhood before displacement, two major 
advantages were their low spending on housing costs, and the relatively secure and 
affordable housing provided by Chonsei tenure. The average amount of  Chonsei deposit 
was estimated to be KRW 7,834,000 during their residence in Nangok neighbourhood 
(Sillim Welfare Centre 2002). This was about 73% of  average annual disposable income 
for the bottom 20% of  income decile for salary and wage earners’ households in 2001 
(NSO Korea 2002a). 
Summary 
This section has examined the neighbourhood formation and growth, living conditions of  
the residents in Nangok neighbourhood before its full-scale redevelopment. It was shown 
that Nangok was initially established as a relocation site for evictees from central Seoul, 
and had grown in the 1970s and 1980s to become an over-crowded informal settlement. 
Like in other redevelopment neighbourhoods, informal jobs and unemployment were 
prevalent among the residents. The majority of  dwellings had no formal land tenure. 
Residents’ living space was far smaller than the municipal average, and the majority of  
dwellings lacked basic facilities. Nangok provided residents with affordable dwellings, and 
the dominant tenure form was Chonsei tenure that involved up-front deposit payment 
without monthly rents. 
 
4.2 Living conditions in Beijing 
Beijing, Dongcheng district and urban redevelopment 
Beijing consists of  16 districts and 2 counties within its jurisdiction, which are usually 
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grouped into three categories: inner city districts (sometimes referred to as ‘city proper’), 
near suburban districts and outer suburban districts and counties. Figure 4-7 below shows 
the administrative boundaries in Beijing. Inner city districts, positioned at the centre of  the 
map, had been the urban core during the imperial period, and remain so now. They consist 
of  four districts, namely Dongcheng, Xicheng, Xuanwu and Chongwen. 
Figure 4-7: Beijing’s administrative boundaries 
 
 
In terms of  land size, the inner city districts occupy only 0.5% of  Beijing’s total surface 
area, but their population accounts for more than two fifths of  total municipal permanent 
population (BMBS 2003a). As such, inner city districts have been the most densely 
populated in Beijing with the highest population density of  34,027 people per km2 in 
Xuanwu district by the end of  2002. Dongcheng district, where my field research was 
conducted, had a population density of  25,847 people per km2, which was more than 6 to 
7 times denser than neighbouring near suburban districts. 
Over the years in the 1990s, in spite of  the implementation of  the Old and Dilapidated 
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Housing Redevelopment Programme (hereafter ODHRP), the population density of  
inner city districts did not experience much reduction. This was the same for Dongcheng 
district. Between 1992 and 2002, the population density of  Dongcheng district only 
decreased by 1% (BMBS 2003a; BMG 1995). This was far less than the 10% reduction, 
which was set out by the Beijing Municipal Commission of  Urban Planning.10 
Figure 4-8: Population density of Beijing districts by the end of 2002 
(BMBS 2003a) 
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When the ODHRP was first introduced in Beijing in 1990, 37 neighbourhoods in total 
were designated to carry out the programme. Five of  them were located within 
Dongcheng district. In 1992, Dongcheng district assigned another 19 neighbourhoods to 
its list of  redevelopment districts. By 1995, another 17 neighbourhoods were added, 
bringing the total number of  ODHR neighbourhoods to 41. The total land area subjected 
to the ODHRP reached 6.22 km2, which accounted for approximately one quarter of  
Dongcheng district’s total surface area. The total number of  households subjected would 
reach 65,300 households. By 1997, ODHRP projects in 5 neighbourhoods were 
                                                 
10 Beijing Municipal Commission of  Urban Planning set out an aim to gradually disperse municipal 
population so that the number of  urban permanent residents within the second ring road would be reduced 
from 1.75 million in 1990 to 1.6 million by 2000. By 2010, it was hoped to reach below 1.5 million (BMG 
1993). 
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completed, 14 still in progress, and work was yet to start in 22 neighbourhoods (Wei 1997: 
49). The redevelopment of  these remaining 22 neighbourhoods started in 1999 (DDG 
2000: 280). 
Residents’ composition in Dongzhimen Street Office 
Administratively, Dongcheng district is subdivided into 10 Street Offices (known as jiedao 
banshichu in Chinese). Xinzhongjie neighbourhood, the field research neighbourhood, was 
part of  Dongzhimen Street Office. As of  the end of  1999, the permanent residents in 
Dongzhimen Street Office were organised into 39 neighbourhood committees (in Chinese, 
juweihui). The population density in the area under Dongzhimen Street Office’s jurisdiction 
reached 23,471 people per km2 in 1999, which was slightly lower than the district average 
of  24,770 people per km2 (DDG 2000: 331, 353). The residents’ composition in 
Dongzhimen Street Office area in Table 4-5 below shows a glimpse of  its social 
conditions.11 
Table 4-5: Household registration and employment status in Dongzhimen Street, Beijing 
 
Household registration status (as of October 2003)
19,711 53,144
Employment status
Employed Retired Laid off or 
unemployed
Beneficiaries of 
social assistance
53,144 44,163 28,531 9,823 4,414 1,395 7,845 1,136
64.6% 22.2% 10.0% 3.2%
Source: Dongzhimen Street Office
Total number of 
registered 
households
26,194 26,950
Total number of 
registered 
residents
Residents excluding students and children under schooling age Students Under 
schooling age
Male Female
2.70
Persons per householdNo. of household members
 
Different phases of housing construction 
According to the director of  Dongzhimen Street Office, the housing construction in 
Dongzhimen Street area could be broadly divided into four phases since the 1949 
Liberation. The first phase referred to the period of  the 1950s when the municipality was 
swept with capital construction to provide major facilities and landmark buildings such as 
The People’s Congress Hall, Beijing Railway Station, Worker’s Stadium and Worker’s 
Gymnasium. During this period, one-storey pingfang dwellings were erected in 
                                                 
11 The other field research neighbourhood, Haiyuncang, belonged to Beixinqiao Jiedao, which was located 
adjacent to Dongzhimen Jiedao. The residents’ composition in Beixinqiao Jiedao was not available. 
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Dongzhimen area and in its precincts (including Xinzhongjie neighbourhood) as 
residential quarters for those workers put into large-scale post-war capital construction 
projects (see Figure 4-9a and Figure 4-9b). 
“The first phase was right after the Liberation, in the late 195s. Worker’s Stadium 
and Gymnasium were also built at that time. In addition, when the Ten Major 
Construction Projects [commonly referred to as shida jianshe in Chinese] took place, 
residential compounds were also built to accommodate those workers put into the 
construction projects. This covers all the areas around here, and also includes 
Xinzhongjie”   (Director of  Dongzhimen Street Office) 
 
 
Figure 4-9: Built forms from the 1950s and 1980s in Dongzhimen Street 
(Photos taken by the author in August 2003) 
 
 
The second phase referred to the period from the late 1970s to the early 1980s when 
multi-storey walk-up blocks including some high-rise flats were constructed in areas such 
as Hujiayuan (north of  Xinzhongjie; see Figure 4-9c above). The third phase referred to 
the period in the 1990s when Dongzhimen Street area began to transform itself  into a 
development zone, experiencing a stream of  investment for large-scale building projects 
to provide hotels, office buildings and the like. These projects were all closely located to 
(a) Front façade of 1950s’ one-storey dwellings 
(pingfang) in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood 
(c) High-rise flats built in the 1980s 
 in Hujiayuan neighbourhood 
(b) Rear façade of pingfang dwellings in
 Xinzhongjie neighbourhood 
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Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. The projects sometimes accompanied residential flats, which 
re-housed some of  the original residents, but in most cases, original residents were 
relocated to other districts in the east or northeast Beijing outside Dongcheng district. 
The fourth phase referred to the recent years of  carrying out the ODHRP projects in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Physical conditions 
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood lies across the Workers’ Stadium outside the eastern section 
of  Beijing’s second ring road. The redevelopment of  Xinzhongjie neighbourhood was 
phased in two separate phases. The first phase was already completed by the time my field 
research was carried out, covering about one quarter of  the neighbourhood into a high-
rise commercial estate called the Sun City estate. The dwellings subjected to the 
redevelopment in Xinzhongjie depicted 
typical characteristics of  old and 
dilapidated dwellings found in other 
redevelopment neighbourhoods in 
Beijing. The juxtaposition of  modern 
high-rise flats and dilapidated dwellings 
in the second phase redevelopment area 
in Xinzhongjie presented a strikingly 
contrasting picture (see Figure 4-10). 
In the case of  the second phase 
redevelopment area in Xinzhongjie, there 
were two distinguishable dwelling forms. 
On the one hand, there were one-storey 
pingfang dwellings. Unlike those former 
imperial courtyard houses largely found 
within the second ring road, pingfang dwellings in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood were 
mostly built in the 1950s, arranged in rows along hutong alleys. Most pingfang dwellings 
were not self-contained, unequipped with facilities such as private toilet or kitchen. 
On the other hand, there were five-storey walk-up blocks, which were also built in the 
1950s with the financial and technical assistance from the former Soviet Union. These 
walk-up blocks consisted of  one- or two-bedroom flats, most of  which were not self-
Figure 4-10: Old and new in Xinzhongjie – 
juxtaposition of a pingfang dwelling and 
the Sun City estate 
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contained either. Two flats often shared a kitchen, and each floor had one public toilet 
installed. Indoor heating depended on individual coal-fired heating system. 
The physical conditions of  the dwellings in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood were subject to 
residents’ discontent and complaints, as some of  the quotes below implied: 
“In winter, it gets pretty cold in this small room, especially near the south wall, 
which gets freezing and damp…”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-01) 
 
“I always longed for relocation. Look at this house, look at lower part of  those walls. 
I did some maintenance of  the house in 1995 when I retired, pulling [all the 
wallpaper] off  the wall, but the lower part of  those walls is covered with mould…” 
 (Interviewee CBX-INT-03) 
 
“At the moment, I just wish to have a place to wash and also a private toilet. Because 
my mom requires to have someone to look after [because she is ill and is in a 
wheelchair]. It is inconvenient when she goes to [public] toilet…If  you go other 
place to take a bath, you have to pay the fees. The house is always in the shadow due 
to the tree in front of  the house. There’s no way to dry clothes here. See the leak in 
the house?”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-06) 
 
In terms of  dwelling space, a Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader commented 
that a flat in a walk-up block would usually have a floor space of  approximately 35~40 m2, 
whereas the floor space of  a pingfang unit would only reach 14 m2 at the most. This was 
only taking the formal dwelling space into account. Old and dilapidated neighbourhoods 
in Beijing were often characterised by the high incidence of  informal extension (known as 
zijianfang in Chinese) to existing formal dwelling space to meet household needs. This was 
also commonly found in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. Such space constituted about one-
third of  their total floor space, but was not subject to any rent payment, nor was it subject 
to compensation at the time of  demolition and redevelopment. Unlike pingfang dwellings, 
the structural rigidity of  the walk-up blocks did not allow informal extension, and their 
original design feature appeared to have remained largely untouched. 
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Figure 4-11: Various views of neighbourhood conditions in 
Xinzhongjie’s second phase redevelopment area 
(Photos taken by the author in August 2003) 
 
  
(a) View of an alley used for small vehicle (b) View of a cul-de-sac. 1980s’ walk-up 
flats lie in the background behind 
pingfang dwellings 
(c) Front façade of pingfang dwellings
(e) View of an alley. About 1.2m wide
(d) View of retail shops and small restaurants 
behind the main street in the neighbourhood
(f) View of a walk-up block built in the 1950s (g) Another view of a walk-up block built
in the 1950s
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Figure 4-12: Physical conditions of a pingfang unit in Xinzhongjie 
(Pictures taken by the author in August 2003) 
 
 
Figure 4-13: Physical conditions of a walk-up flat in Xinzhongjie 
(Pictures taken by the author in August 2003) 
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Table 4-6 below summarises the extent to which the housing space of  interviewees 
depended on the self-built portion of  their residence. It clearly indicates the important 
role the informal extension had played for the residents who were allocated only a small 
portion of  formal dwelling space by their employers or the municipal housing bureau. 
Self-built space constituted approximately one-third of  their total floor space. 
Table 4-6: Extent of residents’ use of informal self-built space in Beijing 
 
Formal space Self-built space Total
20.2 9.0 29.2
Current dwellings of households subject to displacement (N=9) 19.4 7.7 27.1
Pre-relocation dwellings of households displaced and relocated
(N=6)
21.5 11.0 32.5
Note: The data for the displaced and relocated households refer to their floor space of their pre-relocation dwellings.
Source: Data from interviews conducted by the author in 2003
Floor space per household
Total
Category
 
When the number of  co-habiting household members was considered, the per capita 
floor space for those nine households, subject to Xinzhongjie’s second phase 
redevelopment, turned out to be only 6.8 m2 even after including the self-built space. If  
the self-built portion of  their housing space was excluded, their per capita floor space 
would turn out to be merely 4.9 m2. This meant that these households fell into the 
category of  official housing poor in accordance with the municipal statute, experiencing 
over-crowded living conditions.12 The lack of  housing space was therefore a major 
concern to the residents: 
“In winter, I usually sleep on the upper bunker [and her son sleeping in the lower 
bunker], but in summer, it gets pretty hot up there, so I can’t sleep well….As for this 
neighbourhood, it’s a good place. As for the house, however, I really don’t want to 
stay here. The house in the countryside where I used to live has a toilet which is 
bigger than this room…” (Interviewee CBX-INT-01) 
 
“How are we all going to live here? We are a three-person household, and has a 17-
year-old child, who has been all along sleeping in the same bedroom with us. He has 
grown up so big, and surely wants a room of  his own” 
  (Interviewee CBX-INT-02) 
 
                                                 
12 The municipal government issued a measure on the management and implementation of  low-rent 
housing in August 2001, which required rent subsidies and the provision of  low-rent rental units for the 
poor households who fell into the bottom 20% of  decile income groups and who reside in dwelling units 
whose floor space didn’t exceed 7.5 m2 per person (BMBLRHM 2002; Shi 2001: 203). 
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“[Before the children got married and left this house], my son and husband slept on 
this wooden plank bed, bending over to fit in, and my daughter and I slept on this 
double bed [all in this one bedroom]. When the summer came, it’s impossible to 
sleep like that in here with my son and daughter, so my son and husband just slept 
on the ground outside. Life was just like that. It was so difficult…” 
   (Interviewee CBX-INT-03) 
 
Social conditions 
Neighbourhood committees in Chinese cities maintained a detailed record of  permanent 
residents within their jurisdiction as part of  household registration system (known as 
hukou in Chinese). A neighbourhood committee leader in Xinzhongjie explained that 
many residents displaced in December 1999 as part of  the neighbourhood’s first phase 
redevelopment still kept their registration record within Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. 
“People were displaced and went away, but their household registration didn’t 
change, and is kept here. So, if  their children enrol into the army or if  they apply 
and be recipients of  minimum living security allowances, they would still have to 
make applications here [that is, Xinzhongjie neighbourhood]”  
 (Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader) 
 
According to the summary record of  Xinzhongjie residents, there were 1,539 officially 
registered households (see Table 4-7 below). The number of  actually residing residents 
reached 1,237 or 80% of  the total registered residents. The average size of  a household 
turned out to be 2.7 persons, but the record did not show how many households co-
habited a dwelling. 
Table 4-7: Household registration status in Xinzhongjie 
 
No. of
households
Persons per
household
No. of
households
Persons per
household
1,539 4,151 2.70 1,237 3,403 2.75
Male Female Male Female
2,068 2,083 1,702 1,701
Source: Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee
Registered in the neighbourhood Currently residing (as of March 2002)
No. of household members No. of household members
 
Table 4-8 below shows the occupational structure of  all the registered Xinzhongjie 
residents. Among the residents excluding students and children under school age, 48.5% 
turned out to be in employment, but the record itself  did not indicate the proportion of  
residents in part-time or temporary employment. Twenty nine percent turned out to have 
retired, and ten percent lost their jobs by being laid-off  or unemployed. This shows that 
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Xinzhongjie neighbourhood had a high incidence of  unemployment in municipal or 
national standard. The number of  people registered as unemployed in Beijing reached 
51,900 by the end of  2001, resulting in an unemployment rate of  only 1.18% (BMG 2002: 
216). Such a rate of  unemployment was even lower than the national average for urban 
areas, which was 3.6% (NBS China 2002: Table 5-1). 
Table 4-8: Occupational structure of Xinzhongjie residents 
(as of March 2002)
Total number of
registered residents
Students Under
schooling
age
4,151 3,283 Employed Retired Laid off or
unemployed
Others 795 73
1,593 942 319 429
48.5% 28.7% 9.7% 13.1%
Source: Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee
    Residents excluding students and children under schooling age
 
Part of  the reason for such a high incidence of  unemployment in Xinzhongjie 
neighbourhood was the suburban relocation of  factories from inner city districts, which 
took place since the mid-1990s as part of  enterprise reform and municipal economic 
restructuring. As a Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader states: 
“In the case of  factories in Beijing, especially since the reform and open-door 
policies, especially since 1995, there was this policy of  ‘reduce burden and increase 
efficiency’ and Beijing’s enterprises came to suffer. The residents in this area used to 
be part of  the state enterprise in the area, Dabeiyao.13 It wasn’t possible to build a 
factory there anymore. That factory was very big. Premier Ziang Zemin also made 
his visit twice in the past. Indeed a very good enterprise. But, it’s gone…it just 
vacated the area, and moved to a suburban place where it was too far to commute 
from the inner city. Once moved it didn’t need people…it simply found rural labour 
in the relocated area, which was cheaper” 
  (Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader) 
 
As of  March 2002, sixty two households were subject to the receipt of  Minimum Living 
Security System (hereafter MLSS) benefits. By August 2003, the number of  recipient 
households increased to 103, accounting for 6.7% of  all the registered households in the 
neighbourhood. MLSS is a means-tested social security system that has expanded to cover 
the whole urban areas in mainland China by the end of  the 1990s. It is to guarantee 
minimum income to the lowest income strata of  urban households. The system targets 
                                                 
13 Dabeiyao area was located west of  the Temple of  Sun outside the eastern section of  the third ring road. 
It was 3.5 km away from Xinzhongjie neighbourhood, which was within easy reach for daily commuting. 
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those urban households whose per capita income falls below the income threshold 
announced each year by local governments (Zhu 2002). In 2002, those households eligible 
for such benefits in Beijing were to have per capita income less than 290 yuan, which was 
28% of  per capita disposable income of  average Beijing residents in the same year, or 
51% of  per capita disposable income of  the bottom 20% of  income decile (Beijing 
Qingnianbao 26 June 2002; BMBS 2003a: 180). 
Housing tenure 
According to the director of  Dongzhimen Street Office, most dwellings found in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods were public rental housing. The privatisation of  existing 
public housing units was part of  the reform agenda, and helped public housing tenants 
become owner-occupiers. This was not the case for Xinzhongjie residents whose 
dwellings were too dilapidated to be considered for such transfer of  ownership. 
All the interviewees but two were tenants in public rental units during their residence in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods. One household was residing in a completely rent-free self-
built unit with no formal contract with the municipal housing bureau, thus not paying any 
rent. The other interviewee owned her place, because her family used to be registered as 
agricultural households until 1978, and her house was allowed to remain in her family’s 
possession when the area of  her residence was incorporated into urban built-up space. 
Those interviewed households, subject to displacement due to the second phase 
Xinzhongjie redevelopment, reported that their monthly rents averaged less than 2% of  
their monthly household income. This was much lower than reform policies had 
anticipated. While the reform measures aimed at increasing the level of  rent to reach 15% 
of  household income, the rent level in Beijing had not risen to meet this target. The 
standard rent in the public housing sector at the beginning of  the reform policies in the 
late 1980s was 0.11 yuan/m2 (c.0.81% of  household monthly income). It was increased to 
1.3 yuan in 1999, and was further increased to 3.05 yuan/ m2 as of  1 April 2000, but this 
still constituted only about 6.3% of  household income (BMG 2000a; China Daily 22 June 
2000, 22 March 2000). 
Summary 
This section has examined pre-redevelopment neighbourhood conditions in Beijing, 
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including dwellings’ physical status and residents’ social conditions. In Beijing’s 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, those dwellings subject to redevelopment were not illegal 
in character when they were first built, but came to have informal self-built space over the 
time in order to accommodate residents’ housing needs. Dwelling space was far too small 
even if  self-built space was included, and in-house facilities were poor. Public rental tenure 
was dominant, as most dwellings belonged to the municipal housing bureau. Residents 
experienced a high incidence of  out-of-job conditions (e.g. retired or unemployed), 
suggesting unstable or weak income activities. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the physical and social conditions residents were exposed to 
before redevelopment. Redevelopment neighbourhoods and residents in Seoul and Beijing 
shared some common features. As expected, dilapidated dwellings were prevalent, lacking 
basic facilities such as private kitchen or toilet. Most dwellings were built decades ago, and 
apparently experienced lack of  investment for upgrading or maintenance. Although 
residents tried sub-division or external extension to meet their housing needs, per capita 
dwelling space was much lower than the municipal average. A large number of  existing 
residents were either unemployed or engaged in precarious jobs, having difficulties in 
securing stable income. 
On the other hand, redevelopment neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing also displayed 
some differences. In Seoul, dwellings were mostly privately owned with no formal land 
tenure, as they were originally built on public land without conforming to municipal 
building codes. Private rental tenure known as Chonsei was the dominant tenure form. In 
Beijing, dwellings were not illegal in its origin, and in fact, they constituted Beijing’s public 
housing stock. External extension was commonly practiced to increase dwelling space, 
adding informal characteristics. Public rental tenure was the dominant tenure form in 
Beijing. 
Such differences in housing ownership, tenure structure and dwellings’ origin imply that 
the relationship between the local authority, developers and residents may not be the same 
across municipalities in the process of  neighbourhood redevelopment. To some extent, 
this explains partly why the initiating parties for redevelopment projects are property-
owners/developers in Seoul’s JRP, and developers/local authorities in Beijing’s ODHRP 
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(see Chapter 2 on JRP and ODHRP structure). As far as the ownership is concerned, JRP 
projects in Seoul involves public/private lands (mostly public land in the case of  Nangok 
neighbourhood), and dwellings in individuals’ possession. Beijing’s ODHRP is largely 
concerned about public housing on state-owned land, making it simpler for project design 
and execution. In the case of  residents, such situations may bring about differing 
opportunities for their participation, and influence the way in which residents in different 
tenures would respond to their neighbourhood redevelopment.  
JRP and ODHRP projects have proliferated in Seoul and Beijing for nearly two decades, 
attracting developers. Dilapidated dwellings and neighbourhoods might be unpleasant for 
local authorities and inconvenient for residents’ living, but over time, they came to be 
attractive for profit-seeking developers. The next chapter explains what opportunities 
there were in such neighbourhoods for developers, and examines how they exploited such 
opportunities by taking one project from each city. 
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Chapter 5 
Real estate capital and its profiteering in 
neighbourhood redevelopment processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 JRP and Real Estate Capital in Seoul 
Production of  surplus capital and its switch into the built environment 
Dilapidated neighbourhoods and rent gap 
Real estate capital and Nangok redevelopment, 1973 – 1998 
Summary 
5.2 ODHRP and Real Estate Capital in Beijing 
Economic growth and capital switch into the built environment 
Dilapidated neighbourhoods and rent gap 
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood and real estate capital 
Summary 
5.3 Conclusion 
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This chapter addresses the issue of developers’ participation in neighbourhood 
redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing. Earlier reviews of the evolution of redevelopment 
policies revealed that the initial aim of Seoul’s Joint Redevelopment Programme (hereafter 
JRP) and Beijing’s Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Programme (hereafter 
ODHRP) was to overcome the financial burden of local authorities and property-owners. 
By involving developers as the main financier and project managers, it was believed that 
replicable and cost-effective redevelopment at city-wide scale could be achieved. 
The track record of implementing JRP and ODHRP projects indicates that developers’ 
participation was indeed a break-through for these programmes’ sustainability. The key 
question in this respect is what propelled the developers’ participation in redeveloping 
dilapidated neighbourhoods. More precisely, what opportunities were presented to 
participating developers in redevelopment projects, and how did they exploit such 
opportunities? 
This chapter uses rent gap theory to explain that the development opportunities arising 
from the expansion of rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods provided the main impetus 
behind developers’ participation. The way in which rent gap expansion has occurred in 
Seoul’s dilapidated neighbourhoods differs from that in Beijing. The expansion was 
possible with the presence of surplus capital produced in the main production circuit, 
which made its switch into the secondary circuit of fixed asset and built environment. A 
case study supplements discussions on each city to closely examine the way in which 
developers made their participation at neighbourhood scale. 
 
5.1 JRP and Real Estate Capital in Seoul 
Between 1970 and 1985, the share of  housing investment in real GDP (at 2000 constant 
prices) remained more or less lower than 5%. It increased, however, to 5.7% between 
1986 and 1990 (The Bank of  Korea 2004), and then 7.7% between 1991 and 1995 (see 
also Table 2-3 in Chapter 2). This indicates that the commencement and intensification of  
the JRP in Seoul since the mid-1980s coincided with the expansion of  housing investment 
in both relative and absolute terms. The question is: where did the investment come from? 
What propelled such increase in capital input into the real estate sector? In particular, 
what opportunities were there in Seoul’s dilapidated neighbourhoods that attracted 
developers, and how were these opportunities exploited? 
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Production of surplus capital and its switch into the built environment 
Economic growth and capital accumulation 
For the last three decades from the commencement of  industrialisation in the mid-1960s, 
the Korean economy had been noted for its exceptionally rapid economic development, 
sustained by government-led export-oriented macro-economic strategies and heavy 
investment in key industries to build up fixed assets (Kim and Leipziger 1993). The 
average annual growth rate of  real GDP (at 2000 constant prices) between 1970 and 1996 
was a stupendous 7.9% (The Bank of  Korea 2004). Per capita gross national income 
(hereafter GNI) increased at a higher rate of  16.1% per annum during the same period 
(ibid). There was also a phenomenal growth in exports, increasing “from 2 per cent of  
GDP in the early 1960s to around 35 per cent in the late 1980s” (OECD 2000: 25). Such 
growth was achieved in spite of  an economic set-back at the time of  1970s’ international 
Oil Crisis, followed by structural adjustment measures in the early 1980s, which focused 
on price stabilisation and market liberalisation (Suh 1992: 25-29). 
The turning point for the Korean economy came in the second half  of  the 1980s. For the 
first time since the Korean War, the country witnessed a net trade surplus (The Bank of  
Korea 2004). Korea was also internationally recognised as having achieved the fastest 
growth of  per capita GNI in the 1980s among all countries with more than a million 
inhabitants (UN-Habitat 1996: 75-77). Figure 5-1 below shows the growth of  per capita 
GNI and the growth rates of  real GDP in Korea between 1970 and 2001. 
Figure 5-1: Growth of per capita GNI and year-on-year change of real GDP in South Korea 
(The Bank of Korea 2004) 
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The relationship between gross saving and domestic investment as well as between gross 
saving and gross domestic capital formation noticeably changed between 1970 and 2002, 
and this is shown in Figure 5-2. The figure indicates a few noteworthy aspects as follows. 
Firstly, the gross saving ratio had been on the increase in the 1970s and 1980s until it hit a 
ceiling of  40.4% in 1988. In the 1990s, it remained largely stable at a high rate of  more 
than 35% with a slight downturn after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Figure 5-2: Gross saving and gross domestic investment in South Korea 
(The Bank of Korea 2004) 
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Secondly, up until the mid-1980s, the gross domestic investment ratio was higher than the 
gross savings ratio, indicating that the issue of  external borrowing was important within 
the economic agenda in order to finance the investment shortage. The Korean economy 
favoured external borrowing over direct foreign investment when the domestic savings 
could not finance the total investment in the capital formation in times of  rapid economic 
growth (Schätzl et al. 1997: 38-40). The total amount of  foreign debts accumulated by 
1985 recorded US$ 46 billion, registering South Korea as the fourth largest debtor among 
developing countries after Brazil, Mexico and Argentina (Schätzl et al. 1997: 51). The 
foreign loans were directed towards key industries prioritised by the central government 
via state-supported financial institutions (W.-J. Kim 1996: 25-26).14 
                                                 
14 In contrast to external borrowing, foreign direct investment (FDI) was of  much less significance. During 
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Thirdly, the ratio of  gross savings to gross domestic capital formation was relatively low in 
the 1970s. During the boom period of  the 1980s, however, the ratio of  gross savings to 
gross domestic capital formation exceeded 100%, and even recorded as high as 129.3% in 
1988. The total amount of  gross domestic investment was lower than the gross savings 
during the same period. This suggests that a considerable amount of  money capital was 
formed and couldn’t find investment areas to be engaged in capital formation. Such 
money capital represents the manifestation of  surplus capital that is “lacking 
opportunities for profitable employment” (Harvey 1981: 94). 
Such surplus capital would be a good resource of  investment in real estate and built 
environment if  it was no longer profitably employed in direct production circuit. Three 
factors in combination could be identified as having facilitated this channelling process. 
The first factor was the falling rate of  profit of  manufacturing industry in South Korea 
(Shin 1998) that pushed away surplus capital from the primary production circuit to the 
secondary circuit of  fixed asset and built environment (Harvey 1981). It was found that 
since the commencement of  industrialisation, the average rate of  net profit of  
manufacturing industry fell from 39.7% (1963-1971) to 27.7% (1972-1980), and then 
further to 16.9% (1981-1990) (Jang 1995 cited in Shin 1998). The second factor was the 
announcement by the central government in 1987 to build 2 million dwelling units as part 
of  the ‘Five-year Housing Plan (1988 – 1992)’ and to develop new towns around Seoul 
(MoCT Korea 2002c). The third factor could be identified as the speculative environment 
in real estate sector that accompanied significant increases in land and housing prices in 
the 1980s. This is explained in further detail below. 
Speculation and the real estate sector 
Given the situation that about 70% of  the land in South Korea is uninhabitable (KIHASA 
and UNDP 1998: 11), the urbanisation process and the rapid industrialisation in times of  
economic take-off  and maturation created a surge of  real estate demand for industrial, 
commercial and residential uses. Since the mid-1970s, land prices have occasionally 
witnessed precipitous increases, as displayed in Figure 5-3 below. The figure strongly 
suggests a highly speculative environment regarding land transaction. 
                                                                                                                                               
the whole period of  economic take-off  and maturation from the 1960s until the mid-1990s, the total 
amount of  FDI hardly exceeded 0.5% of  national GDP (MoCIE Korea 2001; NSO Korea 1994a, 2002c). 
Of  these, the share of  FDI invested in construction and/or real estate sector was minimal. 
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Figure 5-3: Rate of changes in land prices in South Korea 
(Compiled from Table 3-1 in Park et al. 2000: 34) 
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From the figure above, it appears that opportunities to make capital gains from land 
investment have been superior in urban areas, especially in large cities, as the land price 
fluctuation has resulted in an unequal distribution of  land value. The six largest cities in 
South Korea (that is, Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju and Daejeon) occupied only 
1.7% of  national lands, but accounted for 39.8% of  combined value of  national land in 
1982, and 58.0% in 1994. Seoul occupied only 0.6% of  Korea’s total surface area, but its 
total land value accounted for 23.5% of  combined value of  national lands in 1982, and 
36.9% in 1994 (Jung 1998: 134-136).15 
The sales price of  dwellings also increased considerably in the late 1980s (see Figure 5-4 
below). The housing sales price index in Seoul, regularly compiled by Kookmin Bank, 
indicates that the sales price index increased by 61.3% between 1986 and 1990. The sales 
price was stabilised throughout the 1990s, largely due to the successful implementation of  
national housing programme that added more than 2-million new dwellings on the market. 
The prices of  real estate (both land and housing), having risen rapidly in the 1980s, 
remained at a high level throughout the 1980s and 1990s, creating ample opportunities for 
real estate capital to acquire profits in less developed neighbourhoods. 
                                                 
15 Jung also pointed out that “land prices in the larger cities increased faster than prices in rural and smaller 
cities. During the past twenty-two years from 1974 to 1996, land prices for all the nation’s land increased by 
17.6 times, in rural areas by 10.2 times and in smaller cities by 20.2 times. However, land prices in the six 
largest cities increased by 28.9 times, and in Seoul by 32.9 times” (Jung 1998: 136). 
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Figure 5-4: Rate of changes in land and housing sales prices in Seoul 
(Table 3-1 in Kookmin Bank 2005: 34; Park et al. 2000) 
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Two main factors could be pointed out as having supported the profit acquisition in the 
real estate sector. Firstly, the highly speculative environment in the sector and the frequent 
transaction of  lands prevented capital entrapment. For instance, it was reported that 10 ~ 
20% of  urban land changed hands each year during the 1980s (KRIHS 1989 cited in Jung, 
1998: 141). This was much more than, for example, Japan where only 2.2% of  residential 
land was traded in 1987 (Noguchi 1990 cited in Jung 1998: 141). Such a high frequency of  
land transaction in times of  price inflation provided opportunities for the landed capital 
to realise its profits, guarantee its mobility, and be ready to seek further investment 
opportunities. 
Secondly, major real estate and construction companies that had been investing heavily in 
built environment were also subsidiaries of  large conglomerates (commonly known as 
Chaebols in Korean). The investment in real estate enabled these Chaebols to use acquired 
lands as collateral for more financial loans, and at the same time, safeguard their assets 
against business risks. Furthermore, as Meredith Woo-Cumings pointed out, the Korean 
Chaebols had been operating to increase their market share and follow the logic of  
diversification that would provide them with opportunities to gain from economies of  
scope, building their managerial skills, albeit with low profitability (Woo-Cumings 2001). 
Many of  these Chaebols operated construction companies, one reason being that it was 
easy to forge construction companies’ accounting books in order to produce ‘black 
money’ for bribery, and another reason being that the investment in the rapidly expanding 
real estate market would guarantee profits that supplemented low profitability in their 
business operation. 
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Dilapidated neighbourhoods and rent gap 
In the late 1980s, the production of  surplus capital and the speculative property markets 
in South Korea channelled increased investment into the real estate sector. In particular, 
development gains were anticipated in dilapidated neighbourhoods in Seoul where the 
pressure to secure lands for commercial and residential development was particularly high. 
The JRP, initiated in Seoul since 1983, has been based on the partnership between the 
property-owners and developers, who have taken advantage of  the development potential 
in dilapidated neighbourhoods that experienced low capitalised ground rents. 
Rent gap in informal/illegal settlements 
The rent gap theory has evolved in market economies, and explains that a neighbourhood 
goes through a devalorisation cycle that reduces the amount of  capitalised ground rent 
that property-owners could claim on users (Smith 1996). Three sources are identified as 
having contributed to the devalorisation of  properties: (1) improved labour productivity 
that makes it possible to build a similar structure at lower costs; (2) physical wear and tear; 
and (3) obsolescence of  building style (Smith 1996: 63-64). As the surrounding conditions 
change and new economic needs arise to transform the land into “highest and best use,” 
the rent gap expands, eventually providing the economic basis of  neighbourhood 
rehabilitation/redevelopment. 
In the case of  informal/illegal settlements often found in major cities of  developing 
countries, land invasion by squatters in prime locations, for example, may take away the 
opportunity for the land to be mobilised for “highest and best use.” Informal/illegal 
settlements in less prime locations may initially grow to accommodate migrants as they lie 
outside the real estate capital’s immediate interest, but would eventually come into conflict 
as the city expands and new demand for land rises for economic and residential uses. For 
owner-occupiers in informal/illegal dwellings, they may carry out maintenance or 
upgrading, but are likely to be deterred from making full investment due to restrictions 
imposed by planning regulations. As for real estate developers, informality and illegality of  
such neighbourhoods often make it difficult for them to make a formal entry to exploit 
the rent gap. Real estate investment in the neighbourhoods, if  any, would be speculative in 
nature unless uncertainties are removed (e.g. formalisation of  land tenure, slum clearance 
and land preparation). 
 141
Rent gap in redevelopment neighbourhoods in Seoul 
A large proportion of  land in neighbourhoods subject to the JRP was in state ownership, 
and most dwelling owners did not enjoy the full recognition of  de jure property rights. 
According to the Master Plan for Housing Redevelopment in Seoul, finalised in 1998, the 
proportion of  public land in 106 JRP districts turned out to be around 43% on average. 
The proportion of  illegal dwellings (that is, dwellings in violation of  planning regulations) 
was found to be much higher in these districts, reaching on average 57% of  all dwellings 
(SMG 1998a: 20-21). The absence of  de jure property rights may not hinder usual 
maintenance and repair works by landlords or owner-occupiers to offset physical 
deterioration, but poses serious risks to those who plan to make any long-term investment 
in such neighbourhoods. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely for a neighbourhood to 
experience positive ‘neighbourhood effects,’ that is, the arrival of  higher-income individual 
‘gentrifiers’ who would purchase dwellings, make significant renovation and contribute to 
the revalorisation of  the neighbourhood. The rent gap expansion would be greatest just 
before redevelopment. If  the prospect of  neighbourhood redevelopment prevails, 
speculative interests would prevail, leading to an increase in the amount of  capitalised 
ground rent. As Eric Clark noted, “[c]apitalized land rent rises rapidly, and the rent gap 
narrows rapidly, towards the end of  the cycle when the property becomes an object of  
speculation with a view towards redevelopment” (Clark 1988: 252). 
Furthermore, if  a neighbourhood is designated as a redevelopment district, any further 
structural extension, addition or modification of  the dwellings are restricted in accordance 
with the Urban Planning Act until the demolition of  such dwellings takes place (MoCT 
Korea 2000: 40-41).16 Together with the absence of  de jure property rights, the legal 
restriction to prevent dwelling’s improvement leads to a condition similar to ‘redlining’ in 
western cities that effectively curtails inward investment (Smith 1996: 66-67). This would 
force property-owners to “keep the building appropriate to its site, or, withhold 
investment, minimize maintenance and variable costs, and milk it as it stands, resulting in 
a broadening of the rent gap” (Clark 1988: 252). 
One of  the major problems associated with many redevelopment districts is that it not 
only takes years for an area to be designated as a redevelopment district, but it also wastes 
                                                 
16 The Urban Planning Act has been absorbed into the Act on Planning and Use of  National Territory 
from 1 January 2003. 
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(largely from the developer’s point of  view) another several years to prepare detailed plans 
(that is, project implementation plan and management disposal plan; see Figure 2-4 in 
Chapter 2) and acquire government approval.17 My own estimation on the basis of  
municipal data on 167 JRP districts indicates that it took 39 months on average to acquire 
formal approval of  project implementation plans from the date of  district designation. 
The longest duration was 215 months (see Figure 5-5 below).18 Such lengthy preparation 
results in disinvestment by property-owners, contributing to the further expansion of  rent 
gap in redevelopment neighbourhoods. 
Figure 5-5: Duration between district designation and formal approval of project implementation plan 
(167 Joint Redevelopment Districts – each point denotes a district) 
A verage: 39  months
Source: Seoul Municipal Gov ernment web site,
http://www .seoul.go.kr/info/organ/subhomepage/housing/data/statistics/1217503_7276.html
(accessed on 11 March 2005)
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While those dilapidated neighbourhoods, subject to redevelopment, experience low 
capitalised ground rent, the continued urban densification and real estate boom in Seoul 
as explained earlier increases the capitalised ground rent of  the surrounding 
                                                 
17 The government approval of  project implementation plan is important for anyone who is interested in 
obtaining redevelopment gains, as the approval leads to the next stage of  preparing a management disposal 
plan that includes the evaluation of  property values in redevelopment districts. 
18 The period entails the formation of  redevelopment association among property-owners, the selection of  
a developer (or developers) to form a partnership, and the finalisation of  detailed project implementation 
plans including those for the relocation and compensation. 
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neighbourhoods that enjoy de jure property rights. This, in turn, places development 
pressure on dilapidated neighbourhoods, and increases their potential ground rent in 
anticipation that such neighbourhoods could be put into their ‘highest and best use’ with 
full property rights. Such processes increase the disparity between capitalised ground rent 
in redevelopment districts and their potential ground rent. 
Closure of  rent gap to exploit development gains in JRP neighbourhoods 
The JRP designed and implemented by Seoul municipal government has allowed the 
conversion of  land use in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
into a ‘higher and better’ use, if  not the ‘highest and 
best,’ in the most financially viable way. The transfer 
of  ownership of  public land in a redevelopment 
neighbourhood demonstrates a vivid example of  how 
the rent gap is exploited. Since a large number of  
existing dwellings in a redevelopment neighbourhood 
were erected on public land, dwelling owners are not 
in possession of  legal title to their land. When 
redevelopment takes place, they are therefore required 
to purchase the title of  their occupying land as a 
mandate in accordance with the Urban Renewal Act. 
The land sales price represents the existing value of  
the land under current use, and is determined through 
the price evaluation by an independent party 
consigned by the redevelopment association. Past 
experiences indicate that the sale price of  public land 
in redevelopment districts could be as low as half  the 
price of  those private lands in adjacent neighbourhoods. For example, in the case of  
redevelopment of  Sang-gye 4-1 District,19 completed just before the 1988 Olympic 
Games, the purchase price of  public land was KRW 90,750 per m2, while the land prices 
in the neighbouring private land reached KRW 181,500 per m2 (Jang 1998a: 58-59). 
Another way to see how the rent gap propels redevelopment would be to look at the 
                                                 
19 The district is located in north east Seoul. Its formal authorisation for the project implementation in 
Sang-gye 4-1 District was given on 17 November 1986 (Housing Bureau of  SMG 2005). 
Before Redevelopment (as of 4 August 1994) 
After Redevelopment 
Figure 5-6: Bird's Eye Views of 
Shindang 3 district 
(Seoul Jung-gu Office 2005) 
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increase in land price during the life cycle of  a redevelopment project. One example from 
the 1990s is the redevelopment of  Shindang 3 district, located in one of  the inner city 
districts in Seoul (see Figure 5-6). This redevelopment project started in the mid-1990s, 
and was completed in 2002, covering 22 hectares of  surface area. Approximately 60% of  
the project area were public lands (Kim et al. 1996: 123; Seoul Jung-gu Office 2005; SMG 
2000a: 509-520). The evaluation of  the value of  public land was made in 1997, and the 
average sale price of  public lands turned out to be KRW 1,196,012 per m2. 
Table 5-1 below shows another interesting set of  data on official land prices between 1991 
and 2002 in Shindang 3 district together with the year-on-year changes in average land 
price in Seoul.20 The official land prices are estimated annually for tax purposes. Although 
acknowledging the limitation that “[a]ssessed [land] values for tax purposes are much too 
rough and arbitrary to be useful” (Smith 1987: 464) for the estimation of  rent gap, it is 
envisaged here that the results presented in the table would still provide two useful 
insights. Firstly, the data set suggests that the redevelopment of  Shindang 3 district led to 
the considerable increase in land value, which was much higher than the municipal land 
price changing rates. This would suggest a wide rent gap at the outset, and its closure 
towards the end of  the redevelopment project. The nominal land price in Shindang 3 
district had increased by nearly two fold between 1991 and 2002. Secondly, the data set 
also shows that the anticipated profits helped to limit price fluctuation in Shindang 3 
district when the municipal real estate market in general was experiencing a downturn in 
the 1990s. For instance, the rate of  land price increase in Shindang district since 1997 was 
much higher than the municipal average. 
Table 5-1: Changes in official land price in Shindang 3 district in Seoul, 1990 – 2002 
(Unit: KRW 1,000)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
  Shindang 3 District
  (Land plot no. 373-3006)
756 907 907 900 920 950 980 1,000 1,350 1,300 1,500 1,600 1,700
Year-on-year rate - 20.0% 0.0% -0.8% 2.2% 3.3% 3.2% 2.0% 35.0% -3.7% 15.4% 6.7% 6.3%
  Average year-on-year
  rate in Seoul
31.2% 11.2% -2.8% -8.7% -1.4% 0.2% 0.9% 0.3% -16.3% 2.7% 0.1% 1.9%
Source: Ministry of Construction (1991 to 1994) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha Bogoseo) ;
Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1995 to 2002) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha Bogoseo) ;
Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1999 to 2002) Official Land Prices: Seoul Vol.II-1 ; Seoul Land Information Service web site
(http://lmis.seoul.go.kr/sis/index.html)  
                                                 
20 The land price refers to the official land price compiled by the government for tax purposes, and doesn’t 
include the value of  built structure. They do not fully reflect the capitalised ground rent, however, as tax-
purpose land prices often remain unchanged for some time (Clark 1988: 247). 
 145
Real estate capital and Nangok redevelopment, 1973 – 1998 
As was pointed out in the previous section, the rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
was prominent in redevelopment neighbourhoods, presenting development opportunities 
to be exploited by real estate capital through neighbourhood transformation. Rent gap 
expansion, however, doesn’t lead to an automated process of  gentrification or 
redevelopment. Local conditions count, and the social and political interactions among 
the residents and institutional actors influence the way in which rent gap closure occurs. 
The redevelopment progress discussed in this section covers the first phase of  Nangok 
neighbourhood redevelopment until 1998, which includes the period of  private 
developer’s participation and withdrawal before subsequent public sector intervention. 
The discussion will show that the presence of  rent gap in Nangok provided the economic 
basis of  redevelopment, but it was the action of  the local authority and property-owners 
as well as the participation of  real estate developer within the JRP framework that made 
the redevelopment possible. 
Rent gap and development opportunities in Nangok neighbourhood 
As was the case for Shindang 3 district earlier, the official land price data between 1990 
and 1998 was taken to infer the presence of  a rent gap in Nangok. Two plots of  public 
land from Nangok and a plot of  private land located close to Nangok were chosen to 
compare the degree of  the rent gap. The results are presented in Table 5-2 below. The 
table shows that in 1991, the official land price for public lands in Nangok was less than 
one third of  the official price of  private lands close to Nangok. This indicates that the 
potential ground rent in Nangok would be much higher, and that its transformation to put 
the urban space into a higher and better use would yield higher rents. In 1998, the 
transformation was yet to take place, but the official land price for public lands in Nangok 
was updated and increased in order to partially reflect the rising expectation of  yielding 
higher rents after transformation. The rising expectation was represented by highly 
speculative transactions that took place in the mid-1990s. 
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Table 5-2: Changes in official land price for public land in Nangok and private land outside 
(Unit: KRW 1,000 per m2)
Location
Land
ownership
Land register 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Public   Land plot San97-9 - 260 260 240 220 223 226 300 470
Year-on-year rate - - 0.0% -7.7% -8.3% 1.4% 1.3% 32.7% 56.7%
Public   Land plot San104-6 - 260 260 240 220 220 237 400 500
Year-on-year rate - - 0.0% -7.7% -8.3% 0.0% 7.7% 68.8% 25.0%
Private   Land plot 673-18 690 906 906 880 869 860 860 860 860
Year-on-year rate - 31.3% 0.0% -2.9% -1.3% -1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Source: Ministry of Construction (1991 to 1994) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha Bogoseo);
Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1995 to 2002) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha
Bogoseo); Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1999 to 2002) Official Land Prices: Seoul Vol.II-1; Seoul Land Information Service web site
(http://lmis.seoul.go.kr/sis/index.html)
Nangok
neighoburhood
(Sillim 1 District)
Neighbouring land
outside
 
Initial progress 
Nangok was originally designated as an urban redevelopment district in 1973 in 
accordance with the ‘Temporary Act on the Promotion of  Housing Improvement’ 
introduced in the same year. Like many other dilapidated districts, however, 
redevelopment didn’t take place during the 1970s, and the designation was lifted in 1982. 
When the JRP was implemented in the early 1980s, rumour was spread throughout the 
second half  of  the 1980s and early 1990s that a redevelopment project was soon to take 
place in Nangok. There were at least four failed attempts by the local district government 
(that is, Gwanak district government) between 1985 and 1988 to apply for the designation 
of  the neighbourhood as a redevelopment district. The district government made an 
attempt once again in 1992, this time to include the neighbourhood redevelopment as part 
of  the Municipal Master Plan for Redevelopment.21 The major cause of  such failed 
attempts was the presence of  public lands that constituted almost 96% of  the 
neighbourhood. These lands were designated as ‘natural green land’ and/or ‘parkland’ in 
terms of  municipal land use planning, prohibiting any residential redevelopment. Their 
land use re-classification into ‘residential use’ was only realised in 1994. 
When the land use re-classification was granted, the district government re-submitted its 
application for the designation of  Nangok as a redevelopment district in May 1994 (Stage 
1 in Figure 5-7 below), and received conditional designation a year later (Stage 2 in Figure 
5-7). The condition was to make sure the building density represented by the site’s floor-
                                                 
21 Meeting minute for the Plenary Session of  the 10th Session (Extraordinary) of  the Gwanak district 
council held on 14 May 1992. 
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to-area ratio22 (hereafter FAR) didn’t exceed 300%. This could be considered as a good 
outcome, given the fact that an average FAR in the early 1990s was about 300% and that 
the neighbourhood developed along a steep hillside. 
When this conditional designation was made, neighbourhood property-owners organised 
a redevelopment steering committee (formally approved by the Gwanak district 
government on 30 August 1995), and selected a developer (Daewoo Engineering and 
Construction Co.) in a general assembly on 20 April 1996. A consulting firm was also 
chosen and signed a contract with the steering committee to help them prepare a project 
implementation plan.23 
Figure 5-7: Initial process of Nangok redevelopment, 1994 - 1997 
Stage 1 Stage 2
26 May 1994 11 May 1995
Application for the designation
of Nangok neighbourhood as a
redevelopment district
Conditional designation of
Nangok neighbourhood as a
redevelopment district
From Gwanak-gu government
To Seoul municipal
government
By Seoul municipal
government
FAR: 314% FAR to be less than 300% FAR 292.69% FAR 250%
Project area 171,500 m2 Project area 171,878 m2
No. of
buildings
2,609 units
(2,600 illegal
units)
  No. of
  buildings
2,609 units
(2,600 illegal
units)
Building height: 25 floors Building
height
70m or lower
(25 floors)
  Building
  height
55m or lower
(20 floors)
Sales 3,520 units Sales 2,588 units
Rental 1,470 units Rental 1,580 units
Source: KNHC web site
http://www.jugong.co.kr/gisa/se
oul/sinlim1/chujin/chujin5.htm
(accessed on 05 June 2002)
Source: KNHC web site
http://www.jugong.co.kr/gisa/se
oul/sinlim1/chujin/chujin5.htm
(accessed on 05 June 2002)
(378 m2 increase)
12 Nov 199711 Nov 1996
Application for the approval
of Nangok neighbourhood
redevelopment
comprehensive plan
(re-housing of tenants)(re-housing of tenants)
(Public lands: 164,170 m2)
Stage 3 Stage 4
Source:
SMG Notice No. 1997-354
Source: Meeting Minute of the
Plenary Sesson, 49th Session
(Extraordinary), Gwanak-gu
Council on 30 October 1996
Number of flats designed:
4,980 units
Number of flats designed:
4,168 units
From Gwanak-gu
government
To Seoul municipal
government
By Seoul municipal
government
Approval of Nangok
neighbourhood
redevelopment
comprehensive plan
 
The district government made a formal application to the municipal government on 11 
November 1996 to obtain its approval of  the redevelopment project implementation plan 
                                                 
22 Floor-to-area ratio refers to the ratio of  a building’s gross floor space to the net area on which the 
building is constructed. For example, if  a building, having total floor space of  1200m2, is built on a site 
whose total land size is 500m2, then the floor-to-area ratio would be 240%. 
23 Handout prepared by the Sillim 1 District (Nangok) Redevelopment Steering Committee and presented 
at the Property-owners’ General Assembly on 20 May 2000. Source: KNHC web site 
http://www.jugong.co.kr/gisa/seoul/sinlim1/chujin/chu/chu13.htm (accessed on 05 June 2002) 
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and to clear the conditions regarding the FAR imposed at the time of  area designation 
(Stage 3 in Figure 5-7). In the application, the redevelopment of  Nangok neighbourhood 
was proposed to construct 4,980 flats replacing 2,609 units of  existing dwellings. 3,520 
units were to be sold to property-owners and prospective buyers, and had an average use 
space of  85 m2. The remaining 1,470 units were proposed to be public rental units for re-
housing tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation. These rental units had an 
average use space of  32.95 m2. 
The approval of  Nangok’s redevelopment comprehensive plan by the municipal 
government was, however, contrary to the expectation of  the district government and the 
redevelopment steering committee (Stage 4 in Figure 5-7). The FAR was reduced to 250% 
from what was proposed as 292.69% in the original application. The maximum building 
height was also restricted to 55 metres. Furthermore, the number of  rental units for 
eligible tenants was to be increased from 1,470 units up to 1,580 units. The result was a 
26% reduction in the total number of  flats to be sold in the new housing market. 
Nevertheless, a formal agreement was signed between the developers and the steering 
committee soon after the municipal approval was made. 
Changing environment towards low density 
The reasons behind the reduced building density (that is, the FAR reduction) in the 
municipal approval were the concerns over crowded residential conditions and potential 
damage to the urban landscape due to building high-rise flats along the hill. When the 
municipal government’s Urban Planning Committee (consisting of  planning officials and 
experts) reviewed applications from the district government in February 1997 along with a 
few other similar applications, there was a heated debate regarding the problems of  
unmanaged, high-density redevelopment of  dilapidated neighbourhoods.24 The Urban 
Master Plan for Seoul was under thorough revision at the time, and one of  the principles 
was to emphasise low-rise, low-density land uses on hillsides. This was indeed contrary to 
what was envisaged by the property-owners in Nangok. In fact, the revised version of  the 
municipal master plan for housing redevelopment published in 1998, indicated that the 
FAR in the administrative district that encompassed Nangok should be kept below 180% 
(SMG 1998a: 124). In this respect, Nangok was fortunate to have 250% of  FAR by 
                                                 
24 Session meeting minute of  the Urban Maintenance Committee during the 92nd Session (Extraordinary) 
of  the Seoul Metropolitan Council held on 19 February 1997. 
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obtaining this approval before this revised guideline was officially produced. 
Such an approval was a major step towards Nangok redevelopment. As a member of  
Nangok’s redevelopment steering committee enthusiastically commented, it was envisaged 
that “the project implementation plan would receive government approval by June 1998, 
and once the construction starts, the whole project could be completed by the end of  
2002” (Yoo 1997). The future prospect was bright as the media coverage below displayed: 
“Compared to the situation prior to the approval of  the redevelopment 
comprehensive plan, the price of  [on site] properties are strong, and there are 
queries streaming in. There is a strong expectation that the price [of  the on site 
properties] would go through a further increase before the acquisition of  the formal 
approval for project implementation...The purchase of  a 43-pyeong flat [that is, 115 
m2 of  use space] would require KRW 230 million. Upon moving in, the price of  the 
flat is expected to be at least KRW 300 million when compared with those units in 
the neighbourhood, and hence, even after deducting financial costs, it is expected to 
raise around KRW 50 million of  investment return…” 
 (Seoul Gyeongje, 27 November 1997) 
 
Such a rosy picture, however, couldn’t be drawn by most owner-occupiers who would find 
such revised built density as a severe blow to their original expectation. The tougher 
restriction on built density meant a significant reduction of  those flats subject to sales. 
Because there were 2,489 property-owners who were entitled to make a claim for a 
completed flat, the final approval of  Nangok’s redevelopment comprehensive plan (see 
Stage 4 in Figure 5-7) suggested that there were only 99 units remaining for sales to 
prospective buyers in new housing market. This could be considered too few to raise any 
substantial revenue to lessen property-owners’ financial contribution. This would in turn 
increase the likelihood of  owner-occupiers selling their rights (to a redeveloped flat) to 
those speculators who could withstand the increased financial burden. 
“As for these people [on-site property-owners], suppose that a person has a plot of  
10 pyeong [that is, 33 m2], and say an additional amount of  KRW 100 million needs 
to be paid for a completed flat of  30 pyeong [that is, 99 m2], it is too much of  a 
burden… Then, there is this land price. When redevelopment takes place, the land 
price rises, and they can sell their lands, take the money and find an old flat 
somewhere. This would eventually suit part of  their purposes.”  
  (Head of  a redevelopment section in a private developer) 
 
As the redevelopment prospect became more concrete, speculators began to invade the 
neighbourhood more vigorously. The dwelling prices in Nangok rose sharply, luring many 
owner-occupiers to the sales of  their properties when the prices were good. According to 
the recollections of  an interviewee who was a former owner occupier, the price of  a 26m2 
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dwelling25 reached as high as KRW 65,000,000 by the time the neighbourhood was 
designated as a redevelopment district and a developer joined in. This was two to three 
times more expensive than the usual transaction price. 
As for the developer, the reduction in the number of  sales units could have been 
discouraging news, but for them, the bottom line is to carry out the construction works, 
from which a certain amount of  profits could be secured. When a developer initially signs 
a contract, they make a rough estimate of  the total project costs by considering the local 
conditions as well as similar projects in other areas. The developer makes room for profits 
at this initial stage, commonly referred to as ‘normal profits.’ Once this initial contract 
amount is decided, its escalation depends on the normal price inflation rate, and on 
whether or not the project is significantly delayed due to unforeseen circumstances such 
as the disputes and/or conflicts regarding the relocation of  on-site tenants and owner-
occupiers. 
Asian Financial Crisis and the withdrawal of  the developers 
The situation was overturned completely with the arrival of  Asian Financial Crisis that 
engulfed South Korean economy at the end of  1997. The real estate sector was hit badly. 
The total number of  dwellings authorised for construction in 1998 was just over 300,000 
units, which was only about 50% of  the 1997 level (NSO Korea 2001c). The prospect of  
Nangok redevelopment was seriously threatened as the participating developer was part 
of  the conglomerate, which came close to bankruptcy at the time of  the Crisis. The 
developer’s capacity to mobilise capital to carry out the project was severely undermined. 
As it couldn’t finance the large amount of  up-front costs,26 it had to withdraw from the 
redevelopment of  Nangok early May 1998. From then on, the project went astray, and 
there was no prospect of  finding another private developer who could step in to salvage 
the project. Nangok property-owners contacted a public agency, Korea National Housing 
Corporation, which had begun to engage in neighbourhood redevelopment projects since 
the mid-1990s, to no avail. A letter from the company to the property-owners dated 19 
January 1999 showed that the gloomy prospect of  project financing was the single most 
                                                 
25 This was the most commonly found dwelling size in the neighbourhood. See Section 4.1 in Chapter 4 for 
more descriptions on the neighbourhood dwelling conditions. 
26 Handout prepared by the Sillim 1 District (Nangok) Redevelopment Steering Committee and presented 
at the Property-owners’ General Assembly on 20 May 2000. Source: KNHC web site 
http://www.jugong.co.kr/gisa/seoul/sinlim1/chujin/chu/chu13.htm (accessed on 05 June 2002). 
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important factor that made it hesitant.27 
With the reduced built density, the merit of  redeveloping such a crowded neighbourhood 
with a large number of  property-owners was not present any more. The high share of  
public lands on site also further worsened the situation. The quote below shows the 
typical attitude of  a developer regarding the Nangok redevelopment: 
“That place, Nangok area, we also thought of  doing a business there in the past. 
About three years ago [in 1999], we carried out an appraisal ourselves. I think every 
other company must have considered the area as well. But, that area, more than 90% 
of  the lands in that area are public lands. For a private company, it was very difficult 
due to the burden of  leasing the funds for them [on-site property-owners] to 
purchase those public lands. Usually, when carrying out a redevelopment project, we 
lend the relocation money to the property-owners by taking their lands as collateral. 
But, here, there was no property to be used as collateral. This was the same for 
banks. Existing dwellings couldn’t be collaterals, since they get demolished. This 
aspect was the biggest obstacle. This made it difficult for us to get involved in the 
project.”    (Head of  a redevelopment section in a private developer) 
 
Eventually, the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC), a public agency 
established with an aim to provide homes for low-income residents, took over the project. 
How the KNHC decided to participate will be examined more in detail when the role of  
the public sector is discussed in the following chapter. Here, it would suffice to mention 
that the total number of  rental units allocated for the re-housing of  on-site qualified 
tenants was reduced by mobilising the company’s existing stocks elsewhere, and as a result, 
the number of  units for sales was increased. The position of  KNHC as a public agency 
also placed a pressure upon the company, as there were numerous requests from the 
property-owners via local and municipal governments. 
Summary 
This section has examined the production of  surplus capital in South Korean economy 
and the production of  rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods that provided the 
economic basis for neighbourhood redevelopment. The discussion showed that a 
substantial amount of  money capital was formed that could flow into the real estate sector, 
which was experiencing a highly speculative environment in the 1980s and 1990s. As 
exemplified by the early experiences of  Nangok redevelopment, the JRP provided a policy 
                                                 
27 The official letter, Document Reference No. DoJeong 1620-670, was dated 19 January 1999. 
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framework to direct the capital switching into built environment to transform dilapidated 
neighbourhoods into a higher and better use. Property-owners and private developers 
seized opportunities to take advantage of  the rent gap within the JRP framework and 
enjoy development gains. As shown from the withdrawal of  developers from Nangok 
redevelopment project, the participation of  real estate developers could be considered as 
being more critical than that of  property-owners and the local authority. 
 
5.2 ODHRP and Real Estate Capital in Beijing 
Having examined the participation of  real estate capital in Seoul’s JRP, this section seeks 
to explain that a similar environment of  increased real estate investment and rent gap has 
appeared in Beijing as well, attracting developers to engage in neighbourhood 
redevelopment. The economic conditions that led to such an environment, however, were 
different from those of  Seoul, reflecting the transitional nature of  the economy in the 
midst of  pursuing reform policies. 
Economic growth and capital switch into the built environment 
The economic growth of  the Chinese economy since the implementation of  reform 
policies has been phenomenal from an international perspective and has accompanied a 
huge amount of  investment in fixed assets. A large portion of  this investment went into 
the real estate sector, providing the conditions for extensive restructuring of  urban space 
that includes redevelopment of  dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Economic growth and capital accumulation 
The average growth rate of  real GDP (at 1990 constant prices) between 1980 and 2000 
was 9.7%, outpacing that of  the South Korean economy (7.6%) (IMF Web Database 
2004; The Bank of  Korea 2004). The national GDP per capita increased by more than 15 
times during this period, reaching RMB 7625 by 2001. In Beijing, the municipal economy 
expanded at a comparably fast rate, its real GDP (at 1990 constant prices) between 1980 
and 2000 having increased by an annual average rate of  9.1% (All-China Marketing 
Research 2004). By 2001, the per capita GDP of  Beijing reached RMB 25,523, which was 
more than three times the national level. Figure 5-8 below shows the overall growth trend 
of  real GDP and per capita GDP in mainland China and Beijing since 1980. 
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Figure 5-8: Per capita GDP and year-on-year change of real GDP in Beijing and mainland China, 
1980-2001 
(All-China Marketing Research 2004; IMF Web Database 2004World Economic Outlook Database) 
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During the last two decades, only in 1989 and 1990 did China experience an annual 
growth rate of  real GDP lower than 5%. These years could also be noted by the soaring 
inflation rate of  18.8% in 1988 as well as the political turmoil which peaked at the 
Tiananmen Square incident. The latter event led to a temporary set-back of  reform 
initiatives, which was only overcome when Deng Xiaoping made his historical southern 
tour to Shenzhen in 1992 to re-assure “the legitimacy of  economic liberalization” (Lin 
1999: 461). The response to his visit was overwhelming as the national economy expanded, 
re-positioning the nation on the track of  a high GDP growth rate. The boom period, 
however, came with costs, the inflation rate rising again up to 24.1%, the highest figure 
since the 1980s. The excessive inflation was curtailed only through the implementation of  
an austerity programme by the central government to restore macroeconomic balances 
(Lin 1999: 462). 
According to Wu (1997), one of  the distinctive features of  the Chinese economy during 
the reform period has been the surge of  non-productive investment. The pre-reform 
socialist system operated “to concentrate social surplus and allocate the surplus to 
strategic state projects,” which led to the situation in which any “production of  
consumption space could only be effectively carried out by the use of  the product, i.e. 
project specific development” (Wu 1997: 650). The reform measures relieved the economy from 
such bottleneck conditions, and this was more apparent in large cities such as Beijing. For 
instance, as indicated in Table 5-3 below, the share of  gross fixed capital formation 
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(hereafter GFCF) in regional GDP of  Beijing recorded 45.5% in 1990. The share 
decreased significantly in times of  political turmoil in the early 1990s, but increased 
rapidly to record 63.7% in 1995. Throughout the second half  of  the 1990s, the share of  
GFCF remained at around 55~58%. All these were much higher than the national level. 
Table 5-3: Gross fixed capital formation and investment in real estate as a share of GDP in China 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
National GFCF (% of GDP) 25.5% 27.5% 31.2% 37.5% 36.0% 34.7%
Investment in Real Estate (% of GDP) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.5% 5.4%
Beijing GFCF (% of GDP) 45.5% 30.8% 28.3% 37.8% 47.9% 63.7%
Investment in Real Estate (% of GDP) 4.5% 4.0% 4.8% 6.8% 9.2% 25.3%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
National GFCF (% of GDP) 34.4% 33.8% 35.3% 35.9% 36.5% 37.8%
Investment in Real Estate (% of GDP) 4.7% 4.3% 4.6% 5.0% 5.6% 6.5%
Beijing GFCF (% of GDP) 57.1% 55.3% 58.3% 56.7% 55.6% 57.3%
Investment in Real Estate (% of GDP) 20.3% 18.2% 18.8% 19.4% 21.1% 27.5%
Source: All-China Marketing Research (2004); NBS China (various years) China Statistical Yearbook  
The examination of  the investment structure shows that capital flow into real estate 
played a significant role in this explosive capital formation in Beijing. While the table 
above exhibits an incremental increase in the share of  real estate investment28 in national 
GDP, the real estate investment in Beijing skyrocketed from 4.0% of  its regional GDP in 
1991, to 9.2% in 1994, and then further up to 25.3% in 1995. The year-on-year changes in 
real estate investment, as compared to other investment components of  fixed assets, are 
illustrated in Figure 5-9. The figure also indicates an explosive growth of  real estate 
investment in the mid-1990s. The annual growth rate in 1994 was recorded to be 70.5%, 
and in 1995, a record high level of  254.4% (see also Figure 5-10 that shows the 
investment in real estate sector as a share of  total investment in fixed assets). This 
reflected the real estate boom in this period, and the trend had been more or less similar 
in other major competing cities such as Shanghai (Wu 2002b: 155-159). 
 
                                                 
28 The investment in real estate constitutes part of  total investment in fixed assets in Chinese statistics. The 
real estate investment has been reported in the statistics as a separate item since 1990, and “refers to 
investment in the development of  properties that can be sold in markets (commonly housing and offices)” 
(Wu 2002b: 157). Other major components of  the total investment in fixed assets include: (1) investment in 
capital construction (that is, new construction); (2) investment in innovation (that is, addition to the existing 
assets); (3) other investment by state-owned enterprises and collectives (ibid). 
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Figure 5-9: Year-on-year changes of the total investment in fixed assets and its components in Beijing 
(All-China Marketing Research 2004; NBS China 2002) 
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Figure 5-10: Investment in real estate sector as a share of total investment in fixed assets in Beijing 
(All-China Marketing Research 2004; NBS China 2002) 
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Since 1998, contrary to the earlier experiences of  high inflation, signs of  deflation were 
evident when neighbouring countries including South Korea had been badly hit by the 
Asian Financial Crisis. The central government measures to tackle the deflation were 
active fiscal policies to achieve the target growth rate of  8%. Those policies include 
increased investment in fixed assets such as infrastructure provision, and housing has been 
one of  the key areas. Accordingly, the increase in real estate investment in Beijing gained 
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momentum, and the recent estimate indicated that the annual growth rate in 2001 reached 
50.1%, more than double the rate achieved in 2000 (see Figure 5-9 above). The revised 
housing reform in 1998 (designed to stop the allocation of  welfare housing and to 
promote full-scale housing commodification) was envisaged to work together with the 
economic policy so as to attract domestic savings and have spill-over effects on other 
related industries (Lin 2000; Wu 2001: 283). 
Reform measures, capital switch and real estate sector 
The previous discussion on economic growth and capital accumulation in mainland China 
as a whole and in Beijing showed a definite trend towards an increased input into real 
estate sector during the reform period. Then, what made it possible for such capital switch 
into the real estate sector during the reform period? The following discussion considers a 
number of  factors concerning housing production and consumption. 
First of  all, the reform measures have facilitated gradual expansion of  commodity 
housing market. When the World Bank was analysing China’s housing reform progress in 
1992, it raised concerns over the “absence of  market signals providing information, and a 
dearth of  market-motivated agents able and willing to act on such signals” (World Bank 
1992: xv). Only about one-quarter of  total housing floor space completed in 1991 in 
mainland China was commodity housing. The production and distribution of  housing in 
market ways, however, has had a slow but definite progress throughout the 1990s. In 1994, 
the share of  commodity housing had increased to 37.3% (Data from the Real Estate 
Management Department of  the Ministry of  Construction cited in Wang and Murie 
1999a: 1480). The implementation of  the 1998 housing reform aimed at stopping all types 
of  in-kind housing allocation, and thereafter, the majority of  new houses were put on to 
the market. In Beijing, 83% of  total residential floor space completed in 2002 was sold on 
the open market (BMBS 2003a). 
From the demand side, the expansion of  the commodity housing sector led to the rise of  
individuals as one of  the main actors. In mainland China as a whole, individuals purchased 
more than one quarter (28.7% in floor space terms) of  commodity housing sold on the 
open market in 1990. Within two years, the rate had increased to 38.2% (Wu 1996: 1614). 
In Beijing, the progress was somewhat slower, largely due to the heavy concentration of  
state enterprises and government institutions that were more resilient to the adoption of  
market-oriented practices of  housing consumption. In 1990, less than 1% of  commercial 
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housing sold in Beijing was taken up by individuals (ibid). Seven years later, however, the 
rate had reached 38.4% (Beijing Municipal Housing System Reform Office cited in Y.P. 
Wang 2001: 627). The prohibition of  in-kind housing allocation since 1998 has changed 
the situation radically, and any prospective homebuyers have to purchase a unit on the 
open market rather than relying on their work units. By 2002, individuals have purchased 
almost 97% of  those commercially-sold housing space in Beijing (BMBS 2003a). 
Furthermore, the land use reform since the late 1980s has produced a favourable 
environment for long-term real estate investment. The most important piece of  legislation 
was the 1988 Amendment to the Constitution that officially ratified the transaction of  
land use rights. The Land Administration Law was also subsequently revised, thus laying 
the foundation of  the land market that used to be virtually non-existent before the reform 
(Fang and Zhang 2003: 150). This legislation dictated that land ownership still lay with the 
state, but the right to use would be detached from the bundle of  property rights, and 
become subject to transaction through tender, auction or negotiation. The leasehold of  
land secured in this way could last up to 70 years for residential use, 40 years for 
commercial use, and 50 years for comprehensive use (Xie et al. 2002: 1378-1379).  
Finally, until the late 1990s, the role of  state enterprises and institutions was critical in 
sustaining and expanding commodity housing market, compensating for the lack of  
individuals’ purchase power. They made significant contributions into the real estate 
sector both as main consumers and investors. As much as 46% of  total investment put 
into housing in Beijing between 1992 and 1997 was reportedly coming from state 
enterprises and institutions, while the rest was from commercial developers (Data from 
Beijing Municipal Housing System Reform Office cited in Y.P. Wang 2001: 626). 
Investment from the state enterprises and institutions was put into “their house-building 
programme” or purchasing “new housing from the commercial sector at full market 
prices for distribution to employees who had reached the housing allocation standards” 
(ibid, 627). In Beijing or Shanghai for example, most dwellings developed commercially 
between the 1980s and mid-1990s were purchased by state enterprises and institutions, 
which were then rented out to their employees at nominal rents. Such practice effectively 
re-capturing those commercially developed units within the traditional welfare housing 
system (Wang and Murie 1999a: 1487; Wu 1996: 1612-1618). The low rate of  direct sales 
of  commodity housing to individuals, as explained earlier, was the direct result of  such 
institutional consumption of  commodity housing. 
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Dilapidated neighbourhoods and rent gap 
Given the amount of  investment in built environment and the rise of  real estate sector 
during the reform period, the question is how the urban rent gap was created in Beijing, 
especially in inner city districts. What changes were made in the process of  municipal-
wide urban spatial restructuring that contributed to the rise of  inner city districts as 
attractive loci of  real estate investment? Did these changes present a similar opportunity 
for the ‘market-motivated agents’ to enjoy development gains from the rent gap? 
Rent gap and urban (re-)development in mainland China 
Because of  the late formation of  marketised housing production and consumption in 
urban China, the application of  the rent gap theory requires a brief  explanation. In short, 
China’s reform initiatives during the last two decades including the development of  
housing market, redistribution of  property rights to individuals and the transaction of  
land use rights have made it possible to perceive the process of  redeveloping dilapidated 
neighbourhoods from the perspective of  rent gap thesis. As Fulong Wu has argued, state 
socialism in mainland China displayed a structural tendency to disinvest in built 
environment including housing for residents, but this “engendered a rent gap, which laid 
down the foundation for the phase of  redevelopment when the constraint on land 
transactions was lifted through land reform” (Wu 1997: 659). 
Most dilapidated neighbourhoods subject to redevelopment through demolition consist 
of  state-owned rental dwellings whose rent level is fixed low, subsidised heavily by the 
state or work units. This suggests that the amount of  capitalised ground rent is also fixed 
and could be determined by the state: “In the pre-reform era, underinvestment through 
the administrative allocation of  land and the fixity of  the built environment inherent in 
project-specific development pushed down the rent that could be capitalised” (Wu 1997: 
646). Housing and land market formation in the process of  urban restructuring in 
mainland China enabled the transaction of  land (in the form of  land lease premium) and 
the sales of  dwellings, thus eliminating, albeit gradually, such ‘artificial’ oppression of  
potential ground rent. This has created basic conditions for the creation and expansion of  
rent gap, subsequently providing opportunities for urban redevelopment. 
In market economies, individual gentrifiers (or occupier developers, to use Neil Smith’s 
terminology) constitute one of  the three major gentrifying agents (the other two being 
professional developers and landlords) (Smith 1979; 1992: 112). In its earlier period of  
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implementing housing reform, as discussed earlier in this chapter, consumers of  new 
dwellings had been state enterprises and institutions, and their employees. This process 
has been well-documented by Fulong Wu in his 1996 paper on the structure of  housing 
provision in reform China (Wu 1996). 
Expansion of  rent gap in Chinese cities in their transition to market economies 
The capitalised ground rent in Chinese cities in the midst of  implementing reform 
measures could be assumed as being represented by the rent level imposed upon public 
rental dwellings. As urban expansion and spatial restructuring take place in Beijing, 
disparities occur between ‘potential ground rent’ and ‘capitalised ground rent.’ To carry 
out a detailed analysis, time series data such as land rents and building sale prices in 
redevelopment sites are crucial (Clark 1988). Due to the absence of  such data in Beijing, 
the discussion herein on rent gap would be inevitably reduced to examine the factors that 
contributed to the expansion of  such rent gap in Beijing’s urban (re-)development 
contexts. Such discussion, however, would still be beneficial to enhance our understanding 
about the underlying force behind intense urban redevelopment in Beijing. 
Firstly, the introduction of  the market mechanism in the real estate sector through the 
implementation of  housing and land use reform measures presented opportunities to 
extract market rents from urban land and dwellings (Wu 1997). Under the planned 
economy, rents were collected by the state, and hence there was less chance of  forming 
rent gradient within urban built-up areas. The development of  employees’ residential 
compounds in Beijing followed the socialist principle of  communal living (French and 
Hamilton 1979b). As Gaubatz (1999) noted, “most urban residents would rarely have any 
need to travel beyond the walls of  their work-and-living unit” (Gaubatz 1999: 1497). The 
reform initiatives changed such a way of  living. Many residents now face commuting long 
distances to their work place in central Beijing from their suburban residence, and 
companies are increasingly interested in locating their offices in strategic locations, mostly 
within and around inner city districts. The study of  1463 cases of  land lease transaction 
that took place between 1993 and 2000 in Beijing showed that the land lease unit price 
showed a clear locational hierarchy in favour of  those lands closer to the centre (Ding 
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2004).29 
Secondly, the rent level in public rental units was much lower than market rents. Housing 
in state socialism was one of  the major collective consumption goods, and rents were 
heavily subsidised by residents’ employers to assist their nominal wage. Long-term under-
investment in housing maintenance and management also contributed to the decline of  
housing value and ground rents that could be capitalised. One of  the earlier housing 
reform measures in mainland China was to increase monthly rents to reach 15% of  
household income so that usual maintenance and management activities could be financed. 
This itself  was not an easy task, given the condition that the housing rent in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods accounted for “only about 15 to 20% of  the maintenance and 
management fees” (Sun and Zhang 1989: 7). The official monthly rent for public tenants 
was planned for a gradual increase from 0.55 yuan/m2 in 1994 to reach 3.86 yuan/m2 in 
2000 (Y.P. Wang 2001: 625). In Beijing, the monthly rent in the public rental sector was 1.3 
yuan/m2 only by 1999, and then experienced a sharp increase to 3.05 yuan/m2 as of  1 
April 2000. The increased monthly rent constituted about 6.3% of  household disposable 
income in Beijing (BMG 2000a; China Daily 22 June 2000, 22 March 2000). 
On the contrary to much subsidised public renting, private renting would yield much 
higher rents. The disparity between state subsidised rents and actual market rents was also 
reported to be prominent in the early 1990s (Wu 1997: 652-653). A clear example of  this 
is the rent level in the Sun City estate in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood where I conducted 
field research. The completion of  the Sun City estate as part of  the neighbourhood’s first 
phase redevelopment led to a sharp contrast in the rent level between commercial flats in 
the Sun City estate and public rental dwellings located in the area subject to the second 
phase redevelopment. While the public rental tenants were paying nominal rents set by the 
municipal regulations, the market rent for a two-bedroom Sun City flat with a 
construction space of  around 110 m2, for example, was envisaged by residents to be at 
least 4,000 yuan per month at the time of  field research visits. A talk with an on-site sales 
representative by the author in July 2004 came back with an even higher rent level of  
                                                 
29 The predominance of  price negotiation as a land lease method over tender or auction has led to the 
arbitrary determination of  land value, increasing the risk of  land transaction through corruption and 
informal relationship. Only in June 2002 did the Beijing Municipal Government issued a policy to terminate 
the lease of  state land for business through negotiation, and the first state land auction too place on 19 July 
2002 (Jinghua Ribao 20 July 2002; Ye and Shan 26 July 2002). 
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7,500 yuan for a two-bedroom flat, the sales representative claiming that the estate’s high 
standard and central location in Beijing attracted many buyers and tenants. Such disparity 
between state subsidised rents and actual market rents provide ample opportunities for 
the acquisition of  development gains. 
Finally, as for entrepreneurs, inner city districts present additional incentives to be located 
therein. Major central and regional government offices are concentrated in inner city 
districts. Embassies and foreign representative offices are also largely concentrated in and 
around the eastern section of  the second ring road, which also makes it attractive for 
overseas capital to look for office spaces in the vicinity. Industries formerly located in and 
around the inner city districts are moving outward to give way to other more commercial 
development (Gaubatz 1999: 1503-1504). Development zones are forming at various 
locations in near and outer suburban districts, but the delayed provision of  ground 
transportation network means that a mono-centric urban development with the inner city 
districts at its focal point is more favoured over polycentric development (Deng and 
Huang 2004). In an attempt to promote Beijing to be on a par with other global cities, 
Beijing municipal government has been investing a lot to develop a central business 
district (CBD) as well as a financial centre at each end of  the horizontal main avenue 
(Jianguomen Dajie) where it meets with the second ring road (Beijing Today 18 May 2001; 
Cheng 11 May 2001). These measures in turn increase the level of  potential ground rents 
in those old and dilapidated neighbourhoods, subjecting them to development pressure 
and spatial transformation. 
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood and real estate capital 
In the previous section, it was noted that market-oriented reform measures created 
conditions for the rise of  real estate sector and the rent gap expansion, providing ample 
opportunities for real estate capital to gain profits by exploiting the rent gap in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods. 
In the following section, the first phase redevelopment in Xinzhongjie in Dongcheng 
district is discussed to show how real estate capital operates within local contexts in order 
to realise development opportunities presented by the expansion of  rent gap. The 
discussion also shows that unlike the situation in Seoul where property-owners were 
actively promoting neighbourhood redevelopment as ‘occupier developer’ (Smith 1992: 
112), the dominance of  public rental dwellings in Xinzhongjie meant that it was the real 
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estate developer that actively promoted neighbourhood redevelopment in close 
partnership with the local authority. 
Dongcheng district and real estate investment 
When examining fixed asset investment in Dongcheng district, the investment in real 
estate has been overwhelming. Between 1996 and 2000, the total amount of  fixed asset 
investment in the district reached 18.74 billion yuan, of  which 87% went into the real 
estate sector (SBDD 2001a). Such a share of  real estate investment is far higher than the 
municipal average (37%) during the same period (All-China Marketing Research 2004). 
The district’s heavy investment in the real estate sector could be understood as being in 
line with the municipal government’s effort to transform its urban landscape to be 
‘modern’ and ‘global.’ The district’s locational advantage of  being at the heart of  Beijing 
also made it attractive for real estate investment (Gaubatz 1999, 2005). 
As the District Mayor mentioned in January 2004, the total number of  households 
relocated during this period reached 44,800 households, which were twice as many as 
those relocated during the preceding ten years (Lu 2004). This means that roughly one-
fifth of  all the households in the Dongcheng district were directly affected by the 
redevelopment process. The redevelopment of  Xinzhongjie was initiated during this 
heightened period of  pursuing real estate development and residents’ displacement. 
A summary of  the redevelopment progress 
The redevelopment of  Xinzhongjie was proposed to take place in two phases. The whole 
project was expected to last eight years, aimed at transforming the existing neighbourhood 
into “a new type of  community where housing, retails and offices come together” (SBDD 
2000). The neighbourhood was divided into six districts (Districts A to F). The first phase 
(Phase I) was to build four high-rise blocks of  commercial flats in Districts A and D 
whose combined surface area reached 2.3 hectare. Phase I took three years to complete.30 
Regarding the land lease process, the case of  Xinzhongjie redevelopment exemplified 
                                                 
30 Unless otherwise mentioned, the source of  information on the status and progress of  Xinzhongjie 
neighbourhood redevelopment in this sub-section is from the Dongcheng district government news web 
site, http://www.bjdch.gov.cn/ (last accessed on 15 October 2005), and also from the author’s interview 
with a former manager affiliated with China Homes Limited (Interviewee CB99-INT-12) who wished to 
remain anonymous. 
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what Fang and Zhang (2003) described as ‘allocation first, bid later.’ For the first phase 
Xinzhongjie redevelopment, the demolition notice was delivered to the neighbourhood on 
19 December 1999, which gave 20 days for the residents to move out (Interview with 
CBK-INT-001). In total, 550 households were displaced from the neighbourhood. For 
District A, the contract for the payment of  land lease premium in return for its use rights 
was concluded in the first half  of  2000 with the total contract amount of  RMB 54.67 
million. This was equal to the land lease unit price of  RMB 5,015 per m2, which was about 
one third more expensive than the average unit price of  seven other land lease contracts 
for residential projects made in Dongcheng District in the same period (BLRHMB 2000). 
The contract amount for the land lease of  District D couldn’t be found. The total 
construction space for Phase I amounted to 140,000 m2. The sales process began in 
November 2000 with an expected moving-in date of  one year later. In January 2002, the 
residents began to move into those two blocks in District A, which were completed one 
year earlier than the other two blocks in District D. 
The letter of  intent for Phase II redevelopment was signed on 26 May 2002 between the 
District Government and a Hong Kong-based investment company. A formal contract 
followed on 11 February 2003 in the presence of  the District Mayor. An initial survey of  
the households regarding their housing conditions, in order to determine compensation, 
was carried out by the end of  May 2003. As of  September 2003, the actual date for the 
commencement of  area demolition and relocation was yet to be announced. 
Investment and project financing 
The Xinzhongjie redevelopment was carried out through a joint cooperation between 
foreign investors, local developers and the local authority. Here, the local authority refers 
to Dongzhimen Street Office within Dongcheng District. The Director of  Dongzhimen 
Street Office states: 
“On the one hand, in the case of the national government, particularly close 
attention was paid in these years to the reform issues of redeveloping dilapidated 
areas. On the other hand, I feel this is the benefit of the reform and open door 
policy, this is my personal viewpoint, this policy should be said to have driven the 
government towards construction. I feel nowadays there’s still no financial capacity. 
Like this Phase I development here [Xinzhongjie]. There was a Malaysian 
businessman, who had many friends. The businessman looked around some of his 
friends, and among them was the American Prudential insurance. Americans don’t 
invest in the real estate projects in China. Those countries such as Germany do not 
invest in the real estate sector in China. They feel the policies in China change too 
fast. However, I feel these countries have gained confidence with their investment 
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in our country by means of this joint cooperation.” 
 (Director of  Dongzhimen Street Office3) 
 
The local representative of  the foreign investment was China Homes Limited (hereafter 
China Homes). The foreign investment itself  originated from two overseas investors, one 
of  which was a US-based insurance company, Prudential Financial, which held 100% 
share of  a Bermuda-based company, PRICOA China (Residential) Ltd. China Homes was 
a subsidiary of  PRICOA China (Residential). The other overseas investor was Tan & Tan 
Developments Berhad, a Malaysian investor mentioned earlier. A joint venture was 
established between China Homes Limited and a local private developer (Beijing 
Zhonghong Real Estate Company Ltd.; hereinafter Beijing Zhonghong) in order to carry 
out the Xinzhongjie redevelopment, and was named as Beijing Huaju Workers’ 
Gymnasium Real Estate Development Company Ltd. (hereinafter Beijing Huaju) The 
total amount of  investment that went into the Xinzhongjie redevelopment amounted to 
US$ 33.7 million (China Securities Journal 16 October 2004). Figure 5-11 below shows the 
organisational structure of  the project. 
Figure 5-11: Organisational Structure of the Sun City Project in Xinzhongjie 
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China Homes held 95% share of  the newly established Beijing Huaju in order to take full 
operational control of  the company, and Beijing Zhonghong held the remaining 5%. The 
total investment of  US$ 3,372 million was made by the joint venture as per related 
government regulations that required minimum capital investment of  one third of  total 
project costs. The rest of  the project costs were financed through the sales of  Sun City 
 165
flats. Figure 5-12 shows some of  the marketing posters that emphasise the international 
nature of  the completed estate in terms of  design and investment. The former manager at 
China Homes commented: 
“30% of  the total project costs were required to be invested as minimum capital by 
us investors. This was used for the payment of  land premium after the project lands 
were granted, and also for some upfront construction costs. Two thirds of  the total 
project costs were then financed by the bank mortgages and down payment by the 
homebuyers.”  (Former manager at China Homes Limited) 
 
Densification 
8.5 hectare or 85,000 m2 of  land was subject to redevelopment, which was to transform 
the pingfang-dominated low-rise neighbourhood into a modern district dominated by 
commercial flats of  high-rise (Editorial Committee of  Beijing Dongcheng District 2000: 
330). The total construction space, as envisaged at the project outset by the District 
Government was 255,000 m2, leading to the FAR of  300%. This was an average FAR 
estimated for the whole project by the local authority. 
The final building density of  the Sun City estate, however, was much higher (see Figure 
5-12 at the end of  this section for the view of  the estate). Upon the completion of  Phase 
I redevelopment, the total construction space built on the land parcel of  23,000 m2 
reached nearly 140,000 m2, resulting in the FAR of  about 600%. Considering the fact that 
Phase II redevelopment would focus on commercial and office-oriented development that 
normally entailed high density, the average density for the whole project site would be 
bound to be much higher than the local authority envisaged initially. The orientation of  
the district government towards the real estate development and its strong emphasis on 
the sector for its economic development would explain such preference of  high building 
density. 
The use of foreign investment and the densification have led to the changing landscape 
from a low-rise dilapidated neighbourhood to a high-rise modern estate. For the 
developers, the increased built density would be equal to higher returns to their 
investment. As for the local authority, the transformation of the neighbourhood provides 
the basis of increased tax revenue, and proves the competitiveness of its administrative 
capacity. In terms of re-housing the original residents, however, the neighbourhood 
redevelopment has been an effective process of gentrification. This will be dealt with in 
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the following chapter. 
Summary 
This section has examined the substantially increased investment in the real estate sector 
in the process of  economic growth and capital accumulation in mainland China and 
Beijing. The growing emphasis on real estate sector and the expanding rent gap in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods in times of  urban spatial restructuring under reform policies 
led to the creation of  ample development opportunities. The experiences of  Xinzhongjie 
redevelopment showed that the ODHRP provided a policy framework to invite real estate 
capital (in this case, both local and foreign) to transform dilapidated neighbourhoods into 
a commercial high-rise estate of  much higher density than initially envisaged. Real estate 
developers and local government made a contractual relationship for the land lease and 
redevelopment of  Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. 
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Figure 5-12 : Samples of marketing posters for the Sun City estate and its view upon completion 
 
  
①
②
③
④
Pictures ① and ② are marketing posters that emphasise the global look of 
the Sun City (①) and its competitiveness of having attracted a Fortune 500 
company (Prudential Financial) as the major investor (②).
Picture ③ shows the model of the estate, displaying four high-rise blocks on 
site.
Picture ④ is the view of completed Sun City estate.
Sources:
Pictures ①, ② and ③ are from a marketing web site, 
http://house.ynet.com/moe/viewad.jsp?hrid=27105 (accessed on 20 June 
2004).
Picture ④ was taken by the author on 15 August 2003.
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5.3 Conclusion 
One of  the questions of  this thesis was why developers participated in the redevelopment 
of  dilapidated neighbourhood within the JRP and ODHRP framework. As the UN-
Habitat report pointed out, private sector puts profits at the centre of  its operation, which 
traditionally “limited its involvement in low-income shelter in the cities of  developing 
countries because the commercial private sector has normally been unable to provide 
housing at a profit, at a price the poor can afford” (UN-Habitat 1993: Chapter 2A). From 
the discussions presented in this chapter, we were able to understand that the flow of  
capital into real estate sector and the expansion of  rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
provided the economic rationale for developers’ participation in neighbourhood 
redevelopment. Case studies of  redevelopment projects based on my field research visits 
also allowed us to understand the process of  real estate capital participation at the 
neighbourhood level. 
In Seoul, the creation of  surplus capital coincided with the expansion of  a speculative 
property market, and the under-development of  old and dilapidated neighbourhoods has 
led to an expanding rent gap. The absence of  de jure property rights and subsequent 
restrictions on property maintenance and development contributed to the rent gap 
expansion. In Beijing, reform measures encouraging the transaction of  state land and 
dwellings in newly developed property market gave rise to the importance of  locational 
advantages of  inner city districts, and eventually to the creation of  a rent gap that was 
foreign in the planned economy. This provided developers in the property market with 
opportunities to extract profits. The exclusion of  those dilapidated public rental dwellings 
from the process of  privatisation facilitated the process of  rent gap expansion. 
Seoul and Beijing municipal governments both experienced lack of  financial resources to 
carry out redevelopment in dilapidated neighbourhoods, and the participation of  real 
estate developers certainly proved to be effective in neighbourhood transformation within 
the urban policy framework of  JRP and ODHRP. Developers’ skills to manage projects 
and their capacity to mobilise capital to finance upfront development costs surpassed 
those of  local residents and local authorities. The case of  Nangok redevelopment showed 
that the success of  a redevelopment project relied heavily on the capacity of  participating 
developers. In such an arrangement, developers’ stake was the least to be threatened, as 
the bottom line for them was to secure their ‘normal profits’ through building practices. 
Opportunities to secure development gains were enormous, but could only be 
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materialised when real estate capital intervened as financiers. The case of  the Nangok 
redevelopment, however, showed that such heavy reliance on developers also carried risks 
of  jeopardising a project when participating developers dropped out of  the project. 
In the case of  Xinzhongjie neighbourhood, the Sun City project was a success from the 
local authority perspective that opted for the transformation of  its built environment into 
a modern cityscape. The local authority’s inadequate financial resources and expertise to 
manage such a large-scale development in the locality were compensated by the 
participation of  foreign investment through the establishment of  a joint venture with a 
local private developer. The Sun City project had favourable conditions such as high 
density, high sales price, good location and wide rent gap, which were attractive for the 
developers to participate. It exemplifies developer-led redevelopment that has increasingly 
become a common practice in urban China in transforming old neighbourhoods in good 
locations with a high land value, where high returns to capital investment are promising 
(Y.P. Wang 2003: 258). The case of  Xinzhongjie redevelopment also showed that the 
presence of  overseas developer was crucial in salvaging the project when local developers 
were short of  capacity to carry it out on their own, again suggesting the risks inherent in 
developers’ participation. 
This chapter showed an interesting contrast between Seoul and Beijing in terms of  
developers’ participation in redevelopment projects. In Seoul, developers were in a 
contractual relationship with property-owners to carry out neighbourhood redevelopment, 
while the local authority provided regulatory framework and was not in direct business 
relationship with either property-owners or developers. In Beijing, developers entered into 
a legal contract with the local authority for the land lease and redevelopment of  
neighbourhood, indicating that a stronger alliance between the state and capital could be 
formed in Beijing. Such differing role of  local authorities leads us to the next chapter that 
examines the way in which the public sector makes its intervention in neighbourhood 
redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing. 
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The presence of  rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods as examined in the previous 
chapter only provides material conditions for capital investment, and does not serve as a 
mechanistic determinant of  profit realisation. The closure of  rent gap requires active 
human intervention, and in this respect the public sector performs a catalytic role (Smith 
1996). The recent UK experiences in urban renewal showed that property-based urban 
renewal would not have been possible without the sponsorship of  local authorities, which 
used a range of  powers at their disposal (e.g. planning, building control, infrastructure and 
compulsory purchase powers) to remove supply-side constraints and facilitate private 
sector participation (Jones 1996a; Jones and Watkins 1996). 
In Seoul and Beijing, the design and implementation of  the Joint Redevelopment 
Programme (JRP) and the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment (ODHRP) were 
part of  such human interventions. These programmes provided the redevelopment 
framework within which participating stakeholders from the public and private sectors 
could interact in order to close the rent gap and acquire development gains. In this 
context, this chapter examines the public sector intervention that was made to ensure the 
successful implementation of  JRP and ODHRP projects, and hence, the closure of  the 
rent gap in dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Discussions of  each are divided into three main sections. The first section examines the 
policy incentives to facilitate the operation of  the JRP and ODHRP. This section will 
show that these incentives have been largely provided in order to lessen the financial 
burdens on participating developers. The second section examines the degree of  
residents’ displacement and gentrification, which shows that the JRP and ODHRP 
resulted in mass displacement of  original residents and neighbourhood gentrification. The 
third section discusses the effect and implications of  the public sector’s direct intervention 
in neighbourhood redevelopment by closely examining a case study in each city. 
 
6.1 Government intervention: the case of Seoul 
Policy incentives 
Having initiated the JRP framework in which developers and property-owners took the 
lead, the central and local governments provided policy incentives to encourage 
developers’ participation in JRP projects and ensure that the framework worked. 
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Project finance 
Financial input from the government into neighbourhood redevelopment is usually made 
by marking government revenues for targeted use in redevelopment projects, or by 
providing direct or indirect subsidies to developers and/or residents. In Seoul, in 
accordance with the Urban Redevelopment Act and the Municipal Ordinance on Urban 
Redevelopment, a certain proportion of  urban planning tax income (5% until 1982, and 
10% thereafter) was earmarked to be channelled into a special municipal account for 
urban redevelopment. The fund accumulated in this way was called the ‘redevelopment 
project fund.’ 
The redevelopment project fund became one of  the major means for the municipal 
government to make financial contributions to the JRP as the municipal government had 
to purchase public rental units provided in redevelopment neighbourhoods for eligible 
tenants’ re-housing. Since 1989, JRP projects have been required to construct public rental 
flats within project areas for the tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation if  they 
chose to return for re-housing upon project completion (Kim et al. 1996: 110). Public 
rental flats provided in this way were to be purchased and managed by the municipal 
government. The redevelopment project fund was to finance such purchases (Kim et al. 
1995). The sales revenue of  public land in redevelopment districts was also earmarked for 
the purchase of  these rental units. In particular, the central government transferred state-
owned public land in redevelopment districts to the hands of  local government free of  
charge so that local government could use the revenues from land sales. 
The financing of  JRP projects has also been supported by the National Housing Fund 
(NHF), which was established in July 1981 and operates to provide financial support for 
homebuyers and builders in the public and private sectors (Ha 1987: 107-109). Its main 
sources have been the central government budgetary contribution and the National 
Housing Bonds (MoCT Korea 2002c: 232). Below-market rate interest loans from the 
NHF are provided to developers when constructing flats with a floor space of  less than 
85 m2 (MoCT Korea 2002c: 272). The NHF was also the major source for supplementing 
funding shortages when the redevelopment project fund and land sale revenue were 
insufficient to finance the purchase of  public rental flats in JRP projects (Kim et al. 1995). 
The Seoul municipal government had to resort to loans from the National Housing Fund, 
which provided low-interest (3%) long-term loans to be repaid in instalments over 20 
years after a 10-year grace period (MoCT Korea 2002c: 227). 
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The JRP or real estate sector in South Korea in general was not much influenced by 
foreign capital. Foreign loans and foreign direct investment focused on the economic 
development, concentrating on the growth of  key industries (W.-J. Kim 1996: 25-26). The 
share of  FDI invested in construction and/or the real estate sector was minimal until the 
late 1990s (MoCIE Korea 2001; NSO Korea 1994a, 2002c). The FDI in real estate sector 
only became noticeable in the late 1990s when overseas capital began to take interest in 
the Korean market to take advantage of  the devaluation of  Korean currency after the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The interest focused largely on purchasing buildings at 
prestigious locations rather than getting involved directly in property development. 
Land transaction 
In Seoul, the history of  implementing JRP projects in the 1990s showed that 50% of  the 
land in redevelopment neighbourhoods turned out to be publicly owned, and that nearly 
60% of  dwellings were without possession of  formal land title (SMG 1998a: 20-21). The 
owners of  these dwellings are required to purchase the land when the redevelopment 
project is authorised for implementation. In this regard, the conditions of  purchase 
including the terms of  redemption become an important factor for the facilitation of  
redevelopment projects. 
Until April 1994, the State Properties Act and its enforcement decree stipulated that 
dwelling owners on state-owned lands had to pay for the land in instalments at a 5% 
annual interest rate with a 5-year redemption period. In April 1994, in order to reduce the 
financial burden on dwelling owners, the terms of  payment were relaxed so that 
instalments could be paid over 10 years at 8% interest rate. From July 2000, the 
redemption period was further extended to 15 years, and the interest rate reduced to 5% 
(MoCT Korea 2000: 98). 
Housing transaction 
In South Korea, as part of  government attempts to control housing speculation, the 
central government implemented a ‘resale control policy’ in the new housing market. The 
resale control policy was first put into practice in April 1981, and prohibited the resale of  
new dwellings for two years from the date of  purchase (MoCT Korea 2002c: 305-308). In 
May 1982, this period was reduced to six months, and the policy was completely abolished 
in February 1999 in an attempt to revive the real estate market since its collapse in the 
aftermath of  the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. During the two decades of  its operation, the 
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resale control was never applied to homebuyers of  redeveloped flats. Despite the 
prevalence of  housing speculation in JRP projects, speculators entering redevelopment 
neighbourhoods faced no restrictions on their property transaction. 
Off-plan purchase: buyers’ contribution to project financing 
In line with the rapid expansion of  new housing construction since the 1980s, off-plan 
purchase had been widely practiced. The system was first introduced by the enactment of  
the Ordinance on Housing Supply in 1977 in order to encourage housing construction in 
general, and also became a powerful tool for the implementation of  the JRP. Under this 
system, developers were permitted to sell their flats at an early stage of  a project, usually 
when a project reached 10% or 20% of  project schedule. The down payment and period 
instalment from homebuyers assisted developers with the remaining work. The final 
instalment is made upon their moving-in (Yoon 1994: 70-72). For a JRP project, it was 
found that about one third of  the total project costs were spent by developers before they 
began to receive down payment through the off-plan purchase system (Korea Housing 
Institute 2001: 56-57; Lee and Bae 1998: 277-279). 
Planning control and densification 
According to the Housing Bureau of  Seoul Metropolitan Government, there were 134 
completed redevelopment projects, which received implementation permits after 1990. Of  
these, 97 provided public rental flats for tenants’ re-housing. By the end of  December 
2004, the total number of  rental flats reached 43,453 units, accounting for about 30% of  
redeveloped flats (Housing Bureau of  SMG 2005). Under such circumstances, an effective 
means of  encouraging property-owners and developers to proceed with residential 
redevelopment was to allow higher density development. The prevailing rhetoric in JRP 
projects was to build as many flats as possible to the maximum density permitted by the 
planning regulations in order to maximise development profits. 
One way to judge the degree of  densification is to look at the floor-area ratio (hereafter 
FAR), which is the ratio of  a building’s gross floor space to the net area on which the 
building is constructed. FAR has been an effective planning tool for the government in 
controlling real estate development. In Seoul, until the late 1990s, the planning regulations 
on building density control were relaxed on several occasions to allow high density 
development (Lee and Bae 1998: 268). Between 1983 and 1990, the maximum FAR in 
general residential areas was 250% for north Seoul and 300% for south Seoul (Seoul 
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Building Ordinance No.1766 issued on 4 May 1983). From November 1990, it was 
increased to 400% (Seoul Building Ordinance No.2660 issued on 9 November 1990) 
before decreasing to 300% in 1998 (Seoul Building Ordinance No.3499 issued on 30 April 
1998). 
The high density redevelopment led to significant increases in both dwellings and 
residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods. According to the Housing Redevelopment 
Bureau of  Seoul municipal government, 65 redevelopment districts completed between 
1990 and 1996 experienced an increase in households of  32% on average, and in the 
number of  dwellings by 303% (SMG 1998a: 32). Indeed, the average FAR for 
redevelopment districts as shown in Figure 6-1 below indicates that the building density 
of  redevelopment districts increased substantially throughout the 1980s, and stayed at 
around 300% in the 1990s. 
Figure 6-1: Increase in the floor-to-area ratio in JRP projects, 1983 – 1996 
(SMG 1998a: 28) 
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JRP in Seoul and gentrification 
The previous section examined policy incentives from the government aimed at 
facilitating dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment. Then the question is: does this 
intervention help existing residents to ‘stay fixed’ in their original neighbourhood? In this 
section, I will examine the scale of  existing residents’ permanent displacement and 
gentrification in accordance with conventional and revised redevelopment strategies. 
In Seoul, owner-occupiers, in principle, work in partnership with developers and 
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implement the redevelopment of  their neighbourhood. In practice, however, a large 
number of  them are being replaced by off-site investors (or ‘speculators’ as they were 
commonly referred to). In a JRP project, as soon as professional developers are selected 
and the project enters into the stage of  preparing a project implementation plan (see 
Figure 2-4 in Chapter 2 for the JRP’s implementation process), project uncertainties are 
lifted and speculation becomes rampant. With low re-housing prospect due to the high 
prices of  redeveloped flats, the speculation encourages low-income owner-occupiers to 
sell their properties and withdraw from the redevelopment association (the issue is 
discussed in more details in Chapter 9). The result is the displacement of  poor owner-
occupiers by higher-income residents who can afford redeveloped flats. This process is 
considered to be unavoidable by the local authority under the JRP framework: 
“The owner-occupiers just possess dwellings built with a licence on public 
lands…and don’t have enough money even to pay for their Chonsei deposit 
elsewhere, nor do they have capacity to pay for construction costs…In general, the 
proportion of  owner-occupiers being re-housed is known to be less than 20%, but 
this is exaggerated…In my view, it’s less than 5%, because many properties change 
hands even before the project implementation plan is approved or before a project 
is concretised…When these neighbourhoods are redeveloped, it’s an inevitable 
consequence”  (Head of  Housing Bureau at Gwanak District Government) 
 
In a report published by Seongdong District Office in east Seoul that closely examined 
three redevelopment projects (Hawang 1-2 District, Ogsu 9 District and Geumho 1-6 
District), the proportion of  absentee landlords among property-owners reached 54%, 
49% and 59% respectively by the time their project implementation plans were approved 
by the government. Furthermore, less than one third of  these owner-occupiers were able 
to be re-housed upon project completion (Seongdong-gu Office 2001: 132). Another 
example of  the low re-housing rate of  owner-occupiers could be taken from the data 
compiled by the Housing Bureau of  the Seoul municipal government in 1996. The data, 
which were gathered from 28 JRP districts completed between January 1993 and June 
1996, revealed that only 30.5% of  owner-occupiers were re-housed upon project 
completion (Kim et al. 1996: 221-222). These statistics indicate that despite the initial aim 
of  the JRP to encourage owner-occupiers to implement neighbourhood redevelopment, 
the JRP has been actually driven by absentee landlords, and that the majority of  owner-
occupiers have been displaced. 
In a JRP project, the redevelopment association carried out a survey on tenants in order 
to find out the number of  tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation and who wish 
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to choose in-kind compensation. Here, in-kind compensation refers to the access to 
public rental flats provided on site as part of  neighbourhood redevelopment. By law, the 
redevelopment association has to incorporate the required number of  public rental flats in 
their preparation of  the project implementation plan. This requirement prevents complete 
gentrification of  a redevelopment neighbourhood as a certain proportion of  redeveloped 
flats are built as public rental flats for low-income tenants. 
Nevertheless, most tenants in redevelopment neighbourhoods were found to be displaced. 
A recent study that included a survey on tenants in two JRP projects in Seoul showed that 
public rental flats were provided to accommodate 62% and 46% of  original tenants in 
each neighbourhood, but, upon project completion, the re-housing rate of  the original 
tenants reached only 6.2% and 34.5% respectively (Ahn 2002: 41-42 cited in Lee et al. 
2003: 2228). This indicates that a large number of  eligible tenants refrained from moving 
to these rental flats upon project completion. This issue will be addressed in the following 
chapters on redevelopment impacts on residents. 
Direct intervention: Nangok and the rolling redevelopment 
The previous discussions on the JRP and its impact on residents’ displacement and 
gentrification have shown that the majority of  existing residents are excluded from 
enjoying the direct benefits of  redeveloped neighbourhoods where they have lived for 
years (and possibly decades for some). The second argument to consider is to examine if  
the public sector makes any direct intervention to overcome the shortcomings of  the JRP. 
The direct intervention by the public sector in Seoul came in the form of  implementing a 
revised JRP approach called the ‘rolling redevelopment’ in which public agencies such as 
the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) were to participate as professional 
developers. This provision was made possible by revising the Urban Redevelopment Act 
at the end of  December 1995. The overall process of  rolling redevelopment was not 
much different from what was followed under the conventional JRP framework except 
that, in a rolling redevelopment project, the tenants eligible for redevelopment 
compensation were to be provided with public rental units for their relocation at the 
beginning of  a redevelopment project rather than upon project completion (Bae 1997; 
Yoon 1997). The rolling redevelopment also made the public agency the sole implementer 
of  a redevelopment project instead of  establishing a redevelopment association with 
property-owners. The approach was thought to increase the housing security of  eligible 
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tenants who have chosen in-kind relocation compensation as an option. Since the 
stipulation of  the rolling redevelopment approach in the Urban Redevelopment Act in 
1995, two projects took place, both by the KNHC. One of  them was the redevelopment 
of  Nangok neighbourhood. 
KNHC and its participation in Nangok redevelopment 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, the redevelopment of  Nangok took a severe blow due 
to the withdrawal of  the participating developers early 1998. No other private developers 
came forward to take over the project. Densely populated neighbourhood conditions, high 
concentration of  dwelling owners without de jure property rights and reduced density 
requirement all discouraged developers from participation. It was the Article Nine of  the 
Urban Redevelopment Act that redirected property-owners’ attention towards the KNHC, 
which was a public housing agency with 73.2% of  its equity capital in 2000 coming from 
the central government.31 
The Article Nine of  the Urban Redevelopment Act states that under certain stipulated 
conditions, local authorities are permitted to intervene and take control of  a 
redevelopment project from the hands of  property-owners and implement it on their own, 
or assign a public agency such as the KNHC as a professional developer to continue the 
project on their behalf. Some of  these conditions were, for example: (1) the 
implementation of  rolling redevelopment; (2) the proportion of  public lands within a 
redevelopment neighbourhood being more than 50% of  total land area; or (3) request by 
more than 50% of  property-owners. The participation of  the KNHC in Nangok 
neighbourhood redevelopment met all these conditions. The following discussions on the 
company’s participation in Nangok were largely based on the documents produced by the 
property-owners, the KNHC and the local authority acquired during my field research. 
Negotiations for KNHC’s participation 
Having been informed of  the imminent withdrawal of  the private developers, the 
redevelopment steering committee, which was a representative body for property-owners 
in Nangok, sent out its first letter to the KNHC in order to request the company’s 
participation. The letter was delivered via the Gwanak district government on 21 March 
                                                 
31 This is from the Public Finance Database web site (http://fsg.mpb.go.kr/db/db_04_01.jsp), run by the 
Ministry of  Planning and Budget. 
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1998 (District Government Document No. Jutaeg 58531-777). Having received the 
company’s negative response four months later, the property-owners in Nangok organised 
a general assembly meeting, and collected consenting votes from 73% of  property-owners, 
providing the legal justification for the public sector’s direct intervention. Requests were 
sent out by the redevelopment steering committee again in September 1998, this time to 
the KNHC, the Seoul Metropolitan Development Corporation and other major private 
developers. All other companies rejected the request, but the KNHC’s response carried a 
more sympathetic tone: 
“…for every project, it’s important to secure resources. At present, however, the 
downturn of  the construction business due to the Asian Financial Crisis makes it 
difficult for our company to find a way to sell [the company’s] 33,000 unsold flats. 
Our company is also experiencing management difficulties due to the delay of  the 
cost recovery from the redevelopment project in neighbouring Sillim 2-1 District, as 
the settlement of  the management disposal plan is delayed. Therefore, it is difficult 
for us to participate in a project as large as yours, and we will only be able to 
reconsider your request when the business environment improves and the project in 
Sillim 2-1 District progresses well…” 
  KNHC Letter dated 19 January 1999 (Document No: Dojeong 1620-670) 
 
As of  February 1999, the redevelopment steering committee came up with a revised set 
of  propositions to attract the KNHC’s participation (Sillim 1 District (Nangok) 
Redevelopment Steering Committee February 1999). All four propositions were to lighten 
the financial burden of  participating developers by means of  minimising the up-front 
costs they usually had to bear in JRP projects. 
Firstly, absentee landlords agreed not to cling to interest-free loans which were usually 
arranged by developers during a project period. A JRP project usually required developers 
to provide property-owners with interest-free loans at the outset of  each project in order 
to help them finance any temporary relocation. Because these loans were interest free, 
absentee landlords also took advantage and used to demand these loans despite the fact 
that they would not need temporary relocation. 
Secondly, property-owners promised that they would endeavour to displace existing 
tenants so that dwellings could be vacant and become ready for demolition as soon as 
possible. They estimated that there were around 1,500 tenant households in total and 
promised that they would reduce this number to at least 1,000 households before the 
project implementation. 
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Thirdly, property-owners also proposed that by the time they were to purchase public 
lands in their neighbourhood, they would pay the initial down payment (10% of  the total 
land price) out of  their pocket. In a JRP project, such payment was usually made by 
participating developers, increasing the up-front costs they had to bear. 
Fourthly, with regard to property-owners’ off-plan purchase of  redeveloped flats, they 
proposed that they would start the instalment payment even before the commencement 
of  construction works, reducing the amount of  financial resources that the developers 
had to mobilise to proceed with a redevelopment project. 
These propositions were delivered to the KNHC by the Housing Redevelopment Bureau 
of  the Seoul municipal government on 8 March 1999 (SMG Document No. Jujae 58531-
518). Having received no response within three months, the Housing Redevelopment 
Bureau sent out another letter to the KNHC (SMG Document No. Jujae 58531-1506) on 
10 June 1999 to urge its quick decision. 
KNHC’s participation and the rolling redevelopment: work progress 
To these requests, the KNHC kept on emphasising its practical difficulties as quoted 
previously, but left room for further negotiation by mentioning that the use of  818 public 
rental units provided by the company as part of  redeveloping Sillim 2-1 District could be 
a way of  improving the financial prospect of  Nangok redevelopment. Sillim 2-1 District 
was the first redevelopment project in Seoul to carry what was termed as ‘rolling 
redevelopment’ (sometimes called ‘circular redevelopment’).32 
The idea was picked up by the property-owners, and was delivered to the Gwanak District 
Assembly members who prepared a written petition to the KNHC. This was made 
possible because one of  the property-owners was serving as a member of  the District 
Assembly, and this person also initiated the petition process. The petition included a 
proposition that the implementation of  rolling redevelopment would also lead to the 
reduction of  the number of  public rental units to be built in Nangok from 1,580 flats to 
only about 600 flats. This was thought to allow more space for building commercial flats 
                                                 
32 ‘Rolling redevelopment’ first appeared as an experimental project in 1983, and was applied to the 
redevelopment of  four neighbourhoods (SMG 1983). It failed to survive at that time, and gave way to the 
JRP. 
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for sale in new housing market, and therefore, increase developers’ profitability (Members 
of  GDA October 1999). 
One more letter was sent out by Gwanak District Government on 29 October 1999 
(Document No. Jutaeg 58531-3621) to urge the KNHC’s participation, and the KNHC 
finally gave consent to its participation in November 1999. An agreement was signed on 
29 February 2000 between the redevelopment steering committee and the KNHC to 
make official the company’s take-over of  the project as the sole implementer. In 
accordance with the Urban Redevelopment Act, the redevelopment steering committee 
was to be dissolved, and a body named the Council for Residents’ Representatives was 
formed instead for the KNHC to consult. 
On 20 May 2000, a general assembly was held to secure property-owners’ majority 
consent to the agreement signed between the redevelopment steering committee and the 
KNHC. More than 50% of  property-owners were present, unanimously approving the 
agreement. It was also decided that the redevelopment steering committee would select a 
demolition company to proceed with the demolition of  vacant dwellings until the 
KNHC’s participation was formally approved by the local authority. The KNHC was to 
take over the demolition work thereafter (Sillim 1 District (Nangok) Redevelopment 
Steering Committee May 2000). Based on the general assembly resolution, the formal 
designation of  the KNHC as the project developer was made by the Gwanak district 
government on 15 June 2000 (Document No. Jutaeg 58531-1949). Fifteen months later, 
the Gwanak district government approved the project implementation plan submitted by 
the KNHC. Figure 6-2 below shows the KNHC’s blueprint of  the redeveloped Nangok 
neighbourhood, and includes overall project information specified in the project 
implementation plan (GDG 2001b). 
The KNHC carried out a survey in July and August 2000 to find out the actual number of  
existing residents, and establish a relocation and displacement plan. The survey revealed 
that there were a lot more tenant households in the neighbourhood than the property-
owners disclosed back in February 1999 (Sillim 1 District (Nangok) Redevelopment 
Steering Committee February 1999). The total number of  tenant households turned out 
to be close to 2,100 households instead of  1,500. The discrepancy was largely due to the 
underestimation of  those households ineligible for legal compensation. There was no 
information that revealed whether or not the redevelopment steering committee 
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deliberately made such under-reporting. The underestimation contributed to the project’s 
delay by one year, as it took longer than the initial prediction to complete residents’ 
displacement. The last remaining tenants were displaced completely only in early April 
2003, almost three years after the KNHC’s participation was endorsed by the local 
authority (Korea Economic Daily 1 May 2003). As soon as the displacement was 
completed, the site preparation began, and all construction works were scheduled to finish 
within three years. 
Figure 6-2: KNHC’s blueprint of redeveloped Nangok in bird’s eye view format 
 
(Source: KNHC web site)
Overall FAR (floor-to-area ratio) : 239.04% (maximum building heights: 55 metres)
Project period: September 2001 ~ September 2006
Number of flats: 3,322 flats (including 512 public rental flats)  
Rolling redevelopment and gentrification 
The KNHC participation led to the implementation of  rolling redevelopment, which was 
different from other JRP projects in that the KNHC was to use its existing public rental 
housing elsewhere for the relocation of  eligible tenants who chose in-kind compensation 
option. This arrangement lifted these tenants’ burden of  financing temporary relocation 
during the construction period. It also meant that unlike the eligible tenants in other JRP 
projects who were able to be re-housed in their original neighbourhoods upon project 
completion, the tenants in Nangok were facing permanent displacement. 
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When the KNHC began the formal displacement and relocation of  residents in Nangok 
in October 2000, there were around 10,000 residents or 2,450 households including 421 
owner-occupiers. The number of  actually displaced residents, however, was much higher. 
In October 1996, six months after the selection of  private developers’ consortium, 14,640 
residents used to live in Nangok (see Table 6-1 below). Between 1996 and 2000, around 
4,600 residents left the neighbourhood. Because the series of  redevelopment-induced 
events during these years encouraged owner-occupiers to sell their properties and 
destabilised secure tenure environment for tenants, the departure of  4,600 residents 
during these years could be considered as redevelopment-induced displacement. 
Table 6-1: Changes in the number of residents in Nangok, 1989 – 2000 
(GDA 1996; SMG 1991: 186) 
No. of households No. of residents No. of households No. of residents No. of households No. of residents
4,416 16,734 n.a. 14,640 2,450 c.10,000
Note.
December 1989 October 20002)October 19961)
2) Just before the commencement of residents' relocation by the KNHC. The number of households was from the Housing Bureau of the
Gwanak district government, Seoul. The number of residents was taken from the summary report distributed at the time of public hearing
organised by local community-based organisations on 18th May 2000.
1) Six months after the selection of developers' consortium. One year before the full designation of Nangok neighbourhood as a JRP
redevelopment district
 
Since the eligible tenants with in-kind compensation option were displaced to the public 
rental flats provided by the KNHC elsewhere, the only group of  residents to be re-housed 
in Nangok was the owner-occupiers who held onto their dwellings without selling to 
speculators. As shown in Table 6-2 below, the total number of  owner-occupiers at the 
time of  commencing relocation in October 2000 reached 421 households. This accounted 
for only 16.9% of  the total dwelling owners registered in the neighbourhood, indicating 
that the displacement of  poor owner-occupiers had occurred on a large scale. 
Table 6-2: Number of absentee landlords and owner-occupiers in Nangok 
(GDG 2001b) 
KNHC-provided rental flats Non-KNHC dwellings
2,0722) 4211),2) 2221) 199
83.1% 16.9% 8.9% 8.0%
Note:
1) These numbers were provided by the Housing Bureau of the Gwanak district government, Seoul.
2) These numbers refer to the number of dwelling owners in each category at the time of commencing owner occupiers' relocation in
October 2000.
Temporarily relocated to
Number of absentee
landlords
Total number of
dwelling owners
2,493
100.0%
Number of owner occupiers
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In fact, the actual number of  owner-occupiers who were expected to be re-housed upon 
project completion would be much smaller as they continued to sell their property rights 
as the project progressed. According to the interview with an owner-occupier who had 
been working in property-owners’ association as a delegate (interviewee KSS10-INW-01), 
one fifth of  the owner-occupiers who moved to the KNHC-provided public rental flats 
sold their property rights within 18 months of  temporary relocation to the KNHC-
provided public rental flats (the issue of  affordability problems for owner-occupiers in 
Nangok is explained in more detail in Section 7.1 of  Chapter 7). 
To illustrate the frequent changes in property ownership, I obtained a copy of  land 
registration certificates for one of  the land plots (Land plot number San104-6) in Nangok. 
This was acquired at the end of  October 2005 from the online services run by the Seoul 
Central District Court. The original landlord was the central government. The owners of  
dwellings on this land bought the land title on 7 June 2002. In total, 3,066 m2 of  land was 
sold to 66 people, each person owning 46.5 m2 of  land parcel on average. It was not 
possible to find out the proportion of  absentee landlords as the land registration records 
did not distinguish them. Between June 2002 and October 2005, 48 owners sold their land 
title at least once during this period. There was a case (registration no. 48568) where the 
land title changed hands four times between June 2002 and November 2004 
As for the destination of  the displaced households, Table 6-3 below indicates that only 
about one quarter of  the displaced residents moved out of  Gwanak district. This table is 
based on the household registration records from the local administrative office for those 
Nangok residents who moved their house between September 2000 and March 2002 
(Sillim Welfare Centre 2002: 10-11). Two fifths of  the displaced residents moved to the 
KNHC-provided public rental flats located within Gwanak district. 
Table 6-3: Destination of displaced residents from Nangok 
(Compiled from Sillim Welfare Centre 2002: 10-11) 
Out of Seoul
KNHC-provided
rental flats
Non-KNHC
dwellings
Neighbouring
districts
Remote districts
Households 1507 878 629 193 157 210 2067
% 72.9% 42.5% 30.4% 9.3% 7.6% 10.2% 100.0%
Source: Reconstructed from Sillim Welfare Centre (2002: 10-11)
TotalWithin Gwanak district Out of Gwanak district
but within Seoul
 
Upon project completion, the redeveloped Nangok neighbourhood would have 3,322 flats 
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in total, which included 512 public rental flats (15.4%). These rental units were to be used 
for accommodating any tenants who were to be displaced from other KNHC-led 
neighbourhood redevelopment projects, if  any. Like other JRP projects, the presence of  
these rental flats prevented complete gentrification of  the neighbourhood. 
A trade-off  in whose favour? 
For the property-owners of  Nangok neighbourhood, the KNHC’s participation came as a 
salvation. The efforts by the property-owners’ redevelopment steering committee paid off  
eventually, and the local authorities and district assembly members played a very 
important enabling role. Local authorities could also be relieved for having prevented 
further dilapidation of  Nangok neighbourhood due to project postponement. By 
February 2000, about 8% of  all dwellings on site were empty and faced the risk of  
collapsing due to negligence.33 
As for tenants eligible for legal compensation, they were able to be relocated to public 
rental units upon displacement. This allowed them to avoid temporary relocation during 
the project period, minimising the uncertainty of  having to find a temporary relocation 
unit at their own expense. This arrangement made them permanently leave the 
neighbourhood, and settle down elsewhere. For Nangok tenants, it was lucky that the 
developer, KNHC, was a public development corporation and the main provider and 
manager of  pubic rental flats in the country. It was also lucky that the company was 
coincidently about to complete a redevelopment project in the neighbouring district, and 
had 818 rental units ready for receiving tenants. 
When it comes to the replicability of  the rolling redevelopment approach, however, it is 
difficult to remain fully positive. This approach applied by the KNHC was first tried 
experimentally in the early 1980s, and was abandoned for more than a decade before it 
was reinstated upon amending the Urban Redevelopment Act in 1995. Since then, only 
one project was carried out in this way, and this was the redevelopment of  Sillim 2-1 
District, which was located close to Nangok. No other private developers sought out such 
an approach, as this would have incurred heavy costs upon property-owners and 
developers. 
                                                 
33 The figure was taken from the official letter from the Housing Bureau of  Gwanak District Government 
dated on 21 February 2000 (Document No. Jutaeg 58531-549). 
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“Rolling redevelopment doesn’t go well with private companies like us…As rolling 
redevelopment is to be carried out by the Korea National Housing Corporation or 
the SH Corporation [a municipal government invested housing development 
corporation], we don’t study that much about it, and haven’t done any research 
either…”  (Redevelopment section manager, a private development company) 
 
“Private sector wouldn’t do [rolling redevelopment]. They would lose money if  they 
do, so why should they? In the case of  our company [KNHC], we try to continue 
with this kind of  project, but as for private companies, they do business on a district 
basis. Whether or not they make profits or losses, it’s all limited to one 
redevelopment district, and doesn’t affect other districts…” 
  (KNHC manager in charge of  Nangok redevelopment) 
 
The municipal government was also pessimistic about the approach, as the head of  the 
municipal housing redevelopment bureau stated: 
“The rolling redevelopment in South Korea is impossible. It exists only in theory. 
The pilot project already implemented could not be said to have applied the 
approach because it was simply to make use of  existing empty rental stock as 
relocation dwellings for tenants and property-owners…” 
 (Head of  the Housing redevelopment bureau, Seoul municipal government) 
 
Summary 
This section has examined the policy incentives exercised by the central and local 
governments, which helped sustain the successful implementation of  JRP projects in 
Seoul. These incentives were largely to release professional and individual developers from 
financial burdens and guarantee profit maximisation. This section also showed that the 
JRP accompanied large-scale displacement of  not only tenants in redevelopment 
neighbourhoods but also owner-occupiers who were in principle part of  the legal 
implementers of  JRP projects. This section also showed that the direct intervention by the 
public sector was carried out for dual purposes: (1) to salvage endangered projects and 
complete the closure of  rent gap on behalf  of  property-related interests; (2) and to 
provide permanent relocation rental dwellings, increasing the housing security of  the 
tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation. The replicability of  the revised JRP 
approach (that is, rolling redevelopment) was, however, doubtful. 
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6.2 Government intervention: the case of Beijing 
Policy incentives 
In the following subsection, I will examine what major incentives were put into practice by 
the central and local governments in order to ensure the successful implementation of  the 
ODHRP. These incentives were largely in favour of  professional developers’ interests that 
were exogenous to redevelopment neighbourhoods. 
Project finance 
In Beijing, the ODHRP projects were noted for being heavily levied of  development taxes, 
which contributed to high sale prices of  redeveloped flats, exacerbating homebuyers’ 
affordability problems. The Planning and Construction Committee of  Dongcheng 
District Government acknowledged that the cost structure of  ODHRP projects was not 
rationale, stating that one third of  the total project cost was due to development-related 
taxes, while another third was incurred by residents’ displacement and relocation 
(Planning and Construction Committee of  Dongcheng District Government 1998: 17). 
Given the scale of  neighbourhood redevelopment in inner city districts, the accumulation 
of  such revenues could be substantial. There was, however, a lack of  data to help identify 
if  any part of  locally raised revenues were earmarked to be channelled back into the 
dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment. It is possible that these were diverted to other 
urban projects within the city, as the local government was striving to upgrade its lagging 
urban services and infrastructure provision. 
Given the need for investment to carry out the ODHRP, the state funds allocated to assist 
the programme reached only 200 million yuan in 1990 (UCMCBMPPCC and JSSBC 
1992), which was far less than what was needed. It was estimated that the total amount of  
6 billion yuan would be needed in order to complete whole projects envisaged at the time 
(Sun and Zhang 1989: 7). Local authorities in Beijing had to find their own way to finance 
the programme, and the solution was to encourage the use of  foreign investment in 
ODHRP projects. Between 1990 and 1997, 68.1% of  total investment in ODHRP in 
inner city districts of  Beijing came from foreign investment. In Dongcheng District, the 
share was even higher, reaching 84.3% (Luo and Zhou 1998: 5). The District Statistical 
Office also reported in April 1997 that 90.4% of  total investment in fixed assets in 1996 
went into the real estate sector, and of  these, 61.2% were funded by the joint venture 
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companies between Chinese and foreign partners (Statistics Bureau of  Dongcheng 
District 1997). The case of  Sun City project in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood introduced in 
the previous chapter would be a typical example of  how foreign investment was invited to 
take part in an ODHRP project. 
Off-plan purchase: homebuyers’ contribution to project financing 
In urban China, developers came to rely increasingly on the purchasing power of  
homebuyers to finance their construction costs by means of  adopting off-plan purchase 
schemes. A sales office was usually open when a project was still at its early stage. Between 
January and September 2001, the analysis of  16 real estate companies carrying out 
development works within Dongcheng District indicated that 55.2% of  the development 
costs were funded by deposits and advance payment by prospective homebuyers (SBDD 
2001b). 
Land transaction 
In Beijing, the land lease administered by local authorities has been mostly through 
negotiation instead of  market competition. This significantly undermined the 
transparency of  land transaction practices, increasing the likelihood of  arbitrary decision-
making (Wu 2001: 276-277), but helped developers acquire lands for development at a 
price cheaper than the price of  land supplied otherwise (Zhu 2005: 1372). For example, in 
1996, only 3.7% of  newly developed lands were leased out through tender or auction, 
while the rest were transacted via negotiation. In major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai 
and Tianjin, there was no case of  tender or auction (ibid, p.277). A report from the China 
Real Estate News also suggested that, of  those 0.3 million hectares of  land leased out 
nationwide between 1987 and 2000, only 5% was through auction or tender (cited in Zhu 
2005: 1380). 
Furthermore, the predominance of  negotiation regarding land transaction allowed the 
Beijing municipal government to deflect the state regulation to introduce what Fang and 
Zhang (2003) described as ‘allocation first, bid later.’ According to state guidelines, land 
use rights were to be taken back from residents before they could be sold to developers. 
The relocation of  residents was to take place once the developers make payment to the 
local government. When implementing ODHR projects, however, the Beijing Municipal 
Government made it possible to allocate lands for development first, and then allow the 
negotiation (or bidding) of  land use rights to take place even after residents’ relocation 
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and construction (Fang and Zhang 2003). This was proclaimed to be in the interest of  
residents and the general public as it quickened the completion of  projects, but in fact it 
helped developers to initiate redevelopment projects with much lower financial costs by 
postponing the payment of  land use fees. 
Planning control and densification 
As far back as in the early 1950s, there were heated debates regarding the issue of  
preserving imperial architectural heritages in the process of  socialist capital construction (J. 
Wang 2003; Wu 1999). Those in favour of  preservation criticised high-rise building 
construction and large-scale redevelopment of  the Old City (the area within the second 
ring road), represented by the imperial palace and traditional courtyard houses. They were 
in favour of  locating administrative functions out of  the Old City, while the socialist 
modernists were against the idea. The socialist modernist planners eventually won the 
debate, and a large part of  the Old City became subject to redevelopment in order to 
accommodate major government buildings and monumental landmark buildings to 
celebrate the birth of  the new republic. The idea of  the Old City preservation was not 
washed away completely, and remained in the form of  height restrictions imposed in the 
inner city districts of  Beijing. A 1987 version of  the height control is shown in Figure 6-3 
below. Those areas with maximum heights allowed in the figure are what came to be part 
of  the Central Business District (on the eastern edge of  the horizontal axis) and the 
Financial Street (on the western edge). 
Figure 6-3: Height restrictions in Beijing's inner city districts in 1987 
(Zhang 1993 cited in Leaf, 1995: 152) 
 
< 35/45 M
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Central Business 
District site
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At first sight, this control on building heights could be regarded as being against 
developers’ interests as higher density construction would lead to larger profits. A closer 
look, however, shows that the height restrictions around the Forbidden City within the 
second ring road led to much more relaxed height control outside the second ring road. 
With the rise of  real estate investment, “building height became a key marker of  identity, 
success and competition in the built urban environment” (Gaubatz 1999: 1510), eventually 
changing the cityscape of  Beijing into a “bowl-shaped skyline” (ibid, p.1511). 
In addition, local district governments often made concessions to developers regarding 
building heights in order to accommodate high profile, flagship projects. To nullify the 
municipal planners’ height restrictions, developers often negotiated with the local district 
authorities over building heights, and higher profile projects were more likely to receive 
concessions. For instance, a redevelopment project in Financial Street on the western edge 
of  the second ring road ended up with the maximum building height of  116 metres 
despite the zoning control that restricted building heights to 45 metres (Fang and Zhang 
2003: 152, Table 2). Such practices have led, for instance, to the revision of  the Beijing 
Master Plan in 1993 to “legitimate existing structures” that violated existing height 
restrictions (Gaubatz 1999: 1514). 
ODHRP in Beijing and gentrification 
The previous section examined policy incentives exercised by the public sector to facilitate 
dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment. Then, the question is, does such intervention 
help existing residents to ‘stay fixed’ in their original neighbourhood? In this section, I will 
examine the scale of  existing residents’ permanent displacement and gentrification in 
ODHRP projects. The case of  Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment would also be 
examined in detail. 
Displacement and suburbanisation 
In mainland China, the process of  building socialist China since 1949 led to the 
construction of  residential compounds that emphasised communal living (French and 
Hamilton 1979a: 9-11). The principle was expanded to the extent that “most urban 
residents would rarely have any need to travel beyond the walls of  their work-and-living 
unit” (Gaubatz 1999: 1497). In this respect, residential relocation was strictly controlled 
through the enforcement mechanisms such as the household registration system (or hukou 
in Chinese) that tied welfare benefits and employment to one’s original place of  residence 
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(Chan 1994; Solinger 1999). 
Residents’ intra-urban relocation came to be witnessed more frequently with the 
implementation of  ODHRP projects. Residents were often subject to in-kind 
compensation, which meant that they were presented with re-housing or relocation rental 
dwellings (Fang and Zhang 2003: 158). The official line was, however, to encourage off-
site relocation by means of  combining suburban new estate development with inner city 
redevelopment (BMG 1994a). As shown in Figure 6-4, inner city residents were largely 
offered relocation dwellings located in suburban estates (marked 1 to 27 in the figure). 
Figure 6-4: Location of 27 major suburban relocation estates for Beijing’s ODHRP projects 
(Adopted from the map in Fang and Zhang 2003: 154) 
 
Legend
Urban built-up areas
Main roads
Note:
Dotted lines indicate those incomplete sections of ring roads at the time of original authors’ survey of relocation settlements. They are all 
completed.  
For this reason, the rate of  re-housing tended to be low from the early period of  the 
ODHRP implementation. The Ju’er Hutong redevelopment project, which was one of  the 
pilot ODHRP projects in the early 1990s, also had a low re-housing rate despite the 
provision of  employer subsidies for residents’ purchase of  redeveloped flats. Its first 
phase between 1988 and 1990 resulted in re-housing 29.5% of  the original 44 households. 
Its second phase between 1991 and 1992 also managed to re-house only 23.5% of  the 
original 204 households (Zhang and Fang 2003: 77-78). The majority of  ODHRP projects 
implemented in the 1990s were reported to have less than 30% of  re-housing rates. In the 
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case of  those projects such as Taoyuan and Guanyuan redevelopment where 54% and 
67% of  total floor space provided were non-residential, the re-housing rate of  original 
residents were even lower, less than 10% (Fang 1999: 68-69). 
Xinzhongjie Phase One redevelopment: Sun City estate and gentrification 
With the enhancement of  housing reform measures and the expansion of  the commercial 
housing sector, the ODHRP implementation has become increasingly commercial in its 
approach. A close look at the status of  residents’ re-housing for Xinzhongjie’s first phase 
redevelopment (that is, the Sun City estate project) showed a typical ‘market-oriented’ 
inner city redevelopment in Beijing. Very few residents were able to be re-housed due to 
the affordability problems. 
There were no official statistics or registration data available that revealed the residents’ 
destination upon their displacement at the time of  the first phase redevelopment in 
Xinzhongjie. The interviews with the neighbourhood committee leaders all suggested that 
most residents took cash compensation and moved to near suburban or outer suburban 
districts outside the fourth ring road: 
“At the time of  displacement and relocation, after real estate developers heard about 
the news, they all came, each of  them with a coach, pulling us into the car to take us 
to view their houses. So, for a while, because it was free of  charge, all the residents 
got on the car everyday, taking a view of  those houses, checking out each area’s 
public transportation links, the sales price and so on. All those houses were fine-
looking and pretty…[At that time] so many companies came. They came from 
Tongxian [c.20 kilometres to the east, outside the fifth ring road], from the airport 
area, also from Kangjiagou [between the fourth and fifth ring roads], Wangjing area 
[outside the fourth ring road to the northeast]. Also came from the west, 
Shijingshan district [around the western section of  the fifth ring road]. From all over 
the city, but mostly from the northeast, because we are geographically located at the 
north-eastern corner. Less people bought houses in the southwest…”  
  (Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader) 
 
When the first phase redevelopment took place in Xinzhongjie, the plan to provide rental 
dwellings in the neighbourhood for residents’ re-housing was scrapped at the early stage. 
Any residents who chose to return to the site upon project completion had to buy a 
redeveloped flat at a subsidised sales price. 
The full market price of  redeveloped flats in Sun City estate averaged 8,200 yuan/m2. In 
terms of  the construction space, the Sun City flats ranged from 69 m2 one-bedroom flats 
to 256 m2 four-bedroom flats. In order for a three-person household with a child to 
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purchase a 107m2 two-bedroom flat, it would cost 880,000 yuan, indicating that an average 
Beijing household would require paying 25 times their annual household disposable 
income.34 For Xinzhongjie residents, the price-to-income ratio (hereafter PIR) would be 
much higher, reaching 39 to 1.35 
The residents who were subject to the first phase redevelopment in Xinzhongjie were 
offered a subsidised price of  5,500 yuan/m2 if  they chose to return for re-housing. This 
price, however, appeared to be still too high for most Xinzhongjie residents. Even at this 
subsidised price, a two-bedroom flat would still yield a PIR of  17 to 1 for an average 
Beijing household, and 26 to 1 for the Xinzhongjie residents. 
It is, therefore, not surprising at all that few residents returned to the neighbourhood 
upon project completion. When the first phase redevelopment was completed, only about 
20 households were reportedly re-housed by the end of  February 2002. This meant a very 
low re-housing rate of  less than 5%. The Director of  Dongzhimen Street Office 
recollected: 
“While carrying out the first phase of  redevelopment [in Xinzhongjie], our original 
estimate was that about 10 to 20% [of  the existing residents] would be re-housed, 
but the final result was that the number [of  re-housed residents] was not as many as 
expected. At the time of  initiating [this project], it was to demolish and carry out in-
kind compensation. Afterwards, it was based on cash-compensation. In between, the 
policies have changed many times. I feel the policies change a bit too rapidly. 
Anyway, this project was not in accordance with the welfare housing allocation 
policy. It was on the basis of  housing purchase if  choosing to return to the 
neighbourhood. So, we don’t call it ‘re-housing’ (huiqian) but ‘return and buy’ 
(huigou).”  (Director of  Dongzhimen Street Office) 
 
Moreover, the majority of  the re-housed residents left the Sun City estate within the next 
18 months. By August 2003 when I was carrying out field research, only 6 families 
remained in the estate, and they were also said to be considering moving out in the near 
future. They didn’t mean to sell their properties, but keep them to receive monthly rents 
to pay for their mortgage. 
                                                 
34 The annual household disposable income for a three-person Beijing household reached RMB 34733 in 
2001 (BMBS 2002; NBS China 2002) 
35 The average annual household disposable income of  the six interviewee households who were subject to 
the second phase of  Xinzhongjie neighbourhood redevelopment was found to be 22,392 yuan. 
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Government’s search for an alternative approach: the Haiyuncang model 
So far, this section has shown that the government has been implementing policies to 
provide incentives for developers participating in the ODHRP. This came at the expense 
of  displacing existing residents to accommodate higher-income people. As in Seoul, it is 
interesting to find that the Beijing municipal government has also made changes to its 
conventional redevelopment approach and came up with a revised ODHRP approach in 
2000 that aimed at increasing the likelihood of  original residents’ re-housing (BMG 
2000b). Four neighbourhoods were chosen as exemplary cases, and Haiyuncang 
neighbourhood which was one of  my field research neighbourhoods was one of  them. 
The other three neighbourhoods were Jiaodong, Dongsi and Min-an. Redevelopment of  
these neighbourhoods all began in 2001. In this section, I will interchangeably use the 
term, Haiyuncang model, to refer to the revised ODHRP approach. 
Revised approach towards ODHRP and pilot projects 
The major improvement introduced in the revised ODHRP approach (or Haiyuncang 
model) was to build affordable housing instead of  commercial housing. The affordable 
housing (known as jingji shiyongfang in Chinese) programme was originally proposed by the 
government to make homeownership more affordable for low- and middle-income 
households, and had its roots in the ‘comfort housing’ (known as anjufang in Chinese) 
programme in the mid-1990s. The affordable housing programme commenced in 1999 
with an aim of  building flats on government-allocated lands. The price was regulated by 
local authorities, and the sales price of  an affordable housing unit in Dongcheng District 
was set to be 5,000 yuan per m2 in 2002 (DDG). This would be only about 60% of  what 
an average commercial flat in the Sun City estate would have cost. 
The revised approach was to call for a more pro-active organisational role of  local 
authorities. The four exemplary neighbourhoods chosen for the implementation of  this 
revised ODHRP approach were all in central locations in inner city districts, and could be 
said to be attractive places for profit-oriented real estate developers. In this respect, the 
revised ODHRP approach could be regarded as a case of  the municipal government 
implementing a social approach by promoting a higher incidence of  residents’ re-housing 
and safeguarding these neighbourhoods from the exploitation of  real estate developers. 
In order to carry out the experimental projects, the Dongcheng district government 
established Dongcheng Housing Development Corporation (hereafter Dongcheng HDC), 
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and it was this public agency that acted as the principal developer for Haiyuncang 
neighbourhood redevelopment. Demolition and construction works were contracted out. 
Local officials estimated that 1.5 billion yuan was spent in total for the project (CCHS 30 
September 2004). The project finance was to come from the local government and 
residents’ contribution (that is, payment for their re-housing flats). The exemption of  land 
use charges, which applied to the construction of  affordable housing, also provided the 
reason for price deduction compared to other commercial housing sales. 
Haiyuncang neighbourhood redevelopment: work progress 
The redevelopment of  Haiyuncang neighbourhood was to demolish existing dwellings, of  
which the total construction space reached 117,000 m2 (this information was from the 
neighbourhood committee office). The neighbourhood was divided into two areas, 
District A and District D, and the total construction space of  new dwellings reached 
440,000 m2 (Qianlong News Network 23 November 2002). Twenty nine buildings were 
provided: 11 were six-storey high medium walk-up blocks, which were surrounded by the 
other 18 high-rise blocks on four sides. The average living space of  residents was planned 
to increase from 20 m2 to 70 m2 (Qianlong News Network 23 November 2002). 
The official notice for residents’ displacement and demolition was disseminated on 18 
May 2001 (DDG 2001b). Displacement and demolition works took place within less than 
50 days (Qianlong News Network 23 November 2002), and was praised by the then 
deputy mayor of  Beijing for being swift. In total, 5,319 households were displaced. To 
minimise the displacement and demolition schedule, more than 300 demolition units were 
put into Haiyuncang and Jiaodong (one of  the four exemplary neighbourhoods 
aforementioned) neighbourhoods, each demolition unit being in charge of  roughly 20 
households on the average (DDG 2001c). The building work officially began on 18 
September 2001, and was completed at the end of  2002 (Qianlong News Network 23 
November 2002). The re-housing began on 23 November 2002, and took place over 
almost ten months. It took longer than expected due to the outbreak of  the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome epidemic that swept the nation and the municipality in spring 2003 
(DDG 2003a).36 
                                                 
36 The re-housing work in redeveloped Haiyuncang neighbourhood came to a halt on 20 April 2003 due to 
the epidemic, and resumed again on 05 June 2003 (DDG 2003a). 
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Figure 6-5: Haiyuncang neighbourhood upon redevelopment 
 
Bird’s eye view (model) from Dongcheng district 
government web site Ground view
© Hyun Shin, 2003
 
Disputes over density 
Beijing’s urban planning aimed to reduce overall population density in inner city districts 
by approximately 15% by 2010 (Beijing Today 7 December 2001). The completion status 
of  Haiyuncang neighbourhood, however, indicated that the displacement of  existing 
residents did not necessarily accompany the reduction in population density of  the 
neighbourhood. According to the summary of  Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee, 
the number of  total residents displaced from Haiyuncang neighbourhood reached 12,252 
(5,319 households). Given the surface area of  the original neighbourhood (c.50 hectare), 
this was equal to about 24,500 people/km2, which was 10% less than the average 
population density of  Beijing’s inner city districts (27,332 people/km2) in 2000 (BMG 
2001a). Upon completion of  the neighbourhood redevelopment, the residential density 
increased substantially. In the case of  Haiyuncang District D, the surface area of  the 
district was 22 hectare, accommodating 2,600 re-housed households (7,800 residents). 
This would result in the population density of  35,500 people/km2, which was 45% higher 
than the pre-redevelopment density. 
The residents’ complaints regarding the substantially increased density were heightened in 
a recent court hearing that took place on 13 March 2005. According to a local newspaper 
report, the Beijing City Planning Committee was accused of  having tacitly increased the 
density of  four high-rise blocks (Block Nos. 1, 4, 6 and 9) by adding one storey without 
raising the building height (Jinghua Shibao 11 March 2005). 167 households filed a 
collective law suit against the municipal government, claiming that such design changes 
were not explained to them, and were contrary to what was presented at the time of  
signing the re-housing contract before displacement. The officials at the City Planning 
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Committee claimed that the change was inevitably made to re-house more residents, but 
the residents were demanding explanations as to why 87 households from other 
redevelopment neighbourhoods were accommodated in their neighbourhood if  there 
were shortage of  flats. Whether such a design change involved any illicit activities was yet 
to be determined. 
Local state as a developer? 
Haiyuncang redevelopment was one of  the four redevelopment projects that were 
promoted in accordance with a revised municipal approach that favoured higher re-
housing rates by subsidising the construction by the local government. It turned out 
however that as much as one third of  the original neighbourhood space was allocated for 
commercial development. This would largely explain the high density upon 
redevelopment as discussed earlier. 
It was explained by a municipal government official that the commercial development was 
to supplement the shortage of  neighbourhood redevelopment funds (CCHS 30 
September 2004). Upon completion of  residential redevelopment, Dongcheng Housing 
Development Corporation signed a series of  contracts. For instance, a contract with 
Beijing Mobile Communications was signed on 22 November 2002 to provide its office 
building, total construction space of  63,000 m2, on a plot of  1.2 hectare (DDG 2002a). 
The lease contract for the land use right took place a year later on 12 December 2003, and 
the land use charge for this parcel reached 89.4 million yuan (BMBLRHM 2004), which 
was equivalent to about 6% of  total project costs of  Haiyuncang neighbourhood 
redevelopment. Another contract was signed on 18 June 2003 with Guohua Energy 
Investment Corporation to provide office spaces for the company and its subsidiaries 
(DDG 2003b). 
As there was no financial statement for the redevelopment of  Haiyuncang, it was not 
possible to find out to what extent such commercial development activities supplemented 
the funding shortage experienced in Haiyuncang neighbourhood redevelopment. If  the 
commercial development was a necessary condition for the financially feasible 
implementation of  the Haiyuncang model, it meant that the success of  the Haiyuncang 
model would largely be influenced by private interests. Those neighbourhoods in less 
strategic locations for profit generation and business activities would experience 
difficulties in replicating the Haiyuncang model in their neighbourhoods. This would 
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endanger the future of  the revised ODHRP approach. 
On the other hand, if  such commercial development was not a necessary condition, then, 
this simply indicated that the Dongcheng Housing Development Corporation had been 
performing in the same manner as private developers and was making development gains 
under the disguise of  carrying out social goals of  re-housing residents. As the Dongcheng 
Housing Development Corporation was established and influenced directly by the 
Dongcheng district government, this suggested that the local authority itself  turned into a 
profit-oriented entity with less attention paid to the housing welfare of  residents within its 
jurisdiction. Perhaps, such a conversion was not completely alien from the perspective of  
local authorities, as local state-owned enterprises acting as real estate developers were 
widely practiced until recently (Fang and Zhang 2003). 
Haiyuncang model and residents’ re-housing 
When the Beijing municipal government began to experiment with the revised ODHRP 
approach such as the Haiyuncang model, the positive feature was the re-orientation of  
municipal urban policies towards original residents’ re-housing. As low-cost affordable 
housing was to be provided on site for the re-housing of  existing residents instead of  
highly priced commercial housing, the sales price of  a re-housing flat was more affordable 
for residents. Only the Beijing households who were registered within redevelopment 
neighbourhoods could be subject to re-housing or cash compensation. Re-housing flats 
were for sales only, and their renting was not permitted. According to an official at the 
Housing Management Department at the Dongzhimen sub-district office, the sales price 
of  a self-contained flat for Haiyuncang redevelopment project was set at a ceiling of  5,000 
yuan/m2. The full price of  a completed three bedroom re-housing flat with a construction 
space of  75 m2 would cost about 375,000 yuan, equivalent to about 11 years’ accumulation 
of  the average Beijing household’s annual disposable income. The original residents in 
Haiyuncang, however, could enjoy discounts by taking into account their working years 
and the construction space of  their original dwellings. Long-term housing loans were 
arranged by the local government in accordance with the regulations (BMG 2000b). 
In order to see how much a household would have to pay to be re-housed and how much 
the same household would have received if  it chose cash compensation, I took the 
example of  a Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee leader whose family was also re-
housed upon project completion. Her family was a four-person household, which used to 
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live in a non self-contained dwelling with a construction space of  32 m2, and was re-
housed in a three-bedroom flat with a construction space of  around 75 m2. The total 
amount her family had to pay reached 130,000 yuan.37 This was only about one third of  
the full price of  an affordable housing flat of  the same size in Dongcheng district. If  her 
family had chosen cash compensation instead of  re-housing, she would have received only 
about 190,040 yuan, which was far inadequate to buy even a one-bedroom affordable 
housing flat whose minimum space was about 45 m2. 
The Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee specified that, among the 5,319 households 
displaced from the neighbourhood, 3,716 households were re-housed in the 
neighbourhood upon project completion. This led to the re-housing rate of  70%, which 
was very high compared to the re-housing rates in other ODHRP projects such as the one 
in Xinzhongjie. Those residents who did not choose the re-housing option received cash 
compensation, and were to find a dwelling on their own, which included the purchase of  
affordable housing in a suburban estate outside the north-eastern section of  the fifth ring 
road. The arrangement was made by the Dongcheng district government: 
“Our district government has an affordable housing estate at Tiantongyuan area in 
Changping district…Here, we issue a certificate, and the residents take it to go and 
relocate in that area. The sales price is 2,650 yuan/m2, with a management fee of  0.5 
yuan/m2. That’s relatively cheap. If  you are not satisfied with the place, you can go 
to other places on your own and choose a house, somewhere in Chaoyang or 
Daxing. For example, if  you are particularly worse off  and cannot come back for re-
housing, you can relocate to these areas, as the houses there are cheap, but nobody 
went there. It was too far away.” (Haiyuncang neighbourhood committee leader) 
 
For those who preferred to be re-housed in Haiyuncang, long-term loans from the 
housing provident fund were arranged for qualified residents. Just before re-housing 
started, 1,894 applications (that is, about half  the re-housed households) from Haiyuncang 
were approved, the total loan amount reaching 245 million yuan (DDG 2001d). It was not 
known, however, how many applicants failed to receive the housing loans. For low-income 
residents, resorting to housing loans involved commitment to monthly loan payment that 
might be beyond one’s household income capacity. For instance, in an interview with one 
                                                 
37 The detailed methods for estimating the re-housing prices and cash compensation could be found on the 
district government’s web site that showed information on the guideline for carrying out the revised 
ODHRP in Jiaodaokou neighbourhood (DDG 2001a). Because this neighbourhood was based in 
Dongcheng district and its redevelopment commenced at the same time as the work in Haiyuncang, the 
guideline could be safely assumed to have applied to Haiyuncang redevelopment as well. 
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of  the neighbourhood committee leaders at Haiyuncang whose family was also re-housed, 
her family paid 130,000 yuan for the re-housing flat after discount, and borrowed 60,000 
yuan through the housing loan scheme. Spreading the repayment over ten years in 
instalment, her family was paying back 600 yuan each month. For a family in Beijing 
whose income level belonged to the bottom 20% of  the income decile distribution, this 
would constitute about one third (37%) of  monthly household disposable income (BMBS 
2003a). 
It would be possible that the other re-housed residents who did not receive housing loans 
either failed to receive housing loans or resorted to personal savings and informal 
borrowing only due to their ineligibility for formal loan application or incapacity to afford 
monthly repayment. This aspect of  constraints will be further discussed in the following 
chapter. 
Summary 
This section has examined the policy incentives put into practice by the central and local 
governments in order to pursue ODHRP projects in Beijing. As in Seoul, these incentives 
helped professional developers avoid financial constraints, recover their investment and 
maximise profits. The implementation of  ODHRP projects led to the suburbanisation of  
original residents, as these projects led to the gentrification of  inner city ODHRP 
neighbourhoods. The first phase Xinzhongjie redevelopment was a clear example of  this 
gentrification. This section also showed that the municipal government began to make a 
direct intervention since 2000 by establishing public development corporations to carry 
out redevelopment. This was aimed at providing affordable dwellings and therefore, 
increasing re-housing rates. The case of  Haiyuncang redevelopment indicated that this 
was to some extent a success, as more than two thirds of  the original residents were re-
housed. A closer examination showed, however, that the direct intervention was profit-
motivated, as the neighbourhood redevelopment involved higher density redevelopment 
of  a section of  the original neighbourhood area in order to release remaining lands for 
leasing to business and commercial interests. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
The growth of  both JRP and ODHRP projects has been supported by the government 
intervention that provided policy incentives for participating professional and/or 
individual developers so that the JRP and ODHRP projects could remain attractive for 
developers and property-owners despite these projects’ heavy upfront costs. These 
incentives included help with project financing, property transaction, housing purchase 
and planning control. The most direct arrangement to help ease developers’ financial 
pressure could be the off-plan purchase system. Once a project started, the off-plan 
purchase allowed developers to rely on homebuyers’ instalment payments to proceed with 
the rest of  the construction schedule. The implementation of  the off-plan purchase 
system suggested that developers’ participation as the main financier would only be 
sustained by utilising prospective homebuyers’ purchasing power, and that the 
development risk was effectively shared between developers and homebuyers. Another 
interesting aspect in Seoul, which was not found in Beijing, was that public rental flats for 
eligible tenants were first constructed by developers, and then sold to the municipal 
government. In the case of  Beijing, the municipal government executed an ‘allocation first, 
bid later’ policy for developers so that land premium payment could be postponed to suit 
the developers’ financing schedule. Foreign investment in real estate and ODHRP projects 
was also significant in Beijing, while it was hardly noticeable in the case of  Seoul’s JRP.  
This chapter has shown that the implementation of  the JRP and ODHRP led to the 
gentrification of  redevelopment neighbourhoods. In Seoul, the JRP accompanied the 
displacement of  not only tenants but also owner-occupiers despite the policy emphasis 
that their participation was to be key to its successful implementation. In Seoul, the 
provision of  public rental flats for eligible tenants, however, could be a platform to 
prevent the complete transformation of  a neighbourhood into middle- or higher-income 
residential area. The provision of  public rental flats in redevelopment neighbourhoods 
was not exercised in Beijing. The ODHRP in Beijing also led to the gentrification of  
redevelopment neighbourhoods, and the distinct feature was that the gentrification 
accompanied original residents’ suburbanisation. 
The municipal governments in Seoul and Beijing have tried to address the shortfall of  JRP 
and ODHRP projects by coming up with revised approaches. The implementation of  the 
rolling redevelopment in Nangok took place as the public sector’s attempt to fill the gap 
where the private sector had failed. In this way, the neighbourhood redevelopment was 
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completed, and the closure of  the rent gap in Nangok redevelopment could be achieved. 
From the residents’ perspective, the rolling redevelopment guaranteed secure relocation 
rental dwellings for eligible tenants upon project commencement. In this way, tenants did 
not have to finance their temporary re-housing during the project period. The rolling 
redevelopment, however, appeared to have two significant shortfalls. Firstly, from the 
residents’ perspective, eligible tenants were permanently displaced from their original 
neighbourhood. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the rolling redevelopment 
turned out to be only applicable when public development corporations such as the 
KNHC were to conduct redevelopment projects. Private developers were unlikely to 
implement such an approach due to heavy upfront costs, and this questioned the 
replicability of  the rolling redevelopment approach in the long run. 
In Beijing, the Haiyuncang redevelopment seemed to have achieved a higher social goal of  
re-housing the majority of  original residents in the neighbourhood compared to other 
conventional ODHRP projects such as the Sun City project in Xinzhongjie. The 
Haiyuncang model, however, invites criticisms on three accounts. Firstly, it was a heavily 
subsidised, government-led project. The district government itself  admitted that there was 
lack of  government funding to fully finance the project even though the land use 
premium was exempted for the district-owned housing development corporation. The 
project had to rely on commercial development on part of  the original neighbourhood in 
order to supplement its losses. 
The first criticism leads to the second: to what extent would the district-owned housing 
development corporation behave as a profit-oriented developer? Would it be free of  any 
bureaucracy and corruption? The Haiyuncang residents’ appeal against planning 
misconduct regarding density and building height control raises concern regarding the way 
in which the local authority intervenes. The greatly increased population density in the 
completed estate also suggests that the district-owned housing development corporation 
may have been oriented too much towards making profits. Considering the position of  the 
municipal planning bureau that overall resident population density should be reduced in 
inner city districts in the long term, the densification of  Haiyuncang neighbourhood 
suggests that the government is simply re-shuffling the population in such a way that 
residents are cornered in a smaller neighbourhood, making room for commercial 
development while the ‘average’ density did not get raised. 
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The third point to consider is the government’s proposed way of  financing their re-
housing costs. Housing mortgage was introduced, utilising the accumulated housing 
provident fund in Dongcheng District. In order to be eligible for the mortgage, however, 
residents must have contributed for a certain period, which means that at least a member 
of  a family needed to be a formal employer in a work place that operates the Housing 
Provident Fund (HPF). As the system is employer-based, this bears a serious equity issue. 
Residents with no secure job or workers working in under-performing firms which do not 
have the capacity to make the employer portion of  the HPF contributions would be 
denied access to this form of  mortgage scheme. For such families, there is only one 
remaining option, which is to take the cash compensation and be permanently displaced 
from their neighbourhood. About 30% of  existing residents went along this path. 
Having examined the direct and indirect government intervention in neighbourhood 
redevelopment and its consequence upon residents’ displacement and gentrification, the 
thesis will move on to the discussion of  redevelopment impacts upon residents, starting 
with the constraints upon residents’ decision-to-move. 
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This chapter forms the first of  three chapters on residents. It employs the supply-side 
constraints perspective on residents’ displacement and relocation to discuss institutional 
and structural constraints that influence residents’ decision-to-move when they become 
subject to neighbourhood redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing. These constraints were 
identified from my field research in redevelopment neighbourhoods, and then analysed 
and interpreted against the backdrop of  wider socio-economic processes. 
Each section is devoted to the discussion of  constraints in one city. The major constraints 
examined in this chapter are largely related to the housing production and tenure system, 
redevelopment compensation regulations, housing affordability problems, and existing 
housing finance system for low-income residents. These constraints are discussed in 
relation to place-specific contexts, taking into account the historical and contemporary 
development of  the housing provision system in each city. The final section pulls together 
the findings from both cities. 
 
7.1 Constraints upon residents’ decision-to-move: the case of Seoul 
Housing market: a mismatch between supply and demand 
In Seoul, the proportion of  owner occupying households is substantially lower than the 
national urban average (NSO Korea 2001a). In fact, as shown in Table 7-1, nearly 60% of  
municipal households in Seoul were in some form of  rental contract in 2000, and the 
dominant form was Chonsei tenure that did not require monthly rent payment as long as 
key money was paid to the landlord upon signing a contract. 
Table 7-1: Distribution of households according to tenure in South Korea, 2000 
(NSO Korea 2001a) 
Chonsei
Deposit-based
monthly rental
Monthly rental
with no deposit
Others
Tenancy
sub-total
6,222,073 3,885,239 1,452,319 244,393 585,361 6,167,312 423 12,389,808
50.2% 31.4% 11.7% 2.0% 4.7% 0.0% 100.0%
1,263,357 1,271,330 445,236 36,370 69,636 1,822,572 7 3,085,936
40.9% 41.2% 14.4% 1.2% 2.3% 0.0% 100.0%
Sub-total
Owner
occupation
Seoul
Regions
Tenancy
Unknown
Urban as a whole
 
As the Chonsei key money is returned to tenants in full when their rental contracts expire, 
Chonsei is much more favoured by tenants over other rental tenure systems. Monthly rent 
payment is likely to be chosen when tenants are financially incapable of paying the full 
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Chonsei key money. Tenants also equate monthly rent payment with the reduction in their 
monthly household disposable income, and thus consider it as an irrecoverable ‘waste’ of 
their financial assets, as one of the displacees from Nangok neighbourhood stated: 
“Paying monthly rents, well, in my view, is a crazy thing to do. Paying several 
hundred thousand [Korean] Won is such a waste with no returns, isn’t it? I’d rather 
live on streets, save some money and find Chonsei…”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-13) 
 
Another interviewee living in an adjacent neighbourhood was in deposit-based monthly 
rental tenure, but stated that Chonsei was more preferable if circumstances permitted: 
“My situation doesn’t allow me to choose Chonsei. My children are in junior high 
and primary schools, and no matter how much I earn, I can’t save enough to pay for 
Chonsei deposit… What I’m saying is that it’s not whether one favours it [Chonsei] 
or not. Everyone wants to live on Chonsei tenure. If  you are a tenant in someone 
else’s house, no matter what other conditions you face, Chonsei is still better…” 
 (Interviewee KSS7-INT-15) 
 
In terms of  dwelling types, the majority of  tenant households in Seoul lived in individual 
houses (or dandog jutaeg in Korean; see Figure 7-1 for the description of  individual and 
multi-dwelling houses). As shown in Table 7-2 below, the Population and Housing Census 
in 2000 found 64% of  tenant households living in individual houses, and 22% in 
apartment flats. According to the table, it was also more likely for those tenants in 
individual houses to double up with other households within a dwelling. On average, each 
individual house was home to 2.38 tenant households, and each apartment flat only 0.41 
tenant households. Such figures indicate that apartment flats in Seoul were clearly oriented 
towards single-household and owner occupation. 
Table 7-2: Distribution of households in accordance with dwelling forms in Seoul 
(NSO Korea 2001a: 484, 645) 
Apartment
flats
Individual
houses1)
Multi-dwelling
houses: dasedae
jutaeg only1)
Terrace
houses
Others
Total number of existing dwellings ① 974,910 489,662 177,275 215,319 59,371 1,916,537
50.9% 25.5% 9.2% 11.2% 3.1% 100.0%
Total number of residing household ② 977,832 1,551,382 180,451 232,121 144,150 3,085,936
31.7% 50.3% 5.8% 7.5% 4.7% 100.0%
(Households per dwelling unit) ② / ① (1.00) (3.17) (1.02) (1.08) (2.43) (1.61)
③ 403,788 1,166,992 66,260 79,038 106,494 1,822,572
22.2% 64.0% 3.6% 4.3% 5.8% 100.0%
(Tenant households per dwelling unit) ③ / ① (0.41) (2.38) (0.37) (0.37) (1.79) (0.95)
Tenancy Chonsei 290,754 804,834 57,384 61,654 56,704 1,271,330
Deposit-based monthly rental 98,433 297,073 5,902 11,406 32,422 445,236
Monthly rental with no rent deposit 1,622 26,376 654 1,625 6,093 36,370
Others 12,979 38,709 2,320 4,353 11,275 69,636
Note: 1) See Figure 7-1 for the explanation of the difference between dasedae jutaeg and individual houses.
Dwelling forms
Sub-total
Category
Total number of tenant
households
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Figure 7-1: Explaining individual dwelling types in South Korea 
 
Individual dwellings in South Korea would be broadly grouped in two categories.
(1) Dandog jutaeg (loosely translated as ‘individual house’)
Dandog jutaeg is in general for single family occupancy. It’s usually one or two-storey high, and has a small yard. It could be 
sub-divided for renting, in which case tenants usually live together with owner occupying household. There is no separate main 
entrance for tenants, and it is common for tenants to share cooking and bathroom facilities with their landlords.
(2) Multi-dwelling house (see pictures below)
A multi-dwelling house is for multiple household occupancy, and is usually three- or four-storey high. It is sub-divided with an 
independent entrance, cooking and bathroom facilities for each household.
A multi-dwelling house is further divided into two sub-categories by law: dasedae jutaeg and dagagu jutaeg. The former refers to 
a multi-dwelling house whose sub-divided units can be subject to ownership transfer. The latter refers to a multi-dwelling house 
whose sub-divided units cannot be subject to ownership transfer. In Korean statistics, dasedae jutaeg is treated as a separate 
category for collecting household and housing data, while dagagu jutaeg is included in the individual house category. 
The picture below shows examples of multi-dwelling houses 
near Nangok neighbourhood,
one of which has a roof-top extension.
The picture above shows a lateral façade of a multi-dwelling 
house. Each door in the picture leads to a separate sub-
divided accommodation. The door in the lowest floor leads to 
a semi-basement dwelling.
Note: Both pictures taken by the author 
in June 2002
 
Such concentration of  tenants in individual houses could partly be explained by the fact 
that the individual houses have experienced the least price increase since the mid-1980s. 
According to the results of  the annual survey of  urban housing price index conducted by 
Kookmin Bank, the increase rate of  the sale price index for apartment flats between 1986 
and 2001 was 138.9% in Seoul, whereas it was only 19.4% for individual houses (see 
Figure 7-2). In the case of  Chonsei index, apartment flats again experienced a much 
higher rate of  increase (331.2%) as compared to that of  individual houses (116.8%). Such 
relatively moderate increase in the price index in the detached housing sector would have 
been more attractive to those low-income residents. 
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Figure 7-2: Urban housing sales price and Chonsei deposit index in South Korea, 1986-2001 
(Kookmin Bank 2005; NSO Korea 2001d: 327) 
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While tenants were largely concentrated in the detached housing sector, the housing 
production, however, was largely in favour of  apartment construction, and in particular, 
high-rise flat construction. As shown in Figure 7-3 below, individual houses lost popularity 
among builders, and apartment construction became the norm in the construction 
industry. In the 1990s, around 80% of  new dwellings constructed were high-rise flats 
(KNHC 2004; NSO Korea 2002b). The implementation of  JRP in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods in Seoul has also resulted in the construction of  high-rise flats almost 
without exception. 
Figure 7-3: National housing construction by dwelling types in South Korea 
Source: NSO Korea (various years) Korea Statistical Yearbook; Kookmin Bank web site
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Such orientation towards high-rise flat construction, however, places heavy constraints 
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upon tenants and low-income owner-occupiers when they have to move out of  
dilapidated neighbourhoods due to redevelopment. Upon displacement, they have limited 
housing choice, looking for dwellings in neighbourhoods where individual houses for 
affordable renting are more likely to be found. Furthermore, as those tenants from 
redevelopment neighbourhoods used to pay as little as one-quarter of  what other tenants 
paid in adjacent neighbourhoods as Chonsei key money, their displacement would likely 
place greater pressure on their financial situation, and increase hardship in the context of  
the housing price increase that has been prevalent since the late 1990s (see Figure 7-2 
above). 
Limited supply of public rental housing 
The limited supply of  public rental housing could be identified as the other major 
constraint upon residents’ decision to move, which presents little option but to find a 
private rental dwelling. In South Korea, the public rental sector has received relatively less 
attention, and just over 5% of  the national population are housed in public rental housing 
(MoCT Korea 2002b: 322). Approximately 15% of  all new housing units that were built 
between 1982 and 2000 could be classified as public rental dwellings, but the majority of  
them were for 3 to 5-year short-term leases (KNHC 2001a: 79). These were available to 
those low-income tenants who had subscribed to and maintained a Housing Subscription 
Savings account for a certain period, and were subject to sales to sitting tenants at the end 
of  their lease period. For this reason, these rental units could not be regarded as ‘public’ in 
real terms, and were often seen as a route to home-ownership. As shown in Table 7-3 
below, by the end of  2000 more than half  of  the available national public rental housing 
stock was for 5-year short-term lease.38 
 
 
                                                 
38 Yeong-gu, as shown in Table 7-3, means ‘permanent’ in Korean, and refers to a certain type of  public 
rental housing built for the low-income households from the late 1980s until mid-1990s. It was first of  its 
kind in South Korea that had a 50-year lease period. Tenants were initially given a 2-year rental contract, 
renewable upon meeting the eligibility criteria under relevant regulations. The central government budget 
funded 85% of  the construction costs. The programme came to an end due to the shortage of  funding 
when the central government stopped its budgetary contribution in 1993 (SMG 2002b). Nowadays, these 
units mostly accommodate those recipients of  NBLS benefits, and those who meet the criteria stipulated in 
Article 19 of  Ordinance on Housing Supply. 
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Table 7-3: Public rental housing stock in South Korea 
(KNHC 2001a) 
Year end of 2000
Yeong-gu
rental housing
50-year
rental housing
Urban 
redevelopment
rental housing
5-year rental
housing1)
Total
190,077 45,018 34,021 366,747 635,863
(Supplied by) KNHC 140,078 24,028 0 56,439 220,545
Local governments 49,999 20,990 34,021 7,613 112,623
Private companies 0 0 0 302,695 302,695
45,828 18,164 33,010 547 97,549
% of national total 24.1% 40.3% 97.0% 0.1% 15.3%
Regions
Note: 1) These units are subject to sales after 5 years of rental operation. These are built by both public sector (KNHC and local 
governments) and private companies, and their construction is heavily subsidised by the National Housing Fund (Ha, 2002: 200).
 National total
 Seoul total
 
In Seoul, the provision of  public rental dwellings had been even lower. The Population 
and Housing Census in 2000 showed that approximately 22% of  total national households 
(or 28% of  all national tenant households) were living in Seoul by 2000 (NSO Korea 
2001a). However, there were 97,549 public rental units available in Seoul (see Table 7-3 
above), meaning that the public rental sector could only benefit 5.4% of  all the municipal 
tenant households.39 
Housing purchase and affordability problems 
In the case of  owner-occupiers in redevelopment neighbourhoods, the JRP arrangement 
is such that they retain the right to purchase a redevelopment flat at cost price and be re-
housed upon project completion. Previous studies, however, show that less than half  
(47.3%) of  the existing owner-occupiers had actually moved into their redevelopment flats 
upon project completion in the 1990s (SMG 2000a: 19.129-19.133).40 High sale prices of  
redevelopment flats could be identified as the main obstacle to re-housing. 
In the JRP, the sales price of  a redevelopment flat is preliminarily set by its developer at 
the early stage of  a project when a project’s management disposal plan is finalised (see 
Figure 2-4 in Chapter 2). Property-owners (both owner-occupiers and absentee landlords) 
are expected to pay the full price in instalment. The exact price of  a redevelopment flat is 
                                                 
39 The 2000 Census revealed that there were 1,822,572 tenant households residing in Seoul by 2000 (NSO 
Korea 2001a) 
40 This was based on the analysis of  110 redevelopment projects that were carried out between 1990 and 
2000. The estimation took into account those owner-occupiers who were present at the time of  the 
government’s redevelopment approval, and did not consider those who sold and vacated their dwellings 
prior to the government approval. 
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calculated when the whole project is completed. In its actual implementation of  a JRP 
project, a rough estimate of  the sale price is often shared among property-owners as 
rumours are spread around even before developers officially put forward their price 
estimation. The existing owner-occupiers in redevelopment neighbourhoods are 
discouraged, if  their income and savings are not sufficient enough to afford those new 
flats, from the prospect of  remaining as homeowners in their original neighbourhood 
upon project completion. This eventually leads to the sales of  their property rights to off-
site buyers, as an interviewee from Nangok neighbourhood expressed below: 
“I hear the sales price will be at least KRW 5,000,000 per pyeong [that is, KRW 
1,511,600 per m2], but the actual price is to be decided once they estimate all the 
costs. The demolition is not complete yet, so they don’t know how much the price is 
going to be, but say it’ll at least be KRW 5,000,000. That means, for a 44-pyeong 
[145.5 m2] flat, the price will be more than KRW 200 million41…I don’t have such 
money, so I am thinking of  selling my right”.    (Interviewee KSS10-INT-05) 
 
Such concern over the issue of  affordability in Nangok did not turn out to be groundless 
when its developer made an announcement of  the sales price of  new flats. These prices 
are summarised in Table 7-4 below, and appear to be affordable only for middle- or 
higher-income households in Seoul. For instance, the price-to-income ratio (PIR) for the 
bottom 20% of  income decile distribution was found to be 12.1 to 1 even for the smallest 
flat. 
Table 7-4: Sales price of new flats supplied by Nangok redevelopment 
(NSO Korea 2001b) 
Sales price
(based on 6th floor flats)
Price per flat
(m2) (in KRW) (in KRW) PIR (in KRW) PIR
① ② ③ ② / ③ ④ ② / ④
56.2 5121)
79.3 880 119,704,000 9,854,400 12.1 : 1 27,830,400 4.3 : 1
99.2 15
112.4 1321 172,011,000 9,854,400 17.5 : 1 27,830,400 6.2 : 1
135.5 23
145.5 571 229,482,000 9,854,400 23.3 : 1 27,830,400 8.2 : 1
Note: 1) These 512 flats are public rental flats for tenant households in Seoul, and are not accessible for existing property owners of
Nangok neighbourhood.
Source of sales price: http://www.ten.co.kr/Re/Main/Tooja02.asp?serno=90&chk=d (accessed on 10 April 2005)
Number of
flats
Annual household disposable income in urban areas
(salary and wage earning urban households)
  Bottom 20% of income decile       Average
Construction
floor space
 
                                                 
41 This would lead to the price-to-annual disposable income ratio of  7.2 to 1 for average salary and wage 
earning urban households, and 18.6 to 1 for the bottom 20% of  the income decile distribution (NSO Korea 
2001b). 
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The affordability problem was worsened by the fact that those redevelopment flats were 
relatively spacious. As Ha (2001: 392) noted, “the average floor space per household in the 
redeveloped area is higher than that of  Seoul City as a whole.” In Nangok, the average 
construction space of  all the flats to be supplied was estimated to be 100.8 m2. If  we 
exclude public rental units which were much smaller than flats for sales, the average floor 
space turned out to be 108.9 m2. 
Redevelopment compensation for tenants 
If  on-site owner-occupiers are experiencing affordability problems regarding the newly 
built flats in the neighbourhood, the obvious constraint upon tenants would be their 
eligibility for legal compensation. As far as redevelopment compensation is concerned, 
tenants would be divided into two groups according to their eligibility for redevelopment 
compensation: (1) those entitled to in-kind (access to a public rental flat built on site) or 
cash compensation; and (2) those not entitled to any kind of  compensation but a token 
fee to help with their house-moving expenses. 
In Seoul, at the time of  the inception of  JRP, there was no compensation for tenants in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods. This provoked protests and appeals, often violent and 
fierce, by tenants against forceful eviction in the 1980s, calling for international attention 
(ACHR 1989a; CIIR 1988). It was only towards the end of  the 1980s that the central 
government introduced a legal basis for tenants’ relocation compensation. The 
compensation measures put into practice in 1989 have remained unchanged since then 
(SMG 2000b). The eligibility for any legal compensation is based on residence status: in 
order to qualify, tenants must have lived in the redevelopment neighbourhood for at least 
three months by the time their neighbourhood is designated as a redevelopment district 
and its final blueprint – called ‘comprehensive redevelopment plan’ – is officially approved. 
The provision of  redevelopment compensation for eligible tenants didn’t completely 
prevent tenants’ protests, but the protestors came to be constituted largely by ineligible 
tenants. This meant that property-owners and developers didn’t have to run into 
confrontation with the entire tenant population in redevelopment neighbourhoods. 
In the case of  eligible tenants in redevelopment neighbourhoods, the redevelopment 
compensation consists of  in-kind and cash compensation. In-kind compensation refers to 
a public rental housing unit built on site. If  this option is chosen, tenants are to return to 
their redeveloped neighbourhood upon project completion, but they would have to 
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finance their temporary relocation costs themselves. Public rental units built on site to re-
house eligible tenants are purchased by the municipal government, hence bearing no costs 
on developers and property-owners (Kim et al. 1996: 109-110). If  cash compensation is 
chosen instead of  a public rental flat, they receive an amount equivalent to three months 
of  average monthly expenditure for wage- and salary-earning urban households. It 
increases incrementally to take into account the household size (Kim et al. 1996: 109-110). 
Table 7-5 below shows the amount of  cash compensation for those eligible tenants in 
Nangok at the time of  commencing formal relocation in 2000. The cash compensation 
turned out to be 16% to 49% of  average annual household disposable income for salary 
and wage earning households in cities. For the bottom 20% of  income decile distribution, 
it was 36% to 110%. 
Table 7-5: Cash compensation for eligible tenants in Nangok 
(NSO Korea 2001b) 
Number of household 
members
Total cash compensation
(Unit: KRW)
Cash compensation as a 
proportion of average annual 
household disposable income1)
Cash compensation as a 
proportion of annual household 
disposable income for bottom 
20% of income distribution1)
1 3,541,800 49.4% 110.0%
2 4,386,000 30.6% 68.1%
3 5,367,300 25.0% 55.6%
4 6,621,300 23.1% 51.4%
5 7,137,900 19.9% 44.3%
6 7,762,500 18.1% 40.2%
7 8,606,700 17.2% 38.2%
8 9,450,900 16.5% 36.7%
9 10,295,100 16.0% 35.5%
Note: 1) This is based on the annual disposable household income for salary and wage earning households in urban areas, 
surveyed annually by the National Statistical Office. In 2000, the average annual disposable income was KRW 25,362,000 (average 
household size, 3.54 persons). For the bottom 20% of income decile distribution, it was KRW 9,854,400 (average household size, 
3.06 persons).  
In the case of  ineligible tenants, they only receive a token fee to pay for their house-
moving expenses, and do not enjoy any priority access to public rental housing either in 
the redevelopment neighbourhood or elsewhere in the city.42 If  they wish to access public 
rental flats, they would have to go through a centrally administered application process, 
competing with other tenants from all over the city. This is a very time-consuming process 
under the condition of  such limited supply of  public rental housing. Even if  an applicant 
is allocated to a public rental dwelling, it’s not guaranteed that the flat is in or near the 
neighbourhood where the applicant has been residing. Such situations would not be 
                                                 
42 Among the public rental flats in Table 7-3, urban redevelopment rental units are designated for eligible 
tenants displaced due to residential redevelopment projects, and therefore, the number of  available public 
rental flats for ineligible tenants is further limited. 
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encouraging for those who wished to stay nearby, as some interviewees ineligible for 
redevelopment compensation remarked: 
“If  a public rental flat is provided, it would not be in this area, but somewhere else, 
so I will have to move out if  that happens. If  not, then I will stay in this area, 
moving to somewhere down the hill, not very far. My children have been students 
of  the primary school from Year 1, so I want to see them graduate. I also don’t 
know when my work here would come to an end, but I still have a job here, and I 
don’t know how I would manage to make friends with new neighbours if  I 
move…”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01) 
 
“…I sent in a petition to everywhere, to the President, to the Mayor, to the District 
Government, KNHC, and to the local district assembly member from this 
neighbourhood, to everywhere…Then, personally, I got a call, saying there is a [50-
year public rental] flat at Seodaemun-dong [this area is located in central Seoul and 
takes about one and a half  hour to get there from Nangok by public transport]. It is 
about 11 or 12 pyeong in size [36 or 40 m2]. But, my daughter’s work place is on this 
side of  the river, and too far from that flat. And, the flat is too small as well, so I 
declined the offer…”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-05) 
 
Limits with formal financial opportunities 
If  residents from redevelopment neighbourhoods were to find a private rental dwelling, 
the degree of  their access to financial arrangements at formal institutions would be 
important. The prospect, however, was not bright. In South Korea, personal savings and 
financial support from relatives have played a significant role in financing one’s housing 
costs. For instance, a social statistics survey conducted by the government in 2001 (NSO 
Korea 2002d: 102) revealed that personal savings and financial support from parents or 
relatives were the top two major sources of  funding for the purchase of  one’s own house 
in Seoul. Loans from banks were only the third major source for home buyers. 
A housing finance programme was established by the government to assist low-income 
tenants in 1990. Its full name is called ‘National Housing Fund (hereafter NHF) Housing 
Loan Programme to Subsidise Chonsei Deposits for Low-income Households.’ The 
programme taps resources from the NHF, which was established in 1981 and pools 
resources to finance affordable housing construction nation-wide. An application for 
NHF housing loans is made to the local district government by tenants who have to meet 
two conditions: (1) they should have a valid rental contract with a private landlord before 
making the application; and (2) they should have paid 10% of  their Chonsei deposit in 
advance. The local district government then reviews the eligibility of  the applicants, and 
recommends those successful applicants to the local branch of  Kookmin Bank that 
 215
administers the distribution of  NHF housing loans. The bank then reviews the credit 
standing of  applicants before depositing the loan into the successful applicants’ account 
(MoCT Korea 2002d, 2002e; SMG 2002b: 95-96). The main eligibility criteria and 
conditions of  exclusion are listed in Table 7-6 below: 
Table 7-6: Main eligibility criteria and conditions of exclusion 
regarding NHF housing loans for low-income households in South Korea 
(MoCT Korea 2002d; SMG 2002b: 95-96) 
Category
The applicant should have made a tenancy contract, and have pre-paid 10% of the Chonsei deposit to
the landlord before making the application. The applicant must meet the following requirements:
▪ The total amount of Chonsei deposit should not exceed the upper limit specified by the local government
in each region. In Seoul, as of July 2002, the upper limit is KRW 50,000,000;
▪ The net floor space of a rented accommodation should be 85 m2 or smaller.
▪ The application should be made in the name of the head of a household, who is at least 20 years old and
has dependent family members, or by a person recognised as a household head by the local government.
Single-person households are, in principle, excluded unless the person is 35 years or older and has no
other person on his resident registration for at least one year at the time of application.
Those applicants meeting the following requirements are excluded from receiving the NHF housing loans:
▪ Any member of the household is in possession of a passenger car with engine displacement of 1500 cc or
more;
▪ Any member of the household is in possession of a real estate property;
▪ The rented place is a public rental flat;
▪ Any member of the household is on the credit delinquency blacklist managed by the Korea Federation of
Banks in accordance with the relevant regulations, and thus experiences restrictions with financial
transactions;
▪ The applicant has already received the NHF housing loan, and has not fully paid back at the time of
making an application for a new loan.
Eligibility criteria
Conditions of exclusion
Contents
 
Since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the amount of  loan a household could take out was 
increased substantially at several occasions in the government’s attempt to assist housing 
finance for low-income tenants (see Table 7-7 below). Since mid-2000, in the case of  
Seoul, this NHF housing loan has been open to those who sign a tenancy contract that 
involves Chonsei deposit of  less than or equal to KRW 50,000,000. These tenants can 
borrow as much as 70% of  their Chonsei deposit at a competitive annual interest rate of  
3%. The borrowers are required to pay back the loan in lump sum payment after 2 years 
of  grace period. The loan is renewable twice (Kim et al. 2004: 23-24; SMG 2002b: 93-96). 
 
 
 
 216
Table 7-7: Expansion of NHF housing loan programme to subsidise Chonsei deposits 
for low-income tenants in Seoul 
(MoCT Korea 2002a; SMG 2000a: 2.689; 2001a: 11.1014; 2002a: 11.60) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 July 2002
Number of beneficiaries
(unit: households)
① 5,302 6,438 12,004 9,756 16,292 12,934
Total amount of loans
(unit: million, C54KRW)
② 33,400 42,200 83,500 83,700 165,900 197,210
Average amount of loan per 
household
(unit: million, KRW)
②/① 6.30 6.55 6.96 8.58 10.18 15.25
n.a. 7,500,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 15,000,000
from 16 March;
70% of Chonsei 
deposit from 27 
August
70% of Chonsei
deposit
n.a. 30,000,000 30,000,000 35,000,000
(26 June 
onward)
35,000,000 50,000,000
Maximum amount of loan
a household could claim
(unit: KRW)
Maximum amount of Chonsei
deposit for applicants to be
eligible to apply (unit: KRW)
Year
 
This housing loan programme for low-income households can be considered a 
meaningful measure to ease their housing difficulties to some extent, but it has limitations. 
Firstly, the programme still has limited funds despite the expansion since 1997, and 
benefits only a fraction of  tenant households in South Korea. For example, the total 
number of  households who are yet to redeem the loan has reached 81,396 households in 
2003 (Kim et al. 2004: 51), but this only accounts for just over 1% of  all the tenant 
households in South Korea. In Seoul, the number of  borrowers in 2000 was estimated to 
be 9,756 households (see Table 7-7 above), but this accounts for only 0.5% of  all the 
tenant households in Seoul. 
Secondly, the terms of  redemption, that is lump sum repayment after 2 years of  grace 
period (or 6 years if  renewed twice), are often considered to be too short for many low-
income households whose insecure and irregular income status makes it difficult for them 
to save enough money before the grace period expires. In fact, one of  the requests from 
the tenants’ association in Nangok was a long-term, low-interest loan, repayable in 
instalment over 10 to 20 years after several years of  grace period: 
“What we ask for is a long-term, low-interest housing loan. Personally, I wish to 
obtain housing loan, and pay back in instalment during 10, 20 years or so. If  that’s 
not possible, there’s no way I can cope with this situation…Some people here 
request an increase in cash compensation, but I fundamentally disagree. We should 
ask for money that we can pay back somehow. Asking for money given gratis is like 
the mind of  a thief. But, even if  I work, I have no way to pay back within 2 or 3 
years…so, we ask for a long-term, low-interest loan, but the state says it’s not 
possible, saying there has been no precedent…but without such loan, I have no 
other way to rely on. My relatives are not well-off, and are no way in situation to 
lend me such money. Even if  I borrow [through other informal sources], I can’t 
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afford high interest, then my debt will increase…”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-02) 
 
 
The average annual disposable income of  the bottom 20% of  the income decile 
distribution for salary and wage earning urban households turned out to be KRW 
9,854,400 in 2000 (NSO Korea 2001b). This level of  disposable income is only about one-
quarter of  the maximum amount of  loan permitted under the revised loan programme in 
March 2002. Therefore, for those irregular workers and unemployed residents as well as 
those on means-tested social security benefits, the terms of  redemption of  the NHF 
housing loan require being more flexible if  they are to be benefited by this programme. 
In order to minimise the default on loan redemption, the maximum amount of  NHF 
housing loan permitted to each applicant had been kept to be only about one-third of  the 
maximum amount of  Chonsei deposit until 2000. It was only from March 2001 that the 
central government revised the programme to allow as much as 70% of  the total Chonsei 
deposit to be taken out as housing loans by low-income applicants. This indicates that the 
housing loan could be used only on part-financing the low-income tenants’ full housing 
costs, and further suggests that only relatively better-off  tenants would be able to fully 
utilise the increased allowance. 
Thirdly, as mentioned in Table 7-6, the NHF housing loan is not accessible to those 
moving into public rental housing units whose rental deposit is more than tenants used to 
pay while living in redevelopment neighbourhoods. The logic behind this restriction is that 
these units have already received subsidies from the National Housing Fund, which are 
paid out to the builders for the construction of  these units. This restriction places 
significant constraints upon those low-income households (including the displacees from 
Nangok) who don’t have sufficient financial means at their disposal, and makes it difficult 
for them to take public rental flats as an alternative relocation option. Therefore, even if  
an eligible displacee from Nangok opts for a KNHC rental flat instead of  cash 
compensation, they would have to finance the increased deposit without relying on the 
NHF housing loans. The likely situation is that the displacees are driven towards private 
rental accommodation so that they can at least consider applying for a NHF housing loan. 
Summary 
This section has discussed the major constraints that faced residents upon their 
displacement from redevelopment neighbourhoods in Seoul. The main constraints 
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identified were: (1) housing provision that places more emphasis on apartment flat 
construction rather than individual houses favoured by tenants; (2) limited supply of  
public rental dwellings, which limits the housing choice of  low-income residents; (3) the 
affordability problems with the newly built flats, preventing low-income owner-occupiers 
in redevelopment neighbourhoods from being re-housed in their original 
neighbourhoods; (4) redevelopment compensation criteria; and (5) the limits with formal 
financial opportunities that benefit only a fraction of  tenants. 
 
7.2 Constraints upon residents’ decision-to-move: the case of Beijing 
Since their inception in the early 1980s, mainland China’s housing reform policies 
specifically aimed at enhancing urban housing investment and breaking ties with the 
decades-long in-kind welfare provision of  housing. The spatial and social changes in 
urban China during the reform era seemed to have brought significant changes to 
formerly restricted residential moves. In comparison with the pre-reform practices, urban 
residents were increasingly expected to behave under market conditions as active 
consumers of  commercial housing and meet their individual housing needs with their own 
financial means. As the reform measures were put into practice and strengthened, a 
substantial proportion of  urban households were assumed to be exposed to different 
tenure types with opportunities to move according to their personal preferences, thus 
increasing the incidence of  intra-urban residential relocation and residents’ exercise of  
tenure preferences (Huang and Clark 2002; Li 2000; Wang and Li 2004). 
With the persistence of  institutional intervention in producing and executing urban and 
housing policies and developing housing markets, institutional and structural constraints 
are understood to play a more important and determining role with regard to the housing 
behaviour of  urban residents and their intra-urban relocation during the reform period 
(see for example, Huang 2004; Li 2000; S.-M. Li 2004; Li and Siu 2001; Wu 2004). It is in 
this context that this section tries to address those constraints that would influence 
residents’ displacement and their post-displacement housing consumption in times of  
redevelopment. 
Housing reform and homeownership orientation 
Housing reform was first introduced with an emphasis on sharing responsibilities by 
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adopting a so-called ‘three-pillar system’ that called for diversified sources of  investment 
from the local government, enterprises and employees (Hou 1999: 221-22; Li 2005). A 
strong emphasis was placed on introducing market principles in the housing sector so that 
housing was no longer treated as welfare goods but as a commodity (Wang and Murie 
1996, 1999b; Zhou and Logan 2002). 
The promotion of  individual homeownership was at the centre of  these reform policies, 
converting public housing as welfare benefit to capitalised asset (Davis 2003). 
Homeownership was thought to release the state and under-performing state enterprises 
from their over-stretched burden of  welfare provision, and transfer the responsibility to 
the individuals. It largely progressed on dual tracks: (1) supply of  commercial and 
affordable housing; and (2) sales of  existing public rental units to sitting tenants. 
Supply of  commercial and affordable housing 
Relatively better-off  households were directed toward the commercial and affordable 
housing sectors. The latter (known as jingji shiyongfang in Chinese) was supplied at a lower 
price than commercial housing, made possible through various government subsidies to 
developers (e.g. tax redemption) (J. Lee 2000; Shi 2001; State Council of  China 1998). In 
general, households whose income fell in the top 20% of  income decile distribution were 
expected to buy commercial housing at full market price. Those households whose 
income was above the lowest 20% income were considered as potential buyers of  both 
commercial and affordable housing. Over the years, the sales volume of  new residential 
units to individuals in urban China has increased substantially. According to the National 
Bureau of  Statistics, 88% of  urban housing sold in 2000 went to individuals instead of  
institutions, and the sales volume reached 295.4 billion yuan (People's Daily 19 March 
2001). In 2002, Beijing also witnessed a high rate of  market participation by individuals in 
housing purchase: 97% of  16 million m2 of  residential dwelling space sold in the market 
were bought by individuals (BMBS 2003b). This was a big change compared to the 
dominant role of  institutional actors in the housing market in the 1990s.43 
                                                 
43 Throughout the 1990s, it was often pointed out that one of  the drawbacks of  the 1990s reform measures 
was the unleashed purchasing power of  the state enterprises, who turned out to be the major buyers of  
commercial housing on the market, much less constrained under the Enterprise Reform regarding the use 
of  their budgets. Only a fraction of  commercial housing was sold directly to individuals. Those houses 
purchased by the state enterprises and institutions were then rented out at nominal rents or sold out at 
heavily subsidised price to their employees (Wang and Murie 1996; Wu 1996). The practice came to an end 
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Privatisation of  public rental housing 
The homeownership rate has also increased through the sales of  existing public housing 
stock to sitting tenants at a discounted price based on employees’ work history and ranks. 
As early as 1988, the stock transfer of  public rental units was emphasised by the State 
Council as an essential component of  housing reform policies (Song and Hu 2001). In 
Beijing, the municipal guidance on the privatisation first appeared in 1992 (BMG 1992). 
The earlier years of  privatisation did not see a significant increase in homeownership rate: 
by 1993, about 13.7% of  the sitting tenants in the public housing sector nationwide had 
bought their rented dwellings (Lin 2001). Throughout the 1990s, the sales volume had 
been rising steadily, and a big push came in 1998 when all kinds of  welfare housing 
allocation were to be terminated (State Council of  China 1998). Huang (2004) found in 
his sample survey that nearly half  of  the homeowners achieved their ownership in 1998. 
Many urban residents seemed to have rushed into the queue of  securing welfare housing 
and subsidised sales to ‘catch the last train’ (Huang 2004: 62-63). In August 2002, the then 
Deputy Minister of  the Ministry of  Construction was proud to announce in an 
international conference that “Since the mid-1990s, 80 percent of  China's public housing 
has been sold to local residents” (Xinhua News Agency 12 August 2002). 
Homeownership in Beijing 
In Beijing, the concentration of  government institutions stymied the rise of  
homeownership during the early years of  housing reform, but homeownership has been 
on the increase noticeably since 1998. Surveys by the municipal statistical bureau indicated 
that the proportion of  owner-occupiers was just over 20% in 1998, but it reached 54.1% 
by 2001 (see Table 7-8 below). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
in 1998. Nevertheless, even the employers’ subsidised sale of  commercial housing to their employees was a 
contribution to the rise of  homeownership. 
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Table 7-8: Changes in Beijing’s tenure structure, 1998 – 2001 
(BMBS 2002) 
Year Others Total
Full property
rights
Partial property
rights
Public housing Private housing
2001 31.8% 22.3% 44.5% 1.1% 0.3% 100.0%
2000 21.6% 23.4% 53.2% 1.6% 0.2% 100.0%
1999 12.1% 22.1% 63.9% 1.7% 0.2% 100.0%
1998 12.8% 7.4% 76.6% 2.0% 1.2% 100.0%
Owner occupiers Tenants
Note: Partial property rights refer to the property rights that only grant right to occupy and use, and do not provide residents' right to
dispose at one's own discretion.  
It appears that the pre-reform dominance of  public rental tenure has shifted towards a 
polarised system of  owner occupation and public rental tenure. Private rental tenure was 
marginal and constituted less than 2% of  the sample population. Although the 
strengthening of  reform measures in the housing sector hoped to create diversity in the 
existing tenure structure, the much hoped-for diversity seemed to have occurred only 
within the owner occupation sector which was divided into homeownership with full and 
partial property rights. 
The public rental sector in Beijing occupies an important position in the tenure structure, 
but its long-term prospect is not promising due to the increasing incidence of  urban 
redevelopment replacing public rental units with commercial flats. The inner city districts 
were attracting more and more highly priced commercial flats and offices and, to make 
way for them, a large amount of  public rental units were becoming subject to demolition. 
Therefore, the possibility of  remaining as public housing tenants within the inner city 
districts was expected to be minimal. 
Redevelopment compensation: from re-housing to full monetarisation 
The method of  redevelopment compensation went through a number of  changes since 
the implementation of  the ODHRP. Between 1991 and 1998, residents displaced from 
redevelopment neighbourhoods were compensated in accordance with the State Council’s 
Ordinance on the Management of  Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation in 1991 
(hereafter 1991 State Council Ordinance). It called for in-kind compensation, combined 
with cash compensation if  necessary, when residents were to become subject to 
demolition and relocation (State Council of  China 1991). This meant that developers in 
charge were to provide re-housing or relocation dwellings elsewhere, guaranteeing the 
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continuation of  residents’ existing tenure in a relocation dwelling. 
“Namely, it was in-kind relocation in consideration of  the number of  household 
members and their housing space. For example, let’s say there is a couple who lives 
with a son, daughter-in-law, and a grandchild. This constitutes three generations. 
The displacement and relocation regulation [at that time in the 1990s] was closely 
linked with household structure. That is, if  a household structure was complex, the 
number of  dwellings allocated would also increase… [In the previous case], the 
household structure would lead to the allocation of  two dwellings. If  there is a 
daughter within a family who is not married at the age of  22 years old, or a son at 
the age of  24 years old, then the family would be allocated another room. That is, a 
one-bedroom flat would become a two-bedroom flat…” 
  (Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department, 
  Dongcheng district government) 
 
Until the early 1990s, when the inner city redevelopment was still in its embryonic stage, it 
was not uncommon to find a redevelopment project that re-housed all local residents 
(Dowall 1994; Leaf  1995). ODHRP, however, favoured the provision of  sub-urban 
relocation. A substantial number of  inner city residents were relocated to newly developed 
sub-urban estates that served as relocation sites for displacees from inner city districts 
(Fang and Zhang 2003; Tan 1997). By the end of  1999, Beijing’s ODHRP projects 
resulted in the displacement of  160,900 households, of  which 43.8% (70,500 households) 
were relocated elsewhere, and 29.8% (48,000 households) re-housed (UCCBMPPCC et al. 
2003). 
Such practices, however, took place at the expense of  high project costs and low 
profitability, eventually becoming a hindrance to the rapid expansion of  redevelopment 
programmes (Dowall 1994; Leaf  1995). A major revision took place in 1998. While the 
1991 State Council Ordinance was still in its place, Beijing municipal government 
produced a revised compensation policy by announcing the implementation of  the 
Measure for the Management of  Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation in 1998 
(hereinafter BJ-1998 Compensation Measure). It became effective as of  1 December 1998 
(BMG 1998a). The key to this revision was the monetarisation of  redevelopment 
compensation by taking two factors into consideration: the number of  registered 
household members; and formal dwelling space. The BJ-1998 Compensation Measure did 
not rule out off-site relocation or on-site re-housing, but in its actual implementation, 
cash-based compensation was accepted as the norm under the new regulation, as an 
official explained below: 
“The biggest difference was that it [that is, redevelopment compensation] was not 
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based on the allocation of  relocation dwelling. All was monetarised. The idea came 
from the experiences of  Tianjin. It also took the household element into 
consideration, but it mainly considered dwelling space…” 
  (Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department, 
  Dongcheng district government) 
 
Under the BJ-1998 Compensation Measure, households were more likely to receive a 
larger amount of  compensation if  their household size was larger, and if  they occupied a 
bigger dwelling space. If  a household lived in a non self-contained unit with no in-door 
kitchen or toilet facilities, the household was entitled to the receipt of  an additional space 
subsidy of  25 m2 (BMG 1998b). Only those residents who were formally registered as 
Beijing residents (that is, holders of  Beijing hukou) were eligible for compensation. 
Informal self-built space was in principle not subject to compensation. Table 7-9 below 
shows the amount of  cash compensation estimated when the BJ-1998 Compensation 
Measure was applied to three-person households in non self-contained dwellings of  
different sizes. 
Table 7-9:  Estimated redevelopment compensation as per BJ-1998 Compensation Measure 
(BMG 1998a, 1998b) 
20 m2 30 m2 40 m2
BJ-1998 Cash compensation = (① + ②) x ③ 283,500 346,500 409,500
① : Dwelling construction space
② : Space subsidy for a non self-contained dwelling (25 m2)
③ : Compensation unit price in yuan per m2
     (determined by the local government)
Note: 
(1) The compensation unit price (6,300 yuan per m2) and the average price of economic housing (3,500 yuan per m2) were taken from the 
speech of the official from the Displacement and Relocation Department at the Dongcheng district government.
Policy 
Doc.
Calculation method Non self-contained dwelling for a 3-person household with 
a construction space of
Compensation(1)
= (① + 25) x 6,300
 
Commercial housing and affordability problems 
The tenure polarisation as explained above restricts residents’ housing choice when they 
move from redevelopment neighbourhoods. Remaining as public housing tenants is 
difficult, and the available option is either to become owner-occupiers by purchasing a 
commercial or affordable housing unit, or take up a private rental contract that would 
involve excessively high rents for former public housing tenants. The problem here is that 
the likelihood of  finding an alternative, affordable relocation accommodation within or 
near the inner city districts is slim due to affordability problems in both commercial and 
affordable housing sectors. 
The increasing recognition of  those four inner city districts of  Beijing in the 1990s as the 
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centre of  business and financial activities attracted many developers to focus on the 
construction of  spacious commercial housing and office buildings. Most commercial 
houses completed were affordable only to the high-income groups of  urban residents 
(Wang and Murie 1996, 1999a, 1999b; Wu 2002b), thus making it difficult for the existing 
residents to stay within the immediate surrounding area in central Beijing. 
Table 7-10 below is a summary of  average commercial housing costs and annual 
household income to examine the affordability crisis in Beijing. The average housing price 
in Beijing was taken from the housing price data produced by the National Statistical 
Bureau of  China (Xia 2002). 
Table 7-10: Housing costs and household income in Beijing 
(Household interviews by the author in 2003, BMBS 2003a; NBS China 2003; Xia 2002) 
 
Residents
interviewed
Average
(N = 13)
Average Bottom 20% of
income decile
Average Bottom 20% of
income decile
21,003.7 37,391.7 19,384.0 23,416.5 12,188.2
18.2 : 1 10.2 : 1 19.7 : 1 7.3 : 1 14.0 : 1
Within 2nd ring road
price-to-income ratio 29.5 : 1 16.6 : 1 32.0 : 1
Between 2nd and 3rd
ring road
price-to-income ratio 26.7 : 1 15.0 : 1 29.0 : 1
Between 3rd and 4th
ring road
price-to-income ratio 19.7 : 1 11.1 : 1 21.4 : 1
Outside 4th ring road
price-to-income ratio 13.7 : 1 7.7 : 1 14.9 : 1
Note: 1) The calculation of the average commercial housing price in Beijing and price-to-income ratio is based on a unit with 80 m2 of
construction space, which was the average construction space of those relocated and re-housed households interviewed by the author.
414,480
288,000
Housing cost and income
Beijing (in 2002)
Average commercial
housing price in Beijing
in 20001)
(in RMB)
price-to-income ratio (PIR)
620,240
561,600
Housing price of a self-contained flat (in RMB) 1) 381,680 170,960
4,771 yuan per sq.m
Annual household disposable  income (RMB)
Average commercial housing price as of July 2001
Urban China (in 2002)
2,137 yuan per sq.m
 
According to the table above, an average Beijing household would have to pay more than 
16 years’ accumulation of  their household disposable income to buy a 80 m2 self-
contained commercial flat within the second ring road. In particular, the average housing 
price was the highest within the second ring road, and faltered away toward suburban 
areas. The price-to-income ratio (PIR) outside the fourth ring road for an average Beijing 
household turned out to be 7.7 to 1, less than half  what it was within the second ring road. 
As for the interviewed displacees who retained much lower income status, they would 
have to pay nearly 30 years of  their household disposable income if  they were to stay 
close to their original place of  residence within the third ring road. Unless sufficient 
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subsidies were to be provided, it looked evident that they would have to move out to 
suburban districts if  they were to find a flat in the commercial housing sector. One of  the 
interviewees made a shrewd comment regarding this situation: 
“Nowadays, people say ‘high-level cadres live around the second ring road, while 
paupers live around the fifth or sixth ring road’” (Interviewee CBX-INT-07) 
 
Unaffordable ‘affordable housing’ 
The discussion so far has focused only on the affordability problem in the commercial 
housing sector. The affordability problem, however, also engulfs affordable housing (jingji 
shiyongfang in Chinese). A set of  preferential policies such as tax reduction were 
implemented to set the sales price of  affordable housing flats within the range of  between 
2,400 and 4,450 yuan/m2. In general, the price of  an affordable housing unit was set to be 
600 yuan lower than the price of  other commercial flats nearby (China Daily 23 January 
2001). The sales price of  affordable housing was regulated by local governments, and 
differed from one district to another. In the case of  Dongcheng district, according to a 
local housing official interviewed, the price of  an affordable housing flat in 2003 was 
5,000 yuan/m2. For an affordable housing unit with a construction space of  70 m2, the 
sales price would reach 350,000 yuan, which was equivalent to about ten years’ average 
household disposable income in Beijing. 
A unit of  affordable housing was also much cheaper in locations further away from 
central Beijing. For instance, the economic housing estate designated by the Dongcheng 
district government as a relocation site for the displacees from Haiyuncang 
neighbourhood, was situated just outside the northern section of  the fifth ring road. A 
residents’ committee leader in the neighbourhood informed me in an interview that a unit 
of  economic housing offered to the displacees at the time of  redevelopment was sold at 
the price of  2,650 yuan/m2. This was nearly half  the price of  an economic housing unit 
sold in Dongcheng district. 
Major affordable housing sites were mostly located in outer suburban districts, while their 
availability within and around the second ring road was limited (People's Daily 4 June 
2000). Moreover, although the total number of  affordable housing units completed 
between 1999 and 2002 in Beijing reached 71,731 units, this could only benefit less than 
3% of  2,472,000 households registered within inner and near sub-urban districts (BMBS 
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2002, 2003a). Such limited supply of  affordable housing stock spurred severe competition 
among Beijing residents. For instance, in order to get a place in Huilongguan, one of  the 
major affordable housing project sites located outside the fifth ring road in northwest 
Beijing, 15,000 families rushed to put their names in the waiting list even before the 
blueprint for its second phase was yet to be announced (People's Daily 19 March 2001). 
Furthermore, the affordability problem in the affordable housing sector was fuelled by the 
developers’ practice of  building more spacious flats. The amount of  profits a developer 
could retain from affordable housing development was set at a fixed rate of  3% of  total 
housing costs by the central government regulation (People's Daily 4 June 2000). Because 
of  this, developers were lured into supplying more spacious flats in order to increase the 
transaction volume. For instance, the average construction space of  an affordable housing 
unit turned out to be 95.3 m2 in 1999, but it increased up to 110.9 m2 by 2002 (BMBS 
2002; 2003a: 133).44 
Under-development of private renting 
Given the high prices in both commercial and affordable housing sector, one alternative 
for those displacees from public rental sector could be to look for a private rental unit. 
This option, however, was also very much restricted due to the under-development of  the 
private rental market. 
One of  the major reasons for the under-development was the prohibition of  re-sales or 
sub-letting for a certain period in the case of  those properties with partial property rights. 
For instance, affordable housing was in principle for sales only. It was not subject to re-
sales or letting to a third party within five years until homeowners gained full possession 
of  property rights (MoC China 1995, 1999). The same rule applied to those privatised 
former public housing units. The Ministry of  Construction also prohibited sub-letting or 
leasing of  state allocated public rental housing and any of  those old and dilapidated 
housing units subject to redevelopment. With restricted supply of  affordable rental units, 
private renting in inner city districts was often beyond the reach of  most residents. As one 
                                                 
44 This was based on the figures from the statistical yearbook. In 1999, it was reported that the total floor 
space of  affordable housing completed in 1999 reached 1.23 million m2, while the number of  flats 
completed was 12,901 units. In 2002, the total floor space of  affordable housing was 2.28 million m2, and 
the total number of  units, 20,593 units. 
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of  the interviewees noted: 
“Renting a house is too expensive. I am not capable of  renting a place. Our family 
makes altogether about 900 yuan a month [and is receiving means-tested social 
security benefits]... [If  to find a place to move in] I can only take care of  temporary 
matters. We can live with my mom, my son's grandmother, at her place, which is 
also fine. But, in the end, you should allow us to have a practical place to live in, a 
house that belongs to myself. It must be not too far away. If  it is, I am not 
interested…”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-05) 
 
My quick search for a two-bedroom rental unit in a low-rise walk-up place resulted in a 
rental flat with a range of  monthly rent between 1,000 and 2,000 yuan/month. This would 
usually be equivalent to a low-income household’s monthly disposable income (see Table 
7-11 below).45 As a result, private renting was the least preferred option among the 
displacees, and if  at all considered, it was to serve as a short-term alternative until they 
found a permanent dwelling of  their own. 
Table 7-11: Private rental units in Beijing and their rents 
 
Location District Orientation Neighbourhood Construction
space (m2)
Monthly rent
(RMB)
Within 2nd ring road Dongcheng East Beijing Qingshuiyuan 65 2,600
Dongcheng East Beijing Beixincang 65 2,800
Outside 2nd ring road Dongcheng East Beijing Xinzhongjie Xili 65 1,750
Outside 3rd ring road Fengtai South Beijing Jianmendongli 60 1,300
Outside 5th ring road Chaoyang East Beijing Dingfuzhuang 65 1,200
Outside 5th ring road Changping North Beijing Yunquyuan 65 1,100
Note: Two-bedroom flats in a mediurm rise walk-up blocks only. Search was conducted on 13 April 2005 on the web site,
http://www.5i5j.com, one of the most popular real estate agent in Beijing
 
 
Limits with formal financial opportunities 
With the emergence and development of  the housing finance system in mainland China, 
one would assume that the affordability gap could be addressed by applying for housing 
loans from financial institutions. This requires a brief  discussion on the Housing 
                                                 
45 During the period of  implementing the 10th Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan (2001-
2005) in Beijing, 340,000 households were going to be subject to displacement due to urban redevelopment 
projects (People's Daily 1 April 2002). Given the sheer volume of  residents’ displacement and limited 
availability of  affordable dwellings in inner city districts, it could be assumed that such high rents in private 
rental sector were partly influenced by the chain reaction of  residents’ relocation. 
 228
Provident Fund (hereafter HPF), which has been the backbone of  mainland China’s new 
housing finance system since its inception in Shanghai in 1991. The HPF receives 
monetary contributions from both employers and employees (World Bank 1992: 30-32). 
The HPF account holders are eligible to withdraw their accumulated funds when they 
retire or upon making a down-payment on a new house as a first-time buyer. 
The HPF, however, has been subject to some criticisms for bearing a serious equity issue. 
It is very much employer-based, which meant that those in non-regular jobs or out of  
work would likely be excluded. Workers with under-performing employers were also 
unlikely to receive employers’ contributions, thus having their access denied (Rosen and 
Ross 2000). Moreover, because the contribution to the HPF is based on a fixed rate, the 
growing wage gaps in the labour market would lead to a situation in which a higher-
income earner enjoys a higher contribution from his/her employer (J. Lee 2000). 
When it comes to home buying, HPF account holders, if  eligible, would be able to apply 
for HPF housing loans (Rosen and Ross 2000). This has been a completely new 
experience for urban residents in mainland China. To be eligible, an applicant must have a 
stable job and income, and have kept the HPF account for at least preceding twelve 
months. The applicant must have also made contributions into the account consecutively 
during the last six months before making a loan application. Furthermore, before 
submitting a loan application, the applicant must have made a down payment of  at least 
20% of  the full price of  a dwelling (Beijing Ribao 6 March 2003). HPF housing loans thus 
provided are on preferential terms with lower interest rates (about 1% lower in 2002), 
giving advantages over other commercial bank loans. Table 7-12 below shows the loan 
rates and the amount of  monthly repayment in accordance with the loan periods when an 
applicant borrows 100,000 yuan. 
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Table 7-12: HPF housing loans rates and monthly repayment in Beijing 
(as of 21 February 2002)
(RMB) (RMB)
1 3.60 103,600 one-off repayment n.a. n.a.
5 3.60 109,422 1,824 58.5% 179.6%
10 4.05 121,776 1,015 32.6% 99.9%
15 4.05 133,596 742 23.8% 73.1%
20 4.05 146,064 609 19.5% 59.9%
25 4.05 159,180 531 17.0% 52.2%
30 4.05 172,908 480 15.4% 47.3%
Note:
1) This is for borrowing RMB 100,000 from the bank, and is based on the repayment conditions at the China Construction Bank.
2) The average monthly disposable household income in Beijing was RMB 3,116 in 2002. For the bottom 20% of income decile, it was RMB
1015.7 (BMBS, 2003).
Loan period
(years)
Monthly repaymentTotal amount of
repayment1)
Annual percentage
rate (APR) as a proportion of
average monthly
household disposable
income in Beijing2)
as a proportion of
monthly household
disposable income for
bottom 20% of income
distribution in Beijing2)
HPF housing loans
 
From the table above, it appears that HPF housing mortgage would still be too much of  a 
burden upon low-income households. It would also be a burden upon average Beijing 
residents if  they were to become an owner-occupier by purchasing a new dwelling in and 
around the second ring road where housing prices are far more expensive than elsewhere. 
Reflecting such circumstances, housing mortgage was regarded as an ‘unrealistic’ option 
by the displacees in redevelopment neighbourhoods, as some of  the interviewees from 
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood explicitly expressed: 
“Who would provide you with mortgage? No way to take out a loan… My husband 
doesn’t have a job, and I don’t have one either. It's for sure that they wouldn’t grant 
us any mortgage. I’ve never thought of  that. Don’t you ever say mortgage again!” 
  (Interviewee CBX-INT-02) 
 
“Bank loan is unrealistic. You don’t have enough money for your living. If  you take 
out the loan, then how will you pay back? I feel I don’t even qualify to go and ask. I 
don’t want it at all. At present, I just live day by day…”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-06) 
 
“Where would I get a loan from? Once you retire, then nobody gives you loan. If  I 
have to get a loan, the only way is to depend on my elder son [who has a HPF 
account]. My second son doesn’t have a job, and the third son is laid off. They all 
can’t apply for a loan”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-07) 
 
Prospective applicants are required to submit documentary evidences when they apply for 
HPF housing mortgage. This includes the proof  of  holding a HPF account, an original 
copy of  housing purchase contract, proofs of  household income usually from their work 
units and so on. Therefore, if  a household doesn’t have sufficient income or creditable 
income-generating activities with no HPF account, it would be very unlikely for them to 
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have access to formal loans or housing mortgage from the banks that would favour those 
with proven credit records. All these are new and stressful realities that discourage 
residents in such conditions from considering housing mortgage from the start. 
Summary 
This section has discussed major constraints that would face residents upon their 
displacement when redevelopment takes place. These constraints are closely associated 
with on-going reforms and the resulting changes in the way in which urban housing is 
produced and consumed. In Beijing, such constraints were: (1) the polarised tenure 
structure that increasingly favours owner occupation and reduces traditional public rental 
sector; (2) the redevelopment compensation that has changed from in-kind re-housing to 
full monetarisation, applicable only to those registered Beijing households; (3) the 
affordability problems that are prevalent in both commercial and affordable housing 
sector, especially with regard to those new dwellings provided in inner city districts; (4) the 
under-development of  the private rental sector which requires excessively high rents for 
low-income public housing tenants; and (5) the difficulties in accessing employer-based 
formal housing finance system. 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the major institutional and structural constraints that were 
faced by residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods upon their displacement and 
relocation. These constraints stemmed from the way in which place-specific housing 
provision system is structured in Seoul and Beijing, and from their local regulations for 
promoting and controlling neighbourhood redevelopment. The constraints discussed in 
this chapter are summarised in Table 7-13 below. 
In the case of  housing tenure systems, the majority of  municipal households in Seoul are 
engaged in private rental tenure. The majority of  tenant households were in Chonsei 
tenure which required a substantial amount of  key money upon signing a contract. The 
rate of  owner occupation in Seoul was lower than the urban average. The majority of  
Chonsei tenants lived in individual houses, but new housing production in general 
favoured high-rise flat construction. Such situation would place heavy pressure on 
displacees from redevelopment neighbourhoods, as they are left with no choice but to 
seek for an affordable private renting in the individual housing sector, which itself  is 
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shrinking. 
Table 7-13: Summary of constrains upon residents' decision-to-move in Seoul and Beijing 
 
Housing market
and tenure
Owner occupation rate, lower than the urban
average
Expansion of owner occupation through privatisation
and new housing sales
Chonsei tenure concentration in detached housing Under-development of private renting
New housing construction in favour of high-rise flats
Higher rates of price increase in apartment housing
Public rental
housing
Stock available for only 5.4% of municipal tenant
households
Privatisation and redevelopment of dilapidated
neighbourhoods
Affordability
PIR (Price-to-income ratio) 11.8 ~ 23.0 to 1 for the
bottom 20% of income decile distribution
Highly priced commercial flats (including redeveloped
flats)
Highly priced affordable housing flats in inner city
districts
Redevelopment
compensation
Eligibility based on the  minimum length of residence
in redevelopment neighbourhoods
Redevelopment compensation on the basis of
residents' household registration status
Eligible tenants Eligible tenants
In-kind compensation: access to public rental flats
provided in redevelopment neighbourhoods
Cash compensation: 36 ~ 110% of annual household
disposable income for the bottom 20% of income
decile distribution
Ineligible tenants Ineligible tenants
No compensation. Only a token fee to help their
house-moving expenses
No provision at all for ineligible tenants
Housing finance
Less than 1% of tenants receive the benefits Employment-based housing finance system that
excludes those in unstable jobs or unemployment
Short-term repayment period. Terms of redemption
against tenants' preference
Loans repayment beyond the capacity of most low-
income residents
Excludes public housing tenants
Cash-based compensation since 1998 that could be
more than 10 years' accumulation of average Beijing
household disposable income
Compensation for formal dwelling space only
  From non-compensation to in-kind and cash
  compensation
  Change from re-housing to full monetarisation
  National Housing Fund Housing Loan Programme   Housing Provident Fund
  High sale prices of redevelopment flats
  Tenure polarisation between owner occupation and
  public renting
  Shrinking public housing sector
  Acute affordability problems in inner city districts
Seoul Beijing
  Domination of Chonsei rental tenure
  Limited supply of public rental housing
 
In Beijing, in contrast with the situation in Seoul, private renting is still marginal in its 
tenure structure. The reform measures during the last two decades have largely promoted 
homeownership through new housing sales and privatisation of  public housing stock. The 
pre-reform dominance of  public rental tenure has shifted towards a polarised system of  
owner occupation and public rental tenure, though intense inner city redevelopment 
would further shrink the public housing sector. As for residents displaced from 
redevelopment neighbourhoods, their chance of  remaining as public housing tenants is 
very slim, and their available option is to become either owner-occupiers by purchasing a 
commercial or affordable housing unit, or private sector tenants. 
With regard to the public housing sector, Seoul has been traditionally less focused on 
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implementing extensive public rental housing schemes. It has very limited supply of  
public rental housing stocks, enough to benefit only 5.4% of  municipal tenant households. 
In Beijing, its socialist tradition led to the dominance of  public rental housing, but the 
privatisation of  existing public rental dwellings in the course of  implementing housing 
reform led to a substantial shrinkage of  public rental sector. Urban redevelopment in 
Beijing is expected to further reduce public rental dwellings. Such situations in Seoul and 
Beijing indicate that displacees in both cities would have less chance of  accessing public 
rental sector upon their displacement. 
In both Seoul and Beijing, affordability problems are acute. In Seoul, each property-owner 
in redevelopment neighbourhoods is given a right to purchase a redeveloped flat, and thus 
remain as an owner-occupier upon project completion. The high sale prices of  
redevelopment flats, however, discourages most low-income owner-occupiers from this, 
and eventually leads them to sell their properties to off-site buyers. In Beijing, affordability 
problems are also prevalent in both commercial and affordable housing sector. The sale 
prices of  new dwellings progressively decrease as one moves further out to outer 
suburban districts, thus encouraging displacees’ move out of  inner city districts upon 
redevelopment. 
As for the redevelopment compensation, both cities have a clear distinction regarding 
residents’ eligibility for compensation, which are based on residents’ residence status. In 
Seoul, tenants are eligible for in-kind (an access to a public rental flat provided in 
redevelopment neighbourhoods) and cash compensation (equivalent to three months of  
average monthly expenditure for wage- and salary-earning urban households). The 
amount of  cash compensation amounts to 36~110% of  annual household disposable 
income for the bottom 20% of  income decile distribution. In Beijing, the amount of  cash 
compensation is much larger than in Seoul, reaching more than ten years’ accumulation of  
average Beijing household’s annual disposable income. Beijing displacees are expected to 
use the compensation to look for an accommodation on their own, and in most cases, this 
would mean a transfer to owner occupation by finding a flat in suburban neighbourhoods. 
Seoul and Beijing both provide housing finance schemes. Whereas the housing finance 
scheme in Seoul targets all municipal tenants with no regard to their employment status, 
the housing finance scheme to help residents in Beijing is employment-based. This leads 
to the exclusion of  those Beijing residents who are in unstable jobs or unemployment. 
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Even if  they manage to apply for housing loans, the affordability gap is too large to be 
filled by housing loans within the repayment capacity of  low-income residents. In Seoul, 
the existing housing loan scheme to help tenants with paying their rental deposit benefits 
only a fraction of  municipal tenant households, and the terms of  redemption is not in 
tenants’ favour. 
Having examined the various constraints in this chapter, the next chapter will discuss the 
changes in actual housing outcome experienced by the residents in redevelopment 
neighbourhoods upon their displacement, and compare their pre- and post-displacement 
housing conditions. 
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This chapter forms the second of  three chapters on residents. Based on the identification 
of  institutional and structural constraints in the previous chapter, this chapter examines 
the experiences of  Seoul and Beijing residents upon their displacement and re-housing 
due to the redevelopment of  their neighbourhoods. The findings are based on the analysis 
of  my field research data. The discussion of  the housing experiences of  Seoul residents 
further benefits from the acquisition of  raw survey data from a local welfare centre (see 
Section 3.3 in Chapter 3 for more details). 
The key question to address in this chapter is: whether displaced residents were able to 
gain access to existing housing market and improve, or at least maintain, their pre-
displacement housing conditions within their existing financial resources. For this, each 
section is devoted to the discussion of  residents’ housing experiences in each city. Five 
main aspects of  housing experiences are examined: (1) dwelling space; (2) dwelling forms 
and physical conditions; (3) housing tenure; (4) housing finance; and (5) household 
expenditure. The final section pulls together the findings 
 
8.1 Housing outcomes upon redevelopment: the case of Seoul 
Dwelling space 
Increase in dwelling space upon displacement 
The reviews of  neighbourhood physical conditions in Chapter 4 showed that residents in 
Nangok neighbourhood had enjoyed dwelling floor space much lower than the urban 
average of  48.3 m2 per household (NSO Korea 2001d: 333). In the late 1980s, Nangok 
residents’ dwelling floor space turned out to be only about 22 m2 per household (Lee 
1989: 13). 
As shown in Table 8-1 below, residents’ dwelling floor space before displacement from 
Nangok turned out to be 37.8 m2 on average, which was higher than the 1980s’ finding. 
This could be because the total number of  households decreased substantially during the 
1990s, and as a result, less residents came to occupy existing dwellings. The results in the 
table below indicate that the displaced households as a whole have enjoyed a statistically 
significant increase in household dwelling space upon displacement. 
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Table 8-1: Changes in housing space upon residents’ displacement from Nangok 
unit: m2
Mean
Standard 
deviation
Mean
Standard 
deviation
113 37.8 15.20 43.8 20.10 -2.928 0.004**
26 42.3 16.83 50.6 24.04 -1.603 0.121
87 36.5 14.57 41.7 18.50 -2.438 0.017*
KNHC tenants after displacement
(eligible tenants)
45 35.6 11.03 40.3 2.76 -2.640 0.011*
Moved to non-KNHC dwellings 42 37.4 17.70 43.3 26.55 -1.451 0.154
eligible tenant 32 36.6 14.73 42.6 25.31 -1.294 0.205
ineligible tenants 10 40.0 25.86 45.6 31.55 -0.627 0.546
Recipients of NBLS1) benefits 29 33.0 13.70 33.6 17.87 -0.185 0.855
Non-recipients of NBLS benefits 58 38.2 14.79 45.8 17.59 -2.879 0.006**
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data (*p<0.05, **p<0.01)
  Total
Pre-displacement Post-displacement
t p
Valid 
responses
  Owner occupation before displacement
  Private renting before displacement
Note: 1) NBLS stands for National Basic Livelihood Security, which is a means-tested social assistance programme in South Korea.  
The table above also shows that this increase in housing space is statistically significant in 
the case of  those tenants who moved to the public rental flats provided by the Korea 
National Housing Corporation as shown in 
Figure 8-1 (hereafter KNHC tenants). 46 
They were the tenants who were eligible for 
compensation, and chose the in-kind 
option, that is access to a KNHC-provided 
public rental flat. Their increase in dwelling 
floor space leads us to draw a preliminary 
conclusion that the provision of  public 
rental flats as part of  redevelopment 
compensation had a positive impact on 
residents. Moreover, those tenants who 
were not beneficiaries of  the means-tested 
social assistance programme (that is, the 
National Basic Livelihood Security 
programme or NBLS) also experienced a 
statistically significant increase in housing space upon displacement. This shows that 
                                                 
46 It is difficult to draw a conclusion for Nangok owner-occupiers regarding their dwelling space change 
because they retained the right to purchase a redeveloped flat, and were temporarily relocated during the 
project period. 
Figure 8-1: 
View of KNHC-provided public rental flats 
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economically better-off  households were more likely to have enjoyed an increase in 
housing space upon displacement. 
Per capita floor space after displacement 
There were a substantial proportion of  tenants who chose cash compensation and moved 
to non-KNHC dwellings in the private sector. To some extent, their action was in contrast 
with the historical demand in the 1980s and 1990s by tenants’ movement that argued for 
the provision of  public rental flats to guarantee tenants’ housing rights (Bae 1997; Ha 
2001b; Jang 1998b; S.-H. Kim 1996). If  the eligible tenants’ move to public rental flats 
increased their dwelling floor space, why did some tenants choose cash compensation and 
remain in the private rental sector? 
One of  the clues is provided by the comparison of  per capita floor space as shown in 
Table 8-2 below. The post-displacement per capita floor space for the displaced 
households as a whole turned out to be 14.2 m2, which was only three quarters of  the 
national average in 2000 (NSO Korea 2001d). In particular, the per capita floor space for 
the KNHC tenants was estimated to be 12.6 m2, much less than 15.3 m2 for those tenants 
who moved to non-KNHC dwellings. On the other hand, the recipients of  NBLS benefits 
enjoyed a larger per capita floor space than the non-recipients of  such benefits, but this 
probably owed to the fact that their average household size was much smaller. 
Table 8-2: Post-displacement floor space per capita for former Nangok residents 
unit: m2
Post-displacement
dwelling space
Number of household
members per household
113 43.8 3.08 14.2
26 50.6 3.27 15.5
87 41.7 3.02 13.8
KNHC tenants after displacement
(eligible tenants)
45 40.3 3.20 12.6
Moved to non-KNHC dwellings 42 43.3 2.83 15.3
eligible tenants 32 42.6 2.84 15.0
ineligible tenants 10 45.6 2.80 16.3
Recipients of NBLS benefits 29 33.6 2.21 15.2
Non-recipients of NBLS benefits 58 45.8 3.43 13.3
  Total
  Private renting before displacement
Per capita
dwelling space
  Owner occupation before displacement
Valid
responses
Mean value
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
 
 
 238
Degree of  conformity to the National Minimum Housing Standards 
In June 2004, the Ministry of  Construction 
and Transportation (hereafter MoCT) in 
South Korea produced, for the first time, an 
official policy guidance that defined the 
National Minimum Housing Standards 
(MoCT Korea 2004). The main two factors 
considered in the MoCT criteria were the 
number of  bedrooms and per capita floor 
space for co-habiting household members 
(see Table 8-3). Individual households are to 
have exclusive access to housing facilities such 
as kitchen, toilet and bathroom. Applying the minimum housing standards to the 
household data of  the Population and Housing Census in 2000, the MoCT found that 
23% of  all the households in South Korea failed to conform to the minimum housing 
standards (Ha 2004: 141; MoCT Korea 2004). 
Table 8-4 below exhibits the degree of  conformity to the minimum housing standards in 
the case of  those households that I interviewed, who were displaced from Nangok at the 
time of  interviewing. It shows that those households with a relatively larger household 
size were housed in dwellings that did not conform to the minimum housing standards, 
experiencing over-crowding conditions. 
Table 8-4: Displaced interviewees’ conformity to the National Minimum Housing Standards  
 
Interviewee
ID.
Number of
co-habiting
household
members
Pre-displacement
tenure status
Post-
displacement
housing
Floor location No.
Bedrooms
Floor
space
(in m2)
Conformity to
National
Minimum
Housing
Standards
KSS6-INT-01 1 Private renting Non-KNHC dwelling Semi-basement 1 19.8 Conforms
KSS10-INT-02 2 Private renting KNHC rental flat Above ground floor 2 39.0 Conforms
KSS3-INT-01 2 Owner occupation Non-KNHC dwelling Raised ground floor 2 33.1 Conforms
KSS7-INT-13 2 Private renting Non-KNHC dwelling Semi-basement 2 n.a. Not known
KSS10-INT-03 3 Owner occupation KNHC rental flat Above ground floor 2 39.0 Conforms
KSS10-INT-05 3 Owner occupation KNHC rental flat Above ground floor 2 39.0 Conforms
KSS7-INT-10 3 Owner occupation Non-KNHC dwelling Semi-basement 2 66.1 Conforms
KSS7-INT-14 3 Private renting Non-KNHC dwelling Ground floor 2 n.a. Not known
KSS7-INT-11 4 Private renting Non-KNHC dwelling Semi-basement 2 59.5 Not conforms
KSS7-INT-18 4 Private renting Non-KNHC dwelling Semi-basement 2 n.a. Not conforms
KSS10-INT-01 5 Owner occupation KNHC rental flat Above ground floor 2 39.0 Not conforms
Source: Author's interviews in 2002  
Table 8-3: National Minimum Housing 
Standards in South Korea 
(MoCT Korea 2004) 
Number of
household
members
Number of
bedrooms
Floor space
(m2)
1 1 12
2 1 20
3 2 29
4 3 37
5 3 41
6 4 49
Note: All households are required to have exclusive access
to kitchen, toilet and washroom.
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As one of  the interviewees explains below, budget constraints appear to be the main 
constraint for families with a larger household size: 
“I started my family in 1986, and have two children, a 15-year-old son and a 13-year-
old daughter…When we were living in Nangok, the house originally had one 
bedroom, and we subdivided it into two. We used one room as a storage space, and 
four of  us all lived in one bedroom…The condition of  the previous house was so 
appalling, and it was very small. It didn’t even have a toilet, so we had to use our 
neighbour’s…We now live in a multi-dwelling house, and there are four other 
families there. Ours is located in the semi-basement. Houses were all too expensive 
when we were looking for one to move out of  Nangok, all at least 40 or 50 million 
Korean Won. So, we decided to look for a place within our budget…It has two 
bedrooms. Our children all want a room of  their own, but we let our son use one 
room, and our daughter shares the room with my husband and me…” 
  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-18) 
 
Table 8-5 below summarises the degree of  conformity to the minimum housing standards 
in the case of  those respondents to the Sillim Welfare Centre survey. The table suggests 
that a significantly large proportion of  displaced residents faced overcrowded conditions. 
One third of  all the respondents were experiencing either a lack of  bedrooms or 
inadequate dwelling space. In particular, overcrowded conditions were more prevalent 
among the KNHC tenants (40.3%). This partly explains the lack of  willingness among 
eligible tenants to move to the KNHC-provided public rental flats upon their 
displacement. 
Table 8-5: Sillim Welfare Centre survey respondents’ conformity 
to the National Minimum Housing Standards 
 
Conformity to the
National Minimum Housing Standards
Valid responses  (%)
Conforms 79 57.2%
Not conforms 46 33.3%
Unknown 13 9.4%
Total 138 100.0%
Conforms 37 59.7%
Not conforms 25 40.3%
Unknown 0 0.0%
Sub-total 62 100.0%
Conforms 42 55.3%
Not conforms 21 27.6%
Unknown 13 17.1%
Sub-total 76 100.0%
Category
  Residents as a whole
KNHC tenants
Non-KNHC tenants
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data  
The overcrowded condition in public rental flats was also confirmed by the Seoul 
Development Institute in its study of  a sample of  1,021 tenant households from public 
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rental flats, which found that close to half  of  public housing tenants were experiencing 
overcrowded living conditions that did not conform to the MoCT’s minimum housing 
standards (The Hankyoreh 13 February 2004). 
Dwelling forms and physical living conditions 
In terms of  the built form of  post-displacement dwellings, less than half  of  all the 
displaced households between September 2000 and Mach 2002 moved to the KNHC-
provided high-rise rental flats. As shown in Table 8-6 below, among those households 
who moved to non-KNHC dwellings, the most common dwelling form was semi-
basement or basement units, located within individual or multi-dwelling houses (see 
Figure 7-1 in Chapter 7 for the explanation of  these dwelling types). High-rise flats were 
rarely displacees’ final destination unless they became KNHC tenants. 
Table 8-6: Dwelling forms occupied by displaced residents from Nangok 
 
KNHC-
provided
rental flats
Non-KNHC
flats
Individual houses
(dandog jutaeg)
Ground floor or
above
Multi-dwelling
houses
Ground floor or
above
(Semi-)
Basement in
individual or
multi-dwelling
houses
Others
62 2 11 23 35 3 136
45.6% 1.5% 8.1% 16.9% 25.7% 2.2% 100.0%
  Owner occupation 15 1 0 9 5 0 30
  Private renting: Chonsei 43 1 11 11 24 3 93
  Private renting: Monthly rents 4 0 0 2 5 0 11
  Others 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
  Owner occupation 15 1 0 9 5 0 30
  Eligible tenants 47 0 10 9 24 2 92
  Ineligible tenants 0 1 1 5 6 1 14
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Total
Total
Post-displacement dwelling forms
  Legal compensation eligibility
  Pre-displacement tenure status
 
With regard to other facilities in post-displacement dwellings (e.g. drainage and sewage 
facilities, kitchen and bathroom, and heating facility), most displacees from Nangok 
appeared to be, in general, content with the improved physical structure and indoor 
facilities (see Table 8-7 below). This largely owed to the fact that those pre-displacement 
dwellings they used to live in Nangok were in severe deterioration. The KNHC tenants 
were also overwhelmingly in approval of  the improved physical structure and indoor 
facilities that the public rental flats provided (see Table 8-7). 
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Table 8-7: Post-displacement improvement of housing physical conditions and facilities 
 
Worsened Not
changed
Improved Worsened Not
changed
Improved Worsened Not
changed
Improved
Responses 1 1 60 0 0 62 0 0 62
% 1.6 1.6 96.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Responses 11 8 56 21 14 40 8 24 44
% 14.7 10.7 74.7 28.0 18.7 53.3 10.5 31.6 57.9
Responses 6 5 25 15 7 13 6 12 18
% 16.7 13.9 69.4 42.9 20.0 37.1 16.7 33.3 50.0
Worsened Not
changed
Improved Worsened Not
changed
Improved Worsened Not
changed
Improved
Responses 0 0 62 1 0 61 0 0 61
% 0.0 0.0 100.0 1.6 0.0 98.4 0.0 0.0 100.0
Responses 10 17 49 8 15 53 5 15 54
% 13.2 22.4 64.5 10.5 19.7 69.7 6.8 20.3 73.0
Responses 8 7 21 5 8 23 2 8 26
% 22.2 19.4 58.3 13.9 22.2 63.9 5.6 22.2 72.2
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Heating
Post-displacement housing
Physical structure Dampness and Lighting Drainage and sewage
KNHC-provided rental
flats
Non-KNHC dwellings
KNHC-provided rental
flats
Basement or
semi-basement units
Post-relocation housing
Non-KNHC dwellings
Basement or
semi-basement units
Kitchen Bathroom
 
Housing tenure 
Post-displacement tenure change 
As was the case with many other tenants in Seoul, Chonsei tenure had been the major 
tenure form among Nangok residents. The Sillim Welfare Centre survey data show that 
69.4% of  all valid respondents (or 89.4% of  tenants) were in Chonsei tenure (see Table 
8-8 below). The post-displacement tenure status, however, indicates that more than half  
of  the respondents in Chonsei tenure before displacement transferred to deposit-based 
monthly rental tenure despite their earlier preference for Chonsei. The majority of  them 
did so by becoming KNHC tenants as they were eligible for redevelopment compensation. 
Very few eligible tenants became KNHC tenants with Chonsei contract. About two fifths 
of  the former Chonsei tenants remained in the same tenure after displacement. 
Table 8-8: Pre- and post-displacement tenure status 
 
Owner
occupation
Public
(KNHC)
Private
renting
Public
(KNHC)
Private
renting
9 15 9 6 6 6 0 30 (22.4%)
6 39 4 35 48 39 9 93 (69.4%)
Eligible tenants 4 33 4 29 44 39 5 81
Ineligible tenants 2 6 0 6 4 0 4 12
0 0 0 0 11 4 7 11 ( 8.2%)
Eligible tenants 0 0 0 0 10 4 6 10
Ineligible tenants 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
15 54 13 41 65 49 16 134
11.2% 40.3% 48.5% 100%
Post-displacement tenure status
Deposit-based monthly rentChonsei
TOTAL
Owner occupation
Chonsei rental
Deposit-based
monthly rental
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
TOTAL
Pre-displacement
tenure status
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Table 8-9: Nangok Chonsei tenants and their post-displacement tenure and dwelling forms  
 
Owner occupation Chonsei Deposit-based
monthly rent
6 39 48 93
6.5% 41.9% 51.6% 100.0%
Sub-total 0 4 39 43
Sub-total 6 35 9 50
4 29 5 38
       High-rise flats 0 0 0 0
2 5 1 8
1 5 2 8
1 18 1 20
       Others 0 1 1 2
2 6 4 12
       High-rise flats 1 0 0 1
0 2 1 3
1 2 0 3
0 2 2 4
       Others 0 0 1 1
Post-displacement tenure status TOTAL
       Multi-dwelling houses
       Individual houses (dandog jutaeg)
Ineligible tenants
Eligible tenants
Moved to Non-KNHC dwellings
KNHC tenants (eligible tenants)
TOTAL Responses
Post-displacement dwelling forms
       (Semi-) basement units
       (Semi-) basement units
       Multi-dwelling houses
Source: Sillim Welfare Center survey data
       Individual houses (dandog jutaeg)
 
It was pointed out earlier that the most common dwelling form among households who 
moved to non-KNHC dwellings was semi-basement or basement units. From Table 8-9 
above, it appears that such a move to a much less favoured dwelling type could be part of  
tenants’ attempt to remain in the same Chonsei tenure upon displacement. Given the 
residents’ hesitance to live below ground level, this indicates that there has been a trade-
off  between tenure and dwelling conditions. 
In the case of  those survey respondents who were owner-occupiers in Nangok, two thirds 
of  them became tenants after displacement, but this might be from the fact that many of  
them were temporarily relocated until the project completion. The total number of  survey 
respondents, who were ineligible for redevelopment compensation, was too few to 
determine any definite trend of  tenure change due to their displacement. 
Post-displacement tenure and NBLS beneficiaries 
Another interesting aspect of  residents’ post-displacement tenure status concerns the 
recipients of  NBLS benefits. If  the survey responses are broken down by respondents’ 
eligibility for the NBLS benefits, it appears that the non-recipients of  the NBLS benefits 
were more likely to become KNHC tenants. The recipients of  the NBLS benefits, who 
were economically worse off, tended to remain in Chonsei tenure in the private rental 
sector upon displacement (see Table 8-10). 
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Table 8-10: Post-displacement tenure and dwelling forms as per displacees’ eligibility for NBLS benefits 
 
Owner occupation Chonsei Deposit-based
monthly rent
6 39 48 93
6.5% 41.9% 51.6% 100.0%
Sub-total 0 23 11 34
0 0 8 8
0 7 0 7
  Multi-dwelling houses 0 3 1 4
  (Semi-) basement units 0 12 1 13
  Others 0 1 1 2
Sub-total 6 16 37 59
0 4 31 35
1 0 0 1
2 0 2 4
  Multi-dwelling houses 2 4 1 7
  (Semi-) basement units 1 8 2 11
  Others 0 0 1 1
Non-recipients of NBLS benefits
  Individual houses (dandog jutaeg)
  KNHC-provided rental flats
  Non-KNHC high-rise flats
  Individual houses (dandog jutaeg)
  KNHC-provided rental flats
Recipients of NBLS benefits
Source: Sillim Welfare Center survey data
Post-displacement dwelling forms Post-displacement tenure status TOTAL
TOTAL Responses
 
What pushed the recipients of  the NBLS benefits away from the KNHC-provided public 
rental flats? The main explanation for this concerns the pressure of  paying monthly rents. 
The KNHC-provided public rental flats required monthly rent payment. The NBLS 
beneficiaries were less capable of  making monthly rent payment due to their income 
constraints. KNHC tenants could renew their 2-year rental contracts, enjoy a dwelling 
floor space of  39.0 m2, and pay rent deposit and monthly rent, which were KRW 
13,319,000 and KRW 161,200 respectively.47 Upon signing a rental contract, tenants could 
decide to increase their monthly rents if  they wished to reduce the amount of  rent deposit, 
and vice versa. If  a full amount of  deposit (about KRW 33,000,000) was paid in, then rent 
payment was to be waived. In the case of  KNHC tenants with a monthly rental contract 
(39 respondents in Table 8-9; also see Table 8-10), their average amount of  rent deposits 
and monthly rents turned out to be KRW 14,040,000 and 166,700 respectively. When the 
tenants in receipt of  the NBLS benefits were eligible for redevelopment compensation, 
they tended to choose cash compensation instead of  a KNHC-provided rental flat in fear 
of  being under pressure of  paying monthly rents: 
“(Living in the KNHC rental flat) means being a tenant for 50 years, paying monthly 
rents. Well, I have no intention to live in a place that requires monthly rent payment. 
I’d rather use the money instead to find a basement unit, and live there on Chonsei 
where I don’t get stressed about [paying rent every month]…” 
                                                 
47 The rental conditions for the KNHC-provided flats were taken from the Guidance on New Tenants, 
attached to the KNHC’s internal circulation document; ‘Seoul (Dojeong) 7322-10571’ dated 9 October 2000. 
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 (Interviewee KSS7-INT-02) 
 
Despite the advantage of  long-term tenure security and superior dwelling conditions in 
terms of  indoor facilities, a large number of  eligible tenants favoured cash compensation, 
which was then used for finding an affordable Chonsei dwelling in an adjacent 
neighbourhood. This behaviour was more common among the recipients of  the NBLS 
benefits (see Table 8-11 below). In order to avoid paying monthly rents with their 
constrained income, they seemed to have chosen cash compensation in order to remain in 
Chonsei tenure in the private renting sector after displacement. 
Table 8-11: Eligible tenants displaced from Nangok and their redevelopment compensation 
 
Total
(valid N=95)
Right to move to KNHC-provided
rental flats
Cash compensation
50 45 95
52.6% 47.4%
9 27 36
25.0% 75.0%
41 18 59
69.5% 30.5%
Break-down as per NBLS (means-tested social assistance programme) beneficiaries
Recipients of NBLS benefits
Non-recipients of NBLS benefits
Category
               TOTAL
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Post-displacement rental residence
 
Financing post-displacement rental dwellings 
Increase in housing costs upon displacement 
The displacement of  Nangok tenants led to a significant increase in their housing costs. 
For instance, in the case of  those Chonsei tenants who managed to remain in the same 
tenure after displacement, their average amount of  Chonsei key money almost trebled 
from KRW 6,706,700 to KRW 20,884,600 (see Case A in Table 8-12 below).48 The 
increased amount of  Chonsei key money upon displacement was equivalent to 211.9% of  
the annual household disposable income of  the bottom 20% of  income decile 
distribution for wage- and salary-earning urban households in 2000. Tenants whose tenure 
changed from Chonsei to deposit-based monthly rental tenure (see Case B) experienced 
less increase in rent deposit, but this came at the expense of  paying monthly rents (on 
average, KRW 168,960) for their post-displacement housing. The increase in rent deposit 
                                                 
48 In this table, those former Chonsei tenants who have become owner-occupiers after relocation (six 
households in total) are not included. 
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was also evident in the case of  those tenants whose tenure status remained in deposit-
based monthly rental tenure (see Case C). 
Table 8-12: Tenants displaced from Nangok and their changes in rent deposit 
Unit: KRW 1,000
Valid
responses
Mean (Std.
deviation)
Deposit as a proportion
of annual household
disposable income for
bottom 20%1)
Case A Pre-displacement Chonsei Deposit 39 6,706.70 (4,016.28) 68.1%
Post-displacement Chonsei Deposit 39 20,884.60 (10,500.29) 211.9%
Case B Pre-displacement Chonsei Deposit 48 7,260.40 (4,878.29) 73.7%
Deposit 48 12,657.50 (4,821.62) 128.4%
Monthly Rent 168.96 (48.21)
Deposit 11 2,727.30 (1,737.30) 27.7%
Monthly Rent 125.50 (47.80)
Deposit 11 9,090.90 (5,146.90) 92.3%
Monthly Rent 140.00 (49.00)
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Case C
 Tenure change upon displacement
Note: 1) For salary and wage earning urban households, the annual disposable income for the bottom 20% of income decile distribution
was KRW 9,854,400 in 2000 (Korea National Statistical Office, 2001b)
Deposit-based
Monthly Rent
Deposit-based
Monthly Rent
Deposit-based
Monthly Rent
Pre-displacement
Post-displacement
Post-displacement
 
Usefulness of  cash compensation 
Given that the displaced tenants from Nangok were to undergo a substantial increase in 
housing costs upon displacement, was the redevelopment compensation useful to cover 
the difference for those tenants eligible for it? The comparison of  rent deposits for 
different types of  post-displacement tenure shown in Table 8-13 suggests that cash 
compensation could have helped eligible tenants pay for their increased rent deposit. 
In the case of  those eligible tenants who moved to non-KNHC dwellings and remained in 
Chonsei tenure, their Chonsei key money after displacement was on average KRW 
20,431,000. For them, the proportion of  cash compensation to their post-displacement 
Chonsei key money turned out to be 28% on average. In the case of  those eligible tenants 
who moved to the KNHC-provided public rental flats, the rent deposit was on average 
KRW 14,040,000. This difference was almost equivalent to the cash compensation for a 
three-person household, suggesting that the cash compensation for eligible tenants 
provided them with an opportunity to find accommodation with a higher rent deposit. 
 
 246
Table 8-13: Post-displacement rent deposit and monthly rents 
(for Nangok tenants who were in Chonsei tenure before displacement) 
Unit: KRW 1,000
Ineligible tenants
Chonsei
in non-KNHC dwellings
Chonsei
in non-KNHC dwellings
Chonsei
in KNHC dwellings
Deposit-based
monthly rents
in KNHC dwellings
6 29 4 39
    Deposit Mean 15,000.0 20,431.0 33,000.0 14,040.0
Standard deviation 7,536.6 10,530.3 0.0 3,624.1
Mean n.a. n.a. n.a. 166.7
Standard deviation n.a. n.a. n.a. 42.6
                               Post-displacement
                               tenure
 Deposits and
 Monthly rents
Eligible tenants
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Respondents
Monthly
rents
 
Indeed, most of  the eligible tenants who chose cash compensation and remained in 
Chonsei tenure upon displacement (25 out of  29 households) responded that the cash 
compensation helped them a lot to pay for their increased Chonsei key money. This, 
however, does not mean that the cash compensation covered the difference between their 
pre- and post-displacement Chonsei deposits. Those Chonsei tenants who were eligible 
for redevelopment compensation used to pay on average KRW 7,050,000 as Chonsei 
deposit during their residence in Nangok. The average rent deposit for their post-
displacement dwellings turned out to be on average KRW 14,040,000 for those KNHC 
tenants and KRW 20,431,000 for those who moved to Chonsei dwellings in the private 
rental sector. 
Means of  financing 
The large difference in pre- and post-displacement rent deposits was not filled in by 
relying on loans from formal financial institutions. It was noted in the previous chapter 
that the tenants or low-income residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods experience 
limited accesses to the formal financial sector. This led to the residents’ heavy dependence 
on one’s savings or informal sector borrowing (e.g. loans from relatives, friends or usurers 
operating in the informal sector). The Sillim Welfare Centre survey data present that out 
of  103 tenant households displaced from Nangok, only about one-third of  them took out 
NHF housing loans or other loans from formal financial institutions (see Table 8-14 
below). 
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Table 8-14: Number of tenant households according to the receipt of NHF housing loan 
or other financial institution loans upon displacement from Nangok 
 
Number of households who
HAVE NOT RECEIVED
NHF housing loan or other financial
institution loans
Number of households who
HAVE RECEIVED
NHF housing loan or other financial
institution loans
Total
(valid N = 103)
Number of households 68 35 103
% of total 66.0% 34.0% 100.0%
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data  
The survey respondents were asked to make multiple responses as to the sources of  their 
housing finance, and Table 8-15 below shows the summary of  their responses. The result 
also confirms the fact that loans from financial institutions or NHF housing loans were 
the least used sources of  financing residents’ increased housing costs upon displacement. 
For those tenants who moved to non-KNHC dwellings, cash compensation was cited as 
the most commonly used source of  housing finance. Since the Chonsei key money for 
residents’ pre-displacement dwellings was used to pay for part of  the post-displacement 
dwellings’ rent deposits, it could be concluded that displacees’ personal financial assets 
and borrowing from their support network played a major role rather than formal sector 
borrowing. 
Table 8-15: Sources of housing finance upon displacement from Nangok 
 
Sources of financing Responses Sources of financing Responses
  Cash compensation from displacement 40   Own savings 28
  Own savings 29   Borrowing from support network 18
  Borrowing from support network 20 Borrowing from relatives 14
Borrowing from relatives 11 Borrowing from neighbours 4
Borrowing from neighbours
9
  Loans from financial institutions 10
  NHF Housing loan for low-income households 8    Usurers or moneylenders 2
  Total (multiple responses allowed) 107   Total (multiple responses allowed) 66
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Moved to non-KNHC dwellings upon displacement (N=58) Moved to KNHC-provided public rental flats (N=45)
  Loans from financial institutions 18
 
These increases in the rent deposits upon displacement and the subsequent borrowing to 
finance the increases made negative impacts upon displacees’ household finance. Nearly 
one quarter of  those respondents subject to the Sillim Welfare Centre survey reported 
that their savings had decreased upon displacement, while the rest of  the respondents 
reported no change. The high proportion of  the respondents reporting no change in their 
level of  personal savings was because as many as four fifths of  the respondents did not 
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have any significant savings before displacement. With regard to the residents’ household 
debts, nearly two fifths of  tenants and more than one quarter of  owner-occupiers from 
Nangok responded that they experienced an increase in their level of  household debts 
upon displacement (see Table 8-16). 
Table 8-16: Debts change after displacement from Nangok 
 
Total
Decreased No change Increased (Valid responses
N = 105)
16 48 41 105
15.2% 45.7% 39.0% 100.0%
5 13 7 25
20.0% 52.0% 28.0% 100.0%
11 35 34 80
13.8% 43.8% 42.5% 100.0%
Moved to KNHC rental flats 6 17 8 31
19.4% 54.8% 25.8% 100.0%
Moved to non-KNHC dwellings 5 18 26 49
10.2% 36.7% 53.1% 100.0%
Total
Source: Sillim Welfare Centre study in summer 2002
Changes in DEBTS after displacement
Owner occupiers
Pre-displacement tenure status
Tenants
 
‘Forced consumption49’: increases in household expenditure 
Upon displacement, residents experienced an increase in their household expenditure. In 
particular, as shown in Table 8-17 below, 86.8% of  the respondents expressed an increase 
in their housing maintenance and monthly rents. Utility bills were the next most frequently 
cited increased expenditure item, followed by debt repayment and interest. In fact, the 
table below indicates that all the expenditures seemed to have increased upon 
displacement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 This expression was adopted from the term used by a Chinese journalist, Wang Jun, whom this 
researcher interviewed while conducting field research in Beijing in summer, 2003. The terminology refers 
to the situation in which those displaced residents “are forced to increase their spending on housing, which 
has never been their priority before, and in doing so, they are cutting down on other spending items that 
were more important” (interview by the author). 
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Table 8-17: Changes in the level of household expenditure after displacement from Nangok 
 
Housing
maintenanc
e
(inc.monthly
rents)
Utility bills
and
insurance
Debt
repayment
and
interests
Transpor-
tation
Communi-
cation (inc.
phone
bills)
Medical
expenses
Education Groceries Clothing/
Cultural
activities
Valid responses 136 130 125 128 127 132 115 134 127
Decreased 6 2 5 2 1 4 7 11 9
% 4.4% 1.5% 4.0% 1.6% 0.8% 3.0% 6.1% 8.2% 7.1%
Not changed 12 54 69 90 93 97 86 102 106
% 8.8% 41.5% 55.2% 70.3% 73.2% 73.5% 74.8% 76.1% 83.5%
Increased 118 74 51 36 33 31 22 21 12
% 86.8% 56.9% 40.8% 28.1% 26.0% 23.5% 19.1% 15.7% 9.4%
Decreased 6.7% 1.7% 1.8% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 6.7% 10.2%
Not changed 1.7% 37.3% 69.6% 60.0% 82.8% 86.4% 80.7% 88.3% 84.7%
Increased 91.7% 61.0% 28.6% 36.7% 17.2% 13.6% 14.0% 5.0% 5.1%
Decreased 2.6% 1.4% 5.8% 0.0% 1.4% 5.5% 6.9% 9.5% 4.4%
Not changed 14.5% 45.1% 43.5% 79.4% 65.2% 63.0% 69.0% 66.2% 82.4%
Increased 82.9% 53.5% 50.7% 20.6% 33.3% 31.5% 24.1% 24.3% 13.2%
Sources: Sillim Welfare Centre survey data
Categories of expenses
Moved to
KNHC-provided
rental flats
Moved to non-
KNHC
dwellings
Displacees as
a whole
 
While the limits of  the data make it difficult to figure out how the residents have been 
managing to finance these increases in overall spending, the table clearly shows that the 
residents were driven towards a greater degree of  consumption, forced by the residential 
redevelopment and displacement from their neighbourhood that used to offer affordable 
means of  housing. This is what constitutes ‘forced consumption’ of  the displacees due to 
the redevelopment. 
It was noted earlier that most tenants, who transferred from Chonsei to deposit-based 
monthly rental tenure, were KNHC tenants. Unlike their previous housing conditions, 
these residents came to face the regular payment of  monthly rents (about KRW 160,000 
per month), equivalent to 19.6% of  the average monthly disposable income of  the 
bottom 20% of  income decile distribution for salary and wage earning urban households 
in 2000, and 14.7% of  that of  the bottom 40% (NSO Korea 2001b). If  housing 
maintenance fees imposed by the estate management office were included as well as other 
bills paid by tenants (e.g. phone bills or medical insurances), the monthly regular 
expenditure would amount to roughly 40% of  the household income. 
For many households, such high costs of  living in the KNHC-provided rental flats 
hindered them from moving in at the early stage of  displacement from Nangok. For those 
who were not aware of  such expected increase in household expenditure, life in the public 
rental units has been financially difficult to sustain. One of  the KNHC tenants 
interviewed states that she initially applied for a KNHC-provided rental flat, but soon 
gave it up, and now lives in a semi-basement unit in Chonsei tenure because of  her fear of  
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the high monthly expenditure she would expect: 
“I initially thought of  moving to the rental flat, but my husband says we would need 
to pay monthly rents, not to mention the management fees, that our life would be 
difficult if  we move there…He also didn’t like to live in a high-rise flat where you 
have to stay behind closed doors, saying he’d rather live in the neighbourhood near 
Nangok, mixing together with neighbours. So, I gave up my application. It hurts… 
Afterwards, we looked for a place in this neighbourhood, but all the places were so 
expensive at that time, and we decided to move to a place affordable within our 
budget… My friends who went to those KNHC rental flats all say I have made a 
good decision because the life there is so tough, saying they have to pay rents, 
management fees, and also all those utility bills. They say, in winter, more than 
300,000 [Korean] Won is spent every month. They all go out to work nowadays as 
both partners have to work to pay for all those bills…” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-18) 
 
Another resident quotes his neighbours’ experiences: 
“There are many people who are experiencing difficulties with their living, because 
they can’t pay the rents, and their economic conditions are not up to what’s required 
to live here. If  they paid a rent deposit of  KRW 16,000,000, then they would have 
to pay roughly KRW 160,000 as monthly rents, and if  you add the management fee, 
then in each month, you have to spend KRW 340,000. Each month, how can they 
afford this? So, there are so many who are under pressure with lots of  
stress…There was one neighbour I used to know. When he first moved into this flat 
here, he said it was like living in heaven…with hot water running from the tap, no 
need to change coals in winter, without having to withstand foul smell. Then, now, 
he says his life here is not as good as it used to be in Nangok. Why? It’s because he 
can’t afford the rents and all the bills. At the end of  each month, he says he can’t go 
to sleep because of  all the worries to pay those”  (interviewee KSS10-INT-03) 
 
Summary 
This section has examined the housing outcome upon residents’ displacement, looking at 
the changes in dwelling space, housing tenure, housing costs and household expenditure. 
In the case of  dwelling space, it was found that displaced residents as a whole experienced 
a statistically significant increase in dwelling space upon displacement, and this was 
particularly true of  KNHC tenants and non-recipients of  means-tested social assistance 
benefits. The post-displacement dwelling spaces for most households, however, were 
below the urban average. Despite the dwelling space increase, one third of  the displaced 
residents still experienced overcrowding as defined by the national minimum housing 
standards, and this was more acute among the KNHC tenants (40.3%). 
In terms of  tenure change, more than half  of  the former Chonsei tenants transferred to 
deposit-based monthly rental tenure by moving to the KNHC-provided public rental flats. 
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The other two fifths favoured cash compensation, and managed to remain in the same 
Chonsei tenure at the expense of  poorer living environment, as most of  them found 
homes in semi-basement or basement units, which were the least favoured dwelling form 
in South Korea. Residents with income constraints appeared to favour Chonsei tenure 
since they could not afford monthly rents payment, and this was the main reason for some 
eligible tenants to avoid KNHC-provided rental flats. 
The displacement of  Nangok tenants led to a significant increase in their housing costs, as 
the level of  rent deposit after displacement was twice to three times as much as most 
tenants used to pay in Nangok. Cash compensation for eligible tenants was helpful, but 
not sufficient enough to cover the rent deposit difference. The majority of  the residents 
did not enjoy formal sector borrowing, and instead relied on personal savings and 
informal borrowing to pay for the increased rent deposits. Upon displacement, most 
residents experienced an increase in the level of  their household expenditure. The 
neighbourhood redevelopment and residents’ displacement drove them towards a greater 
degree of  household expenditure in all aspects of  expenditure items. 
 
8.2 Housing outcomes upon redevelopment: the case of Beijing 
This section examines the housing outcome of  Beijing residents upon their displacement 
from redevelopment neighbourhoods based on my in-depth interviews. Following the 
same structure as in the previous section, this section on Beijing residents will discuss 
whether there have been marked changes in terms of  dwelling space, housing built form 
and indoor facilities, tenure, housing finance and expenditure upon residents’ 
displacement. 
Dwelling space 
Earlier in this thesis, it was found that residents living in dilapidated neighbourhoods 
experienced below-average floor space (see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2). As for the 
interviewees, their average dwelling floor space50 per household also turned out to be far 
                                                 
50 The floor space in this context is expressed as shiyong mianji in Chinese, referring to the floor space of  a 
dwelling inside outer walls. In 2002, Beijing’s per capita floor space was 18.2 m2. The average household size 
was 3.0 persons, and therefore, the average floor space per household in Beijing would be 54.6 m2 (BMBS 
2003a). 
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less than the municipal average (54.6 m2 in 2002). If  the self-built space (that is, informal 
space that was not subject to a rental contract nor rents payment) was included, the 
average floor space per household reached 28.3 m2 only. If  the self-built space was 
excluded, it turned out to be 18.7 m2 only. 
Improvement of  household dwelling space upon displacement to suburban estates 
Table 8-18 below shows the interviewees’ changes in dwelling space after their 
displacement from their original neighbourhoods in Dongcheng District. For this 
comparison, only the formal dwelling space was taken, as this was the basis of  calculating 
their redevelopment compensation. According to the table, most interviewees experienced 
an increase in their dwelling space upon re-housing or displacement to suburban districts. 
It appears that displacees’ move to suburban districts resulted in larger dwelling spaces per 
household. The interviewees who were re-housed in Xinzhongjie neighbourhood also 
seemed to have had a substantial increase in their dwelling space, but they were part of  
the few original Xinzhongjie residents (5%) who could afford to purchase spacious flats 
provided in the redeveloped neighbourhood. One household, CBD6-INT-01, was 
temporarily living in a pingfang dwelling originally occupied by their brother’s family. As 
the unit was vacant at the time of  their displacement due to their brother’s job re-
assignment out of  the city, they made a decision to live there temporarily until an 
affordable flat located as close to their original place of  residence as possible was found. 
Table 8-18: Increases in housing space after displacement or re-housing in Beijing 
 
(m2) Per capita
floor space
CBK-INT-01 4.0 20.1 52.2 13.0 160.2%
CBK-INT-02 3.0 16.0 55.7 18.6 247.9%
CBK-INT-03 2.0 21.6 52.7 26.4 144.0%
CBY-INT-01 2.0 18.0 68.7 34.4 281.8%
CBY-INT-02 1.0 15.0 70.6 70.6 370.7%
CBY-INT-03 3.0 18.0 70.6 23.5 292.3%
CBH-INT-01 2.0 20.1 47.9 23.9 138.1%
CBH-INT-02 2.0 42.0 50.0 25.0 19.1%
CBX-INT-10b 4.0 23.0 77.6 19.4 237.6%
CBX-INT-11c 3.0 n.a. 84.1 28.0 n.a.
Temporary
residence after
displacement
CBD6-INT-01
Donsi 6-tiao in
Dongcheng
3.0 15.8 9.0 3.0 -43.0%
Location of post-
displacement
dwellings or re-
housing units
Before
displacement
(m2)
% increasePost-displacement dwellings
or re-housing units
Kangjiakou in
Chaoyang, a near
suburban district
Yinghuayuan;
in Shunyi, an outer
suburban district
Haiyuncang in
Dongcheng
Xinzhongjie in
Dongcheng
Household size
(persons)
Dwelling space
Re-housed in
original
neighbourhood
Displacement
status
Interviewee ID.
Displaced to
suburban districts
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Improved per capita floor space upon displacement 
After moving from their original neighbourhoods, most households except for CBK-INT-
01 and CBD6-INT-01 enjoyed per capita floor space that was larger than the municipal 
average of  18.2 m2 in 2002. This suggests that the supply of  newly built spacious flats 
purchased by displaced residents could have contributed to the improvement of  average 
housing conditions in the municipality as a whole. This also indicates, however, the 
intensifying problems with the housing poor in the old and dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Their housing conditions were falling far behind the municipal average as the 
redevelopment of  dilapidated neighbourhoods progressed, which in turn might have 
provided another reason for the municipal government to proceed with more ODHRP 
projects. 
Dwelling forms and physical conditions 
Neighbourhood redevelopment is rapidly changing the landscape of  Beijing’s urban space. 
Traditional dwelling forms are replaced with modern medium- or high-rise flats, and these 
are what the new housing market offers to most prospective homebuyers. Such was also 
the case for those interviewees who were displaced from their original neighbourhoods 
due to redevelopment. As shown in Table 8-19 below, all the displaced or re-housed 
interviewees but one resided in either walk-up or high-rise flats. 
Table 8-19: Built forms of the dwellings occupied by the interviewees in Beijing 
 
with self-built
extension
without self-built
extension
5 1 3 9
  Moved to suburban districts 6 6
  Re-housed in Dongcheng district 2 2 4
1 1
6 1 11 2 20
Note: The residents who were displaced all used to live in pingfang dwellings.
Source: Data from interviews conducted by the author in 2003
Total
Pingfang dwellings
Walk-up flats
   Displaced and…
High-rise flats
   Displaced and in temporary residence
Displacement status
(N=20)
   Subject to displacement in future
  (Current residence in Xinzhongjie)
   Total
 
While the life in old and dilapidated pingfang dwellings was subject to residents’ 
discontent and complaints (see Section 4.2 in Chapter 4), those interviewees who moved 
to the walk-up or high-rise flats displayed much less complaints, if  not wholly content, 
regarding their dwellings’ physical conditions. These interviewees all used to reside in 
pingfang dwellings before their neighbourhoods were subject to demolition and 
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redevelopment. All those walk-up or high-rise flats currently occupied by these 
interviewees were self-contained, and fully equipped with indoor facilities and central 
heating. This naturally displayed a stark difference from the physical conditions of  
pingfang dwellings or walk-up flats located in dilapidated neighbourhoods such as 
Xinzhongjie subject to its second phase redevelopment. Figure 8-2 below shows some 
examples of  the views of  an outer suburban estate, where three interviewee households 
were residing. 
While the residents in walk-up or high-rise flats were agreeing that the physical conditions 
were far better than their old pingfang dwellings, they still expressed some complaints 
regarding their current dwellings. Such complaints were mostly related to the poor 
construction quality, which did not meet the expectation of  the interviewees, and also to 
the poor management of  their estates, as some of  the quotes below suggest. As of  April 
2001, there were no specific regulations governing the property management practices 
(China Daily 24 April 2001). 
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Figure 8-2: Views of an outer suburban walk-up flat in Beijing 
 
  
Exterior view of a walk-up block in Airport Estate
(‘Konggang Xincheng’) in Yinghuayuan in Shunyi
district. Three interviewees moved from Xiangheyuan 
neighbourhood in Dongcheng district were living in 
this estate.
Lounge area with double-glazed window Bedroom
Main gate to the estate. On the red placard hanging 
over the gate says, “Don’t let SARS enter our 
community”, reflecting the city’s struggle with the 
epidemic in the year.
Kitchen
Note: Pictures of interior views were taken in the 
residence (total floor space, 70.6 m2) of interviewee 
CBY-INT-02. Photos taken in August 2003, and map 
drawn by the author.
 256
Housing tenure 
As discussed earlier in Section 4.2 in Chapter 4, most dwellings in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods were public rental units. Table 8-20 below summarises the current tenure 
status of  the interviewees in Beijing. Those displaced and relocated households at the time 
of  interviewing also used to be tenants in public rental units, and this was the same for 
those who were yet to be displaced. 
Table 8-20: Current tenure status of the interviewees in Beijing 
 
Commercial housing Affordable housing
8 2 1 11
Owner occupation
Municipal bureau
housing
Rent-free occupancy Sub-total
1 7 1 9
Source: Data from interviews conducted by the author in 2003
Subject to displacement
Sub-totalPre-redevelopment tenure
Households
Public housing rental tenure
Tenure status of interviewees yet to be displaced
Tenure status of displaced/re-housed interviewees
Owner occupation Rent-free (temporary)
occupancy
Tenure upon displacement/re-housing
 
Most displacees interviewed became owner-occupiers by purchasing a commercial or an 
affordable housing (jingji shiyongfang in Chinese) unit. None of  the households interviewed 
bought a second-hand flat to become owner-occupiers. Two households who bought 
affordable housing units were those re-housed upon completion of  Haiyuncang 
redevelopment, which accompanied the construction of  affordable housing instead of  
commercial housing. 
In the case of  interviewees yet to be displaced, homeownership turned out to be the most 
preferred option, and private renting was considered, if  at all, as a short-term alternative 
before their permanent resettlement: 
“I don't want to live in a private rental house…Don't live in a private owner's house. 
It's too troublesome. The house owner makes decision about whether to allow you 
to live or not. If  not allowed, you have to move out the next day.”  
 (Interviewee CBX-INT-01) 
 
“Renting a house is too expensive. I am not capable of  renting a place. Our family 
makes altogether about 900 yuan a month [and is receiving benefits from minimum 
living standard security system]... [If  to find a place to move in] I can take care of  
these matters temporarily. We can live with my mom, my son's grandmother, at her 
place, which is also fine. But, in the end, you should allow us to have a practical 
 257
place to live in, a house that belongs to myself. It must be not too far away. If  it is, I 
am not interested, as my child has to commute to school a long distance.” 
 (Interviewee CBX-INT-05) 
 
“Even if  you rent [for the time being], you need to buy a house someday. Renting is 
very expensive. You need to pay the rent every month, and that's not stable. Because 
we are already quite old, soon going to be 50, there's no more future. It's always no 
good to rent. In the end, you place this burden on your children, and it’s not realistic 
either. Still want to have a place of  one's own, regardless of  the size. Having a place 
to return will make the children feel secure when they come home.” 
 (Interviewee CBX-INT-06) 
 
Given the pre-reform situation that public rental tenure with minimal rents was 
guaranteed for life among urban residents, the logical option for the tenants upon 
displacement from their public rental units seemed to be homeownership, if  their 
circumstances permitted. With the reduced amount of  cash compensation from 2001 and 
the difficulties of  the low-income residents in obtaining formal financial assistance, 
however, the residents’ expectation to become owner-occupiers upon their future 
displacement seemed doubtful. 
Financing homeownership 
So far, it was shown that those displaced or re-housed households were able to 
successfully transfer to home owners, purchasing modern, redeveloped flats and 
occupying a dwelling of  much larger size than their previous pingfang dwellings. The 
question is how did they finance the purchase? To address this question, I will first 
consider the amount of  cash compensation these households were entitled to, and then 
examine the extent to which this compensation contributed to the purchase of  their new 
dwellings. 
Cash compensation as financial gains 
As explained in the previous chapter, residents subject to redevelopment have been given 
cash-oriented compensation since 1998. In fact, interviewed households received cash 
compensation upon displacement, which was 5 to 13 times Beijing’s average annual 
disposable household income. Compared to the interviewees’ reported disposable 
household income,51 the cash compensation turned out to be almost equal to their life-
                                                 
51 Interviewees were asked to provide the actual disposable income of  each co-habiting household member. 
This income mainly referred to the regular income, including monthly salaries if  employed, social insurance 
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time cash savings. For example, the interviewee CBY-INT-02 who was 74 years old and 
retired at the time of  interviewing had been living alone on her retirement pension while 
her only son was living separately with his family in a house in one of  Beijing’s rural 
counties. She received in total 205,000 yuan as cash compensation for the formal space 
she occupied as a tenant. This included the cash incentive of  25,000 yuan that she 
received from the developer for having moved out before the house-moving deadline. Her 
total cash compensation was equivalent to forty one years of  her annual disposable 
income. 
Table 8-21: Summary of cash compensation received by 
displaced and re-housed interviewees in Beijing 
 
Household
category
Interviewee
ID.
Displaced date
'Compensation to
interviewee
household income'
ratio
'Compensation to
Beijing's average
annual household
income' ratio1)
① ② ② / ①
CBK-INT-01 29 Dec. 1999 20.1 n.a. 340,000 n.a. 9
CBK-INT-02 01 Jan. 2000 16.0 n.a. 275,000 n.a. 7
CBK-INT-03 Early Jan. 2000 21.6 19,800 300,000 15 8
CBY-INT-01 Early May 2001 18.0 20,400 280,000 14 7
CBY-INT-02 Early May 2001 15.0 5,040 205,000 41 5
CBY-INT-03 Early May 2001 18.0 17,448 490,000 28 13
CBH-INT-01 n.a. 20.1 12,960 0 0 0
CBH-INT-02 n.a. 42.0 24,720 0 0 0
CBX-INT-10 Early Jan. 2000 23.0 n.a. 295,000 n.a. 8
CBX-INT-11 Early Jan. 2000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Temporary
residence after
displacement
CBD6-INT-01 Early Dec. 2002 22.3 29,640 296,000 10 8
Displaced to
suburban districts
Floor space of
interviewees'
pre-
redevelopment
dwellings
Total Compensation received upon
displacement
Note:
1) RMB 37391.7 was the annual disposable household income by the end of 2002 in Beijing (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2003: 179).
Note that the annual disposable income of bottom 20% of income decile distribution was RMB 19384.0 in the same year.
2) The interviewee CBD6-INT-01 is displaced from another neighbourhood in Dongcheng District near Xinzhongjie neighbourhood, who
received compensation under the BJ-2001 Compensation Measure.
Re-housed upon
project completion
Reported
annual
household
income
 
The table also shows that the dwelling use space occupied by interviewed households was 
very similar to each other, but the amount of  compensation received differed considerably. 
This divergence resulted from the differences in household size as well as in the space 
subsidy 
                                                                                                                                               
and security benefits if  in receipt, and any other income generated from informal jobs they said to have 
been engaged in. It was possible that their monthly income might have been under-reported by not being 
able to capture incomes from informal activities or financial support from their social network (e.g. next of  
kin). However, the reported income would still serve the purpose of  comparing the relative difference in 
living expenses before and after displacement from dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
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On the other hand, those two households CBH-INT-01 and -02, re-housed in Haiyuncang 
upon redevelopment, were subject to a substantial amount of  discount for their re-
housing flats instead of  receiving cash compensation. The Haiyuncang redevelopment 
was in accordance with a revised ODHRP approach, which was announced in March 2000 
(BMG 2000b). This circular aimed at implementing a pilot programme that gave greater 
emphasis on existing residents’ re-housing upon the completion of  neighbourhood 
redevelopment by constructing affordable housing on site (see previous Chapter 5 for 
more details). 
Financing homeownership with cash compensation 
Given the huge amount of  total cash compensation, did the displaced residents find an 
opportunity to join the rank of  homeowners upon displacement? The experience of  the 
interviewed households indicated that this was possible, but only by moving further away 
from their original neighbourhoods in the inner city district. 
Figure 8-3 below compares interviewed households’ redevelopment compensation upon 
their displacement with the actual housing price that they paid to become owner-occupiers. 
The figure suggests two interesting findings. Firstly, it clearly shows that the 
redevelopment compensation helped most interviewed households finance their housing 
purchase. Apart from the case of  the interviewee CBX-INT-10, all other interviewed 
households purchased a commercial dwelling in suburban districts more or less within the 
budget of  their redevelopment compensation. The housing price paid by the interviewee 
CBX-INT-10 was far greater than the total compensation she received, and this owed to 
the fact that her family was re-housed in an expensive commercial flat built on site upon 
completion of  Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment. 
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Figure 8-3: Cash compensation versus housing price 
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When the total compensation was inadequate to finance the housing purchase, 
interviewed households filled the gap by relying on informal loans and personal savings. 
This was the case with four interviewees, CBK-INT-02, CBK-INT-03, CBY-INT-02 and 
CBX-INT-10. For instance, the interviewee CBK-INT-02 stated that her family used her 
early retirement payment from her former employer to pay the difference (35,000 yuan). 
The interviewee CBK-INT-03 also paid the difference (20,000 yuan) with her own cash 
savings, while CBY-INT-02 borrowed 5,000 yuan from her next of  kin. In the case of  the 
interviewee CBX-INT-10, the price of  her re-housing flat turned out to be nearly twice as 
much as her total cash compensation. She refused to provide the details of  how she 
financed the difference, and simply acknowledged briefly that she borrowed some money 
from her friends and relatives. It was evident from her response that the difference was 
hardly financed by formal loans from financial institutions. Such hesitance towards bank 
loans and their tendency to rely on relatives confirms the study on tenure decision 
behaviour in Guangzhou, which found that no families relied upon home mortgage at the 
time of  the study (Li 2000: 230). In the case of  homeowners in his study, 69% of  the 
purchase was funded by personal savings, while the financial help from their relatives and 
parents made up the remaining balance. 
As for the interviewees CBY-INT-01 and CBY-INT-03, the housing price was far lower 
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than their total cash compensation. Instead of  finding a relocation accommodation closer 
to their original place of  residence, they chose to move to an outer suburban district (that 
is, Shunyi District). Such decision was made by these elderly displacees so that the 
remaining balance could be given to their children. For instance: 
“Our daughter [whose family is also displaced as part of  redevelopment and has 
chosen a re-housing option] needs to borrow money. She doesn’t have any money. 
If  we say we don’t give her money, she would have to add 200,000 yuan all by 
herself  [to buy the re-housing flat]. 163,000 yuan for the flat, and some more for its 
furnishing…So, in this kind of  circumstance, we moved to this neighbourhood, and 
gave her 150,000 yuan…”  (Interviewee CBY-INT-03) 
 
The interviewees, CBH-INT-01 and -02, received discounts based on their working years 
and previous dwelling space, but still had to finance the large amount of  remaining 
balance on their own. In the case of  the household CBH-INT-01 that consisted of  a 
retired old lady and her disabled son, their monthly income (RMB 1,080) consisted of  
minimum living allowance and a small amount of  subsidy for the son’s disability. The 
interviewee was originally entitled to a three-bedroom flat in accordance with her 
registered household size at the time of  redevelopment. Instead of  purchasing this flat, 
the family went for a two-bedroom flat by giving up one bedroom and in return received 
RMB 90,000 as cash compensation. Their two-bedroom flat was priced at RMB 170,000 
after discount. To purchase the flat, they used their cash compensation, and received help 
from her youngest son and her nephew. 
In the case of  an old couple CBH-INT-02, they retired long ago, and had no housing 
provident fund account. Their monthly income, RMB 2,060, only consisted of  their 
retirement pension. They were entitled to purchase a two-bedroom flat for their re-
housing, which was priced at RMB 100,000. The price was much less than what CBH-
INT-01 had to pay, because their combined working years were longer and they used to 
occupy a dwelling which was twice as large as CBH-INT-01’s. The balance was paid out 
of  household savings, and hence, they did not require any bank loans. 
‘Forced consumption’: increases in household expenditure 
While the residents expressed their desire to become homeowners to maintain their 
housing security, the life as owner-occupiers in modern flats would require far more 
increased expenditure. Given the low level of  household income and rents while residing 
in dilapidated public rental units, the increased monthly housing costs might turn out to 
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be damaging to their future sustenance of  homeownership. An interviewee who moved to 
a walk-up flat in an outer suburban district commented: 
“At that time [before displacement], we didn’t have to spend much. Our rent was 
just over thirty yuan, and water and electricity bills were cheaper there [in her old 
pingfang dwelling]. Now, things are not well. At the moment, I’m telling you, I just 
don’t have the three hundred yuan [to pay for the bills]. I just don’t eat nor drink, 
but no three hundred yuan, and that’s embarrassing…”  (Interviewee CBY-INT-01) 
 
In order to examine how much pressure the housing costs might have had upon residents 
after moving from their old neighbourhoods, Table 8-22 below made a summary of  
monthly housing costs incurred by the displaced interviewees in comparison with their 
reported household income. The table only included those households whose housing 
costs and monthly household disposable income were all reported to the author during 
the interviews. 
Table 8-22: Monthly housing costs as reported by interviewees in Beijing 
 
Rent or 
management 
fee1)
Utility bills
(electricity, 
water & 
gas)
Heating 
costs2)
⑤ =
% of monthly 
household 
disposable 
income
% of average 
monthly household 
disposable income 
in Beijing3)
① ② ③ ④ ② + ③ + ④ ⑤ / ①
CBX-INT-01 1,070 535 0 56 23 79 7.3% 2.5%
CBX-INT-02 3,430 429 30 200 73 303 8.8% 9.7%
CBX-INT-03 3,310 662 65 350 58 473 14.3% 15.2%
CBX-INT-04 970 970 0 75 44 119 12.3% 3.8%
CBX-INT-05 990 330 24 75 15 114 11.5% 3.6%
CBX-INT-06 1,900 380 48 140 58 246 13.0% 7.9%
CBX-INT-08 1,390 463 26 150 0 176 12.7% 5.7%
Average 1,866 466 28 149 39 216 11.6% 6.9%
CBK-INT-03 1,650 825 51 200 188 4) 251 15.2% 8.1%
CBY-INT-01 1,700 850 50 300 129 479 28.2% 15.4%
CBY-INT-02 420 420 52 105 133 290 69.0% 9.3%
CBY-INT-03 1,454 485 52 110 131 5) 162 11.1% 5.2%
Average 1,306 653 51 179 145 375 28.7% 12.0%
CBX-INT-10 n.a. n.a. 375 155 277 807 n.a. 25.9%
CBX-INT-11 n.a. n.a. 406 155 300 861 n.a. 27.6%
Displaced and 
in temporary 
residence
CBD6-INT-01 2,470 823 0 300 225 525 21.3% 16.8%
Source: Data from the interviews by the author in 2003. Only those interviewees with valid monthly income reports are included.
Displacement 
status
Interviewee 
ID.
Per capita 
monthly 
disposable 
income
(in RMB)
Subject to 
displacement 
in near future
Moved to sub-
urban districts
Re-housed
(Xinzhongjie 
Phase I)
Note: (1) Monthly management fee for relocated households. Data are based on management fee rates reported by the interviewees: Kangjiagou 
(CBK) 0.7 yuan per m2, and Yinghuayuan (CBY) 0.53 yuan per m2; (2) Modern walk-up flats are equipped with central heating system, and the 
residents have reported annual heating costs, which are then divided by 12 months; (3) RMB 3,116 per household in 2002 (BMBS, 2003); (4) The 
heating costs for CBK-INT-02 and -03 are based on the annual rate of charge (31 yuan per m2) as reported by the interviewee, CBK-INT-01 who 
resides in the same estate; (5) Mid-value of those of the other two households (CBY-INT-01 and -02) in the same estate.
Monthly 
household 
disposable 
income
(in RMB)
  Monthly housing costs as reported by interviewees (in RMB)
 
In the case of  households who were still residing in Xinzhongjie’s dilapidated dwellings, 
the total housing costs incurred each month were on average 11.6% of  their reported 
monthly household disposable income and 6.9% of  Beijing’s average monthly household 
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disposable income in 2002. 
As for the households relocated to suburban districts (that is, CBK-INT-01, CBY-INT-01, 
-02 and -03), they experienced a significant increase in housing costs. The total housing 
costs of  those four interviewee households constituted on average 28.7% of  their 
monthly household income. The proportion of  housing costs to Beijing’s average monthly 
household disposable income was highest in the case of  those two households re-housed 
in the Sun City Estate (that is, CBX-INT-10 and -11). As was mentioned earlier, these 
households re-housed in the Sun City could be assumed to be the wealthiest among the 
residents displaced as part of  Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment. However, even for 
them, the monthly housing costs in redeveloped flats were beyond their expectation, and 
this was reported to be the main reason behind re-housed households moving out in 
order to gain rent by letting their Sun City flats. Apparently, among the twenty odd 
households who were re-housed upon completion of  the Sun City project in January 2002, 
only six households were remaining at the time of  interviewing in August 2003. 
Summary 
This section has examined the housing outcome of  the residents who were displaced or 
re-housed due to neighbourhood redevelopment in Beijing. In relation to dwelling space, 
all the interviewed households reported an increase in their dwelling space upon 
displacement and re-housing. All of  them also reported increased per capita floor space. It 
appears that displacees’ move to suburban districts resulted in larger dwelling spaces, 
unless residents were rich enough to purchase luxurious commercial flats in inner city 
districts and be re-housed upon project completion. The physical conditions and indoor 
facilities of  the dwellings occupied by the displaced or re-housed households were much 
superior to the pingfang dwellings they lived in before redevelopment. 
The residents’ displacement and re-housing led to their tenure conversion from the public 
sector tenants to owner-occupiers, as they all purchased a flat. The cash compensation 
that the residents were entitled to was 5 to 13 times Beijing’s average annual household 
disposable income and equivalent to life-time savings for those displacees. When short of  
money to finance their housing purchase, they relied mostly on their personal savings and 
informal borrowing rather than on formal loans from financial institutions. The transfer 
to owner occupation in modern flats, however, seemed to have incurred much higher 
housing costs than the interviewees used to pay before redevelopment. Such high costs 
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were too burdensome for Xinzhongjie residents who were re-housed in Sun City so they 
had to move elsewhere and seek rental income instead. 
 
8.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the housing outcome of  the residents from dilapidated 
neighbourhoods in Seoul and Beijing upon their displacement due to neighbourhood 
redevelopment. Five main aspects were examined: dwelling space; dwelling forms and 
physical conditions; housing tenure; housing finance; and household expenditure. The 
summary of  the findings are presented in Table 8-23. 
Existing studies on displacement in market economies tend to find displacement as having 
negative impacts upon residents as it involved substantially higher rents and housing costs 
for more crowded and inferior dwellings (Hartman 1979; LeGates and Hartman 1986). 
The redevelopment of  dilapidated neighbourhoods in Seoul partly supports such 
argument. The displacement of  residents from Nangok certainly led to substantial 
increases in housing costs, and most displacees reported increased household expenditure 
on most spending items. The dwellings in dilapidated neighbourhoods suited low-income 
residents’ financial needs, but their destruction and the subsequent displacement of  
residents seemed to have increased debts and aggravated their financial situations. Due to 
the appalling physical conditions in Nangok before redevelopment, however, the 
displacement of  residents did not necessarily involve moving to a worse living 
environment. Residents who moved to semi-basement or basement units were discontent 
about the lack of  natural lighting and damp conditions, but such dwellings’ other indoor 
facilities were still superior to what could be found in dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Despite the improved dwelling conditions and increased dwelling space, however, 
overcrowding was still prevalent among displaced residents, as they had to find 
accommodations within their budget constraints. 
In Beijing, the physical living conditions were substantially improved in the case of  
displaced or re-housed residents. Such improvement was also accompanied by their tenure 
conversion from public housing tenants to owner-occupiers. Residents disfavoured private 
renting that would not provide housing security as solid as what it used to be within the 
traditional public rental sector. However, relocation to or re-housing in a modern flat 
within or outside the inner city districts would incur a substantial increase in housing 
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expenditure after displacement, which could be detrimental to residents’ monthly 
expenditure capacity, given the low-income status and unstable employment characteristics 
of  many households. 
Table 8-23:  Summary of Seoul and Beijing residents' housing experiences upon displacement 
 
Dwelling space
Overall dwelling space increase, especially when
moving to public rental flats. Economically better off
families more likely to experience space increase
Substantial increase in dwelling space when
displaced and purchased a flat in suburban districts
or re-housed in redevelopment neighbourhoods
Per capita floor space of the displaced, mostly below
urban average
Most interviewed residents experiencing larger per
capita floor space upon displacement than the
municipal average
One third of the displaced households, failing to
meet the national minimum housing standards. More
likely to experience overcrowded conditions in public
rental flats
Increased dwelling space applicable only to those
who became owner occupiers upon displacement
Dwelling forms and
physical conditions
(Semi-)basement units are the least favoured
dwelling form in South Korea, but found to be the
second most frequently cited dwelling form after the
KNHC-provided public rental flats
Physical conditions of post-displacement flats
superior to those in dilapidated neighbourhoods
Displaced residents hardly moved to high-rise flats
unless they became KNHC tenants
Some concerns regarding poor construction and
management practices
Housing tenure
Tenure conversion from Chonsei to deposit-based
monthly rental when moving to public rental flats
Displaced residents in search for homeownership
Residents remaining in Chonsei tenure upon
displacement likely to live in (semi-)basement units
Those residents subject to displacement in future
also expressing a strong preference for owner
occupation
Lower income residents more likely to remain in
Chonsei tenure in fear of paying monthly rents with
limited income
Housing finance
Eligible tenants in receipt of cash compensation
found it helpful to finance their post-displacement
rent deposits
Cash compensation as financial gains: 5~13 times
Beijing's average annual household disposable
income
Cash compensation still not enough to fill in the
difference between pre- and post-displacement rent
deposits
The amount of cash compensation determining
where to buy a flat
Most frequently cited financing methods being
personal savings and informal borrowing, leading to
increased debts upon displacement
If in shortage of funds, mostly relying on personal
means or informal borrowing
Ineligible tenants more likely to find a post-
displacement dwelling that requires less rent deposits
Household
expenditure
Most expenditure items experiencing increased
spending
Monthly spending on housing maintenance and
management likely to be more than doubled when
becoming owner occupiers
Huge pressure of paying monthly rents and
management fees in the case of public sector tenants
Substantial increase in household expenditure in the
case of those in commercial housing, eventually
leading to the displacement of re-housed residents to
seek for rent income through letting
Seoul Beijing
  Increased dwelling space but overcrowding
  persists
  Overall improvement of physical conditions, though
  some concerns raised for (semi-)basement units
  Trade-off between tenure preference and dwelling
  form, constrained by household income
  Increased dwelling space
  Improved physical conditions of post-displacement
  flats
  Homeownership orientation
  Cash compensation helpful, but not sufficient   Homeownership mostly determined by cash
  compensation
  Increase household expenditure   Increased household expenditure
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When neighbourhood redevelopment and residents’ displacement take place, it is argued 
that the actual outcome and consequences of  displacement would depend on the 
relocation (and compensation) policies implemented (Cameron 2003). The redevelopment 
compensation policies in Seoul and Beijing very much support this argument. In Seoul, 
the provision of  public rental flats as in-kind compensation seemed to have attracted a 
certain proportion of  eligible tenants in spite of  the fact that their tenure transfer from 
Chonsei in the private sector to monthly rental tenure in the public sector would incur 
much higher monthly expenditure on rents and management fees. For the tenants eligible 
for such redevelopment compensation, redevelopment meant a ‘fast-track’ access to the 
public rental sector, which only benefits a small proportion of  tenant households in Seoul 
due to limited supply. The high housing costs incurred in the public rental sector, however, 
pushed away a substantial number of  eligible tenants who chose cash compensation in 
order to remain in their favoured Chonsei tenure. The majority of  such tenants had to 
make a trade-off  between the long-term tenure security provided by the public rental 
sector and the poorer dwelling conditions, as such move led to their settlement in the least 
favoured dwelling form (that is, semi-basement or basement units in individual and multi-
dwelling houses). Such trade-off  was more prevalent among the recipients of  means-
tested social assistance programmes, as they tried to avoid paying monthly rents due to 
limited regular income. 
As for the ineligible tenants in Seoul, the absence of  any kind of  redevelopment 
compensation meant that they would struggle hard to keep their head above water in the 
private rental sector that neither guarantees long-term tenure security nor provides 
adequate formal financial support for them to finance housing costs. When the ineligible 
tenants were displaced, their housing consumption behaviour tended to be similar to that 
of  eligible tenants, but the rent deposit of  their post-displacement dwellings appeared to 
be much less than what eligible tenants paid. 
In Beijing, the changes in compensation policies from re-housing to full monetarisation 
led to the displaced residents’ tenure conversion from rental tenure in the public sector to 
owner occupation in the private sector. In this respect, redevelopment policies are in line 
with the government policies of  promoting homeownership during the reform period. 
This, however, also means that public sector tenants have no other choice but to exercise 
their housing choice only within the private sector with no further access to welfare 
housing. Moreover, the cash compensation policies adopted in 1998 came to favour those 
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with larger dwelling space before displacement, and excluded those who were relying 
heavily on informal self-built dwelling space to meet their housing needs. It is doubtful, 
however, that such tenure conversion would continue to take place as the municipal and 
central governments have revised their compensation policies in 2001 leading to the 
substantial reduction of  cash compensation. In this study, it was not possible to contact 
those Beijing tenants ineligible for redevelopment compensation. Such tenants would 
usually consist of  migrant workers or families who do not have permanent Beijing hukou, 
not having lived long-term in dilapidated neighbourhoods. They do not have access to 
Beijing’s public rental housing, and may largely reside in employer-provided compounds 
or private dwellings in and around suburban districts and counties (see Section 2.1 in 
Chapter 2 for more details on urban migrants in Beijing). If  any such families are found to 
live in redevelopment neighbourhoods as private renters, they are not qualified for any 
redevelopment compensation by regulations, and will have to seek alternative dwellings 
with their personal means. 
Having examined residents’ housing experiences upon displacement, such diverse 
experiences among the existing residents in redevelopment districts in Seoul and Beijing 
would result in differing degrees of  frustration. How the residents participate in and 
respond to the redevelopment of  their neighbourhoods is going to be the main topic for 
the following chapter. 
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Residents and participation: limited opportunities 
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This chapter forms the third of  the three chapters on residents. This chapter examines the 
degree of  residents’ participation in order to identify if  there are any opportunities for 
residents in Seoul and Beijing to intervene in the processes of  neighbourhood 
redevelopment. 
In western literatures, the rise of  the regeneration partnership has led to an increasing 
attention on the issue of  community participation. In the UK, for instance, community 
involvement has been considered central to partnership approach especially since the rise 
of  the New Labour government (Imrie and Raco 2003). Increased community 
participation in urban regeneration partnership is treated as an end in itself. Critics 
focused on the need of  empowering local communities and disadvantaged residents 
(Baeten 2000; McArthur 1995; Power 1996), and the evaluation of  the degree of  
community participation and empowerment in regeneration partnership (Hart et al. 1996; 
Hastings and McArthur 1995; Smith and Beazley 2000). It is often criticised, however, that 
limited resources and bargaining power constrain communities from actively partaking in 
decision-making, implementation or evaluation processes (Atkinson 2003; Crawford 2003; 
Morrison 2003; Wilks-Heeg 2003).  
In South Korea and mainland China, community participation in urban renewal has rarely 
received attention in academic literatures in spite of  the extensive operation of  recent 
neighbourhood redevelopment projects. In South Korea, the issue of  people’s 
participation has often been discussed in the context of  democratisation and resistance to 
authoritative state (e.g. Hart-Landsberg 1993; Kim 1980) or rural community development 
and nation-building (e.g. Dore et al. 1981; Whang 1981). In the context of  urban renewal, 
criticisms were mounted mainly against the forced eviction of  tenants and the protection 
of  their housing rights (ACHR 1989a, 1989b; CIIR 1988; Kim 1998; Kim 1991). Recently, 
there has been a call for a more community-based redevelopment approach (Ha 2001a), 
and there is a need to closely examine the local contexts within which residents’ 
participation is constrained and discouraged. 
In mainland China, literatures on community participation emerge mainly in the context 
of  rural development (e.g. Plummer and Taylor 2004), social welfare (e.g. Leung and 
Wong 1999; Liu 2004; Wang et al. 2005) and urban service delivery (Xu and Chow 2006). 
Recently, some critical literatures have begun to emerge and address the limits of  
community participation in policy-making and implementation (Cai 2004; Chu 2004) and 
 270
the changing nature of  urban governance that re-invents urban communities to create a 
“governable society” (Wu 2002a). Community participation, however, has been rarely 
discussed in the context of  urban renewal, and we are yet to have a more concrete 
understanding of  how community participation has been promoted or discouraged. 
In this respect, this chapter attempts to be both exploratory and explanatory in its 
approach, and addresses the following key questions: did residents have means to 
intervene and participate within the existing redevelopment framework; to what extent did 
residents approve or dissent neighbourhood redevelopment; moreover, did they remain 
passive throughout the redevelopment process? 
 
9.1 Seoul: charade of community participation 
In this section on Seoul, I will start by addressing the legal basis of  local community 
participation within the Joint Redevelopment Programme (JRP). It shows that community 
participation in the JRP largely refers to the participation of  property-owners, and 
excludes tenants. I will then discuss how local community participation was hampered by 
taking the case study of  Nangok neighbourhood redevelopment. The third and fourth 
subsections discuss the collective actions taken by the remaining owner-occupiers and 
tenants in Nangok. 
Basis of community participation: voluntary association of property-owners 
Legal provision for property-owners’ participation 
In Seoul, the implementation of  the JRP is based on the voluntary association of  
property-owners. Property-owners in a redevelopment neighbourhood come together at 
the outset to establish a representative body called ‘redevelopment steering committee’ 
(see Figure 9-1). The committee is there to facilitate the redevelopment processes 
including the designation of  their neighbourhood as a redevelopment district if  the 
designation is not made by the local authority. When in need of  a collective decision, the 
committee calls for a general assembly where property-owners cast a vote. 
There are two major moments when property-owners are required by law to make a 
collective decision (Kim et al. 1996: 108-109). The first moment is when the 
redevelopment steering committee transforms into a legal body called a ‘redevelopment 
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association,’ and becomes the official project implementer. At least two thirds of  the 
property-owners should give consent to the establishment of  the redevelopment 
association. It is initially comprised of  property-owners only, but as soon as professional 
developers are selected, they also join the redevelopment association. 
Figure 9-1: Property-owners' action at each stage of a JRP project 
(MoCT Korea 2000) 
 
Project preparation
(area designation)
Project implementation
plan
Designation of a neighbourhood as a 
redevelopment district
Establishment of ‘redevelopment 
association’
Selection of a developer, which then 
joins the association as a co-member
Preparation of a ‘project 
implementation plan’
Preparation and submission of a 
‘project implementation plan’
Selection of a neighbourhood and 
preparation of a project outline
Establishment of ‘redevelopment 
steering committee’
Consent from two thirds of 
property owners
Review and approval of the project 
implementation plan
Consent from two thirds of 
property owners
Management disposal plan
Project implementation
(demolition and construction)
(if area designation
is completed)
(if area designation is
not completed)
Application for a redevelopment flat
Preparation of a ‘management 
disposal plan’
Approval of the management disposal 
plan
Completion of residents’ relocation 
and demolition of dwellings
Construction
 
 272
The second occasion takes place just before submitting a project implementation plan for 
government approval. The delegates of  a redevelopment association, chosen through a 
general assembly of  property-owners at the time of  its inauguration, work together with 
professional developers, and produce a project implementation plan that contains 
information on what are to be built on site. Before its submission to the local authority, 
the plan needs to be approved by at least two thirds of  the property-owners. 
Law enforcement against non-consenting owner-occupiers 
Not all the owner-occupiers would be satisfied with the demolition and redevelopment of  
their neighbourhoods, and some may resist and raise objection and complaints. They may 
also refrain from accepting the collective decision made in a general assembly. Some of  
them may also change their mind after initially consenting to the neighbourhood 
redevelopment, and refuse to vacate dwellings. This often splits property-owners sharply 
into two opposing groups. The head of  the Housing Bureau at the Gwanak district 
government explained: 
“The legal consent rate is very contradictory…Those who consent are acting 
according to their conviction that it [redevelopment] would bring profits. People 
who dissent…are forced to follow despite their unwillingness…So, the dispute can 
be sometimes fierce…” 
  (Head of  the Housing Bureau, Gwanak district government) 
 
The Urban Redevelopment Act defines that when such disputes occur, a negotiation is to 
take place between disagreeing owners and the redevelopment association. When there is 
no prospect of  obtaining disagreeing owners’ consent, the redevelopment association can 
apply to the court to enforce land acquisition as per the Land Acquisition Act. This is 
deemed necessary to safeguard the interests of  the majority group at the expense of  
restricting the right of  the minority to dispose of  their own properties. This is regarded as 
inevitable in order to complete a project. In this process, the local authority itself  does not 
have the jurisdiction to intervene, and the action has to come from the property-owners: 
“…under the present system, it’s a serious problem to mediate such disputes…But, 
the government doesn’t have the means to do this. For instance, if  90% of  the 
residents give consent and submit their applications for government permission, the 
permission has to be given. Then, there’s no guarantee that the remaining 10% 
would understand and yield to the majority. In such a situation…residents have to 
resolve the situation on their own. We encourage them to meet, talk and understand 
each other, but there’s no legal measure we can resort to in order to solve the 
minority problem…”  (Head of  the Housing Bureau, Gwanak district government) 
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No provision for tenants’ participation 
The principle of  voluntary association and residents’ participation applied strictly to the 
property-owners in a redevelopment neighbourhood. As for tenants, there were no 
provisions made in the Urban Redevelopment Act for their participation in the decision-
making process. Since the underlying basis of  property-owners’ participation was their 
financial contribution to the total costs of  redevelopment, tenants were only granted 
redevelopment compensation if  eligible. In most cases, the legal requirement to provide 
public rental flats for eligible tenants who wished to choose the in-kind compensation 
option was regarded by property-owners and developers as detrimental to the profit 
maximisation of  redevelopment projects. 
Fallacy of community participation 
Domination of  absentee landlords 
In a JRP project, as soon as professional developers are selected and the project enters 
into the stage of  preparing a project implementation plan, project uncertainties are lifted 
and speculation becomes rampant. Owner-occupiers increasingly sell their properties to 
off-site investors and speculators who join the redevelopment association as absentee 
landlords. Under such circumstances, collective decisions by the redevelopment 
association increasingly becomes in favour of  the absentee landlords (or speculators as 
they are commonly referred to). In time, these absentee landlords come to dominate the 
redevelopment association, and act as individual gentrifiers, constituting one of  the three 
major gentrifying agents (the other two being professional developers and landlords) 
(Smith 1992: 112). 
In Nangok neighbourhood, this process was also clearly witnessed. As its redevelopment 
project preparation progressed, an increasing number of  properties possessed by owner-
occupiers changed hands. A former owner-occupier who sold her dwelling and moved to 
Chonsei tenure confirmed the prevalence of  absentee landlords, stating that: 
“By the time the general assembly was held in May 2000 [to approve the KNHC’s 
participation], there were only about 450 [owner occupying] households [about 18% 
of  total property-owners]…All others were from elsewhere” 
 (Interviewee KSS3-INT-01) 
 
The speculators’ take-over caused the fluctuation of  dwelling prices in Nangok. 
According to some interviewees’ recollection, the peak price of  a 26 m2 dwelling (that is, 
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the most commonly found dwelling size in Nangok) reached KRW 65 million in 1996 
when private developers signed an agreement to participate. When the developers 
withdrew in May 1998 due to its financial instability, the prospect of  neighbourhood 
redevelopment was endangered, and the dwelling prices fell sharply to KRW 25 million. It 
never recovered the pre-1998 prices afterwards, as the project’s profitability decreased 
substantially. 
Nearly two years after the withdrawal of  the private developers, the property-owners were 
summoned to hold a general assembly in May 2000 to collectively decide the participation 
of  the KNHC. By this time, the speculators must have been deeply frustrated, as the 
prices of  dwellings were only half  what they were before the withdrawal of  the private 
developers. 
“Some estimates say it [the proportion of  speculators] could be as many as 90% [of  
property-owners]. These people paid between KRW 50~100 million to buy a 
dwelling, and they have a very high stake. This might cause conflicts when the 
management disposal plan [to determine the sale price of  redeveloped flats] is 
executed”  (Official consultant to the property-owners’ representative body) 
 
Misleading information that undermines owner-occupiers’ decision-making 
The domination of  off-site speculators threatened the position of  owner-occupiers as an 
official partner of  a redevelopment project. The remaining owner-occupiers’ decision-
making was further undermined as they were often presented with misleading information 
by the redevelopment steering committee and professional developers. A good example 
was the case of  a general assembly held on 20 May 2000, which was to approve the 
participation of  the KNHC as the professional developer. The general assembly was co-
hosted by the then redevelopment steering committee and the KNHC. 
It was required to obtain consent from at least half  of  the neighbourhood’s property-
owners to approve the KNHC’s participation. More than 50% of  property-owners were 
present at the general assembly, and unanimously approved the company’s participation. 
Some interviewees, however, suggested that the event was very much flawed, and that they 
were deceived by the rosy pictures presented in the meeting: 
“If  we talk about the percentage, I think there would be only about 30% of  
remaining owner-occupiers who would agree with the redevelopment…When I 
attended the meeting, I just couldn’t think of  disapproving it... What they said was 
so sweet and attractive…”  (Interviewee KSS10-INT-03) 
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“Without any explanation, they called us to a general assembly… The mayor of  the 
district government, members of  the local district assembly, and the head of  the 
redevelopment steering committee were all there. They asked us to bring our seal. 
We went there to listen to how the redevelopment would proceed. If  it were for us 
to decide whether or not we agreed with it, I wouldn’t have gone there. When I 
arrived, they told us to stamp my seal on a piece of  paper next to my name and 
address before entering the venue. There was no explanation on why we had to 
stamp our seal. There was no other process of  giving consent. They used our seal-
stamping as a proof  of  giving our consent to the redevelopment…During the event 
they told us about what was to happen, and that owner-occupiers were to move to 
Sillim 10-dong [where public rental flats were provided by the KNHC for their 
temporary relocation]. We were told we’d come back here when the construction 
was over. People who knew nothing simply thought apartment flats of  the same 
kind as in Sillim 10-dong would be built here, and we would just move back…” 
 (Interviewee KSS3-INT-01) 
 
The presentation of  exaggerated redevelopment pictures appeared to be an attempt to 
prevent any potential failure of  winning the required number of  votes in the meeting. An 
official at the local district government fully understood this problem and stated: 
“For many local residents, they wouldn’t agree if  they are not presented with 
somewhat speculative blueprint, which says their asset would increase by two fold. 
So, at the beginning, because the project is not yet concrete, a rather hopeful, 
exaggerated plan is shown [by developers] to the residents in order to bring them 
together …” (Head of  the Housing Bureau, Gwanak district government) 
 
Weaker association of  existing property-owners with the KNHC’s participation 
The Urban Redevelopment Act defined that a public agency like the KNHC participated 
in a redevelopment project upon the request of  more than half  of  all the property-owners, 
and that it was to become the sole implementer of  the redevelopment. This meant that 
the property-owners could not become joint implementers of  the redevelopment, and no 
longer had a legal status equal to the developer. In this context, the redevelopment 
steering committee of  Nangok was dissolved after holding the aforementioned general 
assembly in May 2000, and a consultation body was formed instead in July 2000, 
consisting of  17 delegates of  property-owners. The body was called the ‘council for 
residents’ representatives.’ Its role was to collect the opinions of  property-owners, hold 
meetings with the developer on a regular basis in relation to any issues on which the 
developer wished to consult the property-owners, and publicise the project progress as 
well as the contents of  discussions between the council and the KNHC (Council for the 
Residents' Representatives for Sillim District 1 Redevelopment 2000). 
The implication of  this was that the KNHC had no obligation to obtain property-owners’ 
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consent regarding the submission of  the project implementation plan. The only occasion 
to hold a property-owners’ general assembly was when a management disposal plan was 
prepared and ready for submission to the local authority. In this case, at least a half  of  the 
property-owners were required to attend, and any decision in the general assembly should 
be made by majority in accordance with the Ordinance on Urban Redevelopment in Seoul 
(Article 15). Therefore, the council existed to function only as a channel of  information 
between the developer and property-owners, and to facilitate the information sharing 
among them rather than as a decision-making body. 
Owner-occupiers and their limited access to development gains 
Owner-occupiers and loss of  opportunities to acquire development gains 
For owner-occupiers in dilapidated neighbourhoods, the redevelopment presented a good 
opportunity to increase their asset by taking advantage of  the rent gap in their 
neighbourhood (see Chapter 5). The purchase of  redeveloped flats could also lead to asset 
increases as the Korean housing market had been experiencing a general price increase 
especially in the high-rise apartment sector (Kookmin Bank 2005). Furthermore, the price 
of  redeveloped flats sold to the property-owners was about one-fifth cheaper than the 
price of  redeveloped flats set aside for general sales in the new housing market.52 The 
majority of  owner-occupiers were, however, stripped of  the opportunity of  acquiring full 
development gains as they were replaced by off-site speculators. The high prices for the 
purchase of  public lands and redeveloped flats discouraged them from staying, and 
became the main source of  owner-occupiers’ frustration. 
As mentioned earlier, in Nangok, more than 90% of  the lands were public. By the time 
the redevelopment steering committee was organised in the neighbourhood in 1995, there 
was a wide gap between the prices of  public lands in the neighbourhood and those of  
private lands in the vicinity (see Figure 9-2 below). 
 
                                                 
52 The redevelopment of  Sillim 2-1 District, an area located close to Nangok neighbourhood, was also 
carried out by the KNHC, completed in 2001. The final management disposal report (finalised in August 
2001) that I was able to obtain from the KNHC showed that the price of  redeveloped flats was between 
KRW 90,248,194 (for a flat with a construction floor space of  101.0 m2) and KRW 191,291,336 (for a 195.5 
m2 flat), which was 17~18% cheaper than the price of  redeveloped flats set aside for general sales. 
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Figure 9-2: Comparison of official land prices in and around Nangok, 1991 – 2005 
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Gap ① is the price difference between the public land in Nangok neighbourhood and the private land in the vicinity at the time 
of establishing Nangok neighbourhood’s redevelopment steering committee. Gap ② is the increase in the official land price in 
Nangok neighbourhood by the time the land preparation was completed.
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Sources: Ministry of Construction (1991 to 1994) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan 
Yeoncha Bogoseo); Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1995 to 2002) Annual Report on Land Price Notification (In 
Korean: Jiga Gongsi-e Gwanhan Yeoncha Bogoseo); Ministry of Construction and Transportation (1999 to 2002) Official Land 
Prices: Seoul Vol.II-1; Seoul Land Information Service web site (http://lmis.seoul.go.kr/sis/index.html)  
The official price of  public lands in Nangok was as low as one quarter of  the price of  
private lands in the vicinity. As the project went ahead with the participation of  the 
KNHC, the official land price of  the public lands in Nangok substantially increased, 
eventually surpassing the price of  private lands in the vicinity. This represented the 
development opportunities envisaged by the property-owners and developers at the outset 
of  the redevelopment project. 
By law, the dwelling owners occupying public lands were to purchase the lands to secure 
full de jure property-ownership. This purchase was carried out between 2000 and 2001. Ten 
per cent of  the total land price was paid as down payment upon purchase, and the 
remaining balance could be paid in instalment over 20 years with an interest rate of  4%. 
All information on cost items including the land price remained undisclosed, and it was 
not possible to obtain the land price information from official sources. An owner-
occupier in an interview, however, suggested that the land price of  public lands reached 
about KRW 620,000 per m2, which was roughly a mid-point between the price of  public 
lands in the neighbourhood and the price of  private land in the vicinity shown in previous 
Figure 9-2: 
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“The land I occupied was evaluated to be 39 pyeong [that is, 129 m2 in metric 
terms]…I have to pay KRW 80,000,000 in total, and so far, paid KRW 8,000,000. I 
have this table that shows how much I need to pay over 20 years. Next year, I have 
to pay back one-twentieth [of  the total land price]…”  (Interviewee KSS10-INT-05) 
 
Given that the land price could be paid in instalment over 20 years, the actual amount that 
an owner-occupier needed to pay at the time of  re-housing would be equal to the sales 
price of  a redeveloped flat minus the total land price. By taking the examples of  two 
owner-occupiers, Table 9-1 below shows an estimation of  the total payment to the 
developer expected to be incurred upon project completion. I took the average annual 
household disposable income for wage- and salary-earning urban households in 2001 to 
see the affordability of  the total payment (NSO Korea 2002a). 
Table 9-1: Estimated prices of redeveloped flats and land in Nangok 
 
KSS10-INT-05 KSS7-INT-10
145.5 m2 79.3 m2
(44 pyeong) (24 pyeong)
① Housing price1) KRW 218,250,000 KRW 118,950,000
Price-to-annual income ratio
(average income)
7.8 : 1 4.3 : 1
Price-to-annual income ratio
(bottom 20% of income decile)
20.3 : 1 11.1 : 1
  Occupied land ② Land price
(KRW 620,000 per m2)
KRW 79,918,000 KRW 16,368,000
Land area occupied (m2) 128.9 26.4
① - ② KRW 138,332,000 KRW 102,582,000
Price-to-annual income ratio
(average income)
5.0 : 1 3.7 : 1
Price-to-annual income ratio
(bottom 20% of income decile)
12.9 : 1 9.6 : 1
  Total payment to the
  developer upon
  project completion
Note: 1) The housing price in this table is based on the preliminary estimate provided by the vice-chairperson of the council for residents' 
representatives, which was an official association of property owners in Nangok neighbourhood. The estimation turned out to be fairly close to 
the official prices of redevelopment flats announced in 2004 (see Table 7-4 in Chapter 7).
  Interviewee ID (owner occupiers in Nangok neighbourhood)
Size of the redevelopment flat
the interviewee applied for
  Redeveloped flat
 (based on a 6th floor
  flat)
 
The table above reveals three interesting aspects to the situation. Firstly, the price of  
redeveloped flats appeared to be relatively affordable (price-to-annual income ratio of  
4.3~7.8 to 1) for average wage- and salary-earning urban households. Secondly, the 
redevelopment framework was inevitably in favour of  those few owner-occupiers in the 
neighbourhood who already owned their lands, since they only had to pay for the 
difference between the prices of  the land and the redeveloped flat. Thirdly, the total 
payment to the developer upon project completion was still much less affordable for low-
income households. Since most owner-occupiers had to pay for the lands as well, securing 
bank loans for the payment of  housing price would put an additional pressure upon the 
household economy. As an owner-occupier explained: 
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“Even the mayor of  the district government told us to sell our properties so that we 
could at least get some money to pay for rent deposit elsewhere. He said there was a 
limit on what he could do because this project had been already decided to go ahead. 
That meant, if  you didn’t have the capacity, then you should simply sell your 
rights…”   (Interviewee KSS3-INT-01) 
 
Remaining owner-occupiers and their collective actions 
As the financial pressure was heavily felt by the remaining owner-occupiers, disputes 
emerged among them. Some of  the remaining owner-occupiers became increasingly 
unhappy about the inefficiency and incompetent management of  the council for 
residents’ representatives, and established a separate organisation early in 2001, which they 
named the ‘emergency committee.’ The interviewees who led this movement explained: 
“At the beginning, the council for residents’ representatives consisted of  twenty 
delegates. The council represented absentee landlords’ interest only, and some of  
the poor owner-occupiers felt so endangered that they formed an emergency 
committee to launch a struggle…”  (Interviewee KSS7-INW-01) 
 
“I was originally one of  the twenty delegates in that council…There were a lot of  
disputes at that time. I always raised objection, and had a lot of  bickering. Nobody 
could understand me, so I couldn’t bear it any more and quit. When the emergency 
committee was organised, I was chosen as the chairperson through a general 
assembly in order to establish the legitimacy”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-10) 
 
The actions by the emergency committee were, in fact, directed towards the local and 
central governments. The major demand staged was regarding the public lands within the 
neighbourhood that were used for accommodating public facilities such as the local 
administrative office and thoroughfares. Article 56 of  the Urban Redevelopment Act 
stated that any public facilities within a redevelopment district would be transferred free 
of  charge to the implementers of  neighbourhood redevelopment. In Nangok, the Korea 
Forest Service was the largest landlord, and initially denied the free transfer of  lands used 
as thoroughfares. The logic was that the thoroughfares were not officially designated roads, 
and were illegally created and used by the residents. 
“After establishing the emergency committee, we went to the municipal government 
and the Korea Forest Office, demanding the free transfer of  those lands. They 
didn’t accept it. This transfer was actually a very contradictory issue. Say for example 
a piece of  public land is [designated as] forestry [according to the municipal land use 
planning]. Its land use designation will change to ‘land for housing’ when the project 
implementation plan is finally approved. Then, we have to pay for the purchase of  
lands based on the modified land use. In the case of  thoroughfares in our 
neighbourhood, they were saying these were not [officially recognised] roads and 
that we had to pay as well…So, we fought. If  you have no knowledge, you simply 
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get deceived.”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-10) 
 
The land transfer was an important issue for the owner-occupiers, as this would 
considerably reduce the overall redevelopment costs, which would then reduce the 
amount of  contribution each owner-occupier had to make in order to be re-housed. 
About twenty owner-occupiers were actively participating in the emergency council, and 
“staged demonstrations, attended by around 150 residents” (Interviewee KSS7-INW-04). 
In the end, their request was accepted: 
When we went to the municipal government office and the Korea Forest Service, 
the official in charge was telling me not to raise my voice. So I told him, ‘people 
keep quiet because they are not aware of  such regulations.’ In the end, we won. 
What happened was that, say, here is a house. If  an alley was a cul-de-sac, it wasn’t 
counted as a thoroughfare, but if  it wasn’t and you could keep on going, then it was 
recognised as a thoroughfare... It saved a lot of  project costs”  
  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-10) 
 
Upon the approval of  the project implementation plan, the total land size that became 
subject to the free transfer turned out to be 27,324 m2 (GDG 2001b). This was about 
16% of  the total project area. The project costs saved by this free transfer were known to 
be around KRW 50 billion. According to one of  the ex-members of  the emergency 
committee (Interviewee KSS7-INW-04), this could be as much as ten per cent of  the total 
project costs estimated by the KNHC. Upon resolving this issue, the emergency 
committee dissolved, and six of  its delegates joined the council for residents’ 
representatives, who were then able to check collectively the decisions of  those existing 
council delegates. 
Tenants and their collective actions 
When the KNHC finally decided its participation and signed an agreement at the end of  
February 2000, several local community-based organisations organised three occasions of  
public hearing to help tenants understand the redevelopment progress and what 
compensation measures existed for them. These took place in May, June and August 2000. 
The formal relocation of  owner-occupiers and eligible tenants who chose in-kind 
compensation took place in October 2000. Until then, there was no concrete movement 
among the tenants to organise themselves. The approval of  the project implementation 
plan in September 2001 (GDG 2001b) must have triggered a sense of  urgency among the 
remaining tenants, as they began to take organised actions in the following month. 
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Figure 9-3: Approval of the project implementation plan and its signposting in Nangok 
 
Notice board erected by the KNHC to notify property 
owners and the general public of the approval of the 
project implementation plan, and that any changes to the 
properties within the redevelopment neighbourhood 
needed to obtain the KNHC approval.
View of a placard at the entry point to the redevelopment 
neighbourhood, installed by the KNHC and the council of 
residents’ representatives (that is, property owners’
association)
© Hyun Shin, 2001 © Hyun Shin, 2001
 
Tenants’ ineligibility for redevelopment compensation 
While the owner-occupiers were discontent with their inability to afford redeveloped flats, 
the frustration of  tenants came largely from the fact that they had to leave the 
neighbourhood, which provided the cheapest means of  accommodation in Seoul and the 
fact that there was a lack of  provision for them to find alternative accommodation 
elsewhere. 
In particular, ineligible tenants were severely constrained as they were not subject to any 
compensation. These tenants were ineligible either because they failed to register their 
residence status with the local administrative office when they moved in, or because they 
had registered after 12 August 1997, the cut-off  date that determined tenants’ eligibility. 
Ineligible tenants came to the neighbourhood because the place offered the most 
affordable means of  accommodation in times of  their financial difficulties. In particular, 
the South Korean economy was badly hit by the Asian Financial Crisis at the end of  1997, 
leaving many companies bankrupt and pushing the official unemployment rate from 2.6% 
in 1996 to 7.0% in 1997 (Roh et al. 2004: 10). An ineligible tenant who had been living in 
Nangok for more than four years explained how she came to live there: 
“Our previous house was put up to auction when my husband’s business went 
bankrupt…All my family had to leave [the house] in a hurry in order to avoid 
creditors, and were living three months like rough-sleepers on streets. There was 
nowhere else to go, and eventually [a close acquaintance] found this place for us… 
[At first] I thought I would be living here only for one year…because I thought we 
would repay all the debts within a year, and spring back again…”  
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 (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01) 
 
Another ineligible tenant also pointed out in an interview that Nangok offered the most 
affordable means of  accommodation for his family when they first migrated to Seoul: 
“When I first came here to live, I initially borrowed some money, KRW 5,000,000 
from the bank to find a Chonsei house, and because it was beyond my means to 
repay the loan [after the bankruptcy of  his company and subsequent 
unemployment], all my savings accounts were closed. So, we moved our house 
within Nangok…to another Chonsei with cheaper deposit, KRW 1,500,000, so that 
we could spend the difference on living. The house was cheap because the landlord 
wanted to have anyone living there until redevelopment. The house would have 
collapsed due to negligence if  remained vacant…”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-03) 
 
As the largest supplier of  public rental flats in the country, the KNHC apparently made 
an advertisement in September 2001 before the commencement of  residents’ formal 
relocation, encouraging both eligible and ineligible tenants to apply for public rental flats. 
More than 70 ineligible households responded to this, but were not offered any flats in the 
end. This provoked the remaining tenants’ stronger frustration and distrust in the 
developer. 
Weak socio-economic status of  tenants 
As examined in Chapter 4, Nangok residents experienced a high incidence of  non-regular 
jobs and unemployment. This placed them in unfavourable situations when it came to 
formal sector borrowing, driving them towards greater dependence on personal means 
and informal borrowing. 
For instance, residents’ poor credit rating would deter them from gaining full advantage 
of  the National Housing Fund (hereafter NHF) Housing Loan Programme. The 
programme has been implemented to make it the most accessible housing finance 
programme for poor households. To be beneficiaries, applicants should first make an 
application to the local government, which then recommends eligible applicants to 
financial institutions (see Section 7.1 in Chapter 7 for more detailed discussions on the 
programme). Experiences showed that around 30~40% of  the eligible applicants failed to 
pass the screening of  the financial institutions (Kim et al. 2004: 123). Because applicants 
should have signed a Chonsei contract and pre-paid 10% of  the Chonsei deposit before 
making an application, poor residents are often discouraged from making a loan 
application in fear of  failed application. 
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In particular, the NHF housing loan was not applicable to those on the credit delinquency 
blacklist managed by the Korea Federation of  Banks. Since the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997, the number of  credit delinquents rapidly increased to 3.76 million by January 2004 
(Kim 2004). These credit defaulters experienced various forms of  restrictions with regard 
to their financial transactions. To maintain the sound collection of  loans paid out, the 
NHF housing loan programme excluded these credit defaulters. Many of  the ineligible 
tenants, who had moved to Nangok after the outbreak of  1997’s Asian Financial Crisis, 
faced double constraints upon displacement: they were ineligible to receive any legal 
compensation; and also ineligible to apply for the NHF housing loan programme to 
subsidise their rental housing costs. 
“Because I am on the credit delinquency blacklist, I haven’t dreamt of  any loans 
from financial institutions, though I’d wish I could… I am in the worst situation. I 
am not eligible [for relocation compensation], and I am also a credit defaulter. 
Because of  these conditions, I can't even apply for the [NHF] housing loan… The 
loan is for low-income households, but only for those who do not have a bad credit 
history...”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-01) 
 
“We wanted to move to a Chonsei, but the conditions didn’t allow us. In our case, 
we can’t even take out the housing loan, because my husband is on the blacklist as a 
credit defaulter. That’s why we borrowed the money…from our previous 
neighbour…”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-15) 
 
Establishment of  ‘Tenants’ Committee for Countermeasures for Housing’ 
The remaining tenants in Nangok organised a committee and held an inaugural assembly 
meeting on 13 October 2001, naming their organisation the ‘Tenants’ Committee for 
Housing Countermeasures’ (hereafter Tenants’ Committee). Its establishment was 
substantially aided by the local community-based organisations that had been operating 
for many years, but it was the residents themselves who took the final decision to step 
forward to start the committee activities. One of  the tenants, working as a deputy 
chairperson of  the committee, explained: 
“This committee was not established solely by the residents. There was no one who 
could do the job on one’s own initiative. I don’t have the strength either. I felt the 
needs, but I was tied up with things to earn my living. Meetings first began with the 
local community-based organisations, and the participating residents came forward 
to start this. Without their help, it [the committee] couldn’t have proceeded like this. 
Residents don’t know much. We don’t know how to fight and what to do, so we take 
advices…”  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-02) 
 
The establishment of  the Tenants’ Committee was triggered by the approval of  the 
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project implementation plan, as this provided legal justification to proceed with the 
demolition and land preparation works. The remaining tenants were arguing that there 
were still about 700 households who were residing in the neighbourhood, and that any 
demolition works without consultation with them would constitute safety threats. As soon 
as the Tenants’ Committee was organised, they launched their first demonstration in front 
of  the municipal government office on 12 November 2001. They demanded additional 
measures for those who were in financial difficulties and for the postponement of  any 
demolition attempts until appropriate relocation measures were taken for remaining 
tenants (Tenants’ News Vol.2 in November 2001). 
Figure 9-4: Tenants' Committee and the view of its general assembly in Nangok 
 
Front façade of the Tenants’ Committee office. The placard 
above its entrance reads, ‘Where are we to go now? 
Tenants are also human beings.’
Tenants’ Committee having a general assembly in December 
2001 to select its leadership
© Hyun Shin, 2001 © Hyun Shin, 2001
 
Split between the tenants and owner-occupiers 
As the remaining tenants delayed their house moving, the demolition schedule was also 
delayed, placing pressure upon property-owners. Since a longer project schedule would 
result in increased project costs, the tension between the property-owners and tenants also 
increased. 
“There was increasingly a divide between property-owners and tenants. From the 
viewpoint of  property-owners, tenants were detestable because the project costs 
kept on increasing [when the tenants postponed their house-moving]. From the 
tenants’ viewpoint, it was as if  we were kicking them out. So, once the demolition 
started, the atmosphere was like that of  a battle field. Property-owners couldn’t walk 
near tenants even though we were not doing anything…” 
  (Interviewee KSS7-INT-10) 
 
The free-of-charge public land transfer as noted earlier was interpreted by the remaining 
tenants as a kind of  ‘discrimination’ by the local authority in favour of  property-owners: 
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“They [that is, the property-owners] received the public lands free of  charge, and I 
hear the total amount [they could save] would be about KRW 50 billion …They 
received it free of  charge, because they were property-owners. On the contrary, 
tenants’ request for small loans was not accepted. This is a serious matter, because it 
simply means those who already possessed something get more, while those with no 
possession at all are being more squeezed out. I don’t know about law, and I don’t 
know why they [property-owners] received it, but it doesn’t seem nice. When I think 
of  us [tenants], I feel miserable” (Interviewee KSS7-INT-02) 
 
The property-owners were conscious about reducing the total project costs so that their 
financial contributions could be reduced as much as possible. Any demands from tenants 
such as additional cash compensation would lead to the increase in property-owners’ 
financial contributions. In this respect, the conflict between property-owners and tenants 
were bound to occur due to the way in which the JRP framework was designed and 
implemented. The head of  the Housing Redevelopment Bureau in the municipal 
government also recognised the problem, but spoke in favour of  maintaining the status 
quo of  the current compensation framework since any additional allowance for tenants 
needed to come from property-owners: 
It might be nice to allow more compensation [for tenants], but property-owners 
have to bear the increased costs. The municipal government doesn’t feel the need to 
do anything about it. There are criteria to stick to…  
  (Head of  the Housing Redevelopment Bureau, Seoul municipal government) 
 
Remaining tenants’ relocation preferences 
One of  the tasks the Tenants’ Committee embarked on was to carry out a survey on 
remaining tenants in order to find out their relocation preferences, and use the results as 
the basis for their demands (Tenants’ News Vol.2 in November 2001). It was estimated 
that there were around 466 tenant households and 65 owner occupying households who 
were found to be residing in the neighbourhood by the end of  November 2001. The 
Tenant’s Committee collected responses from about half  of  the remaining tenants. 
Table 9-2: Remaining Nangok residents’ tenure status 
Unit: households
Owner occupiers Total
Sub-total Unsurveyed
Eligible for
compensation
Ineligible for
compensation
Eligibility
unspecified
466 113 80 21 252 65 531
Source: Survey by the Tenants' Committee in Nangok neighbourhood, November 2001
Surveyed
Tenants
 
 
 286
Table 9-3: Remaining Nangok tenants’ relocation preferences 
Unit: households
Chonsei tenure
in private
residence
Public rental
flats
Welfare
facilities
Temporary
accommodation
during the
project period
Land allocation
elsewhere for
self-help
construction
No response or
about to move
out
Total
93 60 2 7 6 46 214
43.5% 28.0% 0.9% 3.3% 2.8% 21.5% 100.0%
Source: Survey by the Tenants' Committee in Nangok neighbourhood, November 2001  
As shown in Table 9-3, remaining tenants showed a strong preference for Chonsei tenure 
in private residence, while the second preference was an access to public rental flats. 
Although the relocation of  eligible tenants to the KNHC-provided rental flats began in 
October 2000, many eligible tenants still remained in the neighbourhood, unsure about 
which compensation option to take. The Tenants’ Committee also found out from the 
household registration records that 11.2% (52 households) of  the remaining tenants were 
the beneficiaries of  the national means-tested social assistance programme. 
Organised actions and tenants’ demands 
Since the Tenants’ Committee was established, it organised many visits to the offices of  
the developer, municipal and district housing bureaux. Between October 2001 and March 
2002, three demonstrations were 
staged by the Tenants’ Committee, 
and two of  them were in protest at 
the KNHC sub-contractor’s attempts 
to send in demolition squads and 
equipment. Just after the Tenants’ 
Committee organised a second 
demonstration in December 2001, the 
mayor of  the Gwanak district 
government agreed to visit and hold a 
meeting with the remaining tenants. All the concerned parties were present including the 
KNHC and the property-owners’ delegates. It was in this meeting that the mayor agreed 
to establish a round-table for multi-party talks to discuss remaining tenants’ relocation. 
The representatives from the developer, district housing bureau, the property-owners’ 
council and the Tenants’ Committee joined the roundtable meetings. The demands of  the 
Tenants’ Committee as presented to the mayor of  the district government were as 
summarised in Box 9-1 below. 
Figure 9-5: Nangok tenants walking in protest towards 
the City Hall 
(Source: OhmyNews 15 November 2001)
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Box 9-1: Demands of the Tenants' Committee in Nangok 
 
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
Provision of appropriate measures including the provision of permanent rental flats for those elderly 
single-person households who have no dependents to rely on;
No attempts to be made for forced eviction and demolition.
Access to the public rental flats for the ineligible tenants;
Housing loan to be paid back in instalment over 10 years after 5 years of grace period in order to help 
residents move to Chonsei tenure in private dwellings;
Temporary accommodation built near the neighbourhood for those who couldn’t afford to move at all so 
that they could accumulate enough savings in time to find an alternative accommodation in either 
private or public rental dwellings;
Provision of permanent rental flats for the beneficiaries of the means-tested National Basic Livelihood 
System (hereafter NBLS) programme;
 
Final resolutions 
Despite the comprehensive demands by the Tenants’ Committee, the resolution agreed in 
the multi-party roundtable by March 2002 was rather modest. The KNHC agreed to 
provide additional 59 public rental flats regardless of  tenants’ eligibility for redevelopment 
compensation. The district government also agreed to do their best to consider the fast-
track offer of  permanent (yeong-gu) rental flats in favour of  tenant households who were 
subject to the means-tested social assistance programme. With regard to the long-term 
housing loans, the Tenants’ Committee failed to achieve this, but they were able to 
persuade the district government to shorten the process of  assessing applicants’ eligibility 
for the loan applications. In return, the Tenants’ Committee agreed with the KNHC for 
the company to proceed with the demolition of  vacant dwellings in areas where few 
dwellings remained occupied. 
Figure 9-6: View of demolition works in Nangok 
 
Demolition work in action in Nangok neighbourhood View of a section of Nangok neighbourhood after demolition 
works. The house on the left was not demolished as the 
tenants did not evacuate yet.
© Hyun Shin, 2002 © Hyun Shin, 2002
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It still took more than half  a year to reach the final resolution for the last remaining 
tenants. In November 2002, the Tenants’ Committee, the KNHC and the property-
owners agreed to provide additional cash payment for the households who were 
remaining. As for the eligible households, they received cash compensation 20% more 
than they were legally entitled to. Ineligible tenants also received cash compensation, 
equivalent to 90% of  what an eligible household would have received by law. Once this 
arrangement was carried out, the Tenants’ Committee was dissolved at the end of  
November 2002. Table 9-4 lists the events that took place from the inaugural meeting of  
the Tenants’ Committee to the displacement of  last remaining tenants in the 
neighbourhood. 
Summary 
This section has shown that the JRP implementation on the principle of  property-owners’ 
voluntary association has not been able to ensure owner-occupiers’ active participation 
throughout the redevelopment processes. This was due to the domination of  absentee 
landlords who largely consisted of  off-site speculators. Misleading information also 
confused the remaining owner-occupiers’ decision-making. The participation of  the public 
agency as the professional developer made it more difficult for owner-occupiers to 
participate as they lost their status as legal implementers. Collective responses largely came 
from the tenants who organised themselves to start negotiation with the developer and 
the local authority. This action was concerned more with demands for appropriate 
relocation measures for remaining tenants on compassionate grounds rather than with 
preserving their neighbourhood. 
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Table 9-4: Chronology of Nangok tenants’ collective actions 
 
Date Meetings Demonstration held Remarks
29 Oct. 2001 Inaugural meeting to establish the Tenants'
Committee for Housing Countermeasures
02 Nov. 2001 Leaders of the committee, delivering their demands
to the district government, the KNHC and the
property owners' representatives' council
05 Nov. 2001 Tenants' demands also sent to the municipal
government
12 Nov. 2001 Demonstration at the Seoul City
Hall (attendees: 150 residents)
15 Nov. 2001 Meeting with the Head of Municipal Housing Bureau
27 Nov. 2001 Demolition sub-contractor's first
attempt to send in equipment
resisted by residents
28 Nov. 2001 Meeting with officials (municipal and district housing
bureaux) and the KNHC
07 Dec. 2001 Demonstration at the KNHC
Sillim Office to protest previous
demolition attempt
11 Dec. 2001 Visit to the Seoul Head Office of the KNHC
12 Dec. 2001 Visit to the Housing Bureau at Gwanak District
Government
13 Dec. 2001 Demolition sub-contractor's
second attempt at 7 am to send
in equipment failed again. An
apology was made by the KNHC.
22 Dec. 2001 Tenants meet with the mayor of the district
government. An agreement was made to establish a
multi-party committee in which the district
government, the KNHC, property owners and tenants
all participated
21 Feb. 2002 Demolition sub-contractor's third
attempt at dawn to send in crew
and equipment into the
neighbourhood
25 Feb. 2002 Demonstraton at the District
Government Office in protest of
the third demolition attempt by
the KNHC's sub-contractor
Mar. 2002 Initial resolution made in the multi-party talk
Apr. 2002 59 tenant households (both eligible and ineligible)
granted access to KNHC-provided public rental flats
Nov. 2002 Cash payment arranged for the final remaining
tenants
30 Nov. 2002 Dissolution of the Tenants' Committee
Mar. 2003 Last remaining 14 households moved out
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9.2 Beijing: lack of opportunities for residents’ participation 
In this section on Beijing, I will start by addressing the absence of  the legal basis for local 
community participation within the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment 
Programme (ODHRP). It shows that residents are only able to intervene at the stage of  
their displacement. I will then discuss further barriers to their participation, and then 
identify residents’ discontent and its sources by referring to the case study of  the second 
phase redevelopment of  Xinzhongjie neighbourhood. The final two subsections examine 
the limited actions by individual residents facing redevelopment and displacement, and try 
to identify if  there are any signs of  collective responses. 
No provision for residents’ participation until displacement 
In the case of  Beijing’s ODHRP, it is the responsibility of  the Old and Dilapidated 
Housing Redevelopment Office in each district government to conduct feasibility studies 
and designate a neighbourhood as an ODHRP district (see Figure 2-6 in Chapter 2 for the 
ODHRP implementation process). In practice, however, neighbourhoods are first chosen 
by developers. Government offices conduct feasibility studies afterwards to make sure the 
proportion of  dilapidated dwellings in the neighbourhoods chosen by developers exceeds 
the municipal criteria for ODHRP implementation. Studies found that permissions were 
often granted even if  the proportion of  dilapidated dwellings did not meet the 
requirement (Fang 1999: 61-62; Planning and Construction Committee of  Dongcheng 
District Government 1998: 17). 
When professional developers acquires permission to proceed with an ODHRP project, 
they draw a plan for demolition and relocation of  local residents, and submit it to the 
district government (Article 10 in BMG 1998a). Upon the approval of  the application, the 
district government is required to make a public announcement that includes the names 
of  the developers, the demolition area, the demolition schedule and the compensation 
details (Article 14 in BMG 1998a). This is also the moment that the local authority and 
developers together proceed with publicity works to inform the residents. The local 
authority also orders relevant departments to freeze any changes in household registration, 
tenure and dwelling structure within the ODHRP neighbourhood. 
Unlike the implementation process of  Seoul’s JRP that largely depends on property-
owners’ voluntary association, the ODHRP does not allow individual homeowners or 
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tenants’ intervention. There appears to be no legal obligation for the government offices 
to obtain residents’ consent before a redevelopment project takes place. This is on the 
extension of  the lack of  participation by the general public in urban planning processes in 
mainland China, which has been noted as one of  the main deficits of  a centralised 
planning system (Yeh and Wu 1999). The situation place Beijing residents in a much 
weaker position when it comes to negotiation with developers or local authorities upon 
their displacement. 
Barriers to participation 
Complaints procedure in favour of  developers 
The implementation of  an ODHRP project includes procedures for residents to make 
complaints when they disagree with the compensation presented to them, but these 
procedures are largely in favour of  developers. 
The national regulation on the management of  demolition and relocation processes first 
appeared in March 1991 (State Council of  China 1991). Its major revision was made in 
2001 (C. Wang 2001). In Beijing, there were two major announcements of  related 
regulations: once in 1998 to adopt cash-based compensation, and again in 2001 to reflect 
the 2001 revision (BMG 1998a, 2001c). The demolition procedure including the 
negotiation with residents over compensation, however, remained largely unchanged 
throughout the years. 
When a demolition notice is officially announced by the district government, residents 
enter into negotiation with developers to come to an agreement on compensation (Article 
16 in BMG 1998a). As soon as an agreement is reached, demolition squads visit residents’ 
dwellings and make holes in the wall and on the roof  to brand them as being subject to 
demolition. 
“[The demolition schedule is] all written on the notice. [It says] when you need to 
move, that the house is to be demolished completely. You speak with the demolition 
company [regarding compensation]. After the talk, they come with two people, 
holding an axe and a spade, and make holes on your house…” 
  (Interviewee CBK-INT-01) 
 
If  no agreement is reached, both parties refer the matter to arbitration by the district 
government which initially granted permission to the developers to proceed with the 
ODHRP (Article 18 in BMG 1998a). Figure 9-7 below shows the process of  negotiation 
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and arbitration. If  the residents do not accept the arbitration decision by the local 
government, they are entitled to take the matter to the people’s court (Article 20 in BMG 
1998a). 
Figure 9-7: Beijing's ODHRP and the process of negotiation over compensation 
(BMG 1998a, 2001c) 
 
Negotiation between developers and 
residents begins over compensation
Authentication by a public notary
Demolition
Construction
Developer makes application for 
demolition and relocation
Government actions in place to 
freeze changes in household 
registration, tenure and dwelling 
structure
Vacation of dwellings by residents
District government examines and 
approves the application
District government makes a 
public announcement of the 
demolition
(If agreed)Residents’ appeal to the local authority 
that approved the demolition
(If not agreed)
Residents’ appeal to the people’s court
(If agreed)
Local authority’s arbitration decision
(If not agreed)
Final court decision
Developers hold the right to 
proceed with demolition before final 
court decision is made
(If relocation dwellings 
are ready)
 
The fact that the local government, which granted permission to developers to implement 
ODHRP projects, also makes arbitration decisions implies that it would be less likely for 
the government to come to a decision that would delay approved projects. If  residents 
refrain from vacating their dwellings without legitimate reasons, local authorities also hold 
the right to instruct relevant bureaux to proceed with forced eviction of  occupying 
residents, or obtain court orders to do so (Article 21 in BMG 1998a). Developers and 
demolition companies possess the right to proceed with demolition if  they can prove that 
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they have fulfilled their legal responsibilities of  providing residents with cash 
compensation or relocation dwellings. In such a case, the residents’ further appeal to the 
people’s court would not make any difference in terms of  preventing developers from 
demolishing their homes. Moreover, it has been reported that residents rarely win against 
developers in court proceedings (Fang 1999). 
Hasty displacement 
Residents in ODHRP neighbourhoods also have difficulties in appealing against 
demolition and relocation compensation due to tight schedules of  demolition and eviction. 
The interviewees displaced due to the first phase Xinzhongjie redevelopment testified that 
they were given only twenty days to evacuate. The formal notice for neighbourhood 
demolition was publicly announced on 19 December 1999, and the deadline for dwelling 
vacation was 8 January 2000 (Interviewees CBK-INT-01 to -03). 
“[We were] given twenty days [to move out]…The notice was pasted on the wall on 
19 December in the evening, and the deadline [to move out] was 8 January”  
  (Interviewee CBK-INT-01) 
 
Within this period, they had to reach an agreement on their compensation, and also find a 
dwelling to move to. For interviewee CBH-INT-01 from Haiyuncang neighbourhood, 
there were only two weeks from the date of  formal demolition notice to the date of  
house evacuation. Interviewees CBY-INT-01 to -03 were also given only twenty days to 
reach an agreement and move out of  their homes. 
“The demolition squad [commissioned by developers] is a temporary unit. They just 
work here for a few days, and then simply go away. They don’t tell you when they 
are going to do the demolition, very secretive. For example, if  they are to start the 
demolition in October, they tell you how much you will be given and explain the 
compensation method in September. Afterwards, you are to move out within a 
month”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-07) 
 
The interviewees who were already displaced and re-housed at the time of  interviewing 
had lived over 30 years on average in their old neighbourhoods before displacement. Even 
if  their displacement did not involve any kind of  violence, the tight schedule of  
displacement and demolition with no definite prospect of  re-housing would place 
residents under a lot of  stress and pressure. An interviewee who was displaced moved to 
an outer suburban neighbourhood described her experience of  displacement: 
“People received the [redevelopment compensation] offer, pulled in cars for viewing. 
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Just took that offer, how much per square metre. At that time, our displacement was 
really bustling…Everyday, got in a car, went to see houses. In the end, we came to 
see this place. At that time, our house-moving was really in a hurry. From 16 April 
to 6 May. Twenty days to find a house and move out. My goodness…” 
  (Interviewee CBY-INT-01) 
 
Paying incentives to encourage timely displacement 
In order to encourage residents’ house-moving, the period of  residents’ absence from 
work due to moving is to be treated as ‘paid leave’ (Article 23 in BMG 1998a). Residents 
were also given an incentive if  they moved out before the house-moving deadline set by 
the developers (Article 45 in BMG 1998a). 
“They [developers and demolition squads] usually give you one month. If  you move 
out within one month, you would receive ten thousand or twenty thousand yuan, 
because you don’t hinder their demolition progress…”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-07) 
 
Incentive payment was also given when residents moved to outer suburban districts: for 
instance, if  a household’s original place of  residence was between the second and third 
ring roads, they were entitled to receive 20,000 yuan as an incentive payment for moving 
out to outer suburban districts (BMG 1994b). In the case of  three interviewees displaced 
from Dongcheng district to an outer suburban Shunyi district, each interviewee’s total 
incentive payment for having moved within the house-moving deadline was 25,000 yuan. 
This was about 9%~12% of  their total cash compensation. A more detailed breakdown 
can be seen in Table 9-5 below, based on a sample copy of  a compensation contract 
supplied by another interviewee, CBD6-INT-01. In this case, the total incentives also 
reached 25,000 yuan, about 8.4% of  the interviewee’s total compensation. 
Table 9-5: Details of a Beijing interviewee’s redevelopment compensation 
(unit: RMB)
Dwelling Land use right House-moving
expense
Others House-moving
before deadline
Key project
cooperation
24,255 245,585 593.20 735 5,000 20,000 296,168.20
Source: A copy of a compensation contract from the interviewee, CBD6-INT-01
Compensation for Subsidies Incentives for
Total
 
Residents’ discontent and its sources 
It was noted above that the interviewees who were already subject to displacement were 
under stress and pressure due to the tight displacement schedule imposed upon them by 
developers and demolition companies. With regard to the redevelopment itself, the 
 295
residents were largely in favour of  it, pointing out the fact that their pre-redevelopment 
dwellings were dilapidated, and that the redevelopment provided them with an 
opportunity to change their housing conditions. 
“[When we first saw the demolition notice] we were delighted, [because] it was to 
build [new] flats. Those cramped, worn-out pingfang should be demolished…At 
that time (when living in pingfang), we used to go and see our two daughters’ flats, 
which looked better at a glance. We just wondered when we were to live in such flats. 
In my opinion, I think demolition and redevelopment is a good thing. If  not, one 
would always live in a cramped, dilapidated pingfang…” (Interviewee CBH-INT-02) 
 
Their favourable comment on Beijing’s ODHRP might have also owed to their tenure 
conversion to owner occupation, which was largely made possible by the receipt of  
redevelopment cash compensation. In contrast, the interviewees from Xinzhongjie who 
were subject to its second phase redevelopment expressed frustration and discontent 
towards redevelopment. 
Full monetarisation of  redevelopment compensation and residents’ reduced gains 
The in-kind allocation of  relocation dwellings in the 1990s inevitably incurred a large 
amount of  relocation costs upon developers (Leaf  1995). The BJ-1998 Compensation 
Measure allowed them to implement cash-based compensation instead of  more time-
consuming and costly relocation. In May 2001, the municipal government made a further 
revision to its compensation criteria (hereafter BJ-2001 Compensation Measure), which 
stipulated that the estimation of  redevelopment compensation should be based solely on 
two factors: (1) the construction space of  one’s formal dwelling, and (2) the market-
appraisal value of  the occupied land (BMG 2001b, 2001c). 
“The purpose of  this [that is, BJ-2001 Compensation Measure] is to follow the 
principle of  market appraisal value. In other words, the housing space of  an original 
house and the market appraisal value determine how much one gets. Basically, there 
is an evaluation company that completes the appraisal and submits a report to the 
Displacement and Relocation Department of  the Housing Management Bureau. 
One copy is also given to the displacee…” 
  (Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department, 
  Dongcheng district government) 
 
The BJ-2001 Compensation Measure would lighten the burden of  developers by reducing 
the total costs on residents’ displacement and relocation. Table 9-6 shows the amount of  
cash compensation expected under the BJ-2001 Compensation Measure. It suggests that 
the application of  the BJ-2001 Compensation Measure would result in as much as 36% 
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reduction of  the total compensation in comparison with the BJ-1998 Compensation 
Measure. 
Table 9-6: Comparison of the amount of cash compensation as per BJ-2001 Compensation Measure 
(BMG 2001b, 2001c) 
20 m2 30 m2 40 m2
BJ-2001 Cash compensation = ① x (② + ③ x K) + ④ 181,955 272,933 363,910
① : Dwelling construction space
② : Base dwelling price in yuan per m2
③ : Base land price in yuan per m2
④ : Building replacement value
K : Plot ratio adjustment co-efficient
36% 21% 11%
Compensation(1)
= (5,600 x 1.3 + 1,000) x ① +
   (24,255/29.66 x ①)
Note: 
(1) The values for ②, ③, ④ and K were taken from the compensation contract provided by the interviewee, CBD6-INT-01, who was
displaced at the end of 2002. In the case of building replacement value (④), I assumed for the sake of simplicity that the building
replacement value was in linear proportion to the dwelling space. The building replacement value of the 29.66 m2 dwelling occupied by the
interviewee CBD6-INT-01 before displacement was 24,255 yuan.
Policy
Doc.
Calculation method Non self-contained dwelling for a 3-person household with
a construction space of
Rate of reduction (BJ-1998 vs. BJ-2001)
 
The table above also shows clearly that the rate of  reduction would be greater for those in 
smaller dwellings. For instance, a household residing in a dwelling with a construction 
space of  20 m2, would experience 36% reduction in their total compensation, while a 
household in a 40 m2 dwelling would experience 11% reduction only. 
Future displacees’ frustration regarding compensation 
The interviewees from Xinzhongjie’s second phase redevelopment area were largely 
frustrated over the compensation policies. One source of  this frustration was its frequent 
changes in recent years. The residents facing displacement in Xinzhongjie remained 
uncertain as to which policies were to be applied in the future and how much they would 
eventually receive upon displacement. 
“[In the old days] if  a house gets demolished, we would move to a new flat, but the 
method of  demolition and compensation is changing step by step, and now there is 
a new demolition and compensation method. Let’s wait. We don’t know which 
method is going to be used in the end.”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-04) 
 
“At present, policies are changing day after day…At the moment, the state policies 
regarding this [compensation] are changing. I am not saying the state is bad. The 
Communist party is still good. Otherwise, we wouldn’t have joined the party. The 
state leaders are still good, but when it comes down to the bottom, it’s not always 
like that…”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-07) 
 
While the changing policies presented uncertainties among the future displacees, they 
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were fully aware of  the lack of  opportunities to be re-housed in their neighbourhood if  its 
redevelopment was to go ahead. The Xinzhongjie residents, subject to the second phase 
redevelopment, closely witnessed the fate of  their old neighbours who were displaced at 
the end of  1999 as part of  the neighbourhood’s first phase redevelopment. Very few 
residents were able to come back due to the high prices of  redeveloped flats. Although 
the interviewees preferred to stay in their old neighbourhood, all of  them were pessimistic 
about re-housing, knowing that it would not be possible under current policies. For 
instance: 
“I don't think of  that [re-housing after redevelopment]. It’s not possible to come 
back, really impossible. Why? Good heavens! Do you know how many were able to 
come back in that place [Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment area] after 
displacement? Particularly families like us who live on minimum living allowances 
are really impossible to be re-housed…”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-02) 
 
The other major source of  frustration was the significantly reduced redevelopment 
compensation that was implemented with the announcement of  the BJ-2001 
Compensation Measure. The residents subject to the second phase redevelopment in 
Xinzhongjie expected to have much less chance of  following in the footsteps of  their 
previous neighbours who had become homeowners upon displacement. Despite their 
approval of  the redevelopment itself, the current compensation policy was subject to 
heavy criticism: 
“What I mean is this. Housing redevelopment itself  is not wrong…Everyone wants 
it to be carried out according to the previous policy. If  the previous policy is applied, 
then everyone will go obediently. If  there’s a big difference [in the amount of  
compensation], then people cannot leave…We ordinary people should have been 
provided with a house. This is the most important key point. Premier Zhu Rongqi 
also called for the improvement of  residents’ living conditions. Has it been 
improved in Beijing? According to our current policies, it's not possible to improve, 
is it? This demolition and relocation method has a problem…Support the 
government? We, ordinary people all feel we need to be genuinely convinced…” 
 (Interviewee CBX-INT-03) 
 
This was a problematic issue, and was recognised as such by the Xinzhongjie 
neighbourhood committee leader, who was herself  to be displaced when the 
neighbourhood’s second phase redevelopment was to take place. 
“They are essentially incapable of  buying a house. From what used to be more than 
200,000 yuan [as compensation], you can only obtain 100,000 odd yuan [under the 
new compensation policy]. With such a big difference, people are definitely going to 
experience difficulties…In the case of  a three-person family living in an eleven 
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square metre dwelling [in terms of  use space; this would equal to about 14.6 m2 of  
construction space], given the average land appraisal value of  8,300 yuan in 
Dongcheng district, the relocation compensation will not exceed 130,000 yuan at 
all…” (Xinzhongjie neighbourhood committee leader) 
 
In order to see if  the residents’ frustration regarding reduced compensation could be 
justified, each interviewee’s cash compensation was calculated on the basis of  the BJ-1998 
and BJ-2001 Compensation Measures, shown in Table 9-7 below (for the method of  
calculation, see Table 7-9 in Chapter 7 for the BJ-1998 Compensation Measures, and 
previous Table 9-6 for the BJ-2001 Compensation Measures). 
Table 9-7: Impact of changing compensation policies upon 
Xinzhongjie residents subject to displacement 
(BMG 1998a, 1998b, 2001b, 2001c) 
BJ-2001
① Possibility of householdsplit to get more ② 1 - ①/②
CBX-INT-01 2 0.0 0.0 n.a. No n.a. n.a.
CBX-INT-02 8 35.6 4.5 382000 + α Yes 324000 15.2%
CBX-INT-03 5 20.7 4.1 288000 + α Yes 188000 34.7%
CBX-INT-04 2 48.3 24.2 462000 No 439000 5.0%
CBX-INT-05 3 15.2 5.1 253000 No 138000 45.5%
CBX-INT-06 5 27.6 5.5 331000 + α Yes 251000 24.2%
CBX-INT-07 5 54.6 10.9 501000 + α Yes 497000 0.8%
CBX-INT-08 3 21.7 7.2 294000 No 197000 33.0%
CBX-INT-09 3 17.4 5.8 267000 No 158000 40.8%
Note:
(1) This is based on the dwelling space as acknowledged by each household's official rental contract, and doesn't include informal or self-built space
(2) '+ α' indicates that these households might be able to claim more compensation by splitting their household. Those households with three or
more generations co-habiting one dwelling are included in this category.
Rate of
reduction
BJ-1998(2)
Estimation of cash compensation on the basis ofInterviewee
ID.
Number of co-
habiting
household
members
Construction
Space(1)
Per capita
dwelling
space
 
The table justifies residents’ frustration. Some residents such as the interviewee CBX-
INT-05 would experience as much as 46% reduction in their total cash compensation if  
the BJ-2001 Compensation Measures were applied. As was shown earlier in Table 9-6, the 
interviewees with larger dwelling spaces experienced less reduction. For instance, the 
interviewee CBX-INT-07 would hardly experience any reduction, and this owed largely to 
the interviewee’s large dwelling space. 
Weak socio-economic status of  residents 
When the revised approach to Haiyuncang neighbourhood was applied to redevelop the 
area, the residents’ access to housing mortgages was crucial for their re-housing. In order 
to do this, at least a member of  a household must have been an account holder of  the 
Housing Provident Fund (hereafter HPF). On this basis, it could be argued that the 
reduced compensation could be supplemented by relying on housing mortgage loans if  
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future displacees were to buy a flat in their preferred location. In reality, housing mortgage 
was not considered as an option by most interviewees due to their inability to make 
repayment and, most of  all, due to the absence of  account holders in their families. 
As summarised in Table 9-8 below, many interviewee households in Xinzhongjie who 
were subject to the second phase redevelopment: did not have regular employees among 
their co-habiting household members; were dependent on the means-tested Minimum 
Livelihood Security System (hereafter MLSS) benefits; and did not have HPF account 
holders within the household either. 
Table 9-8: Xinzhongjie household circumstances regarding their opportunities to access formal loans 
 
Interviewee
Household
ID.
Regular employee(s)
among co-habiting
household members?
Minimum Livelihood
Security System
beneficiaries?
Housing Provident Fund
account holder(s)
within co-habiting
household members?
Expectation for formal
housing loan
CBX-INT-001 No Beneficiaries None No expectation
CBX-INT-002 Yes Beneficiaries None No expectation
CBX-INT-003 Yes Non-beneficiaries Yes No expectation
CBX-INT-004 No Beneficiaries None n.a.
CBX-INT-005 No Beneficiaries None No expectation
CBX-INT-006 Yes Beneficiaries Yes No expectation
CBX-INT-007 Yes Non-beneficiaries Yes No expectation
CBX-INT-008 No Beneficiaries None No expectation
CBX-INT-009 No Non-beneficiaries None No expectation
Yes 4 6 3 0
No 5 3 6 8
n.a. 0 0 0 1
Source: Household interviews by the author in Beijing in 2003  
The interviewees’ hesitance and negative views towards bank loans and mortgage could 
have resulted from the fact that only few of the interviewed household members were 
classified as regular employees. As shown in Table 9-9 below, most household members 
were either in temporary and informal employment or out of work. It would be unlikely 
for them to have an employer-based HPF account. With no creditable income-generating 
activities and no HPF account, they would have difficulties in accessing formal loans or 
housing mortgage opportunities that favoured those with proven credit records. 
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Table 9-9: Employment status of all interviewee household members in Beijing 
 
Not 
known
Daily 
worker
Unpaid 
family 
worker
Disabled Schooling
Subject to 
displacement
7 1 5 2 3 6 6 2 4 5 0 36
Displaced or re-
housed
3 1 1 0 1 1 10 1 2 1 6 26
Temporary 
residence
after displacement
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Sub-total 10 3 7 3 4 8 16 3 6 6 6 65
15.4% 4.6% 10.8% 12.3% 24.6% 4.6% 9.2% 9.2% 9.2% 100.0%
Source: Household interviews by the author in Beijing in 2003
Sub-
total
   Informal 
employment
Not 
working 
age
Working age but
no employment
Regular 
employee
Temporary 
employee
Laid-off
or 
unemployed
Retired and 
beyond
working age
 
These conditions would limit access HPF housing loans for these Xinzhongjie interviewee 
households. The reduced cash compensation under the revised regulation in 2001 was 
going to make it more difficult for these residents to envisage any tenure conversion even 
if  they moved to suburban districts. All these conditions were experienced by the 
Xinzhongjie future displacees while their actual household income level was not much 
different from that of  previously displaced households (see Figure 9-8 below). For these 
reasons, Therefore, there were unanimously negative responses from these interviewees 
when they were asked about whether they had any expectation of  getting formal housing 
loans to become owner-occupiers. 
Figure 9-8: Beijing interviewee households’ per capita monthly disposable income 
(BMBS 2003a) 
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Future displacees’ compensation preferences 
Under the circumstance of  reduced compensation under the BJ-2001 Compensation 
Measures, the interviewees had a straightforward request regarding their future 
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displacement: a relocation dwelling in an area not too far from their original place of  
residence. If  not, they all expressed explicitly that the cash compensation should be 
enough to finance their homeownership. For instance: 
“Give us a house, and if  you ask us to move, then give us enough money to buy a 
house. Without a house, do you think it’s okay? If  you give us money only enough 
to buy a house outside the fifth ring road, then what if  something happens to this 
88 year old man? He will be dead while waiting for an ambulance to arrive…” 
  (Interviewee CBX-INT-09) 
 
The Haiyuncang model of  providing affordable housing to increase the re-housing rate 
seemed to have appealed to some residents who wished to stay in the neighbourhood 
without moving to other districts. For example, the interviewee CBX-INT-05 expressed 
she was in favour of  the Haiyuncang model despite her inability to apply for bank loans, 
stating that she might be able to rely on her relatives to borrow some money: 
“I hope for the renewal [as was done in Haiyuncang]. But, this area is not subject to 
such approach. If  this approach takes place, one only needs to contribute 100,000 
odd yuan. Then, other people would help me. My relatives would give me some 
money, and I can borrow some from others, and if  I try hard, I would repay some 
gradually. In this way, I still have some hope of  staying here…If  they can't do in this 
way, then just find a place nearby and give it to us. I am not asking for a new house. 
Just something big enough, something comparable to the floor space of  this 
house…” (Interviewee CBX-INT-05) 
 
Limited individual actions 
Information constraints and individual efforts to make enquiries 
It was noted earlier that residents subject to the Xinzhongjie second phase redevelopment 
were uncertain about which policies were to be applied and how much they would 
eventually be given upon their future displacement. In addition, the residents were left in 
the dark with regard to the actual commencement date of  the redevelopment. From the 
recollection of  some of  the interviewees, it appeared that the household survey by the 
local authority and developers had already begun early 2003. The survey was to investigate 
tenure, dwelling conditions and household size so that the developers would have all the 
information necessary for estimating the total compensation. Even at this stage, residents 
were not provided with any piece of  information that would have helped them prepare in 
advance. 
“[The demolition company] already came here. They came in March [2003]. It was 
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the company that is going to demolish this house, and the same one that 
demolished that chunk of  street [that is, the neighbourhood’s first phase 
redevelopment area]. I don't know what they are called. They recorded the number 
of  houses, and the number of  people. All these were recorded. Having completed 
this, they would come back only to carry out demolition… [Rather than informing 
the details or matters concerning the demolition] they just came into the house and 
took the survey.”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-07) 
 
Under such circumstances, did the residents try to make individual efforts to collect as 
much information as possible in preparation of  their neighbourhood’s redevelopment? 
Table 9-10 below suggests that the interviewees actively sought information from their 
talks with neighbours, and that most interviewees asked their neighbourhood committee 
leaders to find out more information. 
Table 9-10: Efforts by Xinzhongjie interviewees to find out redevelopment-related information 
 
Have you asked the local
authority?
Have you asked the
neighbourhood committee
leader?
Have you discussed with your
neigbhours?
CBX-INT-001 No n.a. Yes
CBX-INT-002 No Yes Yes
CBX-INT-003 Yes Yes Yes
CBX-INT-004 No No No
CBX-INT-005 n.a. Yes n.a.
CBX-INT-006 No Yes Yes
CBX-INT-007 Yes Yes Yes
CBX-INT-008 n.a. Yes Yes
CBX-INT-009 No Yes Yes
Yes 2 7 7
No 5 1 1
n.a. 2 1 1
Source: Household interviews by the author in Beijing in 2003  
The neighbourhood committee leaders were the first point of  contact for the residents, as 
these leaders were supposed to mediate the relationship between the local residents and 
the local authority. The neighbourhood committee leaders often took a visible role when it 
came to neighbourhood redevelopment, as they usually accompanied developers when the 
household survey was carried out. This was because they were in principle best acquainted 
with the lives of  local residents. However, as the lowest in the administrative hierarchy, the 
neighbourhood committee leaders in Xinzhongjie also lacked detailed information. Their 
limits were also acknowledged by the interviewees: 
“Regarding the current policy of  demolition and relocation, I always ask her [the 
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neighbourhood committee leader], but she doesn’t know either. She is also worried, 
as she also lives here, and is also confronted with demolition” 
 (Interviewee CBX-INT-03) 
 
“The neighbourhood committee says the [Dongzhimen] Street Office doesn’t say a 
word [about redevelopment]. Just this neighbourhood committee leader, she says the 
Street Office doesn’t tell the neighbourhood committee” 
  (Interviewee CBX-INT-09) 
 
Table 9-10 above also shows that the interviewees were reluctant to ask the local authority. 
Only one interviewee out of  nine mentioned that she had gone to the municipal housing 
bureau to find out more information about the new compensation policy. Other 
interviewees did not consider making a direct enquiry to the local authority, in particular, 
the Street Office that was responsible for the administration of  the Xinzhongjie 
redevelopment. The interviewees’ responses (shown below) suggested that this was 
because of  their distrust in the local authority. The heavy criticisms were explicitly 
pronounced during the interviews when this researcher was not accompanied by the 
neighbourhood committee leader. 
“I haven't asked them [that is, the housing bureau]. Even if  I go and ask them, they 
wouldn’t have any documents. Also, you don’t have the right to ask them. They 
wouldn’t talk to you”  (Interviewee CBX-INT-06) 
 
“Ask who? The demolition squad doesn’t explain that to you. The Street Office just 
says it’s going to be the end of  the year. The Street Office doesn’t tell the true story 
to us ordinary people…The Street Office should have told us about whether or not 
the demolition would take place. Take a note of  this clearly. At the moment, 
everyone has a lot of  complaints on this matter… Previously, the Street Office was 
the poorest work unit. Now, it’s become the richest” (Interviewee CBX-INT-07) 
 
“This Street Office, what a despicable being it is. If  you don’t believe this, then do a 
survey, and everyone will swear at the Street Office. I’ll tell you about them. They 
think of  taking advantage of  residents…Talking about the Street Office, [they are] 
just wicked…It always thinks of  making money…those dregs of  society, caring for 
the people? Who would believe that? (Interviewee CBX-INT-09) 
 
Individual negotiation with developers and refusal to move if  not satisfied 
Residents’ direct engagement with developers only takes place after the official demolition 
notice is delivered to the neighbourhood. Although the municipal and district 
governments are involved in every stage of  a redevelopment project, they do not come in 
direct contact with residents when developers embark on actual demolition works. The 
local authority such as the Dongzhimen Street Office would only act as an official 
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mediator when unresolved disputes between developers and residents over compensation 
are brought to them for their arbitration decision. In fact, the local authority appears to 
maintain a ‘non-interventionist’ policy as explained below: 
“[Under the BJ-2001 Compensation Measures] there’s no room for any negotiation 
[over compensation]… Under such circumstances, it’s for sure that there’s no way 
they could buy a house. Their living conditions would be worse after 
demolition…They might refrain from moving out. Then, the demolition company 
just has to get in touch with the family and resolve the situation…In the end, the 
only way is for them to negotiate with the demolition company to see if  there’s 
any other way of  supplementing compensation. But, from the viewpoint of  the 
government, we cannot speak out, because we have to guarantee impartiality of  our 
policy implementation. It has to be equal for everyone…” 
  (Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department, 
  Dongcheng district government; Emphasis added by the author) 
 
As the news of  reduced cash compensation under the BJ-2001 Compensation Measure 
was shared among the residents in Xinzhongjie, all the interviewees unanimously 
proclaimed that they would not move out if  the compensation was not up to their 
expectation. For instance: 
“At the moment, all of  us don’t want to move out. All are frankly saying that you 
needn’t do demolition…Everyone thinks in this way. [If  you] demolish ten odd 
square metres, then give us ten odd square metres [in return in the new building]. 
Don’t push us to move out…We will simply go to the municipal planning 
committee…” (Interviewee CBX-INT-03) 
 
Judging from some of  the negotiation cases reported by the interviewees, it seemed that 
negotiations were not uncommon, providing even greater motivation for the residents to 
insist on staying put when their expectation was not met. An interviewee who was 
displaced as part of  Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment recollected that many of  her 
neighbours were able to claim more money by postponing their house-moving: 
“Those who moved out to this place, I am telling you the truth, are all law-abiding 
people. As soon as we were told to move out, we moved out right away. Those 
people who didn’t move out received more money. They were formidable. They 
didn’t obey and made all the noise, then took the money… [Such people] were not 
few”  (Interviewee CBK-INT-01) 
 
Another interviewee, CBH-INT-01, recollected that she was able to receive another 
90,000 yuan by making a pledge to the developer via her neighbourhood committee leader. 
The interviewee was displaced before the implementation of  the BJ-2001 Compensation 
Measure, and she was able to take advantage of  the old compensation policy that took the 
 305
household factor into consideration. 
“I didn’t discuss with them [that is, the developer in charge of  demolition]. I just 
went to the neighbourhood committee, and the neighbourhood committee leader 
gave them a call, explaining my situation…I said I couldn’t move out, and would 
have to stay here, that I had no money. They said we were four-person household, 
and I said that’s not alright…I said we are equivalent to five-person household. 
[When it was done] we were counted as five-person household, and took another 
90,000 yuan…” (Interviewee CBH-INT-01) 
 
The experience of  another interviewee (CBD6-INT-01) also exemplified that displacees 
would make use of  personal connections in order to gain as much money as possible. 
When the interviewee’s family was displaced and compensated in accordance with the new 
BJ-2001 Compensation Measure, the size of  their dwelling, which served as the basis for 
estimating the total compensation, was increased to provide the family with more 
compensation. The construction space of  their original dwelling before displacement was 
21 m2, but according to their compensation agreement with the developer, it was recorded 
as 29.66 m2. 
Are there any signs of collective response? 
The Xinzhongjie residents were clearly unhappy about the reduced compensation that 
they were entitled to upon their future displacement. They also explicitly expressed that 
they would refrain from house-moving. When the demolition work was being carried out 
as part of  Haiyuncang redevelopment, the district government web site reported that 18% 
of  the residents had failed to move out before the imposed house-moving deadline. 
Whether or not this frustration would lead to organised action as in Seoul, however, could 
not be identified. 
Some of  the news reports on displacees’ protests in recent years indicated that individual 
protests were not unheard of, and were in fact on the increase. The government figure on 
the number of  protests revealed that “there were some 74,000 protests” in 2004, “up 
from 10,000 in 1994 and 58,000 in 2003” (The Economist 29 September 2005). Given the 
exercise of  censorship and political control, the number of  protests was likely to be 
underestimated. Most protests were isolated and contained, though occasional violent 
incidents alarmed the nation. For instance, a nation-wide shock was received in August 
2003 when a man died after setting fire to himself  in protest at his home’s forced 
demolition in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province (China Daily 17 September 2003). His family was 
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one of  the 10 out of  1,000 families in his neighbourhood, who refused to move out. Less 
than a month later, another similar incident occurred, this time, in the heart of  Beijing, the 
Tiananmen Square. A peasant set fire to himself  in the morning of  15 September, 
suffering serious burn (Jiangnan Shibao 18 September 2003). He was also protesting 
against his home’s forced demolition and poor compensation. The Ministry of  
Construction also revealed that between January and July 2002, the residents’ protests 
against demolition resulted in twenty six deaths (China Daily 17 September 2003), clearly 
indicating the seriousness of  violence and resistance against demolition. The protests and 
violent clashes seemed to be on the increase especially in rural areas where many lands 
were taken for urban expansion and the provision of  infrastructure services (The 
Economist 23 June 2005). These sporadic cases of  organised protests and petitions were 
found to take place across the cities, but most cases were eventually unsuccessful and 
isolated (Human Rights Watch 2004: 26-31). 
With the reform of  legal systems, law suits filed by displacees and residents in 
redevelopment districts against developers seemed to gain popularity gradually. The case 
of  a law suit filed against the municipal housing corporation by a group of  Haiyuncang 
residents (as explained earlier in Chapter 6) could be one of  the examples of  organised 
action against a developer. Ian Johnson, a Wall Street Journal correspondent, reports the 
case of  two pioneering citizens in Beijing who made a series of  failed law suits against the 
municipal government for making huge profits at the expense of  demolishing their homes 
in central Beijing in the mid-1990s (Johnson 2004). Recently, in Chaoyang District, a near 
suburban district next to Dongcheng District, more than one hundred households 
collectively filed a law suit against a demolition company, claiming that its certificate of  
demolition issued by the Chaoyang Bureau of  Land and Resources was not legitimate, and 
that it should be cancelled in order to stop their dwellings’ forced demolition (Jinghua 
Shibao 17 October 2004). In many of  these cases, it was reported that residents rarely 
won against developers or governments (Fang 1999). Often, the myriad of  bureaucratic 
processes acted as obstacles to the residents’ petition and legal proceedings (Beijing 
Review 2005). So was the use of  implicit and explicit forces that pushed people away from 
resorting to judicial solutions (Human Rights Watch 2004; Johnson 2004). 
Alarmed by a series of  protests in relation to demolition and land confiscation, the 
municipal government began to issue some supplementary regulations that provided 
limited opportunities to guarantee the housing rights of  local residents in redevelopment 
 307
districts. One of  the recent regulations included a municipal guidance in April 2004, which 
stipulated that a consultation meeting should be held when more than 40% of  the 
residents in a redevelopment neighbourhood could not come to an agreement over 
compensation with developers/demolition companies. All the parties concerned in a 
demolition process were required to attend the consultation meeting, including the 
neighbourhood committee leaders, the Street Office, and residents (Jinghua Shibao 17 
October 2004). These measures, however, would do little to engage the residents from an 
early stage of  redevelopment. 
Summary 
This section has explained the lack of  government provision for residents’ participation. 
There were also further barriers to their participation, which included the complaints’ 
procedure in favour of  developers, hasty schedule and incentive payment to encourage 
residents’ timely displacement and cooperation. The changes in redevelopment 
compensation policies in recent years led to growing frustration on the residents’ side, 
fuelled by the fact that their weak socio-economic status made it difficult for them to 
finance their preferred homeownership upon displacement. The field research in Beijing 
was unable to find explicit collective responses, though there were signs of  resistance and 
attempts for individual negotiations with developers. 
 
9.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown contrasts in the way in which residents participated in and 
responded to neighbourhood redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing. Although the 
redevelopment framework of  the JRP and ODHRP both place emphasis on residents’ 
participation and cooperation, the design of  the JRP was more inclusive of  owner-
occupiers as they were considered to be legal implementers through the formation of  
redevelopment association. In this way, owner-occupiers were entitled to participation 
throughout the whole process of  project design, implementation and evaluation. The 
property-based nature of  the JRP meant, however, that there was no room for tenants to 
intervene at any stage of  the redevelopment process. Despite the relatively extensive 
opportunities for owner-occupiers in Seoul to participate in redevelopment, their 
participation was very limited due to the speculative nature of  redevelopment and their 
replacement by off-site investors and speculators who join the property-owners’ 
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association as absentee landlords. All these undermined owner-occupiers’ decision-making 
power, which was usually exercised by casting individual votes in a general assembly to 
reach a collective decision. The predominance of  absentee landlords meant that any 
decision-making process would be heavily influenced by their own profit-oriented 
interests. When a public agency participates, the status of  owner-occupiers is downgraded 
as they lose the position of  legal implementers and become subject to consultation only. 
In the case of  the ODHRP, no provision was identified for residents to participate in the 
planning or implementation processes of  neighbourhood redevelopment. The only 
occasion they were able to express their views was when they entered into negotiation to 
agree upon redevelopment compensation, but this process was severely in favour of  
developers. In short, the residents’ cooperation in neighbourhood redevelopment was 
their cooperation to evacuate in timely manner not to delay the redevelopment schedule, 
and if  financially capable, to purchase highly priced redeveloped flats upon project 
completion. 
As for the tenants in Seoul, they were in a similar position to the residents in Beijing as 
they had no room for intervention, and were able to respond only at the stage of  their 
displacement. Unlike the residents in Beijing, the tenants in Seoul were more pro-active in 
making a collective response through the establishment of  their own organisation to enter 
into negotiation with developers and the local authority. To some extent, the tenants’ 
collective action in Nangok was inherited from other organised actions that took place 
elsewhere in previous decades (ACHR 1989a; CIIR 1988; Kim 1998; Kim 1991). Since 
delays to the project schedule were against the interests of  property-owners and 
developers, the tenants’ organised actions to prevent demolition and refusal to evacuate 
gave them some bargaining power with which to negotiate. The tenants’ demands were 
largely focused on additional provisions for relocation and compensation as they were 
only able to intervene at the very last stage of  redevelopment preparation. 
In Beijing, this research was not able to identify collective actions, though there are signs 
of  the rise of  residents’ resistance in the form of  lawsuits, protests and petitions across 
cities in mainland China. Individual resistance in the form of  refusing to evacuate in order 
to gain more compensation could be identified from residents’ recollection of  indirect 
experiences, and the future displacees also showed their intention to follow the same 
strategy. Their frustration was fuelled by the reduction in their redevelopment 
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compensation expected upon their displacement in future, but, in the absence of  their 
own organisations, most residents interviewed did not go as far as making direct enquiries 
to the local authority. To some extent, this was not surprising as most individual and 
collective actions in mainland China were isolated and short-lived, if  not managed by the 
state (Beijing Review 2005; Cai 2004; Johnson 2004; The Economist 23 June 2005, 29 
September 2005). Moreover, the most problematic issue for the residents engaging in legal 
proceedings such as lawsuits and petitions was that even if  the outcome was in the 
residents’ favour, legal proceedings would do little to stop the demolition. As a Beijing-
based lawyer commented, “the house is gone anyway” even if  the verdict turned out to 
support residents (quoted in China Daily 17 September 2003). 
This chapter, therefore, reveals an interesting picture for our understanding of  the 
neighbourhood redevelopment programmes in Seoul and Beijing. The redevelopment 
experiences in both cities testify to the local residents’ participation significantly 
constrained under profit-oriented, developer-led redevelopment. Even if  the local 
residents were legally permitted to participate from the outset of  a project as in Seoul, 
their strength was considerably reduced due to the gentrification of  local residents. Local 
authorities, professional and individual developers share the goal of  maximisation of  
development gains, and the community participation is minimised in the midst of  realising 
this goal. Since the residents’ involvement comes only at the time of  displacement and 
demolition, the intervention only concerns residents’ demands for appropriate relocation 
measures and compensation for remaining residents on compassionate grounds rather 
than with preserving their neighbourhood. 
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This thesis examined urban redevelopment experiences in two East Asian cities, Seoul in 
South Korea and Beijing in mainland China, from a comparative perspective. The thesis 
aimed at understanding how developer-led partnership for neighbourhood redevelopment 
emerged in different urban contexts, what contributions were made by participating actors, 
and whether or not neighbourhood redevelopment brought benefits to local residents. 
To conclude this thesis, I will pull together research findings from previous chapters to 
discuss three issues: (1) developer-led partnership disadvantaging local residents; (2) 
residents and redevelopment benefits; and (3) beneficiaries and losers in Seoul and 
Beijing’s neighbourhood redevelopment. Then I will draw lessons learnt from this 
research and identify future research agendas. 
 
10.1 Myth of partnership: disadvantaging local residents 
Despite the difference in the formation of  their dilapidated neighbourhoods, Seoul and 
Beijing shared difficulties in ensuring cost-recovery and replicability of  government- or 
community-led neighbourhood renewal programmes. In response to these problems, both 
cities came up with partnership-based redevelopment programmes that relied heavily on 
developers’ contributions. These programmes were known as the Joint Redevelopment 
Programme (JRP) in Seoul, and the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment 
Programme (ODHRP) in Beijing. Both programmes were developer-led in that the 
success of  these programmes depended heavily on the participation of  professional 
developers who provided financial resources and managerial expertise. As the UN-Habitat 
asserts, the most attractive aspect of  a multi-sectoral partnership arrangement would be 
the idea of  exploiting the comparative advantages of  various sectors (UN-Habitat 1993). 
As argued in the following discussion, the redevelopment programmes in Seoul and 
Beijing, however, disadvantaged local residents. 
Residents’ weak position in partnership 
In implementation, a partnership approach faces conflicts among different actors, which 
may occur at every stage of  planning and management (Devas and Rakodi 1993). This is 
because each actor has vested interests, which conflict with those of  other partners. Each 
actor forms different views on the desired outcomes. How to resolve the conflicts 
depends on the power dynamics in a partnership arrangement. Each actor has a different 
 312
level of  resources at his/her disposal, and local communities have the least financial 
resources to contribute, even though they possess the best knowledge of  their 
neighbourhoods and surroundings and share the highest stake in the outcome. In a 
market economy, the ability to contribute financially often determines the degree of  
influence over decision-making processes. Therefore, the basic partnership principle, that 
is the contribution of  each sector’s strengths and capabilities on a ‘complementary and 
mutually-supportive’ basis, is endangered from the beginning (UN-Habitat 1993). 
In Seoul’s JRP, owner-occupiers’ inability to make significant financial resources led to 
their demise. Most owner-occupiers were replaced by off-site speculators and individual 
investors who were alien to redevelopment neighbourhoods but who could afford 
redeveloped flats. The owner-occupiers’ decision to sell their property rights ultimately 
came from themselves, but for most of  them, this was not a proactive decision to acquire 
development gains. It was a passive response to the infiltration of  real estate capital and 
gentrifiers into their neighbourhood. In this process, the majority of  owner-occupiers 
were effectively displaced, but the principle of  JRP partnership framework, that is, a 
contractual bonding of  property-owners and professional developers, remained 
unaffected. 
In the case of  tenants in Seoul or all residents in Beijing, there was no channel for them to 
intervene in the planning or implementation processes until a project reached its critical 
stage of  commencing residents’ displacement and relocation. In financial terms, they had 
little to contribute, and therefore, were to remain ‘mute’ throughout the project. Beijing’s 
public sector tenants were excluded from enjoying the benefits of  housing privatisation 
due to severe dilapidation of  their dwellings. Upon displacement, their compensation 
agreement included contracts for the purchase of  their dwellings, which meant that the 
dwelling ownership was transferred to the sitting tenants before their compensation was 
paid out. Only then were they able to secure financial means to make any contribution, 
but this cash compensation was far less than was needed even for the subsidised purchase 
of  redeveloped flats. 
Divided community, more vulnerable to exploitation 
Many partnership approaches advocate co-operation with local communities, but as noted 
by Devas and Rakodi, “Except in popular mythology, there is no such thing as ‘the people’. 
There are individuals, classes, groups, communities, and popular organisations, each of  
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which may have different and competing interests and ideas” (Devas and Rakodi 1993: 50-
51). This accords with the statement by the UN-Habitat that “slum dwellers are not a 
homogeneous population” (UN-Habitat 2003b: 28). Local residents in renewal 
neighbourhoods have a diverse income spectrum, and not all residents are the poorest 
(Yap 1995). The differentiation and stratification among residents would give rise to 
different attitudes towards neighbourhood changes, and have differing impacts upon the 
patterns of  housing consumption and investment (Miah and Weber 1991). This was clear 
in the case studies presented in this thesis. 
In Seoul, local residents were divided into several groups depending on their tenure, 
compensation eligibility and employment/income status. In terms of  tenure, local 
residents were divided into owner-occupiers, Chonsei tenants and monthly rental tenants. 
Owner-occupiers were the least worse off, as they were implementers and in principle 
financial contributors, therefore in a much superior position than tenants in terms of  
negotiation and access to information. The experience of  Nangok neighbourhood 
showed, however, that their voice could be weakened considerably as their numbers grew 
smaller. In terms of  compensation eligibility, tenants were further split into two groups: 
eligible and ineligible tenants. Ineligible tenants were in the most difficult position as they 
received no in-kind nor cash support for their displacement. Both eligible and ineligible 
tenants were also further divided in accordance with their financial capacity to move to 
post-displacement dwellings that required increased Chonsei key money or higher 
monthly rents and maintenance costs. 
In Beijing, the residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods were more homogeneous in 
terms of  tenure distribution than those in Seoul: most residents were public sector tenants, 
and very few were in owner occupation. It is possible that redevelopment projects would 
face more diverse residents as the number of  private sector tenants and non-permanent 
Beijing residents increased. For the time being, government attention has been more 
focused on owner-occupiers and public sector tenants in dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Among the public housing tenants, however, we could still identify some elements of  
stratification on household income, employment status and eligibility to access housing 
finance system, which led to residents’ differing capacity to finance post-displacement 
dwellings. Moreover, the residents in redevelopment neighbourhoods had dwellings of  
different size, which would lead to different amount of  cash compensation. Many studies 
pointed out that the in-kind housing allocation before the reform led to unequal 
 314
distribution of  welfare housing, largely influenced by the hierarchy of  work places as well 
as the hierarchy of  employees within a work place (Gu and Colwell 1997; Huang 2002; J. 
Lee 2000; Logan et al. 1999; Wang 2000). The monetarisation of  redevelopment 
compensation since 1998 thus led to the visible emergence of  unequal housing 
distribution during the planned economy period. 
Partnership or a growth coalition of property-related interests? 
From this research, it was evident that most local residents had little means to contribute 
to and influence redevelopment partnership in their favour, and that the community itself  
was stratified, vulnerable to the exploitation of  the property-related interests. These 
property-related interests included professional developers, property-owners as individual 
developers and local authorities as collectors of  property-related taxes and land sales/lease 
revenues. Even though the implementation of  redevelopment projects in Seoul and 
Beijing was partnership-based, the way in which the partnership proceeded was by and 
large to promote the growth of  locality and transform dilapidated neighbourhoods into a 
higher and better use. Most local residents were excluded from decision-making processes. 
Nor were they able to continue living in redeveloped neighbourhoods upon project 
completion. In this respect, the operation of  redevelopment partnership in the interest of  
local communities was a myth at the best. 
The way in which the redevelopment partnership worked was analogous to the operation 
of  growth machine or the formation of  growth coalition (Logan and Molotch 1987; 
Molotch 1976). In the growth coalition thesis, the city is perceived as “a growth machine, 
one that can increase aggregate rents and trap related wealth for those in the right position 
to benefit” (Logan and Molotch 1987: 50). The growth coalition thesis explains that local 
economic development and urban renewal are driven by the territorial coalition of  land-
based elites that include local officials, business elites, local media, and sometimes, trade 
unions and corporate capitalists in search for regional basis (Logan and Molotch 1987). 
For the land-based elites, “the agenda…is to secure the preconditions of  growth” in order 
to “increase the value of  land and revenue streams” (Jonas and Wilson 1999: 5-6). In spite 
of  their potential conflicting individual interests, land-based elites have a consensus of  
achieving the growth agenda. Inter-city or inter-regional competition becomes inevitable 
in order to attract mobile capital and central government funds for local growth. Although 
land-based elites try to promote “community ‘we feeling’” (Molotch 1976: 314) so that 
local residents become receptive to the growth ideology, local communities are often 
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threatened and become subject to dismantlement as “the preconditions for economic 
growth” require “changes in the built environment” (Jonas and Wilson 1999: 7). 
There are differences in the way in which land-based elites in American cities interact and 
influence each other in comparison to those in Seoul and Beijing. The implementation of  
developer-led partnership as discussed in this thesis, however, suggests that the essence of  
growth coalition has also penetrated the dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment in 
Seoul and Beijing. The property-related interests (professional developers, property-
owners including absentee landlords, and local authorities) in both cases worked in 
coalition to accomplish the neighbourhood transformation and realise development 
potential at the expense of  local residents and long-standing neighbourhoods. 
Seoul: Urban growth coalition in consolidation 
The implementation of  partnership-based redevelopment programmes in Seoul took 
place at the time of  the central government exercising development-oriented policies. The 
South Korean economy in the second half  of  the twentieth century was often interpreted 
as being under strong state leadership. The South Korean government had been 
intervening actively in economic planning and resource allocation in order to overcome 
constraints in the process of  late industrialisation (Amsden 1989). In times of  its 
economic take-off  between 1963 and 1982, public sector investment was often found to 
exceed public sector saving, and involved heavy borrowing of  foreign loans for 
investment in key industries and infrastructure provision (ibid, pp.88-92). This involved, 
however, little spending on social services (Jacobs 2000; White and Goodman 1998), 
indicating that the “welfare arrangements have been shaped to fit the strategic priority of  
rapid industrialisation” (White and Goodman 1998: 14). The developmental priorities 
characterised by export orientation governed the shaping of  social policies, which largely 
focused on mobilising human resources and enhancing labour productivity (Deyo 1992: 
304-305). In return, the role of  non-state agencies such as communities, firms and 
families were given a major welfare role in both financing and providing welfare services 
(Jacobs 2000; Jones 1990; White and Goodman 1998). Unlike Hong Kong and Singapore 
where the provision of  public housing has been thoroughly implemented as part of  
welfare arrangements (Castells 1992), the South Korean government distanced itself  from 
direct provision, and relied on private-led initiatives. The implementation of  JRP projects 
was a continuation of  prior strategies as it tried to resolve the problems of  dilapidated 
neighbourhoods by means of  mobilising private capital and the private sector 
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participation with less direct intervention by the public sector. 
Based on the contractual relationship, professional developers and property-owners (as 
individual developers) worked together to acquire development gains. The public sector 
was also an active participant: it signed contracts for public land transfer, contributed 
public funds (e.g. land sales revenue and National Housing Funds) and facilitated 
redevelopment through planning regulations. As we have seen in the case of  the Nangok 
neighbourhood redevelopment, the involvement of  the Korea National Housing 
Corporation (KNHC) could also be interpreted as a way of  using a public agency to close 
the rent gap in the neighbourhood, and meet the needs of  property-owners who were 
desperate to salvage their projects. From the tenants or poor owner-occupiers’ point of  
view, the implementation of  the rolling redevelopment did not make too much difference 
in terms of  displacement. The efforts made by property-owners, district assembly 
members and government officials indicated how closely they could work together to 
promote growth in times of  difficulties. These efforts were made in the name of  helping 
local communities, but the local communities remained abstract, and in reality, were 
replaced by off-site investors and speculators. 
Beijing: Urban growth coalition in the making 
In Beijing, the ODHRP was based on a formal relationship between local authorities and 
professional developers. Local residents were expected to cooperate by making timely 
displacement to facilitate land preparation or purchasing redeveloped flats for re-housing. 
China’s constitution stipulates that urban lands are owned by the state. It is in this context 
that local authorities entered a contractual relationship for the redevelopment of  
dilapidated neighbourhoods based on the transfer of  the use right of  the state-owned 
lands. The case of  the Xinzhongjie redevelopment was typical of  ODHRP projects, 
oriented towards commercial housing redevelopment in inner city districts. The 
participation of  an overseas joint venture highlighted the attractiveness of  property-
oriented redevelopment that the ODHRP promoted. The case of  the Haiyuncang 
redevelopment was illusionary in that the project accomplished a very high re-housing rate, 
helping residents to remain in the neighbourhood, but closer examination indicated that 
such a resident-friendly approach came together with stronger government intervention to 
promote property development. By shifting residents into a smaller, densely redeveloped 
neighbourhood, the local authority was able to free up some of  the neighbourhood lands 
and sell the use rights to business elites in search for office building sites. 
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In this respect, ODHRP projects could be identified as facilitating ‘urban growth 
coalition’ between local government officials and developers, and this thesis agrees with 
other researchers who have recently interpreted urban (re-)development in the growth 
coalition context (Fang and Zhang 2003; He and Wu 2005; Zhang 2002; Zhang and Fang 
2003; Zhu 1999). The formation of  urban growth coalition has been facilitated in the 
decentralised environment of  resource control and revenue generation. Local 
governments were provided with greater decision-making power and more incentives 
through fiscal reform to manage and proceed with local investment to meet their regional 
needs and achieve local economic growth (Li and Lian 1999; Wei 1996; Wu 2001). The 
sale of  land use right by the municipal government was an effective means to secure extra-
budgetary revenues to invest in urban built environment such as motorways, metro 
connection, electricity and water supply, all of  which required immediate public 
intervention for the growing population and economy. 
The developers, who are mainly former state-owned enterprises, have relied on their 
personal and institutional links to exploit the new speculative environment of  land and 
housing development. In the 1990s, all the major developers in cities were former state 
enterprises, which were nevertheless under strong influence from the central and local 
governments. These developers were in close partnership with the local officials who 
administered the lease of  public lands. For example, in the early 1990s when ODHR 
began, it was reported that there were more than “200 property development companies 
registered in Beijing, nearly all of  which are owned or controlled by one or another level 
of  government,” and it was these companies that undertook the majority of  ODHRP 
projects (Leaf  1995: 152-153). 
Furthermore, the development goals and policies at municipal level are still set and 
implemented in line with the national guidelines put forward by the central government. 
As for Beijing, this characteristic is strengthened by the presence of  the central 
government institutions and high-ranking state work units, all imposing certain limits to 
the way the municipal government carries out the policy recommendations from the 
central government. The city promotion of  Beijing results in municipal pride, but also 
results in national pride as was witnessed at the time of  Beijing’s successful bid for 2008 
Olympic Games. 
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10.2 Residents and redevelopment benefits 
The fundamental question in this thesis was: does the developer-led partnership benefit 
local residents? The findings indicate that redevelopment projects involved the 
displacement of  most residents, and that whilst there were short-term gains for some 
residents, the long-term sustainability of  these gains was doubtful. 
Scale of local residents’ displacement 
From the viewpoint of  residents’ displacement, Seoul’s JRP and Beijing’s ODHRP did not 
bring benefits for most local residents as these programmes led to their large-scale 
displacement and the dismantlement of  long-standing communities. JRP and ODHRP 
projects accompanied gentrification of  dilapidated neighbourhoods, and redeveloped flats 
were largely consumed by middle- or higher-income households. 
In Seoul, owner-occupiers in JRP projects did not enjoy the benefit of  re-housing even 
though they were in principle the official implementers of  neighbourhood redevelopment. 
Eligible tenants had the choice of  re-housing in redevelopment neighbourhoods as JRP 
projects required the provision of  public rental flats on site by regulations. This allowed a 
certain proportion of  eligible tenants to be re-housed, avoiding permanent displacement. 
As for ineligible tenants, they faced displacement with no compensation at all. 
In Beijing, ODHRP projects accompanied the production of  commercial flats, which 
were increasingly purchased by middle- or higher-income individual homebuyers. Local 
residents were displaced from their inner city neighbourhoods, many of  them moving to 
near and outer suburban estates. Even if  residents were entitled to purchase redeveloped 
flats at reduced prices, these prices were still unaffordable for most residents. The case of  
Xinzhongjie neighbourhood’s first phase redevelopment showed that less than 5% of  
original residents were re-housed, and eighteen months after purchase, the majority of  the 
re-housed residents had moved out due to unaffordable monthly housing costs. 
When the revised JRP and ODHRP approaches were implemented, they led to interesting 
results. In Seoul, the implementation of  rolling redevelopment programme did not change 
the fate of  owner-occupiers or ineligible tenants, but made a significant difference for 
eligible tenants. The rolling redevelopment called for the provision of  public rental flats 
for eligible tenants before the commencement of  residents’ displacement. This increased 
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eligible tenants’ housing security as they did not have to go through long-term temporary 
relocation during the project, but in return led to eligible tenants’ permanent displacement 
since these public rental flats were provided elsewhere. In Beijing, the revised ODHRP 
approach since 2000 (that is, the Haiyuncang model) led to a much higher re-housing rate 
(70%). In this respect, as far as displacement was concerned, Beijing’s latest Haiyuncang 
model brought benefits to the majority of  local residents. 
Redevelopment and financial gains 
In Seoul, redevelopment allows owner-occupiers to legalise their tenure, and tap into the 
development gains. In Nangok, most original owner-occupiers, however, sold their 
property rights to off-site speculators, and few managed to stay for re-housing. As we 
have seen in the rise and fall of  Nangok’s first phase redevelopment, the risk and 
uncertainties involved in redevelopment projects caused dwelling prices to fluctuate 
during project preparation. Based on the most common dwelling size (26m2), the sale 
price of  a dwelling in Nangok neighbourhood between 1996 and 2002 fluctuated between 
KRW 25 million and KRW 65 million (see Section 9.1 in Chapter 9). Given that the key 
money to enter the KNHC-provided public rental flats as Chonsei tenants reached KRW 
33 million, owner-occupiers were likely to convert into private rental tenure if  the sale 
price of  their property rights was their only finance for their post-displacement housing. 
The biggest loss for such owner-occupiers would be the loss of  opportunities to reap 
more redevelopment benefits by purchasing redeveloped flats. These opportunities were 
taken by off-site investors and speculators. As for the eligible tenants, they were entitled to 
cash compensation, which was equivalent to three months’ household expenditure for 
average urban wage- and salary-earning households, weighted by the number of  
household members. This could be considered a financial gain, but not enough to cover 
the increase in housing rents upon displacement. Ineligible tenants were not entitled to 
any compensation, and therefore, had no financial gains at all. 
In Beijing, redevelopment compensation has been monetarised since 1998, and residents 
were entitled to cash compensation that could be more than their life-time savings (see 
‘Redevelopment Compensation’ in Section 7.2, Chapter 7 and also ‘Financing 
homeownership’ in Section 8.2, Chapter 8). The compensation contract for public tenants 
included the purchase of  their rental dwellings, which gave them an equal footing to 
owner-occupiers in terms of  making financial gains. According to the manager who used 
to work for the developer involved in Xinzhongjie redevelopment, the cost of  residents’ 
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displacement and relocation usually constitutes one third of  the total redevelopment 
project costs. This indicates that residents’ compensation is hugely subsidised by 
redevelopment costs. Displaced residents could make a decision on how to use their new 
financial assets, including their move to suburban estates to become owner-occupiers. 
Given that the residents in dilapidated neighbourhoods were previously excluded to take 
part in the privatisation process under China’s housing reform policies, neighbourhood 
redevelopment provided a platform for residents to accumulate assets and overcome their 
marginal position in the city. In 2001, however, the compensation regulation changed to 
reduce the total compensation by 11~36% (see ‘Residents’ discontent and its sources’ in 
Section 9.2, Chapter 9). Given the average housing prices in inner city and suburban 
districts, residents facing displacement after 2001 would find it more difficult to become 
owner-occupiers. 
Redevelopment and loss of affordable dwellings for poor residents 
In Seoul, the implementation of  JRP projects since the mid-1980s has reduced the 
number of  dilapidated neighbourhoods which had similar characteristics to Nangok. 
Dwellings in these neighbourhoods were dilapidated but most were affordable for poor 
residents. In Gwanak district where Nangok was located, there were still some dilapidated 
neighbourhoods, but they were already designated for or in the process of  redevelopment. 
Given that displacees showed a high tendency for ‘intra-district mobility’ (that is, house-
moving within Gwanak district) most likely for the reasons of  employment, existing social 
network and children’s education, they had no choice but to move to the dwellings of  
higher standard and rents available in the proximity. The loss of  affordable dwellings due 
to redevelopment also pushed up the rents of  dwellings in adjacent neighbourhoods. 
In Beijing, the situation was similar in that neighbourhood redevelopment reduced the 
number of  dilapidated neighbourhoods in the city, but this might not have resulted in 
fewer choices for displaced residents. It was unlikely for them to move to other 
dilapidated neighbourhoods since these neighbourhoods largely consisted of  public rental 
dwellings, which were already occupied. Individual access to these public rental dwellings 
was unlikely unless displacees had informal connections (for example, interviewee CBD6-
INT-01 who was able to move temporarily to their father’s vacant dwelling). It is likely 
that intense redevelopment of  inner city districts in Beijing contributed to the increase in 
rents and sale prices in the private housing sector, but part of  this increase could also have 
come from Beijing’s booming real estate sector in the municipal preparation for the 2008 
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Olympic Games. 
Redevelopment and housing conditions 
In Seoul, the physical standard of  post-displacement dwellings was much superior to that 
of  pre-displacement dwellings but, as mentioned earlier, this was inevitable as residents 
had no choice but to move to higher standard dwellings. Residents’ displacement also led 
to higher rents (that is, higher Chonsei key money or monthly rents) as well as tenure 
conversion from the preferred Chonsei tenure to less favoured monthly rental tenure. For 
instance, most eligible tenants who moved to the private rental dwellings were able to stay 
in Chonsei tenure, but this required a substantial increase in Chonsei key money. For them, 
cash compensation was helpful, but still fell short of  fully financing the rent increase. 
Eligible tenants who moved to the public rental flats could be said to have received some 
benefits (that is, long-term tenure security and improved physical conditions), but their 
move involved tenure conversion to less favoured monthly rental tenure, which might not 
be affordable for those with unstable and/or low incomes. The important thing is that for 
most displaced tenants, their displacement went against their initial reason for living in 
Nangok neighbourhood: to minimise expenditure on housing. In this regard, their 
displacement might have detrimental impacts on how they allocated household resources 
to meet their various needs in future, which could not be verified in the short term. 
In Beijing, the physical standard of  residents’ post-redevelopment dwellings was also 
much superior to their pre-redevelopment dwellings. This was also accompanied by their 
tenure conversion from public rental tenure into homeownership, which was made 
possible by heavy subsidies to displacees in the form of  redevelopment compensation. 
Similar to the experiences of  the privatisation of  public housing in Britain (Forrest and 
Murie 1988), most public rental dwellings in good condition in urban China had seen 
heavily subsidised privatisation by the late 1990s. This provided a natural desire for the 
displacees to become owner-occupiers, which seemed to have been within their reach 
given the large amount of  cash compensation under the 1998 Compensation Measures. 
The legacy of  welfare housing provision seemed to have dominated people’s minds, and 
private renting was hardly considered as it did not provide long-term tenure security. In 
Beijing, the likelihood of  enjoying larger cash compensation (and hence obtaining more 
assets for further investment) depended on larger dwelling size and longer working history. 
As mentioned earlier, the 2001 Compensation Measure has substantially reduced the total 
compensation, and future displacees would be less optimistic regarding their prospect of  
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becoming homeowners in new dwellings. It is also yet to be seen whether or not the 
increased monthly housing costs (maintenance and management costs) would have any 
negative impacts on household economy in the long term. 
 
10.3 Who benefited and who lost in neighbourhood redevelopment 
In urban renewal and gentrification debates, ‘who benefits’ has been the most central issue 
(Cameron 1992). This is particularly important as urban renewal objectives proposed by 
central and local governments are often unclear and ambiguous. Two contesting 
perspectives exist regarding the nature of  urban renewal policies (Bailey and Robertson 
1997: 562). On the one hand, there is a perspective that views urban renewal policies as 
promoting economic growth and inviting higher-income groups. In this perspective, 
gentrification is a positive outcome, as urban renewal is expected to provide new jobs and 
generate increased demands for local services, thus trickling down renewal benefits. On 
the other hand, there is another perspective, which argues that urban renewal policies 
should aim at “redistribution of  opportunities or resources to low-income or ‘deprived’ 
groups directly” (ibid). In this perspective, gentrification is considered negative, as local 
residents are displaced with less chance of  enjoying the direct benefits. Therefore, the 
discussion of  benefits and costs could easily be biased depending on whose perspective is 
taken. In this section, I attempt to address the costs and benefits for all the participating 
actors in neighbourhood redevelopment, and conclude that most benefits accrued to the 
property-related interests, supporting the argument in Section 10.1 that the developer-led 
partnership in Seoul and Beijing has been a growth coalition in practice (see Table 10-1 at 
the end of  this section for the summary). 
Beneficiaries 
In the case of  Seoul, the principal beneficiaries were professional developers, local 
authorities and property-owners. Here, property-owners consisted of  dwelling owners (or 
owner-occupiers) and landlords. Landlords included both absentee landlords, and the 
central and local governments who owned public lands in dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Professional developers benefited as redevelopment projects presented them with access 
to lands and hence valuable opportunities for real estate development in a city like Seoul 
where vacant lands had become scarce after decades of  rapid urban growth. Local 
authorities were able to transform dilapidated neighbourhoods into modern estates, thus 
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increasing their property tax basis, collecting land sales revenues and achieving city 
‘beautification’ in their terms. The redevelopment of  dilapidated neighbourhoods also 
enabled the upgrading of  urban services and infrastructure provision in these 
neighbourhoods by means of  relying on private investment and little public spending. As 
for owner-occupiers, they were, in principle, given opportunities to gain from 
redevelopment projects by purchasing redeveloped flats at discounted prices, but it was 
mostly absentee landlords who had the financial means to do so. The provision of  new 
high-rise flats also benefited middle- and higher-income households in and around the city, 
who were looking for new dwellings. People running local stores and businesses around 
the redevelopment neighbourhood might also enjoy increased demands for local services 
from the new incomers. Tenants who moved to public rental flats as part of  
redevelopment compensation could be considered beneficiaries at first glance, since the 
redevelopment provided fast-track access to public rental housing, which occupied only a 
marginal position in Seoul. For the municipality as a whole, the provision of  public rental 
flats in redevelopment neighbourhoods contributed to the expansion of  the public rental 
sector, which was under-developed in Seoul. 
In the case of  Beijing, professional developers and local authorities have certainly 
benefited from redevelopment projects. Professional developers were given access to 
valuable inner city lands to transform them into high-rise modern residential estates. As 
was the case in Haiyuncang redevelopment, higher density residential redevelopments also 
helped release lands for commercial and business uses. As for the local authorities, their 
monopolistic control over urban lands allowed them to gain extra-budgetary revenues (in 
the form of  land use premiums) by land leasing. As Fulong Wu noted, “The policy of  
land leasing enabled the local government to extract landed benefits from developers and 
reinvest in urban development” (Wu, 2001: 283). For local authorities, the neighbourhood 
transformation could also be considered as representing administrative achievement in 
their inter-governmental competition. The transformation of  dilapidated neighbourhoods 
into modern, high-rise flats could also be regarded as improving urban landscape 
especially in times of  preparing for international events such as the 2008 Olympic Games. 
The provision of  modern flats in the inner city districts of  Beijing also benefited higher-
income Beijing residents, foreigners or migrants in well-paid professional employment, 
who sought homes within proximate distance from their work and leisure places. 
Incomers would generate more demands for local services and new employment such as 
housekeepers and cleaners, although these job vacancies would likely be filled by poorly-
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paid migrant workers from other provinces. As for the local residents who used to live in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods, they found an opportunity to catch up with other former 
public sector tenants, and become homeowners by using relatively affluent cash 
compensation (if  displaced) or taking advantage of  subsidised sale of  redeveloped flats (if  
re-housed). The latter choice turned out to be particularly beneficial when affordable 
housing construction parameters were applied as in Haiyuncang redevelopment. 
Losers 
The neighbourhood redevelopment did not come without costs. In Seoul, dilapidated 
neighbourhoods provided affordable dwellings for the poorest population within the city. 
As one of  the residents expressed in an interview (KSS7-INT-10), there was a circulation 
of  people, moving in when they were in difficulties and moving out when they gained 
strength and saved enough money to live elsewhere. The demolition of  such 
neighbourhoods as Nangok gave no regard to this positive role, and effectively reduced 
affordable dwellings for poor people in and around the city. Most local residents could 
also be considered as having lost as a result of  neighbourhood redevelopment. They had 
to spend much more upon displacement in order to finance increased housing costs. 
Large-scale redevelopment and residents’ displacement raised rent levels in adjacent 
neighbourhoods, making it more difficult for the displacees to find affordable dwellings. 
Even the tenants who moved to the public rental housing sector as part of  redevelopment 
compensation could be considered as losers, since the tenure transfer from private 
Chonsei tenure to public monthly rental tenure placed heavy pressure on their monthly 
household expenditure, and for most households, their living conditions in the public 
rental sector still did not meet the national minimum living standard. 
In Beijing, the residents were compensated with relatively large cash compensation, and 
could use it to become owner-occupiers in new suburban dwellings within their budget 
limit. Since the changes in compensation regulation in 2001, it appears less likely for 
displacees to do so if  their pre-displacement dwelling space is relatively small. Unlike in 
Seoul, the demolition of  dilapidated dwellings in Beijing might have less city-wide impact 
in terms of  reducing affordable dwellings for general population. This was because most 
dwellings in dilapidated neighbourhoods in inner city districts of  Beijing belonged to the 
public rental sector, to which free access was restricted. The demolition of  these dwellings, 
however, could be a loss to the local authorities as the number of  public rental dwellings 
in their disposal has been substantially reduced in times of  privatisation. It is also a loss to 
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the city as the historic heritage such as the courtyard housing is demolished in the name 
of  modernisation while pursuing neighbourhood redevelopment. In Beijing, the 
demolition of  cultural relics has been criticised on numerous occasions (e.g. Beijing Today 
9 July 2004; China Daily 13 August 2003, 20 August 2003), but the logic of  modernisation 
seems to override the need for cultural preservation. 
Table 10-1: Summary of beneficiaries and losers in Seoul and Beijing's neighbourhood redevelopment 
 
  Professional developers
Access to lands and opportunities for real estate development
Development profits
  Local authorities   Local authorities
Higher quality housing Loss of cheap housing supply
Expansion of public rental stock (in Seoul) Loss of public rental stock (in Beijing)
Better quality neighbourhoods Loss of social supports
Increased property tax basis Higher costs requiring more subsidy
Collection of land sales revenues (in Seoul) or land use 
premiums (in Beijing)
City 'beautification' by modernising urban landscapes Loss of historic and cultural heritage (in Beijing)
  Absentee landlords
Purchase of redeveloped flats at discounted prices Loss of cheap property
Opportunities to influence redevelopment processes (in Seoul)
  Middle- and higher-income households in the city   Poor households in the city
Provision of higher quality housing for homeownership or renting Loss of affordable dwellings
  Owner-occupiers   Owner-occupiers
For some, opportunities to legalise their land tenure (if resided 
on public lands)
Loss of affordable homes, and potential tenure conversion from 
homeownership to private rental tenure
For some, opportunities to purchase redeveloped flats at 
discounted prices, but few were able to do so
Loss of future gains from redeveloped flats as the majority of 
owner-occupiers are displaced
Little influence over redevelopment processes
  Eligible tenants   Both eligible and ineligible tenants
Opportunities to access public rental flats (in Seoul) Loss of affordable dwellings to rent
Increased rents and/or maintenance costs upon displacement
Little influence over redevelopment processes
Relatively affluent cash compensation, though reduced 
substantially since 2001 (in Beijing)
Relatively affluent cash compensation, though reduced 
substantially since 2001 (in Beijing)
Beneficiaries Losers
Release of lands for commercial and business uses (as was in 
the Haiyuncang model in Beijing)
Upgraded urban services and infrastructure with little public 
spending
Potential increase in demands for local services and new 
employment by incomers
 
In summary, a lot more benefits of  neighbourhood redevelopment seemed to accrue to 
developers, local authorities, and middle- or higher-income earners in search for 
homeownership than to local residents. In this regard, this research agrees with Smith and 
LeFaivre’s conclusion that gentrification benefits accrue to “those who own and control 
capital for the purpose of  investing it for profit or interest, as well as to the middle class in 
general, who are the beneficiaries not only of  new living space but also of  profitable, if  
 326
comparatively small, investments” (Smith and LeFaivre 1984: 54). The finding also 
confirms our earlier discussion that the developer-led partnership has been closer to the 
operation of  a growth coalition. Beijing residents received more benefits in terms of  
increased asset, but as discussed in Chapter 9, this could be interpreted as the attempts by 
the developers and local authorities to minimise their resistance and make them more 
receptive to the redevelopment and displacement. 
 
10.4 What lessons can we learn? 
Several important lessons could be drawn from this research on the experiences of  
neighbourhood redevelopment in Seoul and Beijing. Four questions are discussed in this 
section: (1) is it a good or bad thing to involve developers in neighbourhood 
redevelopment; (2) is there a role for the government to play; (3) how do we protect 
disadvantaged residents; (4) how can residents participate as equal partners in 
neighbourhood redevelopment? 
Is it a good or bad thing to involve developers? 
Despite the negative consequences such as residents’ displacement, the importance of  
developers’ participation still needs to be acknowledged. It was evident that resource-
constrained governments and owner-occupiers in fast growing cities like Seoul and Beijing 
were not able to cope with all the redevelopment needs. Professional developers possess 
the expertise and human/financial resources to achieve neighbourhood transformation 
and redevelopment in an efficient way. 
The participation of  developers, however, still left some room for concern. The success 
of  the neighbourhood redevelopment depended largely on recovering development costs 
and profits through the sales of  redeveloped flats, and also on the financial capacity of  
professional developers. They needed to be financially capable of  handling large-scale 
housing projects, having adequate assets and access to financial institutions for project 
financing. In Seoul, for instance, the average number of  redeveloped flats in 251 JRP 
project areas (completed or in progress by the end of  December 2004) reached 990 flats, 
equivalent to roughly ten twelve-storey high-rise apartment blocks. The largest project in 
Seoul, implemented in Bongcheon 3 District between 1994 and 1997, demolished 1,954 
dwellings and produced 5,387 flats (Housing Bureau of  SMG 2005). Under these 
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circumstances, developers’ financial instability could easily jeopardise neighbourhood 
redevelopment as we have seen in the example of  the failed first phase Nangok 
redevelopment in Seoul, caused by the withdrawal of  professional developers in the 
aftermath of  the 1997’s Asian Financial Crisis. The first phase Xinzhongjie redevelopment 
in Beijing could not have been possible without the participation of  the overseas partner 
that responded to the call of  a local developer. 
The success of  developer-led redevelopment also depended on the extent to which 
redeveloped flats could be consumed in the housing market. As one of  the real estate 
developers interviewed in Beijing commented, “because residential projects are built for 
sale, there is a natural exit for the investment.” In Seoul, redeveloped flats were largely for 
consumption by middle- or higher-income households. The housing shortage and the 
prevalence of  real estate speculation (W.-J. Kim 1996: 106-134) allowed developers to 
proceed with high density redevelopment to extract as many profits as possible. In Beijing, 
redeveloped flats supplied in the 1990s were largely unaffordable for average households, 
and the immature development of  housing finance system aggravated the situation. It was 
the overseas investors, state enterprises and institutions who played important roles in 
consuming commercial flats supplied in the 1990s (Wu 1996), and in turn, sustaining the 
production of  highly priced redevelopment flats in inner city areas. 
Is there a role for the government to play? 
The central and local governments play an important role in setting the preconditions of  
neighbourhood redevelopment. As the UN-Habitat proposed, a partnership approach 
pre-supposes a stronger but effective government to establish a legal and regulatory 
framework to achieve dual purposes: (1) the facilitation of  the private sector’s 
participation that would bring experienced and efficient human and capital resources; and 
(2) the protection of  people who would otherwise be exposed to profit-driven private 
sector (UN-Habitat 1993). Partnership with profit-driven private sector has a risk of  
running counter to the interests of  the poor population, but this can be avoided by 
employing appropriate regulations by the “public interests (since the private sector is non-
accountable politically). This means that there will be a large area of  decision making 
(with regard to minimum standards, zoning and so on) which will need to be retained by 
government” (UN-Habitat 1993: Chapter 2A). 
This research has shown that the central and local governments made both direct and 
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indirect intervention in neighbourhood redevelopment programmes, though the results of  
the intervention were largely in favour of  property-related interests. There were, however, 
some elements of  positive intervention, which we need to focus on and exploit. In Seoul, 
the provision of  public rental flats in redeveloped neighbourhoods was something that 
was not available in Beijing. This measure helped expand the available housing choices for 
tenants eligible for redevelopment compensation. The measure also helped the 
municipality to expand its public rental housing sector, which was substantially 
underdeveloped in Seoul. The application of  rolling redevelopment also helped eligible 
tenants to avoid temporary relocation by providing public rental flats before displacement. 
The rolling redevelopment could have had more positive implications if  they were 
adopted from the early stage of  municipal redevelopment history. The financial support 
for tenants in difficulties (e.g. National Housing Fund housing loans for Chonsei tenants) 
also helped tenants to pay for their increased housing costs, but as requested by displaced 
tenants in their organised action in Nangok, the financial support scheme needs to be 
implemented with a longer redemption period so that poor tenants with unstable or low 
income could have more time to save enough money for repayment. 
From Beijing’s experiences, we could also learn that redeveloped dwellings could be 
supplied at a much lower sales price when neighbourhood redevelopment took place on 
public lands. Public intervention of  this kind was not exercised in Seoul even though the 
majority of  JRP neighbourhood lands belonged to the central and local governments. The 
long-term mortgage provided for those residents with Housing Provident Fund account 
encouraged residents to purchase redeveloped flats upon their re-housing, but there need 
to be provisions to protect residents who fall victim to the on-going economic 
restructuring and labour market reform. In this respect, the municipal policy of  
promoting privatisation and the rapid contraction of  the pubic housing sector need to be 
reconsidered. 
Protection of disadvantaged residents 
When a redevelopment takes place in dilapidated neighbourhoods where poorer sections 
of  the municipal population largely reside, particular attention needs to be paid to the 
more disadvantaged residents who are vulnerable in both the housing and labour markets. 
At this point, the tradition of  social housing in Europe would be a useful point of  
consideration. Despite the decline of  the social housing sector and the decay of  public 
housing estates, we learnt that there remained a role for the state to play by providing 
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affordable dwellings for the socially excluded population (Power 1993). The lack of  public 
housing stock in Seoul, and the rapid decline of  the public housing sector in Beijing under 
reform policies need to be reconsidered. In the case of  housing finance, families with 
irregular and insufficient income are not able to benefit from existing financial 
arrangements. This is something the market cannot provide on its own, and this goes back 
to the enhanced role of  the state. As was shown from the interviews with tenants in Seoul, 
they were still willing to make contributions and repay any loans as long as the terms of  
repayment could be arranged by taking their household situation into consideration. 
One good example would come from the experiences of  housing restructuring policies in 
the Netherlands, which aimed at promoting neighbourhood redifferentiation and diversity 
by means of  physical intervention (demolition and upgrading) of  post-war social rented 
housing (Kleinhans 2003). As most project areas largely accommodated low-income 
households, demolition or upgrading of  housing stocks led to their forced relocation. 
Tracing the relocation experiences of  residents displaced from two restructured 
neighbourhoods, Reinout Kleinhans (2003) found out that many displacees actually 
improved their housing situation if  they had taken advantage of  ‘priority rights’ and ‘rent 
subsidy for displacees’ in the housing market. In the Netherlands, social rented housing 
units were allocated through ‘advert model’ (or the ‘Delft model’): rental units were 
advertised in a weekly newspaper and on a designated web site, specifying eligibility 
criteria and housing characteristics. Eligible households were required to send in a reply 
coupon to the relevant housing association, ranked in accordance with the selection 
criteria. Those with longest residency or waiting period were given priority in the 
allocation process. As for displacees from restructured neighbourhoods, they also had to 
make an application in the same manner, but they were provided with a ‘certificate of  
urgency’ if  they apply for a dwelling unit with a standard comparable with their current 
residence, which then gave displacees with selection priority over other regular applicants 
(Kleinhans 2003: 477).53 If  the displacees were the recipients of  means-tested rent 
subsidy, they were entitled to this rent subsidy even if  they moved to a rental unit that 
commands higher rents than what was allowed for their initial qualification for rent 
subsidy. Such an arrangement allowed those households receiving rent subsidy to move to 
                                                 
53 If  the displacees are applying for a dwelling unit of  a better standard than their current residence, then 
the length of  residency in current residence is the main eligibility criterion. They are also given priority if  
they apply for a dwelling unit in a new housing project delivered by a local housing association, provided 
that they meet the eligibility criteria of  the project (Kleinhans 2003: 478). 
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a better rental unit (Kleinhans 2003: 478). From this Dutch case, it is evident that 
neighbourhood restructuring policies that provide forced displacees with preferential 
treatment, allowing them to make a head-start over other households in housing markets, 
have positive effects on the housing experiences of  the displacees. 
Encouraging residents’ participation 
In order to ensure equal footing for developers and residents, local authorities need to 
make more coherent partnership frameworks within which residents can make their voices 
heard from the early stage of  a redevelopment project. Here, the residents should also 
include tenants as they have also made contributions to the neighbourhood. 
From the viewpoint of  local communities and the third sector in the developing world, 
the potential for sectoral empowerment and increased participation in decision-making 
process indicates that the residents in dilapidated neighbourhoods could be ‘enabled’ to 
take an initiative in a ‘bottom-up’ approach (Awotona 1999; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 
1989). In developed world, advocates of  residents’ empowerment also argue that the 
decline of  inner city neighbourhoods and their ‘dissertification’ could be remedied with 
more innovative measures that rely on residents’ own initiatives (Mumford and Power 
2002; Power and Mumford 1999). 
The implementation of  the JRP in Seoul had potential for residents’ empowerment. It was 
designed to promote the partnership between professional developers and property-
owners including owner-occupiers in redevelopment neighbourhoods. Owner-occupiers 
were invited to intervene in each project milestone. In its actual progress, however, the 
owner-occupiers’ initiatives were largely undermined due to the high degree of  
inaffordability and developers’ profit-maximisation approaches. Most owner-occupiers in 
redevelopment districts in Seoul found it difficult to afford the redeveloped flats, and sold 
their rights to off-site speculators. Such sales took place well before the commencement 
of  a project. This process effectively reduced the proportion of  owner-occupiers among 
the property-owners, which meant that the owner occupying local residents’ decision-
making power was significantly undermined. 
As for the tenants in Seoul, there was no provision at all to listen to their views and to 
encourage their contribution. They were subject to displacement at the early stage of  the 
JRP. In the 1990s, there were some measures to allow them to be re-housed in public 
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rental flats built on site, but their exclusion from taking a share in the partnership 
framework continued. This led to their resistance when the actual displacement was to 
take place. As shown in the case of  Nangok redevelopment in Seoul, such resistance and 
tenants’ negotiation with developers might allow them to extract a little bit more 
concession from property-owners and developers. 
In Beijing, there was no provision for tenants’ participation throughout the whole process 
of  a redevelopment project. The only moment they could voice out was when the time 
came for making negotiation with developers and demolition companies over 
compensation. In Beijing’s ODHRP, residents were considered to be important actors in 
the sense that they were to transfer their land use rights and dwellings to developers, and 
in principle, make financial contribution by means of  purchasing a redeveloped flat. In 
reality, they were subjected to displacement and relocation to make way for more 
profitable redevelopment that targeted off-site buyers who could afford to pay. 
In order to off-set this and encourage the decision-making power, it would be necessary 
for the local authority to establish a framework that guarantees residents’ intervention 
from the early stage. Furthermore, in order to prevent residents from making an early 
departure from their neighbourhood, a set of  financial assistance would be necessary 
particularly for those groups of  residents who would not have established credit history to 
access existing financial arrangement. 
 
10.5 What this research adds: contributions of this research 
This research contributes to the existing body of  knowledge in a number of  ways. Firstly, 
this is empirical research that closely examines neighbourhood redevelopment experiences 
in Seoul and Beijing, which have been understudied despite relatively long-term 
implementation. This research allows us to gain an insight into the process of  
neighbourhood transformation, revealing how it was possible for municipal governments 
to execute a common strategy of  developer-led partnership in different urban contexts. 
This research is a timely academic intervention especially because the urban landscape in 
mainland China has been undergoing dramatic changes in recent years, involving mass 
clearance of  urban dwellings and displacement of  local residents. In order to understand 
these changes, a number of  literatures on issues such as China’s urbanisation, urban spatial 
restructuring, land reform and real estate development have appeared. There are some 
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pioneering works on urban redevelopment, but a more empirical research as presented in 
this thesis was in demand to gain a thorough understanding of  what has been going on in 
local neighbourhood contexts. 
Secondly, this research enhances the understanding of  urban redevelopment at 
neighbourhood level by placing local residents at the centre of  its attention. The main 
strength of  this research is that it was an area-based study in redevelopment 
neighbourhoods, conducting in-depth interviews with local residents who were subject to 
urban redevelopment and displacement as well as interviewing other participants from the 
public and private sectors. In this way, it was possible to collect the views and deliver the 
voices of  participating actors and residents. This research approach was particularly rare in 
the study of  urban redevelopment in mainland China, where few studies conducted in-
depth enquiries into residents’ experiences. The few studies that could be identified 
included Tan (1997, 1998) on Beijing and Wu (2004) on Shanghai, but these studies 
focused on quantitative analysis of  residents’ housing outcome. The studies by Tan (1997, 
1998) do not tell us much about the changes since 1998 when the compensation was fully 
monetarised. 
Thirdly, the in-depth enquiry into residents’ post-displacement housing experiences also 
allows this research to go beyond the discussion of  the scale of  displacement. Researchers 
studying residents’ displacement have been largely inferring the scale of  displacement by 
means of  using census data rather than taking a direct measurement due to difficulties in 
tracking displacees (Atkinson 2002: 9). Moreover, Bailey and Robertson (1997) argued that 
“the concern over displacement is quite narrow, focusing on whether particular 
households in a renewal area (the ‘community’) are able to continue living there after the 
buildings have been substantially upgraded” (Bailey and Robertson 1997). This research 
successfully overcame such difficulties and limits of  studying residents’ displacement by 
recruiting displacees as subjects of  this study. 
Fourthly, this research contributes to the theoretical understanding of  urban 
redevelopment and neighbourhood gentrification by revealing the fact that surprisingly 
similar property-oriented approaches were undertaken by the cities in mainland China and 
South Korea. Such approaches were not confined to the cities of  the developed world. It 
was found in this thesis that developer-led partnership was an important strategy for 
dilapidated neighbourhood redevelopment, bringing together property-related interests in 
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search for profits and resulting in local residents’ displacement in most cases. 
Finally, this research showed that the experiences of  Seoul and Beijing were highly visible 
in comparison with other cities in developing world due to a strong government emphasis 
on redevelopment. In most developing countries, the absence of  efficient, effective policy 
making and strong government has made it difficult to develop a systematic approach to 
concerted urban redevelopment (UN-Habitat 1996, 2003). In this respect, a multi-sectoral 
partnership was strongly advocated to supplement the weaknesses of  each sector in 
developing countries. This research on Seoul and Beijing showed that such a partnership 
was already in place in these cities, having driven urban changes for many years. This 
research also tells us that most benefits of  the partnership-based urban redevelopment 
accrue to property-related interests, and that caution needs to be taken in order to protect 
the disadvantaged local population. 
 
10.6 An agenda for further research 
The findings of  this research have enhanced our understanding about the nature of  
neighbourhood redevelopment in fast growing cities like Seoul and Beijing, providing 
insights into the role of  different actors behind the neighbourhood transformation and 
what impacts the transformation had upon local residents. This research, however, opens 
up more opportunities for further research. 
Redevelopment compensation and ineligibility 
The municipal governments in Seoul and Beijing all made a clear distinction regarding 
who was to be eligible for redevelopment compensation. The residence status and the 
duration of  residence were the key criteria for deciding residents’ eligibility for 
compensation. In Beijing, one important additional requirement was that residents were to 
hold permanent Beijing hukou if  not owner-occupiers (BMG 1998a, 2000b, 2001c). 
Since Beijing is still in the process of  completing housing reform measures, more 
attention needs to be paid to the expansion of  the private rental sector. With the 
development of  the housing market in Beijing, the number of  private rental tenants is 
expected to grow in the near future. This will also be facilitated as the restrictions on inter-
city migration become less severe, inviting more migrant population into the private rental 
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sector. The latest compensation regulation, 2001 Compensation Measure (BMG 2001c), 
stipulates that private rental tenants do not receive cash compensation. When 
redevelopment takes place, they are to terminate their rental contract with landlords, or if  
not agreed, renew their contracts with the original landlords in relocation dwellings 
provided by developers. At first glance, these conditions appear to give tenants more 
choices and prevent their forced eviction. In its actual implementation, however, it is 
doubtful if  the provision of  relocation dwellings would proceed as promised due to two 
reasons. Firstly, the monetarisation of  redevelopment compensation was to avoid 
excessive costs on providing relocation dwellings for original residents. The regulation 
above would only work if  the number of  private sector tenants was small enough not to 
bear financial pressure on developers. Secondly, the compensation regulation is obscure 
about how to solve any conflicts when the private sector tenants refuse to relocate. It is 
very likely that such conflicts are going to be more prevalent as the reform policies 
continue and the private sector expands. 
In Seoul, when formal dwellings are reconstructed, the private rental tenants do not enjoy 
any compensation. In South Korea, a rental contract lasts not more than two years, and 
landlords hold the right to renew or terminate a rental contract. Unlike JRP projects, the 
reconstruction of  private dwellings is entirely considered to be at the discretion of  
property-owners, and there is no legal provision to guarantee compensation for tenants. 
In this respect, under what circumstances could compensation be socially just? This 
question is closely linked to the issue of  establishing a property rights concept in 
connection with development gains in property development. In market economies, to 
what extent could property-owners claim the land increments (increase in land value) due 
to redevelopment and subsequent public investment that goes into the redevelopment 
neighbourhoods? Would it be possible to assign some notions of  property rights to 
tenants and allow them to claim a certain portion of  development gains for having made 
substantial (human and physical) investment into the neighbourhood in proportion to 
their duration of  residence? 
Long-term effects of redevelopment and asset inequality 
One of  the strengths of  this research was the investigation of  post-displacement impacts 
on displacees’ housing experience. It was, however, difficult to see in this research what 
impacts residents’ displacement might have upon their future accumulation of  human and 
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financial capital. 
In Seoul, one of  the findings presented in this research was that tenants had to pay for 
increased rents (either increased Chonsei key money or increased monthly rents) upon 
displacement. The increase in housing costs meant that their displacement incurred forced 
spending on housing-related expenditure, which could have been used to meet non-
housing related household needs if  they were not displaced in the first place. For example, 
displaced residents would have preferred minimal spending on housing (by staying in 
dilapidated neighbourhoods such as Nangok where rents are extremely cheap), and save as 
much as possible to pay off  their existing debts (as some interviewees explicitly 
mentioned) or spend more on children’s higher education to build upon human capital. 
Most tenants also relied on external formal or informal loans to finance increased Chonsei 
key money, and we are yet to find out what negative or positive impacts this might have 
upon household economy in future. 
In Beijing, the large cash compensation for displacees led to the substantial increase in 
their financial assets in their disposal. Unlike displacees in Seoul, those in Beijing therefore 
had more choices in terms of  how to spend their new assets to meet various household 
needs. Like in other market economies where homeownership has long been associated 
with family wealth (Forrest and Murie 1995), Beijing’s displaces were presented with 
opportunities to be active participants in housing markets. Their financial assets in the 
form of  compensation would also give rise to a number of  different investment strategies 
at household level. For many interviewees quoted in this thesis, the priority was to secure 
homeownership, but as the private rental sector and second-hand housing market mature 
in time, it would be possible for them to consider splitting their financial assets for 
different uses. For instance, some of  the financial assets could be invested in children’s 
education, or saved to meet any medical needs in future. This might prove to be beneficial 
for families with low income and insecure jobs since the state provision of  welfare has 
been diminishing under the reform policies, and welfare provision has been tied more 
closely with beneficiaries’ income and employment status. 
In this regard, it would be interesting to find out long-term impacts of  residents’ 
displacement and compensation upon wealth distribution and asset inequality among 
displacees as well as between displacees and other urban residents in the city. As for the 
residents in Beijing’s dilapidated neighbourhoods, they were marginalised in the process of  
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privatisation, and their relatively poor household circumstances would suggest that they 
might face the fate similar to that of  powerless, marginal groups in the UK who suffered 
the most in the process of  privatising council housing (Forrest and Murie 1988). In this 
respect, it would be interesting to further investigate if  neighbourhood redevelopment 
contributes to the residents’ asset accumulation or further marginalisation. With the 
monetarisation of  redevelopment compensation, the size of  cash compensation has 
become directly proportionate to the size of  one’s dwelling under the new compensation 
regulation. This indicates that those residents who received larger dwellings during the 
period of  the planned economy and welfare housing allocation would receive larger 
compensation, giving them a head start over other displacees in terms of  accumulating 
financial assets in the new market economy. This could be an important source of  income 
and wealth disparities in mainland China, closely associated with wealth accumulation 
through homeownership (Forrest 2003: 9-13). In this sense, the compensation is never fair. 
 
10.7 Concluding comments 
This thesis aimed to disclose the momentum behind Seoul and Beijing’s neighbourhood 
redevelopment, and examine the redevelopment impacts on local residents. This was to 
examine what roles were undertaken by participating developers, local authorities and 
local residents, and ultimately to find out if  developer-led redevelopment partnership was 
beneficial to local residents. In doing so, this research disclosed the downside of  
seemingly successful urban transformation in Seoul and Beijing. In the process of  city 
promotion in the globalising world, urban policies led to the exploitation of  development 
opportunities in dilapidated neighbourhoods, which disappeared one after another to 
accommodate the growing demand for modern flats, office spaces and/or commercial 
buildings. The search for profits led property-related interests to form a developer-led 
partnership, demolishing affordable homes, dismantling long-standing neighbourhoods 
and displacing poor residents. 
It is thus essential to recognise the profit-oriented nature of  residential redevelopment 
projects in these cities, and devise renewal approaches that are placed in a wider social 
context on the basis of  the needs of  urban poor residents. Such approaches need to 
acknowledge the various constraints that are faced by residents in dilapidated 
neighbourhoods. Profit-oriented developer-led partnership brings the urban growth that 
suits the interests of  policy-makers, developers or more affluent sections of  the urban 
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population. The problem is how to make the government more accountable to local 
residents, and make its policies more balanced between property-oriented redevelopment 
and protection of  local residents. Governments need to weigh up much more carefully the 
costs and benefits of  neighbourhood redevelopment to different parties or actors, find 
ways to recover excessive profits made by developers and absentee landlords at the 
expense of  local residents, and help residents build their assets to survive in market 
economies. 
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